Unravelling the Roots of Instability: A Critical Study of Military Coups in Sahel Region Since 2020

The Sahel is a semi-arid savannah belt stretching from the Sahara Desert to tropical Africa. It includes Mauritania, Senegal, Gambia, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Nigeria, Chad, Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Djibouti. The region has abundant natural resources and potential for rapid growth, but deep-rooted political, security, and socioeconomic issues affect the region's peace and stability.

This Insight focuses on military coups in the Sahel region between 2020 and 2023. It explores how internal factors such as poor governance, insecurity, and terrorism, which is an increasing threat, instigated the coups. It further analyses how external interventions from France, the US, Russia, and China have altered the region's trajectory, leading to a shift from Western to Eastern alliance.

This insight covers mainly three former French colonies Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso. These countries gained independence from France in 1960. They are rich in natural resources such as Uranium (Niger), oil, gas, and minerals (Mali), and gold (Burkina Faso).

Owing to their location, Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso make the centre of the Sahel region, and political instability in these countries has rippling effects across the region. All these three states have experienced the most number of military coups in the region between 2020 and 2023, including two coups in Mali in August 2020 and May 2021, two in Burkina Faso in 2022, and one in Niger in July 2023.

In Mali, the military led by Colonel Assimi Goita seized power and demanded the resignation of then-president Keita due to his government’s failure to counter corruption and instability. Nine months after the August 2020 coup, the military arrested its own appointed interim President and Prime Minister in May 2021, making it a ‘coup within a coup’. In Burkina Faso, Lieutenant Colonel Damiba led a coup in January 2022 to control security. However, he was overthrown eight months later in another coup headed by Captain Ibrahim Traore, who used the deteriorating security situation as justification for his takeover of power.

In Niger, a military coup took place in July 2023, with several factions of the armed forces capturing power and placing President Bazoum under house arrest. The coup had two reasons: an internal power struggle as Bazoum planned to replace military leaders and growing security concerns.

The Sahel crisis began in 2020, the most violent year in which more than 6,200 deaths were reported collectively in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. The primary reason was their government's failure to counter the actions of so-called jihadist groups, such as Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, and Al-Qaeda present in the region.

Attacks by terrorist organisations on both military and civilians grew more intense. Governments could not maintain sovereignty as these groups had more control over the rural areas and were well-organised. This insecurity became one of the major reasons that instigated the coups.

Moreover, these coups are not solely due to military interventions. Instead, these are mostly viewed as a reformation trend, as this region's public demands better governance systems that provide security and socio-economic benefits.

Another significant catalyst for coups in the Sahel is the involvement of external actors who were present before the coups and aspire to continue their participation and influence here. These include France, the US, Russia, and China.

In 2013, Mali invited French troops to intervene in the ongoing operation against Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Before 2013, French troops were stationed in Mali on training missions as part of a 1985 agreement for technical cooperation between France and Mali. However, in 2022, French troops were told to leave. The military governments of Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso were not satisfied with the French military intervention as it was seen as ineffective and neo-colonial.

The US entered the region after the 9/11 incident. Its Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI) focused on improving the counterterrorism capabilities of Niger and Mali. In 2013, the US sent 100 troops to Niger to assist forces in the fight against militants in its neighbouring Mali. The US government signed a deal with Niger as part of its presence in Africa.

The US approach toward Niger shifted substantially following the 2023 coup. Although the US formally recognised the coup, it reduced military aid to Niger. Making a popular decision, Niger's leadership withdrew from security agreements with the US, leading to the withdrawal of the US troops from the country.

The governments of Niger and Mali have declared the presence of the US and France as illegal and have cut ties with Western powers due to their ineffective operations and exploitations. France and the US are reassessing their strategies to continue their influence in the region.

China formally engaged with the Sahel region in 2013 by sending troops to Mali's UN peacekeeping mission (MINUSMA). However, China is more engaged in economic and development domains. It is the region’s leading foreign direct investment (FDI) source, offering financial aid and infrastructure development in exchange for access to natural resources.

Another active external actor in the Sahel is Russia, whose military advisers arrived in Mali in late 2021, providing a 400-person mercenary force to combat Islamist groups. Russia is said to capitalise on the anti-French sentiment in the region. In contrast to the Western powers that were previously present in the region, it is offering its support without intervening in domestic affairs.

France’s ambition to maintain economic dominance, the US’s focus on security, Russia’s aspiration to regain prestige in Africa, and China’s interest in the region’s natural resources are contributing to an expected increase in competition among these external actors in the Sahel region.

The interventions made by external actors and coups in the Sahel have severe implications for the region's political stability, socioeconomic concerns, and public opinion. Politically, governments in Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso were more inclined toward the West before the 2021-2023 coups. However, the post-coup governments are moving away from the Western bloc. For instance, Mali has sought military assistance from Russia, which could potentially reshape its security and foreign policy dynamics and increase Russia’s leverage.

Moreover, public opinion about the role of external powers has deteriorated, resulting in increased protests. The Sahel region is shifting from Western to Eastern powers to seek better opportunities.