


# Durand Agreement: Its Impacts on Bajour, Chitral, Dir and Swat



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LUTFUR REHMAN

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National Defence University  
Islamabad - Pakistan

## FOREWORD

The border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, known as Durand Line, has purposefully been made controversial by certain quarters, mostly driven by vested interest. The state of Afghanistan existed for centuries, whereas, Pakistan is comparatively a young state, carved out of erstwhile British India. The controversy against an agreement drawn between the then state of Afghanistan and the British Empire over a century ago, therefore, seems unfounded. It amounts to re-setting the course of history, which has no end.

It is, indeed, heartening to see a young researcher of National Defence University, Mr Lutfur Rehman, taking up this vital subject for his MPhil Thesis, under the able supervision of a renowned academic, Dr Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, the Dean Faculty of Contemporary Studies, National Defence University, Islamabad. The book in hand, 'Durand Agreement: Its Impact on Bajour, Dir and Swat', is based on well scrutinized and researched material, which is likely to help crystallize the views of scholars, journalists and political leaders, both in Pakistan and Afghanistan, on the subject that remained hitherto shrouded in mystery / unscholarly debates.

I commend the efforts of the author and his supervisor for this invaluable publication. I am confident, it will set the course for even better publication by NDU alumni in the days to come.

**Lieutenant General  
Agha Muhammad Umer Farooq  
President, NDU**



**DURAND AGREEMENT: ITS IMPACT ON BAJOUR,  
CHITRAL, DIR AND SWAT**

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## INTRODUCTION

Pak-Afghan cooperation is of utmost importance for the restoration of peace and stability in the region and socio-economic uplift of its people. Islamabad and Kabul can change destiny of their poverty stricken people provided bold and practical steps are taken in this regard. They have many things in common including religion, culture, history and a long border. But their relations have remained strain for decades since the emergence of Pakistan as an independent country in 1947. Afghanistan was the only country which opposed Pakistan's entry into the UN. Islamabad-Kabul ties have suffered many tremors of high intensity which resulted in closure of the Pak-Afghan border from time to time. Hostile propaganda from media of the two countries especially Radio Kabul and Radio Peshawar was order of the day for decades. Interpretation or misinterpretation of the Durand Agreement is the sole reason for tension and uneasiness in Pak-Afghan ties. Pak-Afghan border popularly known as the Durand Line was delineated under the Durand Agreement signed in Kabul in 1893.

Many misconceptions pertaining to the Durand Agreement have come to surface in the past particularly during the last two decades. Without bothering to read text of the treaty, different circles have tried their level best to interpret it as suited to them. This has created confusions and uncertainties among people of the two countries about the nature of this pact. The Afghan ruling elites, scholars and writers are of the opinion that the Durand Agreement was to stay just for one century. They argue that after the expiry of the treaty in 1993, Pakistan is bound to return Khyber Pakhtunkhwa particularly Bajour, Chitral, Dir and Swat to Afghanistan. They claim that these areas were grabbed from Afghanistan and merged with the British India under the Durand Agreement. It should be noted that at the time of partition of the Sub-continent, Kabul



made repeated attempts to get hold over the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA but its demand was turned down by the British authorities. Similarly, the people of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa voted in favour of Pakistan in a referendum held in July 1947. Jirgas of the tribal areas also opted for Pakistan. Both the decisions were major blows to Kabul. When failed to achieve its cherished goal, Afghanistan launched a vigorous campaign for the creation of a Pakhtun state comprising of both the Pashto and non-Pashto speaking areas of Pakistan (Chitral, Kohistan, Hazara Division, Gilgit-Balistan, Dera Ismail Khan and Baluchistan) and named it as Pakhtunistan. It promoted nationalist tendencies within Pakistan. Pakhtunistan Day was regularly celebrated in the Afghan capital, Kabul and other major cities of that country. In response, Pakistan encouraged, financed and gave shelter to the Islamic minded Afghan politically motivated people to oust the secular regime of Sardar Muhammad Daud. The era of Sardar Daud is being remembered as the most difficult period in the Pak-Afghan relations. But with the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, the issue of Durand Line and Pakhtunistan went into background. However, with fall of the Taliban regime in 2001, the Durand Line controversy re-emerged sparking tension in Pak-Afghan relations once again.

The present Afghan regime, like many Pakistani, Indian and Afghan writers is of the view that after expiry of the Durand Agreement, Pakistan western border has ceased to exist. These writers and thinkers are of the view that Pak-Afghan border in the north-east of Torkham i.e. Bajour, Dir and Chitral has not been demarcated. Some Indo-Afghan writers also claim that it was under this treaty that Bajour, Chitral, Dir and Swat were snatched from Afghanistan and amalgamated with the then British India.

Pakistan has flatly rejected the Afghan claims regarding the Durand Line and Pakhtunistan issue. Pakistani leaders right from the very beginning have termed question of the Durand Line as a matter settled prior to its emergence. As a successor state, Pakistan has inherited the areas concerned from British India under the international law. However,

these answers are enough to satisfy the people of the two countries. The matter is of an urgent nature and it needs to be looked from an academic perspective. Keeping in view this objective, it was found necessary to re-visit the Durand Line and explore the Durand Agreement in its true and real perspective. Scarcity of authentic materials was the main hurdle at the initial stage of this research work. The most challenging job was as to how and where to find the historic maps and reports. It was found during the study that the Durand Agreement is not for one hundred rather it is a perpetual treaty with no time limit. It was also found in the course of the research that with exception of Mohmand Agency, rest of the border, right from Chitral to the Iranian border, was demarcated by three special commissions set up for this purpose.

Similarly, after going through volumes of related documents and materials, I came to the conclusion that not a single inch of Afghan territory was snatched and merged with the British India under the Durand Agreement. It was under this treaty that Afghanistan gained control over several areas of Bajour. At the time of delimitation of the border, Afghanistan also succeeded in getting hold over the Bashgal Valley of Chitral in violation of the Durand Agreement. It got a vast strip of area of Bajour located on the southern side of the River Kunar.

The first chapter of this research work is about the history of Bajour, Chitral, Dir and Swat. These areas have maintained their independent status for thousands of years and never fell under the Mughal and Afghan suzerainty. There was a strong and properly organized government in Dir at a time of "Alexander the Great" invasion of India in 326 B.C. Similarly, there were local governments in these areas at the time of Mehmood of Ghazani's expeditions towards Bajour, Dir and Swat in 1021 A.D. The people of these areas have always resisted the Mughal and Afghan Kings to occupy their land or interfere in their internal affairs. The first Mughal king, Babar tried to subjugate them but failed. In 1585, Akbar sent an expeditionary force to tame the Yousfzais. But the Mughals

lost thousands of their soldiers due to resistance of the Yousfzais. Similarly, different Afghan kings made similar abortive attempts to win sympathy of the people of Bajour, Chitral, Dir and Swat and include their areas in Afghanistan. However, their efforts failed due to the unsympathetic attitude of Bajour, Chitral, Dir and Swat.

The 2<sup>nd</sup> chapter is about the Durand Agreement when the Indian Foreign Secretary Sir Mortimer visited Kabul at the invitation of the Afghan King, Amir Abdur Rahman and signed the treaty (Durand Agreement) identifying border between the two countries. It was under this agreement that Afghanistan succeeded in gaining control over Asmar, a district of Bajour as well as Birmal area of Waziristan. Mortimer Durand appeased Amir Abdur Rahman at the cost of Bajour and Waziristan. Maps regarding the border were also exchanged and both the sides expressed satisfaction over the agreement.

The 3<sup>rd</sup> chapter is about the demarcation of the Pak-Afghan border in Chitral and Dir districts and Bajour, Mohmand and Khyber Agencies. This border was delimited by the Asmar Boundary Commission. Afghanistan was represented by its Commander-in-Chief, Ghulam Haider Khan and India by Commissioner Peshawar, Sir Richard Udney. They delimited 210 km border i.e. from the Hindu Kush range to Nawa Kotal. They signed a treaty (Udney Agreement) on 9<sup>th</sup> April 1895. Further demarcation of the border became impossible due to the Afghan claim over Mohmand Agency. Both Ghulam Haider Khan and Mr. Udney violated Article No. 3 of the Durand Agreement. The border agreed upon in this section is in total violation of the Durand Agreement as Afghanistan was given a big chunk of land on the southern side of the Kunar River to which it was not entitled. Similarly, Kabul was given free hand to occupy Bashgal Valley of Chitral. Later on, it was re-named as Nuristan. The then ruler of Jandul and Dir, Umra Khan opposed handing over of his areas to Afghanistan. He resisted it but was defeated. The Mehtar of Chitral also wrote petitions to the Indian government for the recovery of his lost territory but his requests were turned

down. The border in Khyber Agency was demarcated after the 3<sup>rd</sup> Anglo-Afghan war of 1919. However, the border in Mohmand Agency is yet to be demarcated. This is the area where the recent NATO air strikes on two Pakistani security posts, have pushed Pak-US relations to the lowest level of their history.

The 4<sup>th</sup> chapter is about the strategic Wakhan Corridor, connecting Pakistan with Tajikistan and the rest of Central Asia. This *Roof of the World* was given to Afghanistan against the wishes of its ruler, Ali Mardan Shah. Under the British-Russo understanding of 1895, British India was entitled to have Wakhan under its political influence. But the British government of India preferred that either China or Afghanistan should have this territory as it was determined not to have a common border with Russia anywhere on the globe. After China declined to incorporate Wakhan Corridor, it was given in the control of Afghanistan. Amir Abdur Rahman took charge of the area willy-nilly. The Amir was given a subsidy of Rs. 50,000 per annum to enable him to smoothly run affairs of Wakhan Corridor. The border in Wakhan was demarcated by the Pamir Boundary Commission. Had this area not been given to Afghanistan, Pakistan would now have direct land links with Tajikistan and other Central Asian Republics.

The 5<sup>th</sup> and last chapter is about the Pakhtunistan stunt with special reference to Bajour and Dir. The question of Pakhtunistan has pushed Afghanistan and Pakistan to the brink of war on several occasions. It is the state policy of Afghanistan since long to have control over Bajour, Chitral, Dir and Swat. Kabul followed the policy of carrot and stick to achieve its objectives. But the rulers, religious figures and general public of these areas never paid heed to the Kabul futile exercise and successfully resisted its pressure for decades.

It was discovered during the research that though Pakistani authorities have rejected the Afghan claims regarding the Durand Line but their knowledge about this

significant issue is not up to the mark. It is need of the hour that they should learn more about the Durand Agreement and history of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and tribal areas. Mainly primary sources have been consulted as well as secondary for writing this book. These also include thousands of files of British era and all the agreements reached between the British India and Afghanistan.

I am thankful to Dr. Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, Dean Faculty of Contemporary Studies, National Defence University, Islamabad for his guidance and encouragement to write this book. I am indebted to Azeem Afridi, the Peshawar based scholar for his help. I thankful to all staff members of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Directorate of Archives and Library, Peshawar and Mr. Liaqat Ali Khan of Tribal Research Cell, Peshawar for their cooperating in this gigantic task.

# 1

## HISTORY OF BAJOUR, CHITRAL, DIR AND SWAT

The history of Bajour, Chitral, Dir and Swat is so deeply intermingled with each other that it is difficult to discuss each of them separately. Despite the fact that the ruling families of these areas had countless inter-marriages yet they always were at dagger drawn with each other till merger of their areas with Pakistan on July 28, 1969. However, credit goes to them that they maintained their independence for centuries defying pressure both from the north and the south with great success. Some writers believe that Bijou Agency, Chitral, Dir and Swat States were included in Afghanistan prior to the Durand Agreement. Razia Naeemi, an Afghan writer argues that it was under Durand Agreement that "Bajour, Swat and Chitral were snatched from Afghanistan and merged with British India."<sup>1</sup> Baijan Omrani writes that "the British threatened the Amir of an invasion of his country if their proposal was not accepted. Ultimately the Amir agreed that Dir, Swat, Peshawar and Chitral should be British."<sup>2</sup> Under this accord, the Amir also agreed, "he will at no time exercise interference in Swat, Bajour or Chitral..."

Now a question arises whether Afghanistan really ceded Bajour, Chitral, Dir and Swat to British India under the Durand agreement? No. Neither the Mughals nor the Afghans

have ever succeeded to bring these areas under their sway. They have fought all the invaders and successfully defended their independence. They have never submitted to Afghan control.<sup>3</sup> They had formed their own governments enjoying complete independence in their internal and external affairs long before the emergence of Afghanistan as an independent and sovereign country. When Alexander the Great attacked this region in 326 BC, he came to the city of Arigaion (Nawagai area of Bajour); its inhabitants burned their houses and fled to the nearby mountains to escape from the wrath of the Greeks. As the city is located at a strategic point, therefore, Alexander directed his commanders "to fortify it strongly."<sup>4</sup> He defeated the Aspasiens and "took 40,000 prisoners and 230,000 oxen."<sup>5</sup> Alexander then crossed the Gouraios (River Panjkora) with great difficulty and entered the Assakeni country, a stable and prosperous kingdom. Its capital was located in the Talash area of Lower Dir. This kingdom was ruled by Askenos. His kingdom included Bajour, Dir, Swat, Buner as well as valleys in north and all the tribes, as far as Indus, recognized him as their chief.<sup>6</sup> The Askenos had a strong army of 32,000 men. He himself was commanding the army at Massaga. His organization for defence included an alliance with the king of the Abhisara, a country beyond the Indus, who sent contingents to Askenos's support.<sup>7</sup> "The ruler of Massaga had also 7,000 Indian mercenaries."<sup>8</sup> The Alexander's army besieged major citadel of the enemy located on a hill top. This was actually the palace of Askenos. Remains of the palace can still be seen in Talash. The city successfully resisted the vigorous attacks for four consecutive days. In order to avert further prolongation of the war in the area surrounded by hills, Alexander decided to launch a full scale war which resulted in fierce clashes between the two sides. Askenos died while fighting against the enemy. Inhabitants of the city surrendered after the killing of their ruler. In the course of fighting, Alexander was hit in the leg and he started feeling severe pain at a time when the chilly winds of Katkila (a historic place in Lower Dir) started shivering everybody. The Assakenis were second to none in bravery. They deeply impressed Alexander. He, therefore, laid mild conditions for their surrender. Some historians are of the opinion that

brother of Askenos along with thousands of his men joined the Alexander's army and played a leading role in its Indian expedition. However, according to another version, "he had fled into the mountains...he [Alexander] never caught him, that chieftain having probably betaken himself to the Chitrali hills..."<sup>9</sup>

Bajour, Dir and Swat were integral parts of Gandahara civilization with its capital at Pushkalavati [Charsadda]. This civilization also included the areas located on the southern side of the River Indus including Attock and Taxila. Ashoka, the grandson of Chandra Gupta, who came to power in 267 B.C, played a marvelous role in the promotion of Buddhism and Gandahara civilization.<sup>10</sup> He first became a Buddhist layman and then a monk who spent the rest of his life in spreading the teachings of Buddha. It was during his reign that Buddhism became the state religion and pilgrims started pouring into Gandahara from every direction especially China. He constructed one thousand four hundred monasteries on the bank of Swat River where eighteen thousand monks were busy in meditation.<sup>11</sup> "As the centuries rolled on...Swat, together with the valley of Dir became a great headquarters of Buddhism."<sup>12</sup> Statues of Buddha were craved in all parts of the region including the one on roadside near Barikot and hill station, Malam Jabba in Swat. However, most of the statues were destroyed by the militants recently. There are also two impressions of Buddha feet on a large stone on the top of Shahkot Pass in Malakand Agency. One impression is eleven inches long and the other about ten inches.<sup>13</sup> It was in the 7<sup>th</sup> and 8<sup>th</sup> century that Buddhism declined and quickly replaced by Hinduism. This religion flourished unchecked for several centuries in this part of the World. In 1021 A.D., Mehmood of Ghazani led an expedition in Bajour, Dir and Swat and Hinduism received its death blow in these areas. He bestowed Bajour upon Ali bin Qadr, a Saljug Turk.<sup>14</sup> Mehmood of Ghazani defeated the ruler of Swat, Raja Gira near Odigram. The relics of Raja Gira's palace are standing even today on a hill top at Odigram recalling its glorious past to the passerby. After their defeat at the hands of Mehmood of Ghazani, the Hindus either voluntarily converted to Islam or migrated to



other areas. However, Swat “remained independent under its Chief with the title of Sooltan.”<sup>15</sup>

Majority of people now living in Swat and Dir belongs to Yousfzai, the biggest and the most civilized tribe among all the Pakhtuns. Mirza Ulug Beg [a descendant of Taimoor and paternal uncle of Baber] came to power in 1470 with the help and support of the Yousfzai.<sup>16</sup> When he no longer required their help, he tried to subjugate them but in vain. He played a trick by inviting all leading men of the tribe to his *Darbar* or court pretending to bestow honour on them. But he on the contrary, disarmed and slew them all except Malik Sultan Shah and his young nephew, Malik Ahmed Khan. This tragic event took place somewhere in the last two decades of 15<sup>th</sup> century. This shocking incident had far reaching implications not only on the Yousfzais themselves but also on Swat, Buner, Shangla and Dir. Malik Ahmad Khan supported by Sheikh Mali afterwards raised the tribe to its zenith. The Yousfzais under the leadership of Malik Ahmad Khan came eastward from Kabul and took possession of Peshawar and Charsadda expelling the local tribe, Dalazak across the Indus River. The Yousfzais victory after victory, went ahead to reach their cherished destination of Swat, which was ruled by Sultan Owais. The Swatis put stiff resistance at Pali (Mora Pass) but they could not withstand the invading tribe from the Malakand side. They were defeated and relatives of Sultan Owais were killed. After their defeat, the Swatis left Swat and moved eastward across the Indus and settled in Mansehra, Balakot, Ghari Habibullah, Battagram and Alai. Side by side with this, Tarkani, a sister tribe of the Yousfzai, also moved in and occupied Bajour. Before its arrival in Bajour, people lived there who were called as the Arabs. Their chief was known by the name of Hakim or ruler of Bajour. The Arabs were paying allegiance to India.<sup>17</sup> The Tarkani tribe emerged victorious in successive actions and completely cleared Bajour of the Arabs, and took possession of the area.<sup>18</sup> Khan Kaju became chief of the Yousfzai in 1494 and “during his rule, the conquest of Buner and Panjkora was completed.”<sup>19</sup> In this way, the Yousfzai and Tarkani tribes settled in their new abodes of Swat, Dir and Bajour.

Bajour, Chitral, Dir and Swat never became part of the Mughal Empire. Babar wanted to chastise the Yousfzai when its leader, Malik Ahmad Khan refused to attend the former *darbar* in Kabul. Malik Ahmad rather sent in his place Malik Shah Mansur, his cousin and the son of Malik Sulaiman..."<sup>20</sup> This angered the Babar who embarked upon the expedition to conquer and subjugate the tribe. He started marching with his army on the historic Bajour-Chakdara route. He entered Bajour through Hinduraj pass on 3rd January 1519 and over run Gibari, the capital of Bajour after bloody clashes with the local people. Babar killed the ruling chief or Sultan named Mir Haider Ali along with greater part of his family, and put to death about three thousand of his ill-fated subjects.<sup>21</sup> However, an armed conflict between the Yousfzai and Mughal was averted when Babar married Bibi Mubaraka, the daughter of Shah Mansur, a leader of Yousfzai tribe.<sup>22</sup> In this way, Babar tied the knot of marriage with Yousfzais besides taking a contingent of twelve thousand of its men as an addition to his army. Since on wards, Babar refrained from advancing into the Yousfzai area of Dir, Malakand and Swat. But sixty six years later, the Mughal-Yousfzai cordial relations strained once again in December 1585. It was Akbar who sent an expedition led by General Zain Khan against the tribe. When Zain Khan failed to subdue the Yousfzais, Akbar sent him reinforcement under the command of Raja Birbal and *Hakim* (Doctor) Abdul Fateh. But the Yousfzais inflicted a crushing defeat on the enemy with great human losses. Birbal and 500 other prominent figures were also killed in action.<sup>23</sup> After this great blow, the Mughal decided not to try the hills of Malakand again and "avoided direct confrontation with the Yousfzai tribe... The Mughals learnt the tactics of hill fighting from the Yousfzais."<sup>24</sup> After this debacle, Akbar never attempted to "subjugate the people upon whom so little impression could be made even by costly expeditions, which exhausted the resources of the empire."<sup>25</sup> The Mughal-Yousfzai relations remained tense even after the death of Akbar in 1605. In 1668, the tribe attacked Chuch and cut off communication between Delhi and Kabul. With this success, the Yousfzai "acquired great fame for valor and prowess."<sup>26</sup> Aurungzeb also tried his muscles against the tribe for two

years (1673 to 1675) but with no success. He unwillingly agreed to terms which left the Pathans almost independent, and recalled his forces back to India.

In 1738, Nadir Shah of Persia summoned Nazoh Khan, the Yousfzai chief to get allegiance of his tribe but the later categorically refused to do so. In order to punish the tribe, Nadir Shah sent a force but it was driven back with heavy losses near Ambella, Buner. The Yousfzais "pursued the retreating enemy as far as the Kalpani Nallah near Mardan."<sup>27</sup> None of the invaders have made any valid impression on the Yousfzais as they always took full advantage of their geographical location with difficult terrains and ravines.

Keeping in view the humiliating defeat suffered by different invaders especially his master, Nadir Shah of Persia, at the hands of Yousfzais; Ahmad Shah Abdali avoided confrontation with the tribe. Ahmad Shah Abdali, "never sought to subject to his administrative control the mountain tracts of the Karlanri tribes, even the valley of Swat."<sup>28</sup> He, however, adopted the ancient policy of matrimonial alliances with the leading tribes. In order to win support and sympathy of the Yousfzais, Ahmad Shah Abdali arranged the marriage of his son, Timur Mirza with a girl from the tribe, Fathma.<sup>29</sup>

Afghan writers in their articles termed Bajour, Chitral, Dir and Swat as Yagistan (the unruly land or no man land). Yagistan also means the "independent country."<sup>30</sup> However, history of the region negates this hypothesis as there were well organized governments fully operational long before the birth of Ahmad Shah Abdali in Multan and the emergence of Afghanistan as an independent country. So far Chitral is concerned; this area up to the mid of the 17<sup>th</sup> century was ruled by descendants of Alexander the Great. When the last ruler of that dynasty, Shah Rais died in 1660, he was succeeded by his Prime Minister and Commander-in-Chief, Mohtaram Shah popularly known as Shah Kator 1.<sup>31</sup> However, Cunningham is of the opinion that "the name of Kator is a title that has been borne by the rulers of Chitral for 2,000 years."<sup>32</sup> According to the genealogy of the family, Shah Kator 1 is

traced back to a pious person, Baba Ayub who himself was a descendant of a celebrated devotee, Shams Tabrez, whose tomb is located in Multan. The sons of Kator who were governors of Upper and Lower Chitral were independent of Badakhshan and Afghanistan. Shah Kator 1 died in 1682 and was succeeded by his son, Shah Afzal who adopted the title of "Mehtar." Mir Yar Beg, the ruler of Badakhshan, sent his envoy named Mirza Gao to Shah Afzal desiring to place Chitral under the protection of Badakhshan and pay tribute.<sup>33</sup> But Shah Afzal turned down the proposal. Shah Afzal ruled Chitral till his death in 1776 and was succeeded by Shah Kator 11 who ruled Chitral upto his death in 1837. After Shah Kator's death, his son, Shah Afzal 11 became the new Mehtar of Chitral. When Shah Afzal 11 breathed his last in 1855, he was succeeded by his elder son, Adam Khor. Adam Khor was assassinated on his way to Dir in 1864. His body was shifted to Chitral and laid to rest in "Gumbaz-e-Miran." This followed the tussle for power among different claimants in which Aman-ul-Mulk emerged victorious. The Kator family ruled over Chitral till merger of the state with Pakistan in 1969.

