International Law at the Crossroads: Evolution or Erosion?

The post-1945 rules-based international order is in a state of ‘rupture’. The foundational principles and institutions still formally exist, but they no longer function as originally conceived and face an unprecedented crisis of credibility. To many, this signals the end of international law, a framework too weak to constrain the powerful and too discredited to command the allegiance of the rest. This insight examines whether international law is eroding or evolving into something new and what middle powers like Pakistan can do to shape that evolution.

The most visible sign of the breakdown of international law is the paralysis of the UN Security Council (UNSC). The veto is not new; it is a founding feature of the UN Charter, designed to ensure great-power buy-in for the system. What is new is its pattern of use. Since 2011, the veto has been exercised to block resolutions addressing crimes against humanity and war crimes, shielding perpetrators from accountability rather than maintaining peace. The United States (U.S.) vetoed three ceasefire resolutions in the first six months of the Israel-Palestine conflict in Gaza; Russia vetoed a resolution condemning its own invasion of Ukraine.

The rupture is also evident in the unprecedented attacks by major powers on the International Criminal Court (ICC). In December 2025, Russia sentenced ICC Prosecutor Karim Khan to 15 years’ imprisonment and jailed eight ICC judges in absentia for issuing arrest warrants for Vladimir Putin.

In July 2026, the ICC's Assembly of States Parties voted to dismiss Khan over charges of sexual misconduct. What made the dismissal striking was its timing and context: credible reports indicated that the U.S. and Israel had actively lobbied to exploit the allegations against Khan to neutralise his office's Gaza prosecutions.

Moreover, in January 2026, the U.S. government decided to withdraw from dozens of international organisations it considered “wasteful, ineffective or harmful.” This retreat has contributed to what French President Macron described as a “world without rules, where international law is trampled underfoot and the only law that seems to matter is that of the strongest.”

The pattern extends beyond institutions. Since October 2023, Israel's military campaign against Palestinians in Gaza has killed over seventy thousand civilians, with the UN Human Rights Council concluding that Israel bears responsibility for the commission of genocide. The same pattern extended to Lebanon, where near-daily Israeli strikes since the November 2024 ceasefire resulted in civilian casualties. Moreover, Israel has conducted hundreds of strikes on Syria and seized its demilitarised buffer zone, which violates Syria's territorial integrity.

In April 2025, India unilaterally placed the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) in abeyance; a move the Permanent Court of Arbitration found to have no legal basis. In June 2025, Israel struck Iranian nuclear facilities; the U.S. joined days later, targeting three major nuclear sites. In February 2026, both launched a second, larger coordinated strike on Iran. The U.S. subsequently imposed a naval blockade on Iranian ports and struck Iranian naval vessels in the Strait of Hormuz. These acts, taken together, represent a pattern of states placing power above legal obligation and acting with impunity.

In this period of disruption, it is reasonable to assume that international law is losing its importance and gradually eroding. But to mistake disruption for disappearance would be to misread what is actually occurring.

Koskenniemi, writing in International Relations in 2012, offers the most precise diagnosis. He points out that international law functions as “an argumentative practice in which political claims are defended and attacked”. This suggests that international law does not function as an enforcement mechanism but rather serves as a shared grammar. Russia invoked Article 51 of the UN Charter to justify its invasion; the U.S. framed its institutional withdrawals in the language of sovereignty. What we are witnessing is states stretching, weaponising, and selectively applying the grammar of international law, rather than discarding it.

Louis Henkin observed in How Nations Behave (1979) that 'almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all the time'. This baseline holds invisibly across trade law, diplomatic immunity, and treaty compliance, none of which make headlines precisely because they are working.

International law, therefore, is not disappearing, but the institutional framework through which it has been administered is visibly weakening. It is in this space that the question of middle power agency becomes urgent.

Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney captured the stakes plainly at Davos in January 2026: “Middle powers must act together because if we are not at the table, we are on the menu.”

The historical record provides reason for cautious optimism that remaining at the table is not only possible but consequential. It was a coalition of small and middle powers that pushed the Rome Statute to adoption in 1998, securing 120 votes in favour amid objections from the U.S., China, and Israel.

Pakistan's rise as the main mediator between the U.S. and Iran in 2026 has shown that Pakistan can forge coalitions across both the centre and periphery of the international system simultaneously. That diplomatic capital must now be focused on shaping norms.

Pakistan can use its current UNSC seat to advance multilateralism and equitable development for the Global South. On the IWT, Pakistan may adopt a strategy at the council that frames transboundary water security and climate change as an international legal question rather than a bilateral dispute.

Additionally, Pakistan's National Security Policy 2022–2026 is due for renewal this year. The upcoming NSP presents a clear opportunity to embed international law as a permanent framework in policy planning from the outset.

However, none of this is achievable without investment at home. Concrete policies and strategies require more than ad hoc mechanisms and dependence on foreign legal experts. Pakistan needs a domestic cadre of international lawyers embedded within its foreign ministry, security establishment, and treaty-negotiating teams who are not brought in only during crises, but are involved at every stage of policy planning. A state that cannot argue its own case is a state that has already lost.