The Kator family never allowed Afghanistan to interfere in the affairs of Chitral. During the life of Ahmad Shah Abdali, one of his ministers, Shah Wali Khan sent a message to Shah Afzal, the then Mehtar of Chitral to pay tribute to his master.<sup>34</sup> But Shah Afzal refused to do so by saying that his area consisted of nothing but unproductive valleys and barren hills. He clarified that his ancestors had never paid tribute to anyone. In this way, Shah Afzal dashed to the ground designs of Afghanistan regarding Chitral. Due to lingering threat from the north, Chitral decided to strengthen its ties with Kashmir. In the middle of 1876, Jafar Ali, an envoy from Chitral arrived in Srinagar to get help from the Maharaja in resisting the Afghan pressure. The same year, Amir Sher Ali sent Governor Jalalabad, Ahmad Khan to Said Abdul Ghafoor (Saidu Baba) of Swat to form an alliance against the British administration of India. Saidu Baba understood the intentions of Kabul, and rejected the Afghan proposal by telling the envoy that "Sher Ali Khan was the man who wanted to strengthen the hands of Englishmen in India."<sup>35</sup> After the 2<sup>nd</sup> Anglo-Afghan war,

*Mullahs* of Bajour, Dir and Swat became more hostile towards the Amir and dubbed him as the friend of the British and not Muslims in a true Islamic sense. In 1889, the Amir issued a proclamation to the inhabitants of Swat and other neighbouring tribes "calling upon all Mussulmans to acknowledge him as King of Islam, and obey him as leader of the Muhammadan relation."<sup>36</sup> Side by side with the Afghan intrigues, the Russians were also bent upon making further territorial gains in the region.

Keeping in view the Russian designs about the Pamirs, the Indian government started taking interests in Gilgit and Chitral. The Adjutant General in India, Sir T. D. Baker advised the Indian government that "we have now in close proximity to our frontier a great European power with which we may at any time be brought into hostile contact."<sup>37</sup> He argued that the Government must have an accurate knowledge of the Indian frontiers especially in the north-west. In order to counter the Russian movement towards Chitral and Gilgit, "Lord Lytton's Government stretched a hand through Kashmir towards Chitral...The avowed object was to ultimate secure the effectual command of the passes of Hindu Kush."<sup>38</sup> In June 1877, the Indian government assured full support to Aman-ul-Mulk in resisting the claim of Kabul over Chitral.<sup>39</sup> Commissioner Peshawar also sent a letter to Amir Sher Ali warning him against any endeavour to assume control of Chitral, Bajour, Dir and Swat. Chitral came under the suzerainty of Kashmir when Maharaja and ruler of Chitral, Aman-ul-Mulk signed an agreement for this purpose in 1878.\* Chitral started receiving an annual subsidy of 12,000 rupees from Maharaja of the Jammu and Kashmir.<sup>40</sup> But the Russian advancement in Central Asia had alarmed both London and Calcutta. The Government of India noted that the region "where the land rises like the waves of a sea, shall serve us as a channel of stormy waters to divide us from our foes and rivals."<sup>41</sup> The British authorities were no less concerned by the Russian movements in the Pamirs. They wanted to have cordial relations with the ruler of Chitral, the Mehtar, Aman-ul-Mulk.<sup>42</sup> Keeping in view its strategic significance, the Indian wanted to have its representative in Chitral in order to

achieve the following objectives:-

- To control its external affairs in a direction friendly to our [British] interests;
- To secure an effective guardianship over its northern passes; and
- To keep watch over what goes on beyond those passes.

With these objects in view, Major Biddulph was sent to the country [Chitral] in 1877 to enter into relations with the Ruler or Mehtar of the country.<sup>43</sup> But no agreement was signed. In 1885-86, a British mission under Colonel Lockhart visited Chitral and held negotiation with Aman-ul-Mulk. Colonel Lockhart spent more than a year in Chitral and the adjoining areas. In summer 1889, the British Agent at Gilgit, Colonel Algernon Durand, the younger brother of Mortimer Durand, arrived in Chitral and met with the Mehtar. Both the parties needed each other although their aims were not the same.

The British government of India was interested in Chitral due to its proximity with the Pamirs and Central Asia. He [Aman-ul-Mulk] was of view that, "so far his dynasty and country was concerned, safety lay in alliance with us [the British]; danger in any close intercourse with Afghanistan."<sup>44</sup> It was after this visit that the government of India sanctioned an allowance of Rs. 6,000 for the ruler of Chitral. In 1891 the Government of India, with the intention of strengthening position of the Mehtar, decided to double his subsidy on the condition that the Mehtar has to accept the advice of the British Agent in all matters relating to foreign policy and the defence of the frontier.<sup>45</sup> But the Amir of Afghanistan still wished to have Chitral in his domain. Even after signing of the Durand Agreement, the Amir Abdur Rahman did not give up the hope of gaining influence in Chitral. In order to ensure territorial integrity of Chitral, the government of India approved a contingency plan to achieve the following objectives:-

- The abandonment by the Amir of all ideas of bringing Chitral under his control;

- The successful conclusion of the negotiations with Russia for the determination of boundaries in the Pamir tract;
- And the mitigation, through the mediation of our frontier officers, of the irritation and suspicion of the frontier tribes.<sup>46</sup>

The plan proscribed Kabul and Moscow either to enter or meddle in affairs Chitral's affairs. The same was the case with Dir where an independent government was functioning since long. Writing in 1961, Arnold J. Toynbee says that "Dir State is at least 300 years old. It was already in existence when the Mughal regime was at its zenith; yet it never fell under Mughal suzerainty..."<sup>47</sup> The Akhund Khel dynasty of Dir remained in power from 17<sup>th</sup> century to 1969. This dynasty was set up by a sanctimonious person named Ilyas popularly known as Akhund. He was born in the year 1581 in Nihag Dara [valley] of Dir.<sup>48</sup> His father, Toor was son of Ibrahim Khan. s/o Bamat Khan, s/o Musa Khan s/o Painsa Khan s/o Maliuddin. When Yousfzais occupied and annexed Swat, the areas north of Laram hill (Lower Dir) was in the possession of Kafirs who made frequent raids on the Yousfzais. The Yousfzais supported by Mandans, Tarkanis, Mohmands and Utman Khel tribes proclaimed Jihad against the Kafirs. After their victory, "the tribes invested the area to Malizai [a sub-section of Yousfzai]; these selected the Painsa clan, from amongst whom a dictator named Ibrahim was appointed; and from him the Khani descended down in proper succession from father to son..."<sup>49</sup> This Khani and later on Nawabi continued to flourish till the merger of Dir state in 1969. This Ibrahim Khan was Ilyas's grandfather. Ilyas received his early education from an eminent religious scholar named Hazrat Najibuddin Khanzada of Sado (a village near Timergara in Lower Dir) and became acquainted with the rudiments of Islam.

Later on Akhund Ilyas became a disciple of another well known saint, Sayyid Adam Banoori alias Sheikh Adam. He was a Mashwani Pakhtoon living at Banoor village of Patiala (India).<sup>50</sup> People of Swat, Dir and Bajour were familiar with Sheikh Adam as he had accompanied the army of Raja Birbal

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Map of Chitral, Dir, Bajour and Swat.





in the reign of the Emperor Akbar in 1585-86 A.D.<sup>51</sup> The offensive of the Mughal army against the Yousfzai resulted in fiasco due to the stiff resistance of the local people. But Sheikh Adam acted as a mediator in the subsequent negotiations. In performance of this duty, he so pleased the local people that they promised to pay him and his descendants *Ushar* (1/10 of agricultural products) henceforth- the promise they kept for a very long period. His grand grandson, Fazli Haq came to Bakhta locality of Thana, Malakand Agency and settled there.

The Khan Khel of Thana used to pay *Usher* (1/10 of agricultural products) to Fazli Haq. Saidu Baba, the Akhund of Swat was also giving him 1/10 from the income of Khadakzai and Abazai and the Amir of Kabul, Dost Muhammad gave him the villages of Khwajak and Charbagh in Jalalabad.<sup>52</sup> Saidu Baba also gave his only daughter in marriage to Sayyid Abdur Rashid Jan, the son of Fazli Haq.

Akhund Ilyas met with Sheikh Adam Banoori in Lahore in 1642. The Sheikh had come to the city with thousands of his disciples or *Murid*.<sup>53</sup> Akhund Ilyas then accompanied Sheikh Adam Banoori to Delhi and became one of his most devoted and favoured disciples. The then Mughal King, Shahjehan asked Sheikh Adam to visit Hijaz and perform Haj. Sheikh Adam left for Hijaz with his several disciples including Akhund Ilyas and Mian Abdullah alias Haji Bahadur Baba of Kohat.<sup>54</sup>

Sheikh Adam stayed in the holy land and died in Madina in 1643.<sup>55</sup> In 1650 Akhund Ilyas returned to Dir. Instead of going to his native village, he went straight to Lajbook valley of Dir and initiated his mission of promoting virtue and discouraging evils. He devoted the rest of his life to this noble cause. He led a life of austerity, religious seclusion and mediation. People of Lajbook were so happy with Akhund Ilyas that they offered him a large portion of their land as *Seri* or *glebe*. His fame and power grew which later on resulted in establishment of the Akhund Khel dynasty. He died at the age of 96 in 1677 and was laid to rest at Lajbook village. His grandson, Ghulam Khan seems to have been the first to acquire temporal power.

Khushal Khan Khattak says that Ghulam Khan was ruling Dir in the mid of 18<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>56</sup> Ghulam Khan was succeeded by his son, Zafar Khan. Information about his life and rule is scarce. After the death of Zafar Khan, his son, Qasim Khan became Khan of Dir who expanded the frontiers of his state in every direction.

Qasim Khan was the most powerful Khan among the Yousfzais. There were about 30 khanates in the region at that time. He was able to assemble a force of 40,000 horses and foot soldiers.<sup>57</sup> He was the first khan of Dir who established his writ over the whole of Panjkora. He fought many wars against the *Tor Kafirs* [black clothed infidels] and Spin [white] *Kafirs* living in Dir Kohistan and Dir-Chitral border areas. Qasim Khan exacted tributes from them after successful expeditions.<sup>58</sup> He also fought a war with Muhtaram Shah (Shah Katoor 2<sup>nd</sup>) of Chitral. Qasim Khan, after surmounting great difficulties in passing over the snow covered Lowari top, occupied Chitral town. Later on, Qasim Khan and Muhtaram Shah arrived at an agreement which resulted in establishment of close ties between the two families.

Qasim Khan used to receive a large income from his own estates as well as tributes from infidels. He had also levied agricultural tax on tribes living in his khanate except Painda Khel, his own tribe. It was mandatory for traders shuttling between Central Asia and the Sub-continent to pay tool tax at Dir. After clearing the tax, Qasim Khan used to provide them *Badraga* or escort to protect them from the attacks of *Tor Kafir*.<sup>59</sup>

Qasim Khan had four sons, Azad Khan, Muhammad Said Khan, Ghazan Khan and Sadullah Khan.<sup>60</sup> Azad Khan, the eldest son assassinated his father in 1793.<sup>61</sup> In this way, Azad Khan became the ruler of Dir but he was unpopular among his people. His younger brother, Ghazan Khan in collaboration with his maternal uncle, Shah Katoor 2<sup>nd</sup> of Chitral, toppled the government of his step brother and proclaimed himself as the chief of Panjkora in 1806.<sup>62</sup> This Khan was a good administrator and soon strengthened his grip over Dir and

thus became “the most powerful ruler in the north of Indus.”<sup>63</sup> He was totally independent in his decisions making process. He and his ancestors never tolerated Afghan rulers “even Ahmad Shah Abdali, in the height of his power, to meddle in the affairs of Dir and they never done so.”<sup>64</sup>

Contrary to Chitral and Dir, people of Swat could not form their own government due to disunity in their ranks and files. Therefore, Ghazan Khan was keeping close watch on the events taking place both in Lower and Upper Swat. In December 1849, the British administration sent a force under the command of Colonel Bradshaw to punish the people of Palai, Zormandi and Sherkhana for supporting anti British elements and raids inside the government controlled areas. These villages were destroyed besides taking away 3,000 maunds [147000] kg grains.<sup>65</sup> This opened the eyes of chiefs of Swat, Dir and Bajour by realizing that their areas can also become the next target. In order to meet any eventuality, Abdul Ghafoor popularly known as the Akhund and Saidu Baba as well, urged the people of Swat, Dir and Bajour to forge unity in their ranks. He suggested the tribal elders to choose a leader from among themselves. Ghazan Khan, who was also present in the council, swore that he would not accept any body as the leader except the Akhund.<sup>66</sup> However, Saidu Baba declined and said that an outsider should be chosen. He proposed the name of Syed Akbar Shah of Sitana, the advisor and close friend of Said Ahmad Barilvi. In this way, Syed Akbar Shah became the ruler of Swat. However, the British refrain from attacking Swat. Syed Akbar Shah constituted a force comprising 800 *Sowara* (horse riders) and 3,000 foot men.<sup>67</sup> The feeble administration of Syed Akbar Shah collapsed with his death on 11<sup>th</sup> May 1857.<sup>68</sup> The same year, Afghanistan for the first time made a claim over Swat and Bajour but the British administration warned Kabul not to harass its northern peaceful neighbours and if Kabul did so, the Indian government was bound to help these independent states.<sup>69</sup> In 1861, Afghanistan laid a claim to Bajour. Lord Mayo warned Amir Sher Khan during his visit to India in March 1869, “Interfere neither with Bajour nor Swat.”<sup>70</sup> In 1877, Afghan renewed its claim over Swat, Dir and Chitral. But

the British authorities once again warned Kabul that “any interference with Bajour, Swat, Dir and Chitral would constitute a contravention of the treaty engagement.”<sup>71</sup> The British Government wanted that Swat and Bajour remain independent as was in the past.

Ghazan Khan was able to resist the Afghan pressure. He also played a prominent role in the Ambella campaign. He arrived in Buner with a contingent of more than six thousand men under his command in December 1863 to take the field against the British army.<sup>72</sup> However, this could not take place due to the withdrawal of the British forces from the area after burning the Malka. Ghazan died in 1864 and was laid to rest in Dir.<sup>73</sup> Ghazan Khan was succeeded by his younger son, Jamdad Khan. He was challenged by his eldest brother, Rahmatullah Khan, who had filled up important posts during his father’s lifetime. After two years of hectic efforts, Rahmatullah Khan succeeded in toppling Jamdad Khan and it became possible only “through the pecuniary assistance by the Maharaja of Kashmir.”<sup>74</sup> This strengthened ties between Kashmir and Dir. In 1875, the Maharaja sent his envoy to Dir to further cement his links with Rahmatullah Khan. Rahmatullah Khan always extended helping hand to rulers of Chitral to safeguard their country from possible Afghan invasion. When Mahmud Shah of Badakshan attacked Upper Chitral in 1872, Rahmatullah Khan sent his soldiers there to help Chitralis in their war.<sup>75</sup>

Trade between Peshawar and Yarkand, Kashgar, Eastern Turkistan and Badakshan was going well via Dir-Chitral route. Convoys or *caravans*, passing through Dir territory, were taxed at the rate of Rs. 1, Rs.2, and Rs.3 per load carried by men, mules and horses respectively. *Caravans* on arriving at Dir were bound to pay duty on their merchandise, as well as to present *nazars* [gifts] to the Khan, who provided them *Badruggas* or escorts as a safeguard against the *Kafirs* who infested the Lowari pass. Travelers and traders were treated with great kindness and hospitality.

Meanwhile, Indo-Afghan relations deteriorated and Amir Sher Ali Khan launched all out efforts to win sympathy of the people of Bajour and Dir etc. During the two years of 1878 and 1879, he gave "Rs. 6,000 per annum to the Chiefs of Asmar, Jandul, Nawagai and Khar, and Rs. 8,000 per annum to the Khan of Dir (Rahmatullah Khan) together with a large number of rifles and the title of Nawab."<sup>76</sup> But he failed to secure support in these areas due to the eruption of 2<sup>nd</sup> Anglo-Afghan war. Later on, Afghanistan changed its tactics and instead of direct confrontation, sent its agents to create problems for rulers of Dir, Swat and Bajour. During the British occupation of Afghanistan in 1880, religious leaders asked Rahmatullah Khan to help the Afghans in their struggle but he paid no heed to their appeals.<sup>77</sup> However, Rahmatullah Khan's reputation was badly damaged when he received Dr. MacNair at Dir on his way to Chitral.<sup>78</sup> He was the first European to enter Dir.<sup>79</sup> The Khan died in October 1884.<sup>80</sup> Rahmatullah Khan was succeeded by his son, Sharif Khan.\*

Sharif Khan was born in about 1848.<sup>81</sup> His ascendancy in the Khanate was not threatened by any of his brothers.<sup>82</sup> In May 1890, Umra Khan declared all out war against Sharif Khan capturing Maidan, and Dir. The cup of misery was not yet full for the helpless Khan of Dir when his own brother, Ashraf Khan changed loyalty by taking side with the winner. This resulted in complete collapse of Muhammad Sharif, who fled to Swat. He lived in Mingora. Umra Khan appointed his brother, Muhammad Shah Khan as the Governor for these areas. During next few years, Mian Gul alias Shirin assisted the ex-chief of Dir in his several attempts to regain control over his state and oust Umra Khan but their efforts met with no success.<sup>83</sup>


Muhammad Sharif Khan who was in Swat rejoiced to learn that the British were planning to attack Umra Khan. Indeed, he had a reason to smile. When the government forces reached Jalala in Mardan district, he came down from Mingora and met with the Chief Political Officer of Chitral Relief Force, Major H.A. Deane at Dargai on the 2<sup>nd</sup> April.<sup>84</sup> He expressed himself ready to do service. He was naturally

anxious to recover his lost position in Dir. The chief political officer told him that the object of the Indian force was not to fight his battles or to reinstate him in Dir, but the opportunity was a good one for him and his services for government would be rewarded in shape of arms and money. The political officer asked Muhammad Sharif Khan to proceed ahead of the Government force quickly, and going over the Laram Pass to raise the Yousfzai tribe including the Painda Khel, Sultan Khel and others sub-sections against Umra Khan. The government wanted achievement of the following objectives through Muhammad Sharif Khan: -

- To secure possession of all the forts along the Panjkora and Maidan routes.
- To secure possession of the Dir, Aton and other forts.
- To ensure unopposed march of the government troops to Chitral.

He crossed the Malakand after the fighting with supporters of Umra Khan on 3<sup>rd</sup> April. Next day, while approaching Khar (near Malakand), a gathering attacked him. But he was saved by the timely arrival of the Indian troops in the area. He then crossed Laram Pass and cleared all forts along the Panjkora and Maidan-Banda from Umra Khan's men. It was due to his role that the Indian troops did not face tough resistance and they crossed over to Dir via Barawal without fighting.<sup>85</sup> With the approval of the General Officer Commanding of the Chitral Relief Force, Muhammad Sharif Khan then sent his men into Chitral. These men occupied Drosh fort. It heralded arrival of the Indian troops in Chitral and the defeat of Umra Khan. The government decided to put Muhammad Sharif Khan in a strong position so that they could rule Dir without any apprehension.

He also captured Sher Afzal and gave him in custody of the Indian Government. The Englishmen used Muhammad Sharif Khan in the same way as the Americans utilized the services of Northern Alliance against the Taliban in Afghanistan and the Kurds against Saddam Hussein in Iraq. The government granted him 400 rifles, in addition to 100 captured by him



Umra Khan's Flag





with 20 rounds per rifle besides allocation of annual allowance of Rs. 10,000 plus Rs.25, 000 as assistance in lump sum to meet his expenses incurred on performing services for the relief force.<sup>86</sup> At the conclusion of the expedition, Muhammad Sharif Khan, now restored to his Khanship, entered into an agreement with the Government of India.

### **The Laram Agreement**

This agreement was signed during a special ceremony held at Laram hilltop on 12th September 1895. The government pledged not to annex Dir in the British Empire. Its main objective was that the road connecting Chakdara with Dir and Chitral, should remain open so that it could send its troops to Chitral and keep watch on situation in Afghanistan and Central Asia.

Under this agreement, Muhammad Sharif Khan was supposed to keep open the road from Chakdara up to Ashret in Chitral. Repair of the road, establishment of levy posts along the road, camping ground, making postal arrangements and protection of telegraph system was included in his responsibilities. Writing about this road about two years later, Sir Winston Churchill noted that "without this road there would have been no Malakand Camps, no fighting, no Malakand Field Force, no story. It is the road to Chitral... If the road is interesting its story is more so..."<sup>87</sup> The Khan of Dir also promised that he would give sufficient ground to the government for accommodation of its troops on Laram Top and Dosh Khela range.

The Government of India undertook to pay the levies required for the road, and to defray the cost of establishing posts along the road. In return for the annual payment of Rs. 10,000, the Khan was bound to exempt all trade passing through his territory from taxes and tolls.<sup>88</sup>

## **Agreement of December 1898**

Under this accord, Muhammad Sharif Khan promised that in future, he would not commit aggression nor interfere in any way with any tribes or people beyond the existing boundaries of Dir. He also pledged that in case of any dispute between him or his heirs and any of the tribes adjoining Dir, he will be guided and act in accordance with the advice and orders of the Indian Government. Under this agreement, the border of Dir with Bajour, Chitral and Swat were specified. It was agreed that Dir-Afghan border would remain the same as determined under the Durand Agreement.

Sharif Khan died on 8<sup>th</sup> December 1904 and was buried in Dir. He was succeeded by his son, Aurangzeb Khan (Bacha Khan). The people of Swat made a number of abortive attempts to liberate themselves from the clutches of the Nawab of Dir. Feelings of dissatisfaction among people of Bar Swat against the Nawab and his greedy servants reached to its climax in 1914. But they lacked unity and leadership due to the strong spirit of faction. They were once again looking for someone outsider who has nothing to do with any of their factions and become their leader. Swatis turned to Sayyad Abdul Jabbar Shah, the grandson of Sayyad Akbar of Sitana to come forward and lead them against the Nawab, offering him their allegiance with the title of "king." He started to come, but turned back before he reached Swat, and the clans were disappointed. The same year, Wali Muhammad alias Sandaki Mullah, appeared amongst them. He was born in Chakesar Tehsil of Shangla district. The name of his village is Sandakai and that is why he is known as Sandakai Mullah.<sup>89</sup> He was one of the most active anti-British propagandists in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP).

It was under the leadership of Sandaki *Mullah* that Swatis succeeded in liberating themselves from the Nawab of Dir in March 1915. They tried to persuade Sandaki Mullah to permanently stay with them but he declined the offer. They once again asked Sayyad Abdul Jabbar Shah to come to Swat and lead them. This time he accepted the invitation and

arrived in Swat in April 1915 and became king of the area. He ruled there till September 1917. With his departure, Mian Gul Abdul Wadood, the grandson of Saidu Baba became the *Wali-e-Swat* (ruler of Swat State).

Bacha Khan tried his level best to regain control over Swat but he failed to achieve this objective. He, however, ruled over Dir and Jandul till his death due to leprosy on 4th February 1925. Shahjehan Khan, the elder son of Augangzeb became the Nawab of Dir. He was deposed in 1962 by the government for his alleged anti state activities. His son, Khisro Khan became the Nawab of Dir. On 28<sup>th</sup> July 1969, all the four princely states in KP were merged with Pakistan. Amb, Chitral, Dir and Swat lost their independent status much to the satisfaction of the people particularly those of Dir.

### **The Bajour Khanates**

Bajour is a tribal agency bordering Afghanistan. The total area of Bajour Agency is 1290 square km and according to census of 1998, its population is about six hundred thousand. According to W. Merk, Bajour is a vague geographical term and its limits are incapable of exact definition.<sup>90</sup> Prior to 1895, the present day Bajour was totally different from that of the existing one. Bajour was consisting of nine Khanates i.e. Nawagai, Khar, Jandul, Upper Barawal (Janbatai), Lower Barawal (Bandi), Maidan, Asmar, Babukara and Salarzai. However, according to Holmes, there were five Khanates in Bajour. These include Asmar, Khar, Nawagai, Pasht and Jandul, "the seats of the respective Khans of Bajour."<sup>91</sup> Bajour is mainly inhabited by Tarkane and Uthman Khel tribes each one further divided into a number of *khels* or sub-sections. Prominent among them is Ibrahim Khel. "But contrary to Swat, where several seats of *khans* were competing for power, all claims to authority in Bajour were concentrated in the hands of one leading lineage, the Ibrahim Khel."<sup>92</sup> All the five mentioned Khanates except Jandul have been ruled by this tribe for centuries. The then ruler of Bajour, Kamardin divided Bajour amongst his sons.<sup>93</sup> They were Hazrat Ali, the ex-Khan of Asmar, Dilaram Khan, the Khan of Khar, Saimullah Khan,

the Khan of Pasht and Safdar Khan of Nawagai. They were descendents of Mauza Khan.<sup>94</sup> In 1830s, the Afghan authorities tried their level best to gain control over Bajour by coercing its rulers. The ruler of Nawagai, Mir Alam Khan was able to maintain his independent position by giving a cash of about 12,000 rupees to Amir Dost Muhammad Khan of Afghanistan in 1831. In order to make himself and his people safe from the impending danger, Mir Alam Khan unwillingly paid a visit to Kabul next year. However, "soon afterwards he joyfully took his departure, inwardly determined never again to trust himself to the power of Dost Muhammad Khan."<sup>95</sup> In the mean time, Shah Ismail Shaheed arrived in Nawagai to seek help from Mir Alam Khan against the Sikhs. Mir Alam Khan asked "Alexander Gardner to take command of those of his followers who desired to array themselves under the sacred banner of the Syad [Syed] or Khalifa...."<sup>96</sup> Earlier Syed Ahmed Shaheed Barelvi himself had visited to Bajour to further the cause of waging *Jihad* against Ranjit Singh, the then Sikh ruler of Punjab.

The people of Bajour have always maintained complete independence and paid alligence and tribute to none.<sup>97</sup> All these khanates were entirely independent of Afghanistan'. "In 1883, the Amir made overtures to the chiefs of Bajour, but they unhesitatingly refused to consider his proposal of placing themselves under his sway."<sup>98</sup> At the time of Durand Agreement and demarcation of the border, the biggest khanate, Nawagai was ruled by Safdar Khan. He joined hands with Umra Khan to resist the Afghan intrigues aimed at bringing the whole of Bajour under the Amir domination.

So far Jandul was concerned; this khanate was ruled by Mast Khel tribe. According to genealogy of the tribe, a person named Haya Nawaz, a resident of Constantinople (Turkey) came to this region to join Mehmood of Ghazni's expeditions towards India especially in Bajour, Dir and Swat.<sup>99</sup> In the recognition of his services, people of Maidan, Lower Dir gave on him a big chunk of land and named it as Haya Serai [the land of Haya Nawaz]. At the conclusion of Mehmood's expeditions, Haya Nawaz settled in Kandahar. However, his

grandson, Mast Ali Khan shifted to Jandul and lived there. According to another version, he was born at Swara Ghundai near Sadbar Kalay in Jandul.<sup>100</sup> His descendents are known as Mast Khel. After the passage of many decades, one of his descendents, Hayat Khan set up the Mast Khel dynasty in 1791. After the death of Hayat Khan in 1820, his eldest son, Abdul Ghafar Khan became the Khan of Jandul. When Abdul Ghafar Khan breathed his last, he was succeeded by his real brother, Faiz Talab Khan. He extended the khanate of Jandul by annexing Barawal and Maidan areas. He was called Haji Sahibzda, as he had made pilgrimage to Makkah. He was also known as the Badshah and Baz. Elphinstone says that the chief of Bajour "called by the peculiar name of Bauz [falcon] who has great power over his tribe. The Caufirs [Kafirs] pay him tribute..."<sup>101</sup> His rule was popular among his subject. He had 13 guns, and a force of ten thousand men, which include two thousand horse riders.<sup>102</sup> When the ex-Afghan ruler Shah Shuja made good his escape from Ranjeet Sing's prison in Lahore, he first moved to Dir where he was warmly received by Ghazan Khan. Shah Shuja then went to Jandul where Faiz Talab Khan gave him shelter as well as gifts. From there he proceeded to Chitral and "its ruler received him with the utmost cordiality and promised to assist him in the design of recovering of his lost kingdom."<sup>103</sup>

Bajour has never sought help from Afghanistan. However, the people of Bajour from time to time have extended help to the people of Afghanistan at critical junctures. A contingent from Bajour under Faiz Talab Khan fought against the British troops in Jalalabad during the 1st Anglo-Afghan war.<sup>104</sup> He also led a contingent of several thousand men from Jandul against the British soldiers during the Ambela campaign of 1863. After the death of Faiz Talab Khan, his son Aman Khan became Khan of Jandul. Aman Khan had six sons. Umra Khan stood No. 5th among them. He was born in 1860.<sup>105</sup> He was distinguished by his lofty stature with powerful arms, strong chest and graceful face. Aman Khan during his lifetime distributed his property among his sons. Aman Khan died in 1879 and was succeeded by his eldest son, Muhammad Zaman Khan. The growing tension between Zaman Khan and Umra

Khan compelled the later to say goodbye to Jandul. He went to Swat and lived there. Umra Khan afterward went to Makkah to perform Haj. In 1881, he returned to Peshawar, succeeded in obtaining a modern rifle with some cartridges and sneaked into Jandul. He quietly approached the Khan and shot him dead. He then entered the fort with his followers and barricaded himself in a room. Confusion prevailed in Jandul for several days. At last his mother stood out upon the wall of the fort, and addressed the people. "O men of Jandul," she said, "why are you troubled? Is it not sufficient for you that one of my sons shall reign over you? Surely it for them to decide amongst themselves which it shall be. That is no concern of yours!"<sup>106</sup> These words of the old lady had far reaching impact. Umra Khan came forward and elders of the town accepted him as their new Khan by putting *pagree* or traditional turban on his head. He raised a group of about eighty armed men. He tried his level best to obtain as many rifles as he could. Strengthening his position at home, the Khan launched a series of wars against his neighbours and emerged victorious. Hardly a month passed without a fight and annexed valley after valley. That is why, he is known in history by the names of Napoleon of Asia and Pathan Napoleon.\* Sir Winston Churchill has termed him as "Afghan Napoleon.....a remarkable man."<sup>107</sup> The Gilgit Agency Report of April 1890 speaks of him as "the most important man between Chitral and Peshawar."<sup>108</sup>

The ever-growing power of Umra Khan alarmed Amir Abdur Rahman. He sent one of his most trusted agents, Abu Bakkar alias Makrani Mullah to Bajour with the sole aim to defame Umra Khan among the local people. He launched a vigorous propaganda campaign by saying that Umra Khan did not rule in accordance with the teachings of Islam. In order to put Umra Khan in hot water, Makrani Mullah succeeded in persuading Safdar Khan, the Khan of Nawagai and people of Mamund to wage a war against him. However, Umra Khan defeated this combined mighty lashkar near Mian Kalay. On 23rd November 1887, he fought another bloody war against Safdar Khan at the village of Kulala and captured his vast area up to Sikandaro. Umra Khan's men arrested Makrani Mullah.

After keeping him in prison for three days, Umra Khan released the Mullah with a warning not to come into this area again.<sup>109</sup> Fearing Umra Khan's reaction, the Mullah went back to his native city, Kabul and never returned to Bajour and Jandul. However, with disappearance of Makrani Mullah, efforts on the part of the Afghan government to contain influence of Umra Khan did not cease rather the Amir himself came to Jalalabad to personally supervise his anti Umra Khan campaign.

### **Contacts with the Indian Government**

Umra Khan was much concerned about the possible attack of the Amir on Jandul. Now he needed a powerful ally to help him in foiling the nefarious designs of Kabul. In 1884, he commenced correspondence with the Commissioner, Peshawar, who recognized in him "a man rising to power."<sup>110</sup> In January 1888, Umra Khan sent his religious advisor, the Sahibzada of Kotu (village near Timergara, Lower Dir) to the viceroy Darbar in Peshawar. He also wrote a letter to Commissioner Peshawar Division enquiring "if the Amir advances upon Bajour, I beg to enquire whether the British government will forbid him to occupy Bajour or if they will grant me assistance to oppose him."<sup>111</sup> The British clarified that "so long as you faithfully and loyally act in accordance with the stipulated conditions, government will not interfere in the internal affairs of Bajour, Dir and Swat, and will protect you from aggression on the part of other states." It also warned the Amir of Afghanistan "interfere neither with Bajour nor Swat."

When Umra Khan took over Dir in 1890, the British government sent him a letter congratulating him on his success.<sup>112</sup> He then sought permission of the British administration to purchase arms and ammunition in India. In April 1892, with the consent of the Indian Government, he purchased 5,000 Snider and 5,000 Henry-Martini cartridges. None of this ammunition had yet been taken away when fighting broke out between Umra Khan's men and the Afghan soldiers in Shurtan in June. The government detained the



whole consignment till Umra Khan met certain conditions, viz, --

- To withdraw his troops from Shurtan or other places where they were likely to come into collision against the Sipah Salar's forces;
- To keep his troops within his own territories;
- To refrain from hostilities against troops of the Amir.

Later on, he was allowed to lift the arms and ammunition. Umra Khan then asked the British administration for help particularly to supply him arms and ammunition. He writes that "If the government desire to maintain firm and friendly relation with me, it is advisable that I should at once be supported and strengthened by means of cartridges and rifles..."<sup>113</sup>

### **Postal service between Peshawar**

In April 1892, the British administration made an arrangement with the Khan Khels of Thana and the Khans of Allahdand and Umra Khan for initiating postal service through their territories. In return, the government agreed to pay Aslam Khan and Inayat Khan of Thana and Saadat Khan of Alladand Rs. 2,400 per year each, Rs. 500 to Sarbiland of Palai per annum and Rs. 302 to Umra Khan per month. Nine posts were established in Umra Khan's territory and employed 39 people as dak runners and munshis for this purpose. The British administration also promised to provide 200 rifles to Umra Khan as a gift besides granting him permission to purchase ammunition. However, Umra Khan declined to receive even a single penny in return for the postal service. He was time and again asked by the British authorities to receive all his arrears. In response, Umra Khan wrote to Deputy Commissioner Peshawar on 2nd November 1893 stating that "a mere receipt of pay for dak runners and munshis is no strength to me, and I derive no advantage from it. If any expenditure is required for this, I will pay it myself."<sup>114</sup> Despite many ups and downs in his relations with the British authorities, Umra Khan continued the postal service through

his territory without any hindrance up to January 1895. The handing over of Asmar to Afghanistan proved a greatest blow to his relations with the Indian Government which resulted in divorce to the marriage of convenience between the parties. He then pampered himself in the affairs of Chitral which resulted in his down fall and the restoration of Dir and Jandul to Muhammad Sharif Khan. This deeply changed the geo-political scenario of the region. The British authorities were of the firm belief that if Umra Khan had maintained friendly ties with them, he might had become the most powerful ruler of the region. For this, he had to discard his principled stand regarding the question of Asmar. But he was not ready for that.

## Notes

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- <sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 114.
- <sup>19</sup> Major Henry George Raverty, *Grammar of the Afghan Language* (New Delhi: Asian Educational Services, 1987), p. 32.
- <sup>20</sup> Sir Olaf Caroe, *Op. cit.*, pp.158-59
- <sup>21</sup> Major Henry George Raverty, *Notes on Afghanistan and Part of Baluchistan*, *Op. cit.*, p.127.
- <sup>22</sup> Dr. Ahmad Hassan Dani, *Peshawar, the historical city of the Frontier*, (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 2002), p. 96.
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- <sup>24</sup> Dr. Ahmad Hassan Dani, *Op. cit.*, p.103.
- <sup>25</sup> Major Hugh R. James, *Op. cit.*, p. 32.
- <sup>26</sup> *Ibid.* p. 35.
- <sup>27</sup> Major Raverty, *Notes on Afghanistan and Part of Baluchistan* *Op. cit.*, p. 203.
- <sup>28</sup> Sir Olaf Caroe, *Op. cit.*, p. 258.
- <sup>29</sup> Khushal Khan Khattak, *Swat Nama*, p. 51.
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### THE DURAND AGREEMENT

The Durand Line refers to 2590.4 k.m (1610 miles) long Pak-Afghan border, right from the Sarikol Range in Wakhan to the Kohi Sia Malik Range near the tri-junction border of Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran. This line was demarcated in the light of the Durand Agreement signed on November 12, 1893 in Kabul.\* It has been surrounded by numerous rumours and myths. It is perhaps the only agreement of the world so widely and publically misquoted. Even highly educated people both in Afghanistan and Pakistan are not clear about nature of this accord. Different people take the Durand Agreement according to the interpretation which suited to them. Some people are involved in this propaganda due to ignorance while others are doing so to further their vested interests.

The question of Durand Line is the stumbling block in improvement of Pak-Afghan relations right from the start. Successive Afghan governments have propagated that under this accord, a major portion of that country had gone into the control of Pakistan. The biggest historic injustice, according to many Afghans, "was the imposition in 1893 of the Durand Line, which split the region's Pashtun population between the British India and Afghanistan."<sup>1</sup> The Afghan Government, long dominated by Pashtuns, "has never recognized the Durand Line."<sup>2</sup> Even those leaders of the Afghan Mujahideen who stayed in Pakistan for a long period during the Soviet

\*Appendix-D, p.171.



occupation of their country, did not express their willingness to accept the Durand Line as an internationally recognized border. Commenting on the issue, Prof. Sibghatullah Mojaddedi said that he does not recognize the Durand Line as an international border...Durand Line had no meaning for them [Afghans].<sup>3</sup> No doubt Prof. Sibghatullah Mojaddedi termed the Pakistani Pashtoon areas as “a second home for Afghans.” An Indian writer W. P. S. Sidhu is of the opinion that the Durand agreement was to stay in force for one century. He says that the agreement expired in 1993, and “Pakistan’s dejour western border ceased to exist.”<sup>4</sup> He argues that the Amir signed the agreement “under duress” Prof. Dr. Dipak Basu says that “just like Hong Kong, NWFP [Khyber Pakhtunkhwa] should go back to Afghanistan after expiry of the lease of one hundred years.”<sup>5</sup> Another Indian writer, J. Daulat Singh argues that “no Afghan regime has accepted the validity of the Durand Line.”<sup>6</sup> An Afghan scholar Dr. G. Rauf Roashan writes that “Kabul has refused to renew the Durand treaty which since 1993 when it expired.”<sup>7</sup> Many Pakistani politicians and scholars have repeatedly stated in their interviews with different TV channels that the Durand Agreement expired in 1993 after completing its one century period.

This is a tragedy on the part of the Pakistani nation that even scholars of high esteem, journalists and those serving on key posts are as much ignorant about the Durand Agreement as layman in the street of a remote area of Baluchistan or FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas). This is the reason that Pakistani authorities have utterly failed to respond to the Afghan claims regarding the Durand Line in an academic way. The former Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Governor Khalil ur Rehman while talking to newsmen in Peshawar, said that the Durand Agreement signed in 1893 was to stay for one hundred years. Khalil ur Rehman added that “he had asked President Pervaz Musharraf to talk to the Afghan government for extending the agreement.”<sup>8</sup> Addressing the Baluchistan Bar Association in Quetta in August 2007, head of his own faction of JUI (F) Maulana Fazl ur Rehman asked the Afghan government to recognize the Durand Line.<sup>9</sup> Afghan writers say

that Pakistan is bound to return KP to Afghanistan. They assert that KP is a disputed land, which rightfully and legally belongs to Afghanistan. Afghan writers and scholars allege that the document signed by the then Afghan ruler, Amir Abdur Rahman was in English. The Amir did not understand English language; therefore, the agreement is of suspicious nature or false documentation. The American Institute of Afghanistan Studies arranged a three day conference on Durand Line in Istanbul, Turkey in July 2007. A paper read out during the conference says that “no Afghan government ever accepted the Durand Line as an international border.”<sup>10</sup> Some writers argue that “....Durand found it necessary to aim several veiled threats at the Amir.”<sup>11</sup> Other scholars think that Amir Abdur Rahman signed the agreement against his wishes “Afghanistan was deprived of her following territory which included Chaman, Chaghai, Khyber, Chitral, Waziristan, Peshawar, Chilas, Bajour, Dir, Buner, Swat etc.”<sup>12</sup> Similarly, Radio Liberty in its report broadcast on 7<sup>th</sup> August 2003 claimed that Pak-Afghan border was not demarcated in any area with the exception of Chaman-Spin Boldak and the Torkham region.<sup>13</sup> Only history and historical proofs can judge as how far these claims are valid. Keeping in view this objective, it is necessary to have just a bird eye view of the Afghan history.


This is known to all and sundry that Afghans are living in the areas now called Afghanistan for thousands of years but they had no independent country till 1747. During the reign of Zahir ud-din Muhammad Babur and “his successors down to the middle of the 17<sup>th</sup> century, the rich provinces of Kandahar, the Derajat, Peshawar and Kashmir were included in the Indian Empire, Khorasan and the western tribes in Persia, while the more mountainous regions were pretty well left to govern themselves under their own chieftains.”<sup>14</sup> But the situations did not remain the same and many changes occurred in coming centuries. In 1650 Abbass of Persia, added Kandahar and Ghazni to his kingdom.<sup>15</sup> For a brief period of about twenty eight years, the Hotaki dynasty ruled over a wide area in Persia and Afghanistan from 1709 to 1738. But in 1738, Nadir Shah conquered Kandahar and razed it to the ground.

This gave death blow to the Hotaki dynasty. Now Herat, Farah and Kandahar were in the possession of Persia, Balkh was a part of Bokhara, while Kabul was included in the Mughal Empire of Delhi.<sup>16</sup>

Later on, Nadir Shah of Persia also conquered Kabul and annexed it in his vast empire. He then raised a contingent of sixteen thousand Afghans, twelve thousand from the Abdali and four thousand from the Ghilzai tribes. Ahmad Shah Abdali, who was an officer in the Persian army, had under his command from two to three thousand men. In June 1747, Nadir Shah was assassinated and during the anarchy prevailed after his murder; Persia lost control over its northern provinces. This provided a golden chance to Ahmad Shah Abdali to liberate some northern provinces from the Persian yoke. He succeeded in this objective without any hurdle in 1747 and became king of the new country. In this way, Afghanistan appeared on the globe as an independent and sovereign country having no definite boundaries. Ahmad Shah Abdali was able to gain control over much of the treasure of Nadir Shah including the Koh-I-Noor diamond.<sup>17</sup> Ahmad Shah assumed the title of Dur-e-Durran (Pearl of Pearls), from which the Abdali tribe became known as the Durrani. Thus Afghanistan began not as a typical nation-state with definite boundaries, but as the unification of a loose ethnic group with common customs, traditions, language, and ancestry.<sup>18</sup>

In 1749, Ahmad Shah attacked India and the Mughal Emperor Shah Alam saved Delhi by agreeing to cede him all the trans-Indus territory previously ceded to Nadir Shah, plus the province of Sindh.<sup>19</sup> Later, Timoor Mirza, the son of Ahmad Shah Durrani, married a Mughal princess and she was given Punjab in dowry.<sup>20</sup> But after the murder of the Mughal king, Alamgir, in 1760, the Marathas incited the Sikhs to revolt and seized Punjab, a property of the Mughal princess. In retaliation, Ahmad Shah Abdali decided to take stern action against the Marathas. Two hundred thousand men of the Marathas assembled to confront Ahmad Shah Abdali, but they could not withstand. They were defeated at Panipat in January 1761. Next year, Ahmad Shah defeated the Sikhs in the vicinity

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of Lahore and annexed Kashmir in Afghanistan. It was not only difficult rather almost impossible for him to keep hold on such a vast empire. In 1767, Ahmad Shah Abdali returned Central Punjab to the Sikhs, retaining northern Punjab under his control. In June 1773, Ahmad Shah Abdali died of cancer in his face leaving behind 36 children including 8 sons.<sup>21</sup> He was succeeded by the heir of his choice, the second son, Timoor Mirza. The first act of the new king was to put down the opposition of his elder brother, Suleman, by putting out his eyes.<sup>22</sup> Instead of giving attention to the state affairs, he was more interested in luxurious life and left running affairs of the government to his ministers and provincial administrators. He shifted the capital from Kandahar to Kabul and generally spent the winter in Peshawar. Timorr Mirza's reign was in complete contrast to that of his father. He did not undertake any expedition to expand the borders of Afghanistan rather his grip over provinces became weedy. Timoor Mirza died in May 1793 in Kabul, after twenty years of mismanaged rule. His mourners include 23 sons and a large number of daughters.<sup>23</sup> Of his sons, Zaman was governor of Kabul, Abbas of Peshawar, Kuhndil of Kashmir, Humayun of Kandahar, and Mahmud of Herat.<sup>24</sup> With the death of Timur Mirza, the downfall of Durrani Empire started. Prior to his death, Timur Mirza had not nominated his successor. This resulted in chaos, each son trying to eliminate his brothers and gain control over his father's patrimony. At last Zaman Shah, the 5<sup>th</sup> son succeeded in gaining control over the kingdom with the help and support of Payanda Khan, the prime minister of his father. In short period, the wide empire so hastily and violently shrunk back to its natural geographical limits.<sup>25</sup> All captured territories were lost one by one. He ceded Balkh to Persia. It was followed by a revolt in Punjab and Zaman Shah gave it in the control of Ranjeet Singh. In the meantime, Mehmood strengthened his position, marched against Kabul, defeated and arrested Zaman Shah, and put out his eyes.<sup>26</sup> The blind monarch shifted to Ludhiana and became a pensioner of the British Government of India.

In 1803, Shah Shuja captured Kabul and imprisoned Mehmood. Fearing invasion of India by Napoleon in close

collaboration and coordination with Alexander of Czarist Russia, the government of India decided to have close ties with Shuja ul Mulk and sent a mission to Peshawar under the leadership of Mountstuart Elopinstone in 1809. This was the first ever contact of the British authorities with Afghanistan. Soon Shah Shuja suffered a defeat at the hands of Fateh Khan, the son of Payanda Khan. It resulted in the re-establishment of Mehmood at Kabul while Shah Shuja fled and took refuge with Ranjeet Singh in Lahore who put him in prison. Later on, he escaped from the prison. Wandering in Dir, Bajour and Chitral, he at last succeeded in regaining Peshawar. Members of the Afghan ruling family were at dagger drawn with each other. The Durrani's house was in doldrums which greatly benefited Ranjeet Singh who seized Multan in 1810, Kashmir in 1819 and Peshawar in 1822.<sup>27</sup> The British, Ranjeet Singh and Shah Shujah signed a tripartite treaty in 1838 to contain the growing influence of Russia in the region. Under this accord, Shah Shujah ceded Peshawar and all other areas to Sikhs, which were included in Afghanistan in the past. The Sikhs during their rule over Peshawar especially their Italian origin Governor, General Avitable perpetrated atrocities on the local population. People were put to death by hanging them from minarets of the Mahabt Khan Mosque. General Avitable used Gorghatri as his residence. A sign board bearing his nameplate can still be seen on the western gate of the building. Ranjeet Singh died on 27<sup>th</sup> June, 1839 and ten years later (1849), the British Government of India captured Peshawar. Of the 'frontier districts' of the Punjab i.e. Hazara, Peshawar and Kohat came under the commissioner of Peshawar while Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan and Dera Ghazi Khan came under the commissioner Derajat.<sup>28</sup>

The 1st Anglo-Afghan war resulted in debacle for the British and they suffered colossal human and material losses. By 1849 the British had advanced the foothills of the mountains bordering Afghanistan. The question as to where the Indo-Afghan border stood? The answer to this question was neither known to the Afghans nor to the British authorities or somebody else. This was yet to be decided. Decades passed and no concrete efforts were made in this

connection. In the meantime, the 2nd Anglo-Afghan War started which was formally brought to an end by signing the treaty of Gandamak on May 26, 1879.

### **Mortimer Durand in Kabul**

Most of the Afghan rulers including Dost Muhammad Khan and Sher Ali Khan had apprehended the invasion of their country by Russia via Central Asia. This induced Kabul to define its borders with the neighbouring countries. Afghan rulers were not aware about the territorial limits of their country. It was in 1869 (during the reign of Amir Sher Ali Khan) that Russia and Great Britain started negotiation to define the Russo-Afghan frontier. In 1872, the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, under instructions from Earl Granville, submitted proposals to the Russian Government in this regard.<sup>29</sup> However, it did not receive positive response from Russia. Next year, the British Government once again repeated the proposals. This time Russia agreed and informed the British Government about its decision saying that “we do not refuse to accept the line of boundary laid down by England.”<sup>30</sup> This paved the way for the Clarendon-Gortchakoff Agreement of 1872-73. Despite this understanding, nothing was done on the ground regarding the delimitation of the Russo-Afghan border. Amir Abdur Rahman after coming to power in July 1880, started practical work to achieve this goal. But Russia refused to cooperate. The Russians were of the opinion that “Hindu Kush, and not the Oxus, is both historically, ethnographically, and geographical the natural boundary between Afghanistan and Russia’s Central Asian possessions.”<sup>31</sup> The British authorities dismissed the Russian claim by saying that “from historical point of view Russia has not the faintest claim to the territory between the Oxus and Hindu Kush. Geographically a river is just as good a boundary as a chain of mountains.”<sup>32</sup> Amir Abdur Rahman himself was confused about the boundary of his country and even did not know “how many provinces he ruled.”<sup>33</sup> But he preferred to settle first the issue of the Afghan frontier with Russia and a joint commission comprising some Afghan and Indian officials was set up in July 1884. The mission was headed by



General Sir Peter Lumsden while General Zelenai represented Russia. In May 1885, Peter Lumsden was replaced by Colonel Sir West Ridgeway. The commission started its work in November the same year which continued till July 1886. It delimited over 563 km (350 miles) long Afghan-Russia border from Hari Rud (Herat) to Oxus (Amu River). 65 pillars were erected along the border from Hari Rud to Sultan Robot in Faryab province.<sup>34</sup> A protocol about this section of the Afghan-Russia boundary was signed at St Petersburg on 22<sup>nd</sup> July 1887. The Amir was so pleased with the British help in settling the thorny issue of his country's border with Russia that he gave gold medals to Sir West Ridgeway, Kazi Aslam Khan, Colonel Holdich, Colonel Yate and several others members of the Mission.<sup>35</sup>

Now he was able to turn his attention towards the Indo-Afghan border. Amir Abdur Rahman received an annual subsidy of twelve hundred thousand rupees from the Indian Government since 1883. He paid a visit to India in April 1885 and met the Viceroy, Lord Dufferin in Rawalpindi. In October 1888, he asked the Indian government to send a mission to Kabul to settle the question of the boundary line between the two countries. He suggested that "Sir Mortimer Durand, the Foreign Secretary, might be appointed as the head of it [Mission]."<sup>36</sup> In response, Lord Lansdowne decided to appoint Lord Roberts to be chief of a Mission to Kabul.<sup>37</sup> Keeping in view the murder of Sir William Burnes and Sir Louis Cavagnari, it was also agreed that a strong armed contingent would escort the Mission to Kabul. This did not suit the Amir due to the active role played by Lord Roberts during the 2<sup>nd</sup> Anglo-Afghan war. He, therefore, adopted delaying tactics so that the time may come when Lord Roberts would leave India for England. The Amir replied that "it is a thing which must take place, but at the proper time".<sup>38</sup> He, however, requested the Viceroy to send him a map regarding the future boundary between the two countries. The Viceroy sent him a map showing Asmar, Mohamad and Chitral etc as belonging to India. The Amir strongly objected to it and replied that "as to these frontier tribes known by the name of Yaghistan, if they were included in my domain I should be able to make them

fight against any enemy of England and myself, by the name of a religious war, under the flag of their co-religious Muslim ruler (myself).”<sup>39</sup>

The Amir sent his advisor, Mr. Pyne to Calcutta with two separate letters one each addressed to the Viceroy and Sir Mortimer Durand. He directed “Mr. Pyne, to go to India slowly and if possible to postpone or delay the Mission for a few days, so that Lord Roberts, whose time for leaving India was very near, should leave for England.”<sup>40</sup> In the mean time, Lord Roberts departed for England and the Amir succeeded in his plan. Now without wasting a moment, the Amir once again invited to Kabul the Mission to be headed by Foreign Secretary Sir Mortimer Duran. Lord Lansdowne approved the proposal and informed the Amir that instead of escorting the Mission by British or Indian soldiers; it would be protected by the Afghan authorities. Lord Dufferin, who had keen interest in matters relating to the Indian frontiers, while writing to Sir Mortimer Durand from Paris expressed his sentiments in these words, “You can well imagine with what interest I am watching your journey to Kabul. You have a very difficult and delicate mission to fulfill, but if anybody can deal successfully with that strange, strong creature at Kabul, I am sure you will.”<sup>41</sup>

The mission left Peshawar for Kabul on 19<sup>th</sup> September 1893 to enter into negotiation with the Amir to identify the border line between the two countries as well as to decide the future of the independent tribes living along the Indo-Afghan frontier. Other members of the mission were Colonel Elles (the then head of the Intelligence in India), Dr. Fenn, Captain Manners-Smith, MacMahon, Mr. Donald and Mr. Clarke. Mr. Donald used to “speak Pashto with exceptional fluency.”<sup>42</sup> He had great knowledge about the tribal areas particularly Waziristan. Khan Bahadar Ibrahim Khan, a retired Assistant District Superintendent of Police, Peshawar was also included in Durand’s entourage. He had at his credit the splendid record of services in the Black Mountain and was rewarded 2,000 rupees for that. No survey officer was permitted to accompany the mission by saying that his presence might

raise suspicions in Kabul in general and in the mind of the Amir in particular. But this proved a serious blunder later on. This was the reason that the most experienced and brilliant surveyor of India, Colonel Sir T. Hungerford Holdich opposed the Durand Agreement right from the start. "He always maintained that the presence of a surveyor or topographer, who knew the ground from personal observation, among the advisers of Government, would have prevented some of the errors that were made owing to lack of geographical knowledge, and the subsequent political troubles on the border, both during and after demarcation."<sup>43</sup> The mission was warmly received by the Afghan Commander-in-Chief, Ghulam Haider Khan on Indo-Afghan border at Landi Kotal. Tight security measures were taken for safety of the Mission and the Afghan soldiers had surrounded them from all sides to avert any untoward incident. The Mission stayed for a night at the newly constructed palace of the Amir in Jalalabad. It arrived in Kabul next day and was given a royal reception with 21 guns salute. Bands playing "God Save the Queen" sounded everywhere in the city. The Mission not only got welcome messages but also received some bags containing thirty thousand Kabuli rupees from the Amir as traveling expenses. The Mission was accommodated in the house of Habibullah Khan, the Amir's son located in the neighborhood of Kabul. The Amir did every thing possible to keep the Mission feel at home and used to send it baskets of fresh and dry fruits regularly. The official arrival of the Mission in Kabul was made on 2nd October 1893.

After exchange of ceremonial welcome notes from the two sides, negotiations between the two distinguished persons of their respective fields, started. Mortimer Durand was the most experienced civil servant in the Indian bureaucracy. Besides English, he knew Persian, German, French and Russian. He was a good writer, a poet and a player of football, cricket, lawn tennis and polo. He was "the son of Henry Durand, the subaltern who had blown up the gates of Ghazni during the 1st Anglo-Afghan War."<sup>44</sup> It may be recalled that Sir Henry Marion Durand fell from an elephant in Tank on January 1, 1871 and died on the spot. He was laid to rest at a

church in Dera Ismail Khan. Mortimer Durand had served as a political officer to Lord Roberts during the 2<sup>nd</sup> Anglo-Afghan war. At the age of thirty five, he was posted as the Foreign Secretary of India. Mortimer Durand had to face the toughest Afghan ruler. Amir Abdur Rahman was not an ordinary Afghan ruler like Shah Shuja or anybody else. He was, rather the strongest ruler ever produced by the Afghan nation after Ahmad Shah Abdali. "More than anyone since the Ahmad Shah Durrani, the founder of the kingdom of Kabul, Abdur Rahman made Afghanistan a reality. He is the Iron Amir, who brought the disparate and antagonistic tribes and petty chiefdoms to heel; he is the ruler who transformed a small cohort of scribes into an administrative bureaucracy; he is the general who molded a motley collection of mercenaries and militias into a standing army; he, more than anyone else, is the visionary who established the boundaries, the offices, the apparatus of the modern nation-state."<sup>45</sup> Throwing light on his meeting with the Amir in Rawalpindi in April 1885, Lord Dufferin says that "but for the accidental circumstances of the Amir being in my camp at Rawalpindi, and the fortunate fact of his being a prince of great capacity, experience and calm judgment..."<sup>46</sup> At first the Amir was suspicious, but Durand's knowledge of Persian impressed him. The Amir started trusting him and both became friends.<sup>47</sup> Mortimer Durand spoke of him as "the Amir was the strongest man with whom he had had to deal in long and varied career."<sup>48</sup> Just from the beginning, Abdur Rahman made every possible effort to avoid creeping any misconception in future about their talks. He, therefore, wanted to put every word spoken by the either side in black and white. The Amir says that "I [he] had arranged for Mir Munshi Sultan Mahomed Khan to sit behind a curtain without being seen or heard, or his presence known of by anyone else except myself, to write down every word they spoke to me, or among themselves, either in English or Persian. He wrote in shorthand every word uttered by Durand and myself, and this conversation is all preserved in the record office."<sup>49</sup> The Amir offered such a seat to Mortimer Durand so that he could face the light, while turn his [the Amir] own back to it.

The primary duty of Mr. Durand was to persuade the Amir to evacuate districts of Roshan and Shignan and take control of Darwaz as stipulated in the Russo-Anglo Agreement of 1873. Roshan and Shignan are located on the northern side of River Oxus while Darwaz on its southern side. One irregularity adjusted the other. It was on the persuasion of Mortimer Durand that the Amir vacated these areas in 1894. The second part of their discussion was to specify the Indo-Afghan border. Initiating the talks, the Amir said that "he wanted to have a wall round his country, so that he might know exactly where he was...Moreover, he imagined that his political and geographical knowledge of the subject was perfect and declined to accept maps or statements that were not in accordance with his views."<sup>50</sup>

When the two strong men met, the Amir was aided by one of his trusted friends, Sir Salter Pyne. Mortimer Durand tried his level best not to speak a single word which might irritate or make the Amir angry. During the course of discussion with Mortimer Durand, the Amir remarked "I would fight you if you drove me to it. I am not a coward, and would fight, though I know what the result would be. I have not forgotten Shir Ali, [Amir Sher Ali Khan] but I would not give up my independence without a fight for my honour. But remember what I say, unless you drive me into enmity, I am your friend for my life."<sup>51</sup> The Amir renounced his claims over the frontier tribes including Bajour, Chitral, Dir and Swat. He also agreed to the British request to keep Wakhan under the Afghan suzerainty. The difficult point of the negotiation was Asmar which the Amir wanted to include in the Afghan territory at any cost. He was determined never to surrender Asmar but Durand had the power to give some concessions to make the negotiations a success. But at this point, he gave extraordinary concession by accepting the Afghan's occupation of Asmar. The Amir also succeeded in persuading Mortimer Durand to give Hissara, Marawara and Shortan in the Afghan control. In fact, all these areas belonged to the Khans of Charmang, Bajour.<sup>52</sup>

The talks continued for over forty days. At last, they

arrived at the conclusion and reached an accord which is known as "The Durand Agreement." Amir Abdur Rahman and Mortimer Durand signed the agreement in Kabul on 12th November 1893. Besides its English version, Persian copies of the agreement were also signed and exchanged. As the Amir says that "two agreements were sealed and signed by me, and by the members of the Mission..."<sup>53</sup> The first agreement was about Roshan, Shignan and Darwaz. The second accord was about the Indo-Afghan border. Maps of the proposed boundary line were also exchanged. The Amir did not sign the maps. However, it does not mean that "the Amir disliked the Agreement as there was no reason for that..."<sup>54</sup> Kabul achieved all its objectives i.e. retaining Asmar, control over Birmal area of Waziristan besides three times increase in the annual subsidy (from .6 million to 1. 8 million rupees). It may be recalled that the maps were prepared by Royal Engineer Lt. P.J. Macaulay and green colour was used in it for highlighting the border line. The green line on the maps represented a strip of a mile broad. It was agreed that the border in Kunar should be at average of four miles from Kunar River on the side of Bajour.<sup>55</sup> Mr. Durand appeased the Amir at the cost of Bajour. Besides this, another blunder was committed which later on resulted in a greater territorial loss to Chitral. That was the question of Bashgal, a major valley of Kafiristan. The wrong worded Article No. 3 of the Durand Agreement is responsible for this. The article says that "the British Government thus agrees to His Highness the Amir retaining Asmar and the valley above it, as far as Chanak. His Highness agrees on the other hand that he will at no time exercise interference in Swat, Bajour or Chitral including Arnawai or Bashgal valley." Arnawai and Bashgal were one and the same place. But later on Afghanistan argued that Bashgal and Arnawai were two different places and not one as written in the agreement. Afghanistan took full advantage of it at the time of the demarcation of the border.

Next day, a special Darbar was held at Salam Khana hall. It was attended by the Amir's two eldest sons and four hundred leading Afghan elders, civil and military officers. The Amir twice addressed the participants, first in the beginning and

second time at the conclusion of the Darbar. The Amir urged his countrymen to be true friends of the British and make their children the same. After each period of his speech, there were shouts of "Approved! Approved!" He thanked Sir Mortimer Durand and other members of the Mission for their wise way of settling the disputes.<sup>56</sup> Amir was quite contented because he gained more than his expectations from this agreement. The accord "was mutually beneficial with win-win result."<sup>57</sup> Then Mortimer Durand made an *ex tempore* speech in Persian. The Amir sent medals and thanks to all members of the Mission. This also includes a golden star for Mortimer Durand. Expressing his sentiments about the Durand Agreement, the Amir says that "the misunderstandings and disputes which were arising about these frontier matters were put to an end, and after the boundary lines had been marked out according to the above-mentioned agreements by the Commissioners of both Governments, a general peace and harmony reigned between the two Governments, which I pray God may continue for ever."<sup>58</sup> The mission had made "Abdur Rahman Khan happy and cleared away from his mind all suspicions was good news, and we all hoped that it might turn out to be true in the end, although there were one or two disbelievers in India who were not quite so sanguine."<sup>59</sup>

The mission returned to "Peshawar on November 22 with great rejoicing and was accorded honours such as no mission has received before or since."<sup>60</sup> Mortimer Durand and Lieut. Colonel Fenn left for India the same day, and the rest of the party moved on next day.<sup>61</sup> It also got congratulation from the Queen. Mortimer Durand was recognized as the great peacemaker. The Spectator termed him as "the strongest man in the Empire."<sup>62</sup> Later on while commenting on the agreement, Mortimer Durand remarked that "the key-note of the Mission was confidence in the Afghans, and the smallest sign of mistrust would have done great harm. There was never anything of the kind."<sup>63</sup>

### **Explanation of the map attached with the Agreement**

"This map is intended to show the line which the

Government of India and His Highness the Amir have agreed to regard as the frontier of Afghanistan from Chandak to the Persian border. A map on this scale (1"=12 miles) cannot show the boundary line in detail; this can be done only by delimitation on the spot; but the intention of the map will be understood from the following explanation.

From Chandak it is necessary that the Afghans should have a clear road southwards along the course of the Kunar river, and the line is, therefore, carried along the left or Bajour [Bajour] side of the river at an average distance of four miles from it until it crosses the Kotkot Dara leading into Baraul [Barawal]. It then runs up to the hills above Shurtan, and thence southwards to the neighbourhood of Kunar, still at an average distance of four miles from the stream, so as to include Shurtan and Maraora in Afghanistan. From the neighbourhood of Kunar, the line passes by the point marked Silala Sar [it is the same Silala Sar where the NATO helicopters attacked two Pakistani check posts in November 2011, killing 26 soldiers and officers] through the Silala Pass, and down the spur to Palosi and the Kabul River, crossing the river, it runs to the neighbourhood of Lundi Khana leaving Shinpokh under British influence. The Shinwaris of Ningrahar, leaving the villages of Darband under British influence."

Durand Agreement is not a bulky document. It is just one and a half page treaty comprising seven articles. Nothing has been mentioned anywhere in the agreement that it will remain intact for any specific period. On the contrary, Article 2 of the treaty says that "His Highness the Amir will at no time exercise interference in the territories lying beyond this line [Durand Line] on the side of India." So far the idea of lease is concerned, this word (lease) has not been used anywhere in all the treaties signed between Afghanistan and British India. Similarly, there is nothing on the record to prove that the Amir was threatened either by Mortimer Durand or any other member of his mission. Amir Abdur Rahman has nowhere stated in his autobiography or on any other occasion till his death in 1901 that he was forced to sign the treaty. On the



contrary, he considered the Durand Agreement as "his grand climactic of honour and success."<sup>64</sup> Amir Abdur Rahman repeatedly expressed his full satisfaction over the Durand Agreement.<sup>65</sup> Afghan writers criticize the British Afghan policy as well as the Russian-British competition for supremacy in Central Asia. But they forget the most important point i.e. Afghanistan survived as an independent state due to the Anglo-Russian rivalry. This rivalry not only ensured the Afghan independence rather the Russo-British frontier policies created the modern frontiers of Afghanistan by delimiting its borders in every direction of its neighbourhood. The process of boundary-making during the nineteenth century, gave to the ruling Afghan dynasty control over territory and population which, in other circumstances, it might never have acquired.<sup>66</sup>

Similarly, it is repugnant to historical facts to say that the Durand Agreement is of suspicious nature as the Amir did not understand English. It should be noted that all the discussions were conducted in Persian as according to the Amir, "Durand, being a very clever statesman as well as a good Persian scholar, all discussions were soon put right..."<sup>67</sup> Each article of the treaty was thoroughly studied, checked, rechecked and then signed. Successive Afghan government signed several treaties in which they reaffirmed their pledge to honour the Durand Agreement both in letter and spirit. It is on record that Afghanistan has verified the validity of the Durand Agreement several times. Amir Habibullah, the successor of Amir Abdur Rahman, signed a treaty with the British India on 21st March 1905.\* The Amir pledged in second para of the treaty that "...the engagements which His Highness, my late father, that is, Ziaul-millat-wa-ud-din, who had found mercy, may God enlighten his tomb! concluded and acted upon with the Exalted British Government, I [Amir Habibullah] also have acted, am acting and will act upon the same agreement and compact, and I will not contravene them in any dealing or in any promise."<sup>68</sup> In February 1919, Amir Habibullah was murdered and his son, Amanullah Khan took control of the country. His representative, Ali Ahmad Khan signed the "treaty of Rawalpindi" on 8th August 1919.\* Article 5 of the

\*Appendix-E, p.174.

\*Appendix-F, p.176.

treaty says that "The Afghan Government accept the Indo-Afghan frontier accepted by the late Amir. They further agree to the early demarcation of a British Commission of the undemarcated portion of the line west of the Khyber, where the recent Afghan aggression took place, and to accept such boundary as the British Commission may lay down."<sup>69</sup> This was followed by another treaty signed on 22<sup>nd</sup> November 1921 in Kabul. It was aimed at establishing friendly and commercial relations between Afghanistan and British India.

When Nadir Shah came into power, the Afghan representative General Shah Wali Khan exchanged notes with the British administration in London on 6th May 1930. General Shah Wali Khan writes in his note, "...in view of the recent accession to the Afghan Throne of His Majesty King Muhammad Nadir Shah, to reaffirm the validity of the Treaty concluded at Kabul on November 22<sup>nd</sup>, 1921, with the four Letters annexed thereto, and of the Trade Convention concluded on June 5<sup>th</sup>, 1923. I have the honour, in reply, also to place on record that it is our understanding that these two Treaties continue to have full force and effect."<sup>70</sup> After settlement of the Dokalim dispute, the Afghan Minister for Foreign Affairs Sardar Faiz Khan in his letter sent to the British Minister in Kabul, Sir Richard Roy Maconachie on February 3, 1934, explained that the demarcated line in the vicinity of Dokalim forms the international boundary between Afghanistan and India. The letter says that "the Royal Government of Afghanistan under the rule of His Majesty Muhammad Zahir Shah confirms the boundary line, as demarcated by the said representatives..."<sup>71</sup> This shows that each and every Afghan ruler before partition of the Sub-continent accepted the Durand Line as an international border. It was with the emergence of Pakistan that Afghanistan raised objections regarding the Durand Agreement, creating tension in relations between the two neighbouring countries. A year later, the Afghan Ambassador to Pakistan, Sardar Shah Wali Khan tried to cool down the tense atmosphere. Addressing the Aligarh old Boys Association in Karachi in June 1948, Sardar Shah Wali Khan declared that "Our King has clearly stated that I as

representative of Afghanistan Government with full sense of responsibility declare that Afghanistan have no claim on the Frontier territory and even if there were any, they have been given up in favour of Pakistan. Any thing contrary to this which may have appeared in the press is the past or may appear in future should not be given credence and should be considered just a canard.”<sup>72</sup> This announcement of the Afghan ambassador was highly appreciated by people of Pakistan in general and that of KP and FATA in particular.

### **Asmar Issue**

Since 1861, the Amir was claiming Asmar and Bajour as the Afghan territory but the Indian government flatly rejected the claim. In past, Bajour actually comprised four major independent Khanates. These were Nawagai, Khar, Jandul and Asmar, all located on the left bank of the Kunar River. The rulers of these khanates belonged to one and the same family. They all were descendants of a common personality, Qamardin Khan of Nawagai. The total area of Asmar is about 500 square miles. The Amir has cast his eyes on the Kunar valley especially Asmar since long. He was of the opinion that this would pave the way for the Afghan occupation and annexation of Kafiristan.<sup>73</sup>

This Khanate had its own ruler. Writing in 1879, C.R. Markham says, “Asmar forms an independent state...”<sup>74</sup>At the time of McNaior’s visit to Dir, Chitral and Kafiristan in 1883, Hazrat Ali was the chief of Asmar. He died due to an accidental discharge of his gun in 1886 and was succeeded by his son, Tamash Khan. Amir Abdur Rahman says that “Timur Mirza Shah [Tamash Khan], the ruler of Asmar, gave me the oath of allegiance... and put himself as well as his country under my protection against an expected attack from his powerful enemy, Umra Khan of Bajour.”<sup>75</sup> Tamash Khan was murdered by his Kafir servant in 1890.<sup>76</sup> His daughter was engaged to Habibullah Khan, the son of Amir Abdur Rahman. In his letter to one of most trusted Afghan agents, Muhammad Said Khan, (who had now got an employment with Umra Khan), Sardar Habibullah Khan, (the son of Amir Abdur

Rahman) writes that “as regards the intention of the Khan of Jandul to seize Asmar, please God, he has no power to move in that direction. God willing, through the endeavour of my father, arrangements will be made for those parts.”<sup>77</sup> The Afghan *Sipah Salar* [Commander-in-Chief], Ghulam Haider Khan arrived in Asmar, on the pretext of escorting her (the girl) to Kabul but his real objective was to check the influence of Umra Khan.<sup>78</sup> Throwing light on the mission of the Afghan Commander-in Chief, Amir Abdur Rahman writes on November 24, 1891 that “now that the *Sipah Salar* is proceeding with the troops to settle the frontier districts of the God-granted Government, please God, everything will be properly arranged.”<sup>79</sup> Ghulam Haider Khan won sympathy of Nawagai Khan [Bajour] to support the Afghan candidate for the Khanship of Asmar, the infant son of the late Thamash Khan. On the other hand, Umra Khan extended assistance to the late Khan’s half brother, Ghulam Khan, a partisan of his own. The latter, with Umra Khan’s help, succeeded in establishing himself in Asmar.<sup>80</sup> This enraged the Khan of Nawagai who collected a *lashkar* against Umra Khan. But Umra Khan enjoying support of other independent tribes including Mamunds, was able to defeat the enemy by inflicting heavy losses on them both in men and material. In March 1892, the *Sipah Salar* succeeded in occupying Asmar. Three months later, he sent soldiers to Shortan but Umra Khan once again succeeded in driving out the Afghan troops from the area. Now Umra Khan was surrounded by enemies from all sides i.e. Afghanistan, the Mehtar of Chitral and the Nawagai Khan. He, therefore, made an appeal to the British authorities for supply of arms and ammunition, but his request was turned down. He was also stopped from lifting the two hundred rifles and ten thousand cartridges from Peshawar which were earlier purchased with the permission of the Indian government.<sup>81</sup>

The Indian government strongly opposed to the occupation of Asmar by the Afghan soldiers. Explaining the situation, Foreign Secretary, Mortimer Durand says that “the Amir is behaving worse than ever, and I cannot see where it is to end.” The British Foreign Secretary further says that the

Amir has taken Asmar, in spite of our prohibitions against meddling with Bajour.”<sup>82</sup> In his letter addressed to the Chief Secretary Punjab dated June 28, 1892, Mortimer Durand writes that Asmar “is certainly not within the limits of Afghanistan, and so long as it continues to be occupied by an Afghan force, there can no security for peace upon this part of the frontier.”\* The Viceroy also sent a letter to Amir Abdur Rahman clarifying the actual position.\* The Viceroy writes that “Asmar was the frontier of your country but Ghulam Haider Khan has now actually occupied it.” He regretted that the Amir intends to annex Asmar. The Viceroy asked the Amir “to withdraw his forces from Asmar without delay as it has become evident that further conflict will be inevitable unless Afghan force retires from Asmar.”<sup>83</sup> Side by side with this, the Foreign Office sent a message to Commissioner Peshawar Division to tell Umra Khan to recall his men from Nasrat [Chitrali territory which became part of Afghanistan in 1895] as the Amir has been warned “to withdraw his troops without delay from Asmar limits.<sup>84</sup> However, Afghanistan paid no heed to these repeated calls from the Indian government to vacate Asmar. The Indian government also started working on a proposal to give Asmar to Umra Khan. As Commissioner Peshawar Division says, “...Asmar might be made over to Umra Khan on the understanding that his somewhat indefinite relations with us would be maintained, whilst he in return for this concession might agree to give up his designs on Swat.”<sup>85</sup> But the situation took a new turn with the signing of the Durand Agreement. Under article 3 of the Durand Agreement, Asmar was given in the control of Afghanistan. This greatly upset Umra Khan, who so far was on friendly terms with the Indian government. The Amir also hired services of Mukhtar Shah Badshah of Kunar to assist Ghulam Haider Khan in inducing tribes of Kunar and Asmar to accept the Afghan rule.

But this did not satisfy the Amir and his commander-in-Chief Ghulam Haider Khan. They were bent upon bringing maximum area of Bajour under the control of Afghanistan. The Amir started giving allowance to Haji Mirzaman Khan, chief of Shamozaï branch of Utman Khel to further the Afghan

\*Appendix-G, p.178.

\*Appendix-H, p.181.

cause in Bajour. The Afghan Commander-in-Chief also wanted to bring Mamund and other areas of Bajour under the sway of Kabul. He deputed Akhundzada Mullah Muslim to induce the people of Bajour to join Afghanistan and even pay *Ushar* if demanded as the Amir was the ruler of Islam. The Amir wanted to win sympathy of Safdar Khan of Nawagai and issued two "farmans" or order on 15<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> May 1894 respectively that he will give the Sipah Salar all possible assistance and advice in official business. But Safdar declined the offer.<sup>86</sup> He (Safdar Khan) observed that "he would not let the Amir to have even an inch of land in Bajour."<sup>87</sup> On the other hand, Ghulam Haider Khan sent a letter to Umra Khan requesting him to switch over his side (the Amir) and give his whole country to Afghanistan and for that he will receive a subsidy of 50, 000 rupees for per annum. At this Umra Khan and Safdar formed an alliance to maintain independence and protect their country against the foreign rulers.<sup>88</sup> When disappointed from Safdar Khan, the Amir on 19<sup>th</sup> October 1894 sent a letter to Muhammad Ali Khan, son of Safdar Khan saying that "your stupid father has abandoned the right path and enlisted himself in the category of Kafir." Afghanistan wanted to occupy Bajour with the use of force but the British government warned the Amir that if he ever attempted any aggression on Bajour, it [the British Government] would enforce the line against him in fullest sense. The British government asked Kabul to stop giving allowances and direct Ghulam Haider Khan not to receive people from this side of the border or to communicate with them.

Despite this, Mortimer Durand made every possible gesture of good will to Afghanistan while holding discussion with Amir Abdur Rahman. He out of proportional generosity, agreed to give Asmar in the control of Afghanistan. He also gave out Shurton and Marawar areas of Bajour to Kabul. It was due to the Asmar issue that cracks developed in friendship between Umra Khan and the British authorities. This resulted in open hostility between the two allies. Umra Khan at last resorted to the gun boat diplomacy (although it was immature decision) by attacking Chitral and arresting several India soldiers and two British officers. This pushed the

area into the war of 1895 (the Relief of Chitral).

Some Afghan writers claim that the Durand Agreement has lost its validity as it was cancelled by the Afghan parliament in June 1949. But they forget that international accords cannot be cancelled until and unless a provision is provided for the same in the treaty or mutually agreed upon. The issue became so hot in 1950s that it was taken up at the Commonwealth level. The British Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, Philip Noel-Baker while addressing a press conference in Karachi on January 21, 1950, declared that under international law Pakistan is the lawful inheritor of the rights and duties of the old Indian Government of the regions on the Pakistan side of the Durand Line.<sup>89</sup> The same year, the issue was twice raised in the British House of Common. Explaining the actual position and the British policy towards the Pak-Afghan border, Philip Noel-Baker declared in the house on 30<sup>th</sup> June 1950 that "it is His Majesty's Government's view that Pakistan is in international law the inheritor of the rights and duties of the old Government of India, and of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, in these territories, and the Durand Line is the international frontier."<sup>90</sup> The matter once again came up for discussion in the British Parliament on 1<sup>st</sup> March 1956. Prime Minister Sir Anthony Eden while responding to a question of Mr. Mott-Radclyffe said that "Pakistan came into existence as a new, sovereign, independent member of the Commonwealth. Her Majesty's Government regard her as having, with the full consent of the overwhelming majority of the Pashtu-speaking people concerned, both in the administrative and non-administered areas, succeeded to the exercise of the powers formerly exercised by the Crown in India on the North-West Frontier of the Sub-continent. Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom fully support the Government of Pakistan in maintaining their sovereignty over the areas east of the Durand Line and in regarding this Line as the International frontier with Afghanistan."<sup>91</sup> Indo-Afghan writers and some Pakhtun nationalists argue that KP should be handed over to Afghanistan as in the past it had ruled over Peshawar and Kohat etc. But Pakistani people

question that whether Afghanistan will be ready to return Herat and Kandahar to Iran and Mazar-e-Sharif to Uzbekistan as these areas were parts of Iran and Uzbekistan in the past? For how long, the US soil remained in the hands of the Red Indians and for how many centuries the Muslims have ruled over Spain and Eastern Europe? Whether anybody will return these areas to those who governed them in the past? Frontiers of countries can be redrawn on the basis of centuries old claims and counter claims and if this is the case, map of the whole World will have to be changed.

Another group of Afghan writers argue that Khyber Pakhtunkhwa should be merged with Afghanistan due to similarities in their language and culture. But they don't remember that two thirds Pakhtuns are living in Pakistan and it is unrealistic that majority should join minority. Only minority can join majority. It should be remembered that Pakhtun is the largest tribal human race living in almost all parts of the world right from Scandinavia to Australia and Canada to Russia. Some of them have forgotten their language but try their level best to keep live their traditions. Neither Kabul, nor Kandahar is the largest Pakhtun city on the globe. This credit goes to Karachi.

Similarly, it should be kept in mind that there are Tajaks, Uzbeks, Turkmen and Hazara communities in Afghanistan. Whether Afghanistan would be ready to let them join Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Iran? There is a great contradiction in the Afghan policy. It is demanding the right of self determination for Pakistani Pakhtuns but denying the same to its non Pashto speaking nationalities. Instead of calling themselves as Afghans, they prefer to be called by the name of Uzbek, Turkmen, Tajik and Hazara etc. National unity and national integration has become an old story.<sup>92</sup> There are no such feelings among people of KP, FATA and Pashto speaking areas of Baluchistan to join or to go to the other side of the border. Despite wide spread propaganda especially on Radio Kabul, the ex-US Ambassador to Afghanistan, Robert Gerhard Neumann says that "I could never discover the slightest indication of any great sympathy



for Pushtunistan joining Afghanistan on the other side of the border.<sup>93</sup> No doubt, the language and culture of the people living on both sides of the Durand Line are the same but they are like brothers living in two separate houses. People on this side of the border have always helped Afghanistan during its critical hours but seldom sought their assistance. Millions of IDPs shifted to different areas of Pakistan during recent unrest in Swat and tribal agencies right from Bajour to South Waziristan but not a single one of them went to Afghanistan. What lesson this gives? Pakhtuns of Pakistan would never opt to join Afghanistan as they are more at ease than those Pakhtuns living in Afghanistan, which is much poor and underdeveloped as compared to Pakistan.

So far Pakistan, is concerned it has no claim even on a single inch territory of Afghanistan despite the fact that it has suffered too much due to the Durand Agreement. On the contrary, Afghanistan which greatly benefited from this treaty, is claiming a vast territory of Pakistan. Such claims do not give fruitful results but it is only wastage of time, resources and creating ill will between people of the two countries. Boundaries of countries cannot be changed mere with claims and one has to call a spade a spade. The head of Afghan National Congress Party, Latif Perdrum while addressing a press conference in Paris on 1<sup>st</sup> July 2004, said that “Durand Line has to be recognized. Border had to be left where it now stood in order to distinguish who was Afghan and who was Pakistani. This crisis had to be solved. The Pakhtuns on the other side [Pakistan] do not want to join ruined Afghanistan.”<sup>94</sup> The non-Pashto speaking Afghans do not support those Afghans who are claiming Pakistani territory. They are already in minority and they do not want to be further sidelined by the majority. They want an end to this controversy. A spokesman of the Afghan National Front, Jafar Kohistani at a press conference in Kabul on 5<sup>th</sup> June 2008 stressed the need for an amicable solution to the Durand Line controversy. He termed it as “the mother of all conflicts between Afghanistan and Pakistan.”<sup>95</sup> Kabul and Islamabad should desist from turning the Durand Line into a flashpoint. If China and Russia can settle differences about their 4,300

k.m long common border through negotiation, then why Pakistan and Afghanistan can't do so. The question of Durand Line is not as much complicated as was the Sino-Russian border dispute. Skirmishes took place between the Chinese and Russian troops in 1929 and 1960s due to their border dispute. However, leaders of the two countries demonstrated sagacity and signed an agreement in July 2008 ending the long standing territorial dispute. For years, armies of the two countries stood eyeball to eyeball with enormous tanks and artillery on their border, and "if full scale war had broken out, it could have led to one of the largest land battles in history."<sup>96</sup> It is a lesson for Afghanistan and Pakistan. It is in the supreme interest of Pakistan and Afghanistan to forget past and work collectively for peace and stability in the region. The two neighbours have suffered huge losses both in men and material due to the ongoing instability, terrorism and extremism. If they did not cooperate, they will suffer more and history will never forgive leaders, public opinion makers, writers and intellectuals for not playing their role to avert the threat hovering over the region especially on Pak-Afghan border areas. Taking quick and bold decisions are need of the hour so that both the countries could divert their resources to the socio-economic development of their people.

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# 3

## DEMARCATIION OF THE BORDER IN BAJOUR, DIR AND CHITRAL

It is generally believed that Pak-Afghan border has not been demarcated due to one reason or the other. According to David B. Edwards, "while no British subject was ever allowed to enter tribal territory to survey the actual line and no cairns were set up in place to show where Afghan sovereignty ended and British sovereignty began..."<sup>1</sup> An Afghan writer says that Pak-Afghan border "has never been demarcated either, especially from Khyber Agency north to Chitral."<sup>2</sup> A Pakistani journalist, Shaukat Piracha is of the opinion that Pak-Afghan "boundary has remained un-demarcated except at one or two place."<sup>3</sup> However, statements of both the writers are unfounded and contrary to the historical facts. Under the Article No. 4 of the Durand Agreement, the whole Indo-Afghan border was to be demarcated. Three commissions were constituted for this purpose. These include Asmar Boundary Commission, Afghan-Waziristan Boundary Commission and Baluch-Afghan Boundary Commission. These commissions delimited the Indo-Afghan border thus making it as one of the "best defined and most clearly recognized frontiers in the world."<sup>4</sup>

Mortimer Durand had nothing to do with the demarcation of the border. He was already posted as the Minister

Plenipotentiary at the British Mission in Tehran. The post was much lower than his caliber and expectations. In 1900, he was appointed as the British Ambassador to Spain (1900-1903). From 1903 to 1906, Mortimer Durand acted as the ambassador to the USA which he really liked and enjoyed. He died in England in 1924. He had written a number of books including a novel on Nadir Shah of Persia. However, his great achievement "was the creation of the Durand Line, which laid down British policy on the North-West Frontier of India, and resulted in the actual delimitation of both the administrative and the political boundaries."<sup>5</sup>

The first commission was assigned the task of delimiting the border in Chitral, Dir, Bajour, Mohmand, Khyber and onward to Koh-e-Safid in Kurram Agency. Commissioner Peshawar Division, Sir Richard Udny who had earlier served as a Political Officer with several expeditions in Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa was posted as British Commissioner for this task. On the other hand, Amir Abdur Rahman appointed his *Sipah Salar* (Commander-in-Chief), Ghulam Haider Khan as the Afghan Commissioner.\* He was known as "the great Ghulam Haider Khan" as he was tall with a strong body.<sup>6</sup> Captain Younghusband, posted in Chitral was to help Mr. Udny by explaining to the Mehtar and the Kafirs of Hindu Kush that the demarcation party was engaged on a peaceful work and not on a hostile mission.

The Indian government on the request of Afghanistan agreed to protect the rights of those Afghan subjects who may prove that their land was located on the Indian side of the border. It accepted giving accession of minor changes in the agreed border so that the concerned tribes could not be deprived of their land. The Indian government advised Mr. Udny not to indulge himself in Bajour-Chitral dispute. Initially, it was decided that the demarcation work would be started from Khyber. It was expected that the delimitation in Khyber would be completed within a month. However, Amir Abdur Rahman requested that the demarcation should be started from the Chitral side.<sup>7</sup> It was agreed that the Khyber's portion would be demarcated after such work is completed in

\*Appendix-I, p.184.

Chitral, Dir, Bajour, and Mohmand. He had to start the demarcation from Chitral frontier meaning "beginning from Chanak.<sup>8</sup>" Chanak is also known by the name of Banda Toti Sheikh. The word Chanak has been clearly mentioned in the Article No. 3 of the Durand Agreement. Mr. Udny issued a proclamation to inform all the tribes living on the Indian side of the border from Mohmand to the southern limits of Chitral about his mission.\* The proclamation was circulated among all the tribes living along the Indo-Afghan border in Dir, Bajour, Mohmand and Khyber. When the Afghan *Sipah Salar* came to know about the proclamation, "he issued orders and sent messengers to have all the copies secured and they were either destroyed or sent to the Amir at Kabul."<sup>9</sup> This indicates the intentions of the Afghan authorities.

Before starting his actual work on the ground, Mr. Udny sent a letter from Simla in July 1894 to his Afghan counterpart, Ghulam Haider Khan. Two messengers i.e. Muhammad Ali and Alamdin took the letter to Ghulam Haider Khan in Asmar. The Afghan *Sipah Salar* enraged to see the messengers and refused to receive the letter. He directed them to post the same to him. Later on, he changed mind and took the letter but warned his guards not to allow the entry of such people in his camp. After consultation with the viceroy, Mr. Udny left Simla for Peshawar on 10<sup>th</sup> August 1894 where he reached after two days of journey. District Superintendent Police, Peshawar, Mr. C. G. Hastings was appointed as his second in command in the commission. The party also included Sir Thomas Hungerford Holdich, Lt. Coldstream, Khan Bahadur Ibrahim Khan (who was being paid a lump sum salary of 250 rupees per month), Surgeon Macnab, a native Surveyor, Khan Sahib Abdul Ghafar Khan and Superintendent of the Commissioner's Vernacular Office, Rai Bahadur Pandit Ishar Das (Mir Munchi). Monthly salaries of the staff were fixed as below:-

	Rs
➤ Mir Munshi (and Translator)	250
➤ English clerk	70
➤ Muharrir (Vernacular)	60
➤ Native Treasurer ("Khazanchi")	60



Mr. Udney hired the services of 43 low staff members i.e. clerks, a treasurer, *Daftri* and cooks etc. He also ordered for purchasing 31 tents to be used during their stay in Afghanistan.<sup>10</sup> The government placed a sum of Rs. 20, 000 at the disposal of Mr. Udney for miscellaneous political expenditure in connection with the demarcation work.<sup>11</sup>

The commissioner accompanied by his team members crossed the Indo-Afghan border at Torkham on 17<sup>th</sup> August. He had one and a half hour meeting with Afghan Commander-in-Chief in Jalalabad on 21<sup>st</sup> August. Mr. Udney was alone while the *Sipah Salar* was assisted by a local *Hakim* (doctor), Ahmad Jan and Colonel Abdul Karim Khan, who had escorted Udney's party from the border to Jalalabad. During their negotiations, the *Sipah Salar* argued that the whole of Kafiristan as far as Barikot has fallen in the territorial limits of Afghanistan and Arnawai belong to India. He professed knowing nothing about the Bashgal Valley. He also laid a bold claim over the whole of Mohmand. This resulted in failure of the talks. They, however, agreed to meet again next day. This time Mr. Udney was accompanied by Khan Bahadar Ibrahim Khan. The *Sipah Salar* claimed that besides Narai and Sao, the whole of Asmar including Mirkandi belongs to Afghanistan. He also showed a map which was totally different from those signed in Kabul during the Durand Mission. The new map was prepared by Rahim Bakhsh and Imran Bakhsh, both employees of the Amir of Afghanistan.<sup>12</sup> This map was showing the whole of Mohmand on the Afghan side.<sup>13</sup> In this way, the two day negotiations proved fruitless. Five days later (27<sup>th</sup> August), they once again met in Jalalabad. The Afghan commissioner was now reluctant to continue the talks and informed his Indian counterpart that he was busy in preparations to undertake operations in Kafiristan. Mr. Udney then returned to Peshawar on 31<sup>st</sup> August 1894 and from there went to Simla. He again arrived in Jalalabad on 7<sup>th</sup> December 1894 to restart the demarcation work. He had a meeting with Ghulam Haider Khan the same day and both the commissioners agreed to start demarcation work from the

Asmar side. They started their journey for Asmar on 10<sup>th</sup> December and reached there on 16<sup>th</sup> December 1894. They then moved to Nashagam [Palasgor] from where Chanak is located at a distance of about five km. They could not go beyond Nashagam as the area was in the control of Umra Khan, "the Napoleon of the Frontier."<sup>14</sup> The *Sipah Salar* had an advance post at Nashagam. The Afghan government had deployed heavy 24 guns and 9 regiments of infantry aggregating between 6,000 to 7,000 men on the northern side of Kunar River. Mr. Udney and his party set up their camp on the southern side of the river (towards Bajour) at Nashagam.

The British administration wanted to lay down the eastern and northern boundaries of Asmar carefully to prevent any sort of dispute in future. But this was possible only in concert with Umra Khan. The British authorities were keen to get his support for this purpose. Foreign Secretary W. J. Cunningham asked the Chief Secretary Punjab that "it would be well if Umra Khan accompanied, or sent a representative to accompany the Joint Commissioners while engaged on the demarcation of that portion of the border which adjoins his territory." But the Khan was of the opinion that he will meet Mr. Udney at Sao and assist him provided "the Government give him [Umra Khan] Asmar and cause it to be evacuated by the Amir's troops."<sup>15</sup> This was now impossible for the British authorities as they had allowed Afghanistan under the Durand Agreement to keep hold on Asmar. Anyhow, Khan Ibrahim Khan visited Umra Khan's fort at Sao, about 8 km from Nashagam. In addition to this, Mr. Udney sent a letter to Umra Khan on 11<sup>th</sup> December 1894 with concurrence of the *Sipah Salar*, inviting him either to come himself or to send a representative to his (Mr. Udney) camp as a guest to lend a helping hand in the demarcation work. Umra Khan is said to have thrown this letter in an open *Darbar* saying "unless the British give him Asmar, he would have nothing to do with it, and never be on friendly terms, rather oppose them to the bitter end."<sup>16</sup> When failed to receive a reply, Mr. Udney sent another letter to the Khan on 26<sup>th</sup> December. After lapse of ten days, Mr. Udney received a letter from Umra Khan excusing himself for not having replied earlier due to illness of his

trusted agent, Badshah Jan. Mr. Udny wanted to give some cash to Umra Khan as a gift if he visited him. But this did not happen. Mr. Udny writes that "this resentment (about Asmar) kept him back from meeting me at Chanak, or from assisting me in the demarcation of the boundary down the valley southward from Chanak, the loss would be his own, as the line would be drawn without our hearing anything he might have to urge against it."<sup>17</sup>

Earlier, Umra Khan was on good terms with the Indian government. It was after signing of the Durand Agreement and arrival of the Asmar Boundary Commission in the vicinity of Bajour and Dir that he became suspicious about the intentions of the Indian government fearing that British were bent upon to annex all the territories up to the line decided upon as the Amir's frontier. The Amir wanted to milk the occasion and he developed a rapport with the Khan. An agent of the Afghan Commander-in-Chief came to him [Umra Khan] to make overtures from the Amir and to offer him Asmar if he will become reconciled with His Highness [Amir Abdur Rahman].<sup>18</sup> The Amir also sent some gifts to Umra Khan with a warning that the British Government intended taking possession of his country.<sup>19</sup> In this way, the arch rivals came closer to each other under the theory of "the enemy of my enemy is my friend." Umra Khan declared that "I have failed to get what I want from Government, I am now going to see what I can get out of the Amir."<sup>20</sup> Throwing light on this new development, the British Agent at Gilgit, George Robertson says that "ever since my mission to Chitral in 1893 there has been a *rapprochement* between the Amir and Umra Khan; the determination of both being that English should be forced out of Chitral—a natural enough wish on their part."<sup>21</sup> In the mean time, Umra Khan involved himself in the internal affairs of Chitral out of proportion after the murder of Mehtar Nizam-ul-Mulk in January 1895. After much delay, Umra Khan's representatives arrived in Nashagam 22<sup>nd</sup> February 1895 to have a meeting with Mr. Udny. They presented a petition on behalf of Umra Khan regarding the proposed boundary line but the later was now in no mood to listen them. Umra Khan annoyed the British administration and

pushed it towards Guhlam Haider Khan. The later fully exploited the absence of Umra Khan from the proceedings of the Asmar Boundary Commission as well as the crisis in Chitral.

### **The Question of Nasrat District and Bashgal**

Afghanistan wanted to occupy the District Nasrat so that it could get passage for its troops to penetrate into Bashgal valley. It is worth mentioning that the Nasrat district [renamed as Narai district and incorporated into the Afghan province of Kunar] has remained an integral part of Chitral for centuries. Its inhabitants were *Kafirs* (infidels) and subjects of Chitral. The valley was called Nasrat by Chitralis, and "Satrgrom by the *Kafirs*."<sup>22</sup> It was in 1697 that Muhammad Shafi, the then Mehtar of Chitral conferred all the revenues of Nasrat on a pious Chitrali, Mullah Baba Adam and his successors. The privileges were renewed by Mohtaram Shah in 1759.<sup>23</sup> The document was also verified by the succeeding Mehtars Shah Nawaz in 1775 and Shah Afzal during their reign. The Khan of Asmar, Hazrat Ali attacked Nasrat in 1877 but a *lashkar* from Chitral headed by Aman-ul-Mulk who was a young boy at that time "inflicted defeat on the Asmaris."<sup>24</sup> The Mehtar then constructed a fort at Nasrat to ward off any such attack in future. "The people of Nasrat were originally *Kafirs*. But they were converted to Islam by the efforts from Dir."<sup>25</sup> It was Mehtar Afzul-ul-Mulk [the new Mehtar] who withdrew the Chitrali levies from Narai, the headquarters of Nasrat district after the death of his father, Aman ul Mulk in 1892. The people of Narai thereupon recalled Akram Jan, a converted *Kafir*, who was formerly the Governor of Nasrat, now living as a refuge in Jandul. On Akram Jan's request, Umra Khan sent a *lashkar* under the command of Gul Wali Khan to support him.<sup>26</sup> In retaliation, the new Mehtar, Afzal-ul-Mulk immediately collected an army to expel Umra Khan's men from there. The force had not yet started for the mission when Sher Afzal not only toppled the Mehtar but also killed him. The army destined for Nasrat dispersed. Umra Khan built a fort in Nasrat, and his move was merely a counter-move to the Amir's continued occupation of Asmar.<sup>27</sup> The new

Mehtar, Nizam-ul-Mulk could not concentrate on the recovery of Nasrat due to his preoccupation of strengthening his position at home. Explaining the difficulty face by the Mehtar, the British Agent at Gilgit, George Robertson says, "the faction opposed to the present Mehtar tries to make capital out of the fact that the Nasrat District has gone out of Chitral control, while the Mehtar Nizam-ul-Mulk is anxious to convince his people that he is only restrained from resuming this country by force of arms because he is prevented doing so by the Government of India."<sup>28</sup> There was tug of war for power in Chitral after Nizam-ul-Mulk became the Mehtar of Chitral. This was followed by an attack of Umra Khan on Ushtargaz, a *Kalash Kafir* village near the opening of the Bashgal valley.<sup>29</sup> The Political Officer Chitral asked the Indian government to restore both the areas to Chitral. He argues that "affairs cannot go on much longer this. A collision between the Mehtar and Umra Khan ...would possible prove most inconvenient to ourselves and the Mehtar"<sup>30</sup>

Umra was making all out efforts to strengthen his position in the area by starting construction of a fort at Barikot. The Afghan Commander-in-Chief asked him to stop the project but Umra Khan replied that "he would not comply with his request and would not suspend the construction of the Barikot Fort unless the *Sipah Salar* evacuated Asmar, which was a part and parcel of Bajour."<sup>31</sup> The people of Bailam [Bargam] village of Nasrat wanted to meet members of the Asmar Boundary Commission to tell them that their area belongs to Chitral but the Afghan Commander-in-Chief forbade them to appear before the commission. Bakhtawar Shah Mehtarjao, a descendant of the Mehtars of Chitral, living in Bailam wrote a letter to Assistant British Agent in Chitral, Captain Younghusband in this regard.<sup>32</sup>

During their talks at Nashagam on 21<sup>st</sup> February 1895, Ghulam Haider Khan laid a claim that Sao and Nari (Nasrat District) belong to Afghanistan. He argued that all the areas up to the village of Arwanai (Arandu) have been given to Afghanistan under the Durand Agreement. Mr. Udny at first rejected Ghulam Haider Khan's plea by saying that under

Article No. 3 of the Durand Agreement, the Amir was to have the Kunar valley up to Chanak, not beyond and the said areas were outside the Afghan territory. He wrote a letter to the Afghan Commander-in-Chief on February 22, 1895 saying that "...I cannot admit that you are entitled of right to Sao and Nari because whatever arguments may be adduced about the name Arnawai, it was not said in the Convention [Durand Agreement] that His Highness the Amir was to have the Kunar Valley up to Arnawai, but only that Arnawai was outside the Afghan boundary and that His Highness was to have the Kunar valley up to Chanak."<sup>33</sup> It may be recalled that the bridge constructed by Umra Khan at Sao, was cut by Ghulam Haider Khan's men. But all of a sudden, Mr. Udny changed his mind [this was perhaps due to non-cooperative attitude of Umra Khan] and not only allowed the Afghan Commander-in-Chief to have Sao and Nari but also Birkot. Mr. Udny further writes in the same letter that "...I must again repeat that this boundary was not capable of being claimed in any way under the Convention [Durand Agreement], and I trust that you will not only admit that my agreeing to it is a remarkably friendly concession, but that you will be prepared on your part to act in a similar conciliatory spirit if difficulties should arise hereafter about any point of the delimitation elsewhere."<sup>34</sup>

The British Commissioner Mr. Udny violated the Durand Agreement by allowing Afghanistan to have control over the Nasrat District. However, instead of giving concession, Afghanistan adopted a well thought policy of maximum gains and further claims. Encouraged by this success, Ghulam Haider Khan asserted that the Bashgal valley also belongs to Afghanistan. The valley was known by the name of Bashgal as well as Arnawai. The two words are synonymous and have been used synonymously in the Article 3 of the Durand Agreement. However, there is a Chitrali village named Arandu on the southern side of Chitral River (also known Kunar River). The people of Afghanistan recall the village by the name of Arnawai. Ghulam Haider Khan alleged that only the Arnawai village and not the whole of Arnawai valley belong to Chitral.

Earlier, Mortimer Durand had apprehension in this regard. Therefore, he wrote both the words Arnawai and Bashgal to prevent any sort of misunderstanding in future. He never used Arnawai just for a small village. Ghulam Haider Khan's argument was in complete contrast to the text of the Durand Agreement. Both the words have been used in the Article 3 of the agreement for one and the same place i.e. the Bashgal valley. Similarly, the two words "Bashgal or Arnawai" have not been used in the Durand Agreement in a sense of a minor village. These words have been referred to the big valley located on the northern side of the Chitral River. Name of small villages are seldom mentioned in the international agreements unless it is of the utmost importance and cannot be ignored. It may be recalled that none of the researchers have used the word Arnawai in a sense of a village. They have used it for the Bashgal valley. Colonel Lockhart in his report had used the phrase "Arnawai or Bashgal." Pointing towards Bashgal, W. W. McNair used the name of "Arnawai Darra"<sup>35</sup> But the Afghan Commander-in-Chief created this confusion to score further territorial gains. Mr. Udny wanted to dispose of the work of delimitation of the border at earliest and he did not bother to consult the Chitral based Assistant British Agent or George Scott Robertson (the British Agent in Gilgit). George Robertson was being considered as an authority on Kafiristan in general and Bashgal valley in particular.

But Mr. Udny proved his incompetency by failing to discharge his responsibility honestly. He allowed Afghanistan to occupy Bashgal valley in violation of the Article 3 of the Durand Agreement which states that "the British Government thus agrees to His Highness the Amir retaining Asmar and the valley above it, as far as Chanak. His Highness agrees on the other hand that he will at no time exercise interference in Swat, Bajour or Chitral including the Arnawai or Bashgal valley."<sup>36</sup> Writing to the Afghan Commissioner, Mr. Udny says that "the Government of India out of friendship waived their claim to this valley..."<sup>37</sup> He gave free hand to Afghanistan to occupy the above mentioned areas by telling Ghulam Haider Khan that "...you intend to seize Sao and Nari and to occupy the Bashgal valley...there is no objection whatever to your

occupying as soon as you like the country on both sides of the Kunar river up to the limit of the frontier which we have agreed upon..."<sup>38</sup>

Afghanistan wanted to tarnish the image of Umra Khan so that it could get further territorial benefits. Kabul pretended that Umra Khan was going to attack Bashgal Valley after receiving it as a "remarkably friendly concession from Mr. Udny." Therefore, Ghulam Haider Khan asked Mr. Udny what to do if such a situation arises? In reply, Mr. Udny wrote another letter to Ghulam Haider Khan saying that "...now that this valley has been decided to pertain to His Highness the Amir, you have my full assent to repelling any such invasion by force."<sup>39</sup> In this way, Mr. Udny inflicted great losses to Bajour and Chitral by his irresponsible actions and imprudent policy of giving concessions.

In addition to Bashgal, he also gave away a long strip of area to Afghanistan on the southern side of the Kunar River. Under the Durand Agreement, Afghan border was to be located just four miles on the southern side of Kunar River towards Bajour. Mr. Udny, though a good mathematician, miscalculated many things. He gave extra-ordinary benefits to his Afghan counterpart at the cost of Bajour and Chitral. In this way, Ghulam Haider Khan got everything which he ardently desired. Now he was expecting nothing more. This paved the way for signing of the Nashagam Agreement (also known as Udny Agreement) by the two commissioners on 9<sup>th</sup> April 1895.\* Article VII of the treaty says that "the *Kafir* country (*Kafiristan*) which has now been decided to pertain to the Government of Afghanistan and to be included in the limits of Afghanistan."<sup>40</sup>

Mr. Udny not only betrayed the Indian Government but also the people of Chitral by agreeing to the Afghan proposal to replace the word "Arnawai" with the name of Landi Sin in the Nashagam Agreement. Similarly, the word "Arnawai" was intentionally used just for a small village of Arandu and not for the Bashgal valley. The Asmar Boundary Commission demarcated about 210 km long border from Hindu Kush



range of mountains in the east to the Nawa Kotal in the south. Out of this, 75 km was actually surveyed and the remaining did not. Two maps of this portion of the border were also signed indicating the border by a red line. However, there is a gap of about 25 km as the Afghan Commander-in-Chief declined to escort the Indian Surveyors either into the Bashgal valley or up to the Kunar valley above Chanak. Each commissioner retained one copy of the agreement and the map.<sup>41</sup> It was also agreed that if found desirable, pillars would be erected by officers of the two governments on this portion of the border. The border agreed upon in this section is a great departure from the Durand Agreement and the map (Asmar Section) attached with it. Mortimer Durand had carefully entered a clause in the Kabul (Durand) agreement so that Chitral may retain the Bashgal valley and Amir Abdur Rahman had also agreed to it. However, both the commissioners (Ghulam Haider Khan and Mr. Udny) committed gross violations of the Durand Agreement. The former violated the Durand Agreement by claiming the territories to which Afghanistan was not entitled under the accord. Mr. Udny also breached the Durand Agreement by giving free hand to Afghanistan to occupy and annex the territories which belonged to Chitral and Bajour. In this way, he demonstrated extreme negligence in the task assigned to him. But the Indian Government did not take any action against him because his carelessness cost nothing to the British Empire. Only the people of Bajour and Chitral suffered due to his incompetency and negligence.

Now the two commissioners had to proceed towards Mohmand and Khyber to delimit the remaining border allotted to the Asmar Boundary Commission. But new challenges emerged and further demarcation of the border became impossible as Ghulam Haider Khan asserted that the whole of Mohmand belongs to Afghanistan. Let us touch the question of Mohmand.

The total area of Mohmand Agency is 2296 square kilometers and its population, according to 1998 national census, is 3, 24,453. The Mohmand tribe consists of four

main divisions: the Tarakzai, Halimzai, Baizai and Khwaezai. Other clans living in the area include the Kukkozai, Dawezai, Utmanzai and Safis. The tribes in Mohmand were totally independent of Afghanistan long before the signing of the Durand Agreement. However, Kabul was making efforts to get hold over it. In order to gain influence in Mohmand, Amir Sher Ali Khan married Qamar Jan, the only daughter of Saadat Khan, the then Khan of Lalpura.<sup>42</sup> The Mohmands were in touch with British Government even before the occupation and merger of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA with the British India. Sir Alexander Burnes was the first British officer to come into actual contact with the Mohmands in 1832. He was soon followed by many more Englishmen. In 1838 Torabaz Khan, the nephew and enemy of the then Khan of Lalpura (Saadat Khan), met with officers of Indian army in Jhelum. This induced Colonel Wade to depose Saadat Khan who was known for his anti British policy. He was replaced by Torabaz Khan as the new Khan of Lalpura. After the disasters of 1<sup>st</sup> Anglo-Afghan war, Torabaz Khan was ousted by Saadat Khan and he fled to Peshawar. In 1864, Amir Sher Ali Khan arrested Saadat Khan and his son Nauroz Khan due to pressure exerted by the Indian government in this regard. Saadat Khan died a few months afterwards in captivity, from the effects of severe cold weather of Kabul.<sup>43</sup> The Indian government wanted to have a friendly Khan at Lalpura, therefore, Raza Khan, son of Torabaz Khan was appointed as the Khan. But Sultan Muhammad Khan, the eldest surviving son of Saadat Khan was able to oust him after one and a half year. Anyhow, Malang, son of Raza Khan assassinated Sultan Muhammad Khan in 1870. In January 1880, the Khan of Lalpura, Sadiq Khan was deposed by the British Government and appointed his half brother Akbar Khan as the Khan.<sup>44</sup>

Halimzai and Tarakzai tribes received a grant of 2,947 and 3,430 rupees respectively from the British Government annually. Similarly, the Khan of Pandiyali received 1,000 rupees from British government per annum. The Halimzai clan of Mohmand had signed a peace treaty with the British government on 12<sup>th</sup> July 1852. The treaty says that "they [the Halimzais] consider the friends of the Government to be their

friends, and the Government enemies their foes.”<sup>45</sup> It was after signing of the Durand Agreement that Afghanistan started meddling in the affairs of Mohmand. Afghanistan adopted the carrot and stick policy viz-a-viz the tribal people in order to gain control over their maximum area. Under instructions from the Amir, Ghulam Haider Khan in May 1894, invited to Jalalabad 40 leading Maliks of Mohmand and asked their permission to establish cantonments at Ghanam Shah, near Nawagai, Kotal Karapa on Mohmand-Peshawar road and Ispin Khakh near Shabqadar. The Maliks subsequently held a consultation and resolved not to allow the construction of the Afghan cantonments in their areas.

In September 1894, Ghulam Haider sent one of his agents to Baizai (Mohmand) to ascertain whether this tribe desires to come under the control of Afghanistan or of the British administration. The whole tribe replied that they will resist the Afghan occupation of their land. Amir Abdur Rehman sanctioned a grant of 1, 4000 rupees for Halimzai and 4,500 rupees per annum for Tarakzai tribes of Mohmand with the hope to win their support. Meanwhile, the Indian government issued a proclamation to people of Mohmand stating that their areas belong to the British and the Amir had nothing to do with it.

But Ghulam Haider Khan insisted that Mohmand belongs to Afghanistan. He sent a strong worded warning to the British commissioner by telling that “not a foot shall you set in Mohammad territory.”<sup>46</sup> Thereafter, Afghanistan also sent its agents and hired services of some local people to create problems for the British administration. In this way, the Asmar Boundary Commission failed to complete its assigned task. In July 1896, the Viceroy again proposed the demarcation of the remaining border but got no reply. It was November 1896 that the two governments formed another commission to demarcate the boundary line in Khyber and Mohmand areas. Mr. Udny was posted as officer on special duty while Amir Abdur Rahman once again appointed Ghulam Haider Khan as the Afghan Commissioner. The commission was to demarcate the boundary from Nawa Kotal to Sikaram

peak. Mr. Udny and Ghulam Haider Khan met at Landi Kotal on 12<sup>th</sup> March 1897 for delimiting the last 100 miles of the boundary, yet unsettled. After his tough experience in Asmar, Mr. Udny decided “not to give an inch as there is always danger of the Afghans wanting an ell in the way of further concessions.” The commission failed to start its work due to huge gap between the points of view of the two parties. Since the suspension of demarcation operation upon that portion of the boundary line, the Indian government adopted a tribal boundary upon this section in question. The same year, Afghan troops occupied Maitai area of Bajour. However, they withdrew after receiving a strong worded warning from the Indian government. Later Maitai was detached from Bajour and incorporated in the Mohmand Agency.

### **The Afghan Occupation of Bashgal**

After getting green signal from the British authorities in the shape of the Nashagam Agreement in April 1895, the Afghan authorities left no stone unturned to occupy and annex the strategic valley of Bashgal. It is the most prominent valley of the *Kafiristan* (the land of infidels). It has been now renamed as *Nuristan* or the land of light. *Kafiristan's* capital was Kamdesh, a major town of the Bashgal valley. Before the Afghan occupation, *Kafiristan* was spreading over 8045 square kilometers area. It was a province of Chitrali state, directly ruled by the Mehtar prior to the Durand Agreement. The area is surrounded by Chitral in the east, north-east, Badakhshan in the north, and Kunar in the south-west. If its name, *Kafiristan*, has any significance, it is to suggest that “this is entirely virgin territory, as untouched by the old Islamic civilization that had conquered India as by the British; for kafir in Arabic means unbeliever.”<sup>47</sup> Explaining the geographical location of this area, George Scott Robertson says that “*Kafiristan* is a country of consisting of an intricate series of valleys, side ravines and gullies formed by spurs of the Hindu Kush and their sub-divisions, which run down on the Indian side of that great westward continuation to the mighty mountain separating India and Afghanistan from the rest of Asia.”<sup>48</sup> The problem in *Kafiristan* is that each village

has at least two names and in some cases three i.e. Kafir name, Chitrali as well as Afghan name. Main valleys of *Kafiristan* include Bashgal, Kulam, Dungul, Pittigul, Pech, Darra-e-Nur and Waigal etc. Bashgal valley was also known by the name of Arwanai while Arwanai is also a Pashto name of the Chitrali village i.e. Arandu. Bashgal was included in the dominion of Chitral since long. This area was given the name of *Kafiristan* by its Muslims neighbours. Before the Afghan occupation of their land, people of *Kafiristan* were known as *Siahposh Kafirs* [black clothed infidels]. It is difficult to give exact number of the *Kafir* tribes before occupation and annexation of their land by Afghanistan. "The tribal divisions of the *Kafirs* are some say nine, some twelve, and others a still larger number."<sup>49</sup> Prominent among them are Rungali or Lumgali, Waigali and Bashgali. These main divisions are again subdivided into clans.<sup>50</sup> Nothing can be said with certainty about the origin of the *Siahposh Kafirs*. Different people have presented different theories in this regard. Some writers say that they were Greek Bactrians; others assert they were fire-worshippers; while another group of scholars allege they were Buddhists. The Russians maintained that "they [*Siahposh Kafirs*] are incontestably of Slav origin, and the natural subjects of Czar."<sup>51</sup> Rejecting all these claims, the *Kafirs* say that they are *Quresh* of Arabia and their forefathers fled from there to protect their identity from being swept away by the tides of the new religion, Islam. "They have no books, nor is reading or writing known in the nation, so that they have no written traditions."<sup>52</sup> Even the *Kafirs* have no religious books or any sort of their written history. They just rely only on oral traditions coming down from generation to generation. Their language has a close affinity with Sanskrit, which according to the Hindus "is the mother of languages." The dialects of their language differ from valley to valley and village to village. Prior to their conversion and becoming Sheikhs, they were expert in wine making and presented the same to Babur when he was marching towards Bajour and Dir.

There appears to have been a time in remote history when the *Kafirs* occupied the fertile valleys of Bajour, Swat and Dir...prior to the advent of the Yousfzai upon the scene.<sup>53</sup>

Even Laghman was under their control but slowly and gradually they lost much of the territory. Their neighbours always remained busy how to expel or convert them. Caliph Mu'awiya, sent an expedition to Laghman in 664 but it failed to gain a decisive victory over the *Kafirs*. "Subaktagin and Shahab-ud-Din Ghori led wars against the *Siahposh Kafirs* in 978 and 1179 respectively. They [the *Kafirs*] successfully resisted the attacks of Mehmud of Ghazani...."<sup>54</sup> In 1398 Amir Timur gained a partial victory over them after severe fighting. He engraved the date of his victory over the *Kafir* land on a stone pillar both in Hijri as well as in the *Kafir* era. He also built a fort on the bank of Najil stream. It was known as "Taimur Hissar." In 1453, Sultan Muhammad Mirza, Taimuri of Bokhara led a *Jihad* against them [*Kafirs*]<sup>55</sup> Babur attacked the *Kafir* area of Sigal in 1507. The people of Dir, Bajour and Asmar waged religious wars against these people from time to time. However, after Babar, the only noted and decisive war against the *Kafirs* was fought by Amir Abdur Rahman.

*Kafiristan* is located in the most inaccessible part of the Hindu Kush and its inhabitants remained different from all other nations of Asia for thousands of years before they were forced to give up their culture and traditions. This area has always remained a country of peculiar interest from historical, religious and cultural point of view. In modern times, a Portuguese, Bento de Gois is perhaps the first European who learnt about *Kafiristan* during his journey towards Yarkand via Pamir in 1603 to trace out the Kingdom of Cathay. He was told that "at a distance of 30 days' march there was a territory called Caferstan [*Kafiristan*] which no Mohammedan was allowed to enter."<sup>56</sup> Later on the word "*Kafiristan*" appeared in the *Pilgrimage* series of Samuel Purchas published in 1613.

However, no concrete efforts were made to explore the area. Centuries passed but no European explorer could bother to visit this unique land of the unique people. Credit goes to the ill fated British General of the 1<sup>st</sup> Anglo-Afghan war, Mountstuart Elphinstone who highlighted *Kafiristan* in his book; "An Account of the Kingdom of Cabul" published in 1815. The information given in the book is scanty and not up

to the mark as the author himself had never visited *Kafiristan*. He had obtained that much knowledge from an Afghan national, Mullah Najeeb. Alexander Gardner who was a Colonel of Artillery in the Service of Ranjit Singh visited *Kafiristan* twice in 1826 and 1828 respectively. Accompanied by a *Kafir* priest, Gardner was warmly received by *Kafirs* and "his only difficulty being to escape from the hospitality of his hosts."<sup>57</sup> He was followed by Lt. John Wood who passed through northern portion of the *Kafir* land while leading a mission exploring the passes of Central Asia in 1836-38. Alexander Burnes hired the services of a person in Peshawar "to travel into Chitral for the purpose, among other things, of ascertaining the truth of certain information he received as to the existence in that country of idols, and inscriptions to which the nations ascribed a very remote antiquity."<sup>58</sup> But this idea could not take practical shape. Anyhow, Burnes was able to have interaction with a number *Kafirs* in Kabul who were arrested and brought to the city by some Afghan nationals. He obtained a little bit information about their country, people and traditions. Alexander Burnes threw some dim light on *Kafiristan* in his book, "Personal Narrative of a Journey to Kabul" published in 1842. He says that "their country had many flowers and much shade: numerous coins are found in it, resembling those to be procured about Bajour, and some of which have Grecian inscriptions."<sup>59</sup> With the passage of time, lust for more information about the *Kafir* country increased and British army officers and researchers turned their attention to this remote and little known area. Major Raverty, Major Bellow, Lumsden and Masson etc also wrote about the *Kafirs* but their knowledge about the region and its people was not of first hand as none of them ever visited the area. In 1874, two Christian missionary groups made abortive attempts to enter *Kafiristan*. John Biddulph, the British Political Agent at Gilgit, during his visit to Chitral in 1878 received two delegations of *Kafirs* inviting him to visit their country. He due to one reason or the other could not do so. He, however, succeeded in collecting some information about tribes of the region. He wrote a book, "Tribes of the Hindoo Koosh" which was published from Calcutta in 1880. Sufficient space in the book has been given to the *Kafirs*. In 1879,

Colonel H.C. Tanner of the Survey of India made an attempt to visit *Kafiristan* in disguise.<sup>60</sup> However, he was able to penetrate only into Dara-e-Nur area of *Kafiristan*. He published his experience and knowledge about *Kafiristan* in April 1881. Colonel H.C. Tanner estimated the population of *Kafirs* as one hundred thousand souls. Rudyard Kipling was so much impressed of *Kafiristan* that he dedicated one his short stories, "the Man who would be King" to this region.

*Kafiristan* formed a part of the medieval kingdom, of Bolor; but it is always written of as "the home of an uncouth and savage race of people, with whom it was difficult to establish intercourse."<sup>61</sup> The area was an integral part of Chitral before the Udney agreement. In January 1893, Chitral border "extends least to the crest of the Hindu Kush range and southwards it includes the valleys of Kunar River and a few tributaries."<sup>62</sup> Before the handing over of Bashgal and others *Kafir* areas to Afghanistan, researchers and British officials had to obtain permission and escort from the Mehtar. The Mehtar being suspicious of British activities, always tried his level best to create hurdles in such trips. That is why; the area could not be properly explored. "The valley of Kunar has only been partially explored. The upper part is occupied by the Muhammadan state of Kashkar, or Chitral..."<sup>63</sup> William Watts McNair visited the area in 1883. Accompanied by two Kaka Khel Mian of Nowshera, McNair started the risky journey towards Bashgal. He disguised himself by keeping beard and wearing local dress. He adopted the name of Mir Muhammad, *Hakim Sahib* or a local doctor and visited *Kafiristan* with the consent of Mehtar Aman-ul-Mulk. It was unfortunate for McNair that he had to shortcut his visit when recalled by the Mehtar. McNair says that he returned to Chitral when "an urgent message was brought from Aman ul Mulk desiring me to return immediately, owing to some unfavourable news that was abroad."<sup>64</sup> However, efforts to explore *Kafiristan* gained momentum. Colonel Lockhart as the head of a mission exploring passes in the Hindu-Kush paid a brief visit to upper part of Bashgal valley in 1885-86.

British Agent at Gilgit, Dr. George Scott Robertson during



his visit to Chitral in 1888 met with a number of *Kafirs*. This enhanced his curiosity in the *Kafir* land thus he decided to visit the area next year. It was in October 1889 that Dr. Robertson once again arrived in Chitral seeking permission of Mehtar Aman-ul-Mulk to visit Kamdesh, the headquarters of Bashgal valley. The Mehtar allowed him and provided an escort of his two officials as well as hiring the service of some *Kafirs* to facilitate his safe and sound stay in the area. George Scott Robertson stayed in Kamdesh for three days i.e. till 29<sup>th</sup> October 1889. He then returned to India and went to England. Next year, he again embarked on expedition to *Kafiristan* but this time with full preparation. He arrived in Chitral on 15<sup>th</sup> September. Aman-ul-Mulk was reluctant to allow Robertson to visit *Kafiristan* by pretending deteriorating law and order situation. When the later insisted, the Aman-ul-Mulk asked him as George Scott Robertson says, "to sign a paper exonerating him [the Mehtar] from anything which might befall me, and stating clearly that my contemplated journey was to be undertaken in direct opposition to his wishes and advice...So I signed the paper."<sup>65</sup> At this, the Mehtar directed his son, Ghulam Dastagir and a strong escort to accompany the guest. Dr. Robertson remained in *Kafiristan* months after months creating suspicion in mind of the Mehtar who used different tactics so that either, he may return or the *Kafirs* expel him. Despite all odds, he was able to stay in *Kafiristan* for more than a year (1<sup>st</sup> October 1890 to 22<sup>nd</sup> October 1891) and gathered valuable information about the *Kafir* land, its people and their traditions. When Robertson safely returned to Chitral, Shah-i-Mulk, the Governor Drosh remarked that "it is all very wonderful, but the most wonderful thing is that you have returned."<sup>66</sup>

Keeping in view its strategic importance, Afghanistan since long had focused its covetous eyes on *Kafiristan*. Mortimer Durand writes in 1885 that "I have always been a little afraid of the Amir turning our breechloaders upon the independent tribes, and especially upon the *Kafirs*."<sup>67</sup> His apprehension further increased as he noted in May 1887 that "the Amir has recently circulated a proclamation, or pamphlets, which warns the Afghans to prepare for an invasion of *Kafirs*..."<sup>68</sup> Amir





Abdur Rahman while addressing a Darbar in May 1888, threatened to invade *Kafiristan* if the *Kafir* elders did not come to him and acknowledge his suzerainty.<sup>69</sup> This was not just a threat as the Amir directed his soldiers to construct a road linking Jalalabad with Chagar Sarai so that heavy weapons could be transported there for possible action against the *Kafirs*. In February 1891 the Amir sent a message to the *Kafirs* saying that he would not levy taxes on them or set up military posts in their country if they would acknowledge his rule.<sup>70</sup> The *Kafirs* turned down the offer. As the Amir says that "I had several times invited many of their chiefs to come to Kabul, and send them back overloaded with rupees and other rewards, so that they should go and talk about it with their countrymen...They did not appreciate my kindness, and with the money, I had given them bought rifles to use in fighting against me. About this time Russia, having taken peaks of the Pamirs, drew near to *Kafiristan* from several points, and continued to advance. I considered it useless to wait any longer."<sup>71</sup>

After making full preparation, the Amir decided to invade *Kafiristan* in winter season so that the *Kafirs* could not run away or climb over the hill tops due to heavy snow fall. A large number of troops were amassed with war machinery at four different places waiting for order of the Amir to go ahead with the invasion of the *Kafir* country. One column headed by Captain Mahomed Ali Khan, was to advance on *Kafiristan* from the Panjsher valley and its prime objective was to occupy Kullum where the strongest fort of the *Kafirs* was located. Another contingent led by the Afghan Commander-in-Chief Ghulam Haider Khan was to launch an offensive from the Asmar side. The third force commanded by General Katal Khan was heading from Badakshan and the 4<sup>th</sup> and the last one from Laghman. It was on a chilly day of severe winter season of 1895 that "orders were one day issued for the four."<sup>72</sup> No doubt the *Kafirs* put stiff resistance and the Amir has repeatedly praised their bravery. But their bows and arrows could not match the modern guns and artillery of the Afghan army. Several *Kafirs* delegations visited Chitral to get help from their ruler, the Mehtar to whom they were paying

tributes for centuries. However, they returned empty handed and even hollow promise of assistance was not granted.

The Mehtar left his subjects in sack clothes and ashes at the total mercy of the Afghan authorities. Now the *Kafirs* were surrounded by troubles from all the directions. They were under attacks with no hope of getting assistance from any quarter. Their elders met with Ghulam Haider Khan "offering that if he would withdraw his troops they would accept Islam, permit *mullas* [clergymen] to live among them to teach the precepts of Islam, and would pay the Amir the same annual tribute which they had previously paid to the Mehtar of Chitral, i.e. 20 balti of ghee—approximately 100 lbs of clarified butter."<sup>73</sup> But the Afghan Commander-in-Chief rejected the proposal and presented some very harsh demands. With this, the hostility resumed. Delegations of *Kafirs* again visited Chitral requesting the Mehtar to allow their people to migrate there in case they were defeated. At first the Mehtar agreed but later changed his mind due to pressure from the Indian government. The Viceroy sent a telegram to the Resident in Kashmir saying that "the *Kafirs* are now Amir's subjects. It is very undesirable that they should be permitted or encouraged to hope for refuge in or assistance from Chitral which should observe strict neutrality as between *Kafirs* and Afghans."<sup>74</sup> A copy of the same was also sent to Younghusband, Assistant Political Agent for compliance accordingly. Many *Kafirs* living in Chitral as refugees were sent back by the Mehtar. The Afghan army captured the whole of Bashgal including their major town, Kamdesh. The *Kafir's* houses were looted and "in the course of pacification of *Kafiristan*, 10,000 were killed and 16,000 forcibly resettled throughout the country, reducing the local population by half."<sup>75</sup> The Afghan suffered about six hundred casualties. The *Kafirs* were arrested and forcibly relocated in different areas particularly in Paghman. Some were enlisted in the Afghan army against their will. Kabul city was decorated and illuminated on January 1, 1896 to celebrate the victory over *Kafirs*. Ghulam Haider Khan "sent 1500 *Kafir* prisoners to Kabul with 100 camel loads of plunder as a gift for the Amir."<sup>76</sup> This followed military action against the *Kafirs* of Waigal, Pech, Parun and Alingar valleys.

They made several abortive revolts. Hundreds of them migrated to Chitral and settled there. The Afghan government repeatedly asked them to return but they preferred to stay with their relatives in Kalash valley of Chitral. Those *Kafirs* living in Bashgal were converted with the barrel of guns under the directive of Amir Abdur Rahman. "He took full advantage of the British promise of noninterference to engage in a number of small wars of conquest..."<sup>77</sup> The "Iron Amir" succeeded in silencing the voice of *Kafirs* with brutal force and the British Government of India witnessed the whole drama as a silent spectator. They are now known by the name of Sheikh [converted]. Kabul renamed the area as *Nuristan* or the land of light.

### **Impacts of the Durand Agreement on Bajour, Chitral, Dir and Swat**

The Durand Agreement and demarcation of the border has left deep impressions on this region. It resulted in fall of Umra Khan of Jandul, re-instatement of Muhammad Sharif Khan as the ruler of Dir. He extended his state first by occupying Jandul and later two third of Swat (located on the right bank of Swat River). This agreement generated the unrest of 1895 and 1897.

### **Relief of Chitral**

Aman-ul-Mulk, the *Lott* or Great Mehtar died on 30<sup>th</sup> August 1892. He left behind seventeen sons by different wives, but only five of them were regarded as of any importance. They were Nizam-ul-Mulk, Afzal-ul-Mulk, Shah-i-Mulk, Bahram, and Murid Dastgir. The first two were full brothers by a daughter of Rahmatullah Khan of Dir, and had been generally considered the principal sons. Nizam-ul-Mulk, as the elder, was his father's acknowledged heir. "But fortune favoured Afzal-ul-Mulk who, at the moment of his father's death, happened to be present in Chitral, while his elder brother was away in Yasin carrying out his duties as Governor of that province."<sup>78</sup> This frightened Nizam-ul-Mulk who fled to Gilgit. The British administration acknowledged Afzal Mulk as

Mehtar. Now Afzal-ul-Mulk was much safer as regarded his brothers. However, there was an aggrieved uncle, Sher Afzul who had been overlooked. Sher Afzul who had first fled to Badakhshan and then to Kabul some thirty years back, made a surprise attack and killed the Mehtar . On hearing about this development, Nizam-ul-Mulk supported by the Gilgit based British officer Colonel Algernon Durand, marched on Chitral. He succeeded in ousting Sher Afzal, who once again fled to Kabul. In this way, Nizam-ul-Mulk became the new ruler of Chitral. Two years later, Nizam-ul-Mulk was murdered by his younger brother, Amir-ul-Mulk while they were hawking on 1<sup>st</sup> January 1895. It was generally believed that Umra Khan abetted the assassination. However, H. C. Thomson says that "...so far as I have been able to ascertain, there is no direct proof that he instigated it."<sup>79</sup> The only idea that promoted Umra Khan's involvement in the murder was that Amir-ul-Mulk had recently stayed in Jandul. After killing his brother, Amir-ul-Mulk became the Mehtar and demanded the Acting British Agent at Chitral, Lieut. Gurdon who had arrived in Chitral town from Mastuj on his way to Asmar to help Mr. Udney and the Afghan Commander-in-Chief in the demarcation of the border. Lieut. Gurdon informed the Mehtar that he had no such power unless directed by the Indian government. At this, Amir-ul-Mulk intercepted Mr. Gurdon's letter to George Scott Robertson, the British Agent in Gilgit. He threatened that the letter would not be allowed to be taken to Gilgit until he (Amir-ul-Mulk) is recognized as the Mehtar. They hold several inconclusive meetings. Some fifty Indian soldiers were moved from Mastuj to Chitral to help Lieut. Gurdon who was in hot water. The British officers and soldiers were confined to the Chitral Fort as it was besieged by Amir-ul-Mulk, s men. This is known as the Siege of Chitral.

The matter lingered on and the British Agent arrived in Chitral on 1<sup>st</sup> February 1895 from Gilgit to sort out an amicable solution to the problem. Umra Khan who had married sister of Amir-ul-Mulk, rushed to Chitral apparently to help his brother in law in strengthening his grip over Chitral. He with a force of 1200 fighting men and 1500 colliers crossed the snow covered Lowari Top and reached Ashret on

19<sup>th</sup> January. But the matter further complicated as Umra Khan moved further and occupied the fort of Drosh. George Scott Robertson asked Umra Khan to retire from the Chitral's territory. Sher Afzal, who was detained by the Afghan authorities in Kabul for about the last three years, arrived at Drosh to try his luck. He joined hands with Umra Khan for this purpose. George Scott Robertson once again asked Umra Khan to leave Chitral without further delay. But the Khan paid no heed to these warnings. This turned the situation more serious and the Government of India issued a proclamation to people of Swat and Bajour on 22<sup>nd</sup> March 1895. The proclamation says that "Be it known to you, and any other persons concerned that Umra Khan, Chief of Jandul, in spite of repeated assurances of friendship to the British Government, and regardless of frequent warnings to refrain from interfering with the affairs of Chitral, which is a protected state under the suzerainty of Kashmir, has forcibly entered the Chitral valley, and has attacked the Chitrali people. The Government of India has now given Umra Khan full warning that unless he retires from Chitral by the 1<sup>st</sup> April, corresponding with the 1<sup>st</sup> day of Showar [Showal] 1312 H., they will use force to compel him to do so. In order to carry out this purpose they have arranged to assemble on the Peshawar border a force of sufficient strength to overcome all resistance, and to march through Umra Khan's territory towards Chitral..."

Side by side with these developments, Amir Abdur Rahman made contacts with Umra Khan to win him to his side. But the Amir did not prove a sincere ally for Umra Khan. The Amir while referring to him writes that "Umra is the same Umra about whose misconduct I had repeatedly written, and the high officials of the Government (Indian) did not accept what was written...But both these persons [Umra Khan and Sher Afzal] are foolish, and nothing will be gained by them but repentance"<sup>80</sup> On the other hand, situation in Chitral started further deteriorating with frequent attacks on the Indian troops besieged in the Fort of the town. Orders were, therefore, issued for the "dispatch of the Chitral Relief Force under Lieut. General Sir Robert Low, as soon as it could be



made ready.”<sup>81</sup> Eventually 30, 669 animals were procured to carry 103, 238 maunds of gunpowder.<sup>82</sup> The Afghan government wanted to exploit the situation. Giving instruction to his agent, Mullah Najmuddin on 6<sup>th</sup> March 1895, Amir Abdur Rahman writes that “for years past we have held out to the Maliks of Swat and Bajour hopes of our royal favour, and have exhorted them to accept the commandments of Muhammadan law, and to submit to the God-granted Government of Afghanistan that they might remain safe from all dangers, but their Khans and Maliks would not harken nor follow our advice, with the result that God, the Almighty, has sent down upon them a calamity which will make them understand the value of their friends...You have asked permission to collect men and to fight, I thank God, I am also a Mussalman, and it is incumbent on all believers to further a *jehad* (religious war)...We have instructions to Ghulam Haidar Khan. You should consult him and act upon his advice.”<sup>83</sup>

These Afghan steps were repugnant to the Durand Agreement but Kabul wanted to interfere and gain influence in Bajour, Chitral, Dir and Swat. On the other hand, both Sher Afzal and Amir-ul-Mulk were asking for their recognition as Mehtar. But George Robertson had no such discretionary power without the approval of the Indian government. Instead of the two, the Indian government nominated a third brother, Shuja-ul-Mulk (younger than the both) as the new Mehtar. He was just about twelve years old when he took oath of his office in Chitral on 2<sup>nd</sup> March. George Robertson then warned Sher Afzal either to leave Chitral territory or acknowledge Shuja-ul-Mulk as Mehtar.<sup>84</sup> Three days later, Umra Khan’s envoy arrived in Chitral saying that if the British vacate Chitral’s Fort, he (the Khan) would let them go to Asmar to join Mr. Udny there. The British authorities turned down the proposal. However, when Umra Khan learnt about advancement of British troops towards Chitral via Malakand, Dir and Bajour, he rushed back to Jandul taking with himself two British officers i.e. Lieutenant Edwardes and Lieutenant Fowler who had been made captives during parleys.

Meanwhile, a force under command of Colonel Kelly

started marching towards Chitral via Shandur Pass. In addition to this, the mobilization of the main force started on 26<sup>th</sup> March and within seven days, it was concentrated at Hoti Mardan and Nowshera.<sup>85</sup> "There were some 10,000 to 12,000 men at Malakand to fight the British forces. Some 3,000 of them were armed, and the rest using rocks and stones."<sup>86</sup> The locals, despite being poorly armed, fought bravely. This has also been acknowledged by British authorities. H.C. Thomson writes that "it was impossible not to admire the courage displayed by the enemy, who exposed themselves most recklessly, the mullahs standing upon the sungars encouraging their followers, and waving large coloured banners."<sup>87</sup> A drum beater received many bullets but he continued beating the drum. At last, he was shot in the chest and died, "with his drum round his neck, and his arms ready raised to strike it."<sup>88</sup> The *Ghazis* could not stop advance of the British soldiers. Hundreds of local people lost their lives during the two day fighting at Malakand. The British doctors did excellent job by treating most of the wounded in a field hospital and the Peshawar and Nowshera based hospitals. The force also committed inhuman acts of burning several dead bodies of local people. The force after crossing Swat River at Chakdara went to Sado. It then crossed the Panjkora River on its way to Jandul.

Umra Khan released both the British officers (Lieut. Edwardes and Lieut. Fowler) on 13<sup>th</sup> and 16<sup>th</sup> April respectively. The Khan had treated them with great respect, honour and dignity. He did whatever, possible to keep them happy and relax. In their report, the two officers noted that "we both consider that Umra Khan treated us very well indeed, and that he never intended to be the direct cause of injury to us under any circumstance."<sup>89</sup> John Flower says that "Edwardes and I owe him a debt of deep gratitude for his behaviour to us, and I should be very sorry, indeed, if he ever came to any harm."<sup>90</sup> Umra Khan had under his command 30,000 men but he did not fight the last battle of his life. The Indian government offered an honourable asylum to Umra Khan, his family and a reasonable number of his supporter.<sup>91</sup> But the Khan was so much panic stricken that he fled to

Afghanistan. On the night between 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> April, he went to Bin Shahi and from there sneaked into Asmar along with his family members. The Afghan Commander-in-Chief Ghulam Haider Khan arrested them all and sent them to Kabul.<sup>92</sup> Ghulam Haider Khan confiscated 250 rifles and 60 horses of Umra Khan. Amir Abdur Rahman told Umra Khan that he would be provided an annual allowance of Rs. 25,000 and he would be considered as his (the Amir) servant in future. But Umra Khan declined to accept the offer. During in one of his meetings with Amir Abdur Rahman, Umra Khan remarked that "in opposing the British Government, he [Umra Khan] had only acted on His Highness' orders received through Muhammad Said, Sahibzada of Miankili [Jandul]."<sup>93</sup> The Amir said that if he had come to him [the Amir] earlier he would have "arranged to stop the advance of the British troops, but that even then he had rendered Umra Khan great help by allowing his subjects to join secretly in the *jihad* in Bajour."<sup>94</sup>

Umra Khan fled from one enemy but fell into the lap of the worst one. Umra Khan was not happy in Kabul but he had closed all the doors for himself first by provoking the mighty neighbour and second by taking shelter with Amir Abdur Rahman. He died in 1903 and was laid to rest at Waisal Abad locality of Kabul. "This Umra Khan was a man of much talent, a man intellectually a head and shoulders above his countrymen."<sup>95</sup> Dir and Bajour have so far failed to produce a man of his stature. He even still rules over the hearts of the people of Bajour, Dir, Swat and Malakand. He is always recalled with honour.

The question of Chitral was heatedly debated in the British Parliament soon after the removal of Umra Khan. Sir H. Fowler in his speech said that "...Chitral is of the greatest strategic importance, so far as the heads of the passes of the Hindu Kush [Kush] are concerned; that the invasion of India from the north-west could be attempted through those passes, and that Chitral, being a weak power, would fall under the power of its strongest neighbour."<sup>96</sup> The British had apprehensions that Russia could attack India by using the

passes of Chitral especially the Darkot and Baroghil. Malakand, North and South Waziristan Agencies were set up in 1895-96. Malakand Agency included Swat, Dir and Chitral. The British government decided to have permanent military presence in Chitral, Chakdara and Malakand.

After relief of Chitral, Major H. A. Dean was posted a Political Officer Dir and Swat. He was drawing a special allowance due to his fluency in Pashto.

### **The Uprising of 1897**

The people of Swat are known for their hospitality and good manners. They have the reputation of being unable to unite against an external enemy, though they demonstrate bravery in their internal feuds. Despite signing of the Durand Agreement, Afghanistan continued its efforts to win sympathy of the people of Bajour, Dir and Swat and expel British from there both by hook or crook. To further these aims, Amir Abdur Rahman sent some religious books in 1896 "calling upon the people of these areas to wage a Jihad against the infidels for invasion of their country."<sup>97</sup>

On the other hand, the British authorities were under the impression that after Chitral expedition and removal of Umra Khan from the political scene, everything had become ok. They did not expect a popular uprising so earlier. It was in July 1897 when people of the area took up arms to expel the Indian army and civilian administration from their area. This uprising was led by *Sartor Faqir* (Sartor means bareheaded and Faqir is the one who abandons worldly affairs to get in touch with the religion) and engineered by Kabul. *Sartor Faqir* real name was Sadullah Khan. He was son of Amir Khan of Tor Warsak area of Buner. He became a *Faqir* and went to Ajmeer Sharif and spent three years there. He went to Kabul in 1894 where he was known as Diwana Baba. He met with Mullah Najmuddin alias Hada Mullah, and after passing some days with him, returned to Buner and became custodian of the shrine of Pir Baba. He was known among local people by the

name of *Sartor Faqir* as he was always bareheaded while the Indian government dubbed him as the Mad *Faqir*.

There were two main causes of the unrest. First Muhammad Sharif Khan and his servants committed atrocities on people of Swat. It was Mian Rahim Shah Kakakhel who advised Muhammad Sharif Khan "to treat people of Upper Swat as he liked" because the area was out of the Indian government jurisdiction and the British would not interfere. Muhammad Sharif Khan having accomplished his purpose with regard to occupation of two- third of Swat, the Mian Guls was only left with one option to call upon the tribes of Buner and Mardan to help him in expelling Muhammad Sharif Khan. They realized that this would not be achieved so far he enjoys support of the Indian government. So they decided to combine and attack the British troops at Chakdara and Malakand.

The 2<sup>nd</sup> reason of the uprising was the Afghan interference. It was a holy war; "with Abdur Rahman in the back ground..."<sup>98</sup> He was the self professed champion of Islam and Muslims. The Afghan government sent its agent to *Sartor Faqir* on 20<sup>th</sup> July 1897 telling him to start and he would receive assistance. Hadda Mullah also become active to steer troubles in Swat. The Amir described Hadda Mullah as "a light of Islam" and directed his officials to cherish and honour him.<sup>99</sup> After these developments, the *Faqir* appeared in Swat on 25<sup>th</sup> July 1897 and his fame reached far and wide. He like Sufi Muhammad and his son in law, Maulvi Fazullah was expert in exploiting the religious sentiments of people of Swat. The *Faqir* claimed to be inspired to work miracles; the Heavenly Hosts were on his side. He abused all those receiving allowances from the government. The *Faqir* also declared "English bullets would be turned to water, and that by the appearance of the new moon not a single individual of the Malakand garrison would remain."<sup>100</sup> "A great day for Islam was at hand. A mighty man has arisen to lead them. The English would be swept away."<sup>101</sup> Some people including Pir of Manki Sharif were of the opinion that the *Faqir* would do nothing but bring miseries to people of Swat. But the *Faqir*

was not ready to listen to anybody and he moved towards Lower Swat where people were filled with superstitious fear of the *Faqir*. His boldness convinced them that the *Faqir* was a "Buzurg" meaning pious man. They joined him en masse and started marching in the direction of Malakand on 26<sup>th</sup> July. His emotional preaching had far reaching impact and people from Buner, Dir and Bajour, Jandul and Mardan flocked to him. Their number increased with the every passing moment and reached to one thousand men the same day. The ill-organised tribal lashkar launched simultaneous attacks on the military posts of Malakand and Chakdara, which continued until 30<sup>th</sup> July and 2<sup>nd</sup> August respectively. This onslaught turned into the "Great Frontier War." Men swarmed across the Swat River from Dir and Bajour to join them. Chakdara fort and Shisho Garat (Signal Tower) were attacked three times at night of 26<sup>th</sup> July. But the attackers were repulsed. A gathering of thousand men attacked Malakand post in most determined manner but they were beaten off. The attacks were renewed on nights of 27<sup>th</sup>, 28<sup>th</sup> and 29<sup>th</sup> July. Some personnel of Dir Levies deserted and joined the *Faqir*. The Chakdara garrison and signal tower were hardly pressed. It was the brief message of Sepoy Prem Singh from Chakdara which totally changed scenario of the uprising. Despite repeated attacks, he climbed over the top of the room to give a small message comprising just two words, (Help us). The message on receiving at Malakand "was wired to India and from there it was cabled to England."<sup>102</sup> The response of the government was quick and effective. It constituted the Malakand Field Force led by Major General Sir Bindon Blood to deal with this bolt from the blue. 3,100 camels and 3,000 horses were made available for transportation of arms and ammunition to the war zone. The force arrived at Dargai on the night of 29<sup>th</sup> of July. The two Mian Guls brothers of Swat joined the war on 30<sup>th</sup> July (it was Friday) and they brought 900 men with them. Mian Gul Abdul Wadud wrote a letter to Muhammad Sharif Khan, the Nawab of Dir to join the *Jehad* along with his men. The Nawab openly declared that he would not go back from promises made to the government.

“Fighting continued at the Malakand from the 26<sup>th</sup> July till the 1<sup>st</sup> August; and Chakdara’ which was attacked at the same time, was not relieved until August 2...”<sup>103</sup> Officer Commanding Malakand Brigade in his message to Adjutant General in India asked for help on 31<sup>st</sup> July. The *Faqir* was injured during fighting in Malakand and retired to Swat from where he along with the Mian Guls went to Mahaban Mountain. On 29<sup>th</sup> morning another fierce attack was made on the Signal Tower but was repulsed. About 60 dead bodies of locals were found near the tower. Men in the tower remained without water for 15 hours. After defeating the tribals, the Indian army burnt Batkhela, Alladand Thana, Chakdara and Ouch towns. The Malakand Field Force marched from Thana towards Swat at 6.30 a.m. on 17<sup>th</sup> August. Besides seven soldiers, Lt Maclean, Lt. Greaves and a press reporter name Lancashire Fusiliers were killed in fighting near Landakai. General Officer Commanding Malakand has praised not only the good health of local people but also the beauty of their area. The force chased the tribals up to Manglawar in Swat. It then moved into Bajour. It met with unexpected tough resistance in Mamond area of Bajour. The inhabitants of Bajour once again proved that they were second to none in bravery by repeatedly attacking the British army men, inflicting heavy losses on them. Some Afghan nationals were also fighting shoulder to shoulder with the people of Bajour. The uprising turned into a wild fire engulfing Mohmand, Khyber, Orakzai and Kurram. But the British Administration was able to control the situation and both the sides suffered heavy losses. The British authorities awarded all those *gentle men* with rewards who served the *Sarkar*.

Mian Rahim Shah Kakakhel, who was awarded the title of Khan Bahadur and two thousand rupees as a prize annually from the government of India for his services in Chitral expedition, used his influence with the people of Dir to remain aloof from the unrest. He also succeeded in satisfying the Nawagai Khan, and, working with the Khan, broke up the resistance. The Khan of Khar also helped the British administration for keeping situation under control in Bajour by sending his men against supporters of the *Faqir*. The







Indian government paid Rs. 6, 000 as compensation to Nawagai Khan for damage to crops and houses during the operation in Bajour. He was also given 10, 000 as a gift while Khan of Khar 3,500 and Jar Khan 2, 000 rupees respectively for their services to Indian government during the uprising.

In all 43, 500 people participated in the uprising. However, according to another report, their number was 45, 800. 1200 local people were killed in Malakand and about 2000 in Chakdara. Terming the uprising as the greatest Frontier War in the history of the British Empire in India, Sir Winston Churchill says that "the tribesmen suffered terrible losses."<sup>104</sup> He has put their casualties about 4,000. The people of Swat, Malakand, Dir, Buner, Mardan and Bajour were heavily fined and they were now cursing the *Faqir* for having deceived them in regard to his miraculous power. People of the entire region suffered a lot due to this uprising. However, the *Faqir* was of the opinion that the attack was premature, and for this he blamed the people instead of himself for starting it. The Mirror Tower was named as "Churchill Picket" in the recognition of Winston Churchill services. He had come to the area as a reporter of the Daily Telegraph to cover the uprising. Later on, he also wrote a book on the uprising "the Story of the Malakand Field Force". The *Faqir* died in 1917 at the age of about 100. During his life, he never missed an opportunity to stir up troubles in Swat.

### **Afghan Occupation of Dokalim**

Since 1895, Afghanistan has been following the policy of gradual encroachment (first laying a claim, demand for revenue, then occupation, and lastly fortification). It followed the same tactics while occupying Dokalim, 32 square miles area of Chitral located across the Chitral River opposite to Arandu.<sup>105</sup> It was on September 1, 1896 that Afghan authorities put forward a claim to Dokalim and demanded *Ushar* or revenue. Sixteen years later (2<sup>nd</sup> September 1912), the Afghan soldiers occupied Dokalim and expelled Chitrali troops from there. On September 3, 1919, Kabul constructed a garrison with twenty men deployed there permanently.<sup>106</sup>

After the 3<sup>rd</sup> Anglo-Afghan war, a commission headed by Sir Henry Dobbs was constituted to demarcate the border in Khyber.

The commission was in Kabul when it learnt that Afghanistan was still in possession of Arnawai [Arandu, Chitral], which had been occupied during the brief war. "Compliance with the Amir's order for the evacuation of Arnawai was delayed till 17<sup>th</sup> January [1921], when Arnawai itself was handed over back to the Chitral's representative."<sup>107</sup> The commission demarcated the boundary line except 24 km (Nawa Kotal-Palosi) in Mohmand and 4 km in Kurram agencies.\* Now we have only 1.1 percent of the Pak-Afghan border as un-demarcated. Under Schedule No. 1 of the Article 2 of the Afghan-British Treaty concluded in Kabul on November 22, 1921, the Afghan border was advanced about 700 yards in Khyber towards Peshawar.<sup>108</sup> Similarly, the Afghan border was advanced east of the Kabul River up to Palosai. Shamsa Kandao and Shamsa Kandao Sar were also handed over to Afghanistan under this treaty.

Despite these friendly gestures on the part of the British Administration, Kabul failed to take practical step to solve the Dokalim dispute. Instead, the Afghan authorities constructed a tower in Dokalim in 1924 and a bridge on Chitral River in May 1925.<sup>109</sup> In 1929, a popular uprising erupted in Asmar and Bashgal against the Afghan rule. The ex-Khan of Asmar, Ghulam Khan who was living in Bajour since his expulsion by the Afghan authorities, recaptured Asmar with the help of the Salarzai tribe. The people of Sao, Narai, Bailam, Barikot and Bashgal valley asked for the Mehtar's help. At this, the Mehtar Shuja-ul-Mulk wrote petitions to British officers seeking permission to send his soldiers to help his former subject.

Taking advantage of uncertain situation, the Nawab of Dir occupied Sao and made further advancement towards Kamdesh. But both the Mehtar and Nawab were discouraged by the Government. On the other hand, (with success in Dokalim due to passive attitude of the Indian government which was unwilling to risk a collision with the Amir over such

a petty dispute), Kabul started moves to gain control over the whole area up to "the Lowari Top in order to straddle and close the main route to India."<sup>110</sup> The Foreign Secretary directed the Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa to take immediate steps to prevent further Afghan encroachments towards Chitral. It was under these circumstances that the British authorities approved Chitral-Gilgit Defence Plan in 1930. Chitral was put under the control of General Officer Commanding-in-Chief Northern Army while responsibilities regarding Gilgit were shifted to the Political authorities. New military posts were established along the Afghan border besides strengthening the existing ones. It was agreed that arms and ammunition supplied for defence of Chitral and Gilgit would be inspected by Staff Officer from GHQ once a year.<sup>111</sup> This plan greatly helped in foiling designs of Afghanistan regarding further encroachments in Chitral.

The Mehtar wanted to capture Dokalim with the use of force. However, the Indian government informed that he has no authority to attack the Afghan positions at Dokalim. In June 1932, Dokalim Boundary Commission was constituted. The Indian side was represented by Captain W. R. Hay while Aliqadr Sadaqatmaab Habibullah Khan Tarzi represented the Afghan side. They signed an agreement on 11<sup>th</sup> July, 1932. Under this accord, Dokalim was given in the control of Afghanistan. The treaty became effective from 3<sup>rd</sup> February 1934 when a note [written both in English and Persian] was exchanged between the Afghan Foreign Minister Sardar Faiz Muhammad Khan and the Kabul based British Minister, Sir Richard Roy Maconachie in this regard<sup>112</sup>. Seven pillars were also erected on this portion of the border.\* It is astonishing to note that all the four British officers on their turn handed over territory of Chitral and Bajour to Afghanistan to appease the Afghan authorities. Mortimer Durand gave Asmar, Richard Udny donated Nasrat, Bashgal valley and Barikot, Sir Henry Dobbs handed over areas in Khyber and Captain W. R. Hay relinquished Dokalim. This policy of "a remarkable friendly concession" deprived Chitral of its centuries old all weather route connecting the area with the rest of the country via Bajour, Dir and Malakand. This has put the people of Chitral

in perpetual troubles as they remain disconnected from the rest of the country for several months every year when the Lowari Top remain closed due to heavy snow fall. Besides other problems, it creates shortage of food items. To overcome this problem, the government of Pakistan has dug a tunnel in Lowari Top as a result of which Chitral will now remain connected with the rest of the country. The Chitralis suffered a lot due to the blunders and appeasement policy of the British officers.

## Notes

- <sup>1</sup> David B. Edwards, Op. cit., p. 27.
- <sup>2</sup> Dr. G. Rauf Roashan, *The Unholy Durand Line, Buffering the Buffer*, [http://www.institute-for-afghan-studies.org/Contributions/Commentaries/DRRoashanArch/2001\\_08\\_11\\_unholy\\_durand\\_line.htm](http://www.institute-for-afghan-studies.org/Contributions/Commentaries/DRRoashanArch/2001_08_11_unholy_durand_line.htm) (retrieved on 17<sup>th</sup> May 2011).
- <sup>3</sup> Daily Times, May 19, 2003.
- <sup>4</sup> L. F. Rushbrook Williams, *The State of Pakistan* (London: Faber, 1966), pp. 62-63.
- <sup>5</sup> P.M. Sykes, *Sir Mortimer Durand*, *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland*, No. 3 (July 1924), p. 505.
- <sup>6</sup> Sir Thomas Hungerford Holdich, *The Indian Borderland*, Op. cit., p. 243.
- <sup>7</sup> Amir Abdur Rahman's letter sent to the Indian Foreign Secretary, April 15, 1894.
- <sup>8</sup> Letter No. 304 Sent by Chief Secretary Punjab to the Secretary, Foreign Department, May 8, 1894.
- <sup>9</sup> Colonel Robert Warburton, Op. cit., p.269.
- <sup>10</sup> Foreign Office Annual File 1, (Lahore: Punjab Government Press, 1894), pp.2-3.
- <sup>11</sup> Letter No. 1086 sent by H. Daly, Deputy Foreign Secretary to Chief Secretary Punjab, May 22, 1894.
- <sup>12</sup> Ibid. p.2.
- <sup>13</sup> Ibid. p.5.
- <sup>14</sup> W. R. Hay and D. R. Crone, *Demarcation of the Indo-Afghan Boundary in the Vicinity of Arandu*, *The Geographical Journal*, Vol. 82, No. 4 (October 1933), p. 351.
- <sup>15</sup> Statement recorded by Sahibzada Badshah Jan, Confidential Agent of Umra Khan before Deputy Commissioner Peshawar on May 2, 1894 (Simla: Foreign Frontier File No. 53, p. 9).
- <sup>16</sup> Extract from Gilgit Diary for week ending August 11, 1894.
- <sup>17</sup> Mr. Udney's letter No. 1 addressed to Chief Secretary Punjab, May 18, 1894.

- 18 Letter No. 69 sent by Deputy Foreign Secretary W. J. Cuningham to Chief Secretary Punjab, June 2, 1893.
- 19 Extract from Khyber Political Diary from 15<sup>th</sup> to 21<sup>st</sup> August 1894.
- 20 Memorandum No. 65 written by Deputy Commissioner Peshawar, Captain H. A. Dean, May 29, 1893.
- 21 Letter No. 455 of the British Agent at Gilgit, G. S. Robertson sent to Foreign Secretary, April 30, 1895.
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- 23 Political Officer Chitral, Captain F. E. Younghusband's letter No. 125 of March 19, 1894 sent to British Agent at Gilgit, Colonel A. Mearns Bruce (Available in Foreign Department Frontier (Simla) File No. 11, Serial No. 44, p. 3.
- 24 Ibid. p. 3.
- 25 Major H.A. Dean, *Chitral Relief Force* (Lahore: Punjab Government Press, 1895), p. 3.
- 26 Telegram from Commissioner Peshawar to Simla and Punjab, 20<sup>th</sup> September 1892, *Chitral Affairs* (Foreign Department Frontier File No. 4, (Lahore: Punjab Government Press, 1893), p. 1.
- 27 Major H. A. Dean, *Chitral Relief Force*, Op. cit., p. 3.
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- 29 Bajour Affairs; Relations of Umra Khan of Jandul with the Government of India, Foreign Department File No. 11, (Lahore: Punjab Government Press, March 30, 1894), p. 3.
- 30 Captain F. E. Younghusband's letter No. 125 addressed to British Agent, Gilgit Op. Cites, p. 4.
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- 32 Extract from the Gilgit Diary for the week ending the September 1, 1894.
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- 37 Sir Richard Udny's letter No. XIV, sent to Ghulam Haider Khan, March 29, 1895.
- 38 Sir Richard Udny's letter No. XIV, sent to Ghulam Haider Khan, April 1, 1895.
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- 40 Sir Richard Udny, *Report on Demarcation in the Kunar Valley*, (Simla: Punjab Government Press, 1895), p. 8.
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- 42 Merk, *Report on the Mohmands* (Lahore: Punjab Government Civil Secretariat Press, 1882), p. 29.
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- 44 Ibid. p. 13.
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- 60 George B. Scott, Op. cit., p. 16.
- 61 Colonel Sir Thomas Holdich, *The Gates of India, being an Historical Narrative* (London: Mcmillan and Co, Limited, 1910), p. 269.
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- 96 Times Newspaper, quoted by H.C. Thomson, p. 304.



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- <sup>99</sup> Sir Winston Churchill, p. 70.
- <sup>100</sup> H. Woosnam Mills, Op. cit., p. 36.
- <sup>101</sup> Sir Winston Churchill, Op. cit., p. 25.
- <sup>102</sup> H. Woosnam Mills, Op. cit., p. 61.
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- <sup>104</sup> Winston Churchill, Op. cit., p. 86.
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- <sup>106</sup> Telegram to Secretary of State for India, No. 244-S., dated 23<sup>rd</sup> February 1922 (Serial No. 181, Afghan Series, Part VII).
- <sup>107</sup> C. U. Aitcheson, Vol. X111, op. cit., p. 226.
- <sup>108</sup> Ibid. p. 293.
- <sup>109</sup> Letter of the Chief Commissioner, North West Frontier Province, No. 1651-P, February 1924 addressed to the Foreign Secretary.
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- <sup>111</sup> Note on Chitral-Gilgit Defence Plan, Major General Baird, (L750, C, F& PD, 1930), p. 43.
- <sup>112</sup> League of Nations-Treaty Series No. 3560 (1934), p. 355.

# 4

## WAKHAN CORRIDOR

The Wakhan Corridor is "about 300 km long extending east-west dividing north-eastern Pakistan from Pamir [Tajikistan] and communicating eastwards with China."<sup>1</sup> It is spread over approximately 10300 square kilometers area.<sup>2</sup> It has the maximum width of 65 km. The width varies at different points; the narrowest of it is 13 km. The corridor is generally thought of as extending from the Afghan village of Eshkashem at its lower or western end to the Vakhijir Pass at the Chinese border on the east.<sup>3</sup> The population of Wakhan is about twelve thousand people. These include about 10,000 Wakhi people and approximately 1400 Kyrgyz. Some 40,000 Wakhis live in Tajikistan, Pakistan and China.<sup>4</sup> Wakhan itself is a portion of the Pamirs. Pamirs is a Wakhi word meaning "the fertile high mountain pastures."<sup>5</sup> According to Sir D. Forsyth, Pamirs is a Khokandi-Turki word signifying desert.<sup>6</sup> However, it should be noted that Pamirs was never and will never remain desert. The word Pamirs is being used "in some form or other...for a period of 1200 years."<sup>7</sup> Four Pamirs are located in Tajikistan (Kargushi, Rang Kol, Sariz and Alichur), and three in Afghanistan (Great Pamir, Little Pamir and Pamir-i-Wakhan). The Great Pamir is also known by the name of Pamir Kalan or Pamir-e-Buzurg while it is referred as the Past Pamir in the Wakhi language. Similarly, the little Pamir also has two other names i.e. Pamir Khurd and Pamir-e-Kochak. The third and last one (Pamir-e-Wakhan) is the

narrowest of all the Pamirs.<sup>8</sup> Only one Pamir i.e. Taghdumbash is located in China. Each of one of them is spreading over at least 300 km area.<sup>9</sup> Besides these major Pamirs, there are a number of other small Pamirs including Shimshal, Mair-e-Bugrumal, Mariang Pamir and Tagarma Pamir etc.

The Pamirs are inhabited by Tajiks, Kirghis, Wakhi and Sarikolis. Pamirs is highest place on the globe and John Wood used the term "Bam-i-duniah", or *Roof of the World* for it. The Pamirs is also known by the name of Bam-yar or Roof of the Earth.<sup>10</sup> In the past, the locals called it as the "Backbone of the World" as the area remained out of the great powers influence for long period till the last decades of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. The four big mountain ranges i.e. Himalaya, Karakorum, Hindu Kush and the Pamirs meet at the eastern end of Wakhan (Pamir Knot). Hiuen Tsiang was perhaps the first individual who passed through Pamirs about 630 A.D. on his return journey from Udyana (Swat).<sup>11</sup> While going to the court of Kublai Khan, Marco Polo "crossed the Pamirs in 1272 in company of his father Nicolo and his uncle Maffeo..."<sup>12</sup> He saw "neither habitation nor verdure..."<sup>13</sup> He visited the Sarikul Lake. The valley of Sarikul is located 10,250 feet above the sea level.<sup>14</sup> It is about eight mile long with average breath of three miles. Benedict Goes passed through the Pamirs in the beginning of 17<sup>th</sup> century. The area is remote, difficult for travel and this is the reason that none of the Tartar invaders, "seem to have penetrated so high up the valley of the Oxus..."<sup>15</sup> Zaheer Uddin Muhammad Babar, one of the great conquerors, "starting for the invasion of India from Andijan—due north of the Chitral-Gilgit region— avoided the Pamirs and marched *via* Kabul."<sup>16</sup> Similarly, 'no conquering races have ever entered India by any route east of Badakshan..."<sup>17</sup>

All the Pamirs are extremely cold and "from the middle of November to the end of April, the Pamirs are deeply covered with snow, the lakes are frozen and the passes are nigh impossible."<sup>18</sup> Temperature is much below the zero level at night and morning throughout the year. The wind of this region is severe to the extreme extent particularly in the

winter season and it is referred as “Bad-i-Wakhan”, or wind of Wakhan in Badakshan.<sup>19</sup> The Sarikol Lake “lies in the form of crescent, about fourteen miles long from east to west, by an average breadth of one mile.”<sup>20</sup> John Wood renamed it as Victoria Lake because the Queen had just acceded to the throne before the start of his (John Wood) journey for the Oxus. It is this *Roof of the World* where the source of Oxus River is located. “The Oxus, writes George N. Curzon, “ that great parent stream of humanity, which has equally impressed the imagination of Greek and Arab, of Chinese and Tartar, and which, from a period over three thousand years ago, has successively figured in the literature of the Sanskrit Puranas, the Alexandrian historians, and the Arab geographers, had always similar appealed.”<sup>21</sup> John Wood was perhaps “the first European who in later times had succeeded in reaching the source of this river [Oxus]...”<sup>22</sup> At the time of John Wood visit, the area was ruled by Muhammad Rahim Khan.

The Pamirs have remained as a cockpit for rivalry among four powers i.e. Russia, British India, China and Afghanistan. Russia continued its expansionist policy in Central Asia unchecked since the conquest of Kazan in 1552. The Russian territory in Asia “expanded at an average rate of 20, 634 square miles of territory annually. An empire of only 1, 530, 000 square miles of territory in 1584 had by 1899 reached an extent of 8, 660, 282 square miles.”<sup>23</sup> These victories were mainly achieved by subjugating the Muslims of Caucasus and Central Asia. In the last decades of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, both the British and the Russians were expanding their borders forward towards the passes of Hindu Kush and Karakorum. The main objective of the Russians was to have a common border with the British India so that it could “exert pressure on a very sensitive point of the British Empire. Were London to adopt a hostile policy towards Russia elsewhere in the world, Petersburg could respond by instigating and supporting rebellions against British rule among the tribal people of the northern frontiers, or within India itself.”<sup>24</sup> In order to avert this eventuality, the British Government of India set up an Intelligence Branch in the office of the Quarter Master General, India in 1878 to get maximum information

about the impending Russian threat. A number of agents were sent to explore the Pamirs and their passes. These include Abdul Majeed, Pundit Munphool, John Wood, Mr. Forsyth, Faiz Bukhsh, Ibrahim Khan and Hayward etc. These visits gave fruitful results and the British authorities succeeded in gaining sufficient knowledge about the region. Muhammad Ameen compiled a list of native travelers as well as the information about routes between India and Central Asia. Muhammad Ameen says that the major town of Wakhan was Sarhadd-e-Wakhan "containing about one thousand houses."<sup>25</sup>

The Russian continued their march unabated and in 1869, they reached the banks of Amu River (Oxus) compelling the British authorities to believe that "...the continued advance of Russia in Central Asia is as certain as the succession of day and night... Russia will continue to push on towards India until arrested by a barrier which she can neither remove nor overstep."<sup>26</sup> In order to achieve this objective, British policy makers wanted a strong and stable Afghanistan with clearly defined borders in order to use it as a buffer state. Both England and Calcutta were determined to stop the Russian advancement well north of Chitral and Gilgit and to have a neutral strip separating its border from the Russian.

In 1872, the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg Clarendon in a note given to his Russian counterpart, Gortchakoff asked Russia to accept Badakhshan, Wakhan, Kunduz, Khulm, Balkh, Sari Pul, Maimana and Shiberghan as Afghan territory. But Russia disputed the Amir's claims to Maimana, Andkhui, Balkh, Kunduz, Badakhshan and Wakhan.<sup>27</sup> The Russians were doubtful that whether these areas were really in the Afghan possession. The Russians were of the opinion that Badakhshan and Wakhan were still enjoying a greater degree of independence. Next year, Russia took U- turn and Prince Gortchakoff informed the British ambassador that "we do not refuse to accept the line of boundary laid down by England."<sup>28</sup> This statement of the Russian envoy is known as the Clarendon-Gortchakoff Agreement of 1872-73. It was concluded without any reference

to the Amir.<sup>29</sup> But implementation of the agreement on the ground was a difficult task due to the continued Russian advancement towards the south. In 1882, the British proposed the demarcation of the Afghan-Russia border and two years later, Russia responded positively. It was decided that the British commissioner General Peter Lumsden would meet his Russian counterpart, General Zelenoi in October 1884. But the Russian commissioner did not arrive to start the demarcation work by pretending that "he was ill and unable to start..."<sup>30</sup> In the meantime; situation deteriorated by the Afghan occupation of Panjdeh. The Russians retaliated and occupied Pul-i-Khatun on Hari Rud River and Pul-i-Khishti located near Panjdeh. This crisis delayed the demarcation till a fresh protocol was signed in September 1885. The British government replaced General Peter Lumsden with Colonel Ridgeway. This time, the commission was able to demarcate the border from Zulfiqar in Herat province to Andkhui situated some 60 km in the vicinity of the Oxus. But further delimitation was impossible due to difficulties which came to surface regarding the border in the suburbs of Amu River. As a result, the commission was disbanded. But Colonel Ridgeway was highly appreciated by Amir Abdur Rahman for his work.

In July 1887, a fresh protocol was signed whereby Russia gave up her claim regarding the areas under the Afghan control on the Oxus. In response, Kabul returned some land to Russia between Murghab and Khushk rivers. The border was demarcated up to the Oxus and pillars erected along the border. But Russia was not ready to acknowledge Wakhan to be a part of Afghanistan. Moscow was of the opinion that if the Afghan claim was admitted, "the power of Afghans could be extended far to the north."<sup>31</sup> No doubt, Badakshan and the Wakhan Corridor up to Sarikol were declared as the Afghan territory under the British-Russian accord of 1873. But the Afghan control over these areas was so nominal and precarious that they were not considered as integral parts of Afghanistan.

The British authorities wanted a neutral strip to separate its border from Russia at any cost. They prefer that this

neutral strip should either belong to China or Afghanistan. Britain wanted that both China and Afghanistan must have effective control over the southern and eastern Pamirs. In 1891, British authorities informed China that a strip of Chinese territory extend westwards along the Alichure River to Somatash.<sup>32</sup> However, Beijing turned down the proposal and informed the British government that “as China was not desirous of retaining this territory, and as understood that England had no intention of advancing beyond the Hindu Kush, the only alternative seemed to be the occupation by Russia.”<sup>33</sup> On the other hand, Russia continued her expansionist policy and was able to assert its authority in the Pamirs. In 1891, Russia made additional advancement and came as far as Broghal Pass and further at the Darkot Pass.<sup>34</sup> The Russians then withdrew to Fergana leaving behind some soldiers in the Pamirs and informing the local people that they were now Russian subjects. When disappointed from China, the British decided to hand over Wakhan to Afghanistan to serve as a barrier between the Indian and Russian territory. The British did not care the wishes of the Wakhan’s ruler and his people. In fact, Wukh Watan or Wakhan country was a principality located on both sides of upper Amu River...”<sup>35</sup> Its ruler was known as the Mir collecting taxes from his subjects both Wakhi and Kirghiz. The Mir, Ali Mardan Shah of Wakhan sensing the danger to his khanate from the Afghans and the Russians, expressed his desire of joining the British India but his request was given no value. In this way, Wakhan lost its independence due to power politics among big powers of the day. Wakhan was divided between Russia and British sphere of influence. It was agreed during Mortimer Durand visit to Kabul in 1893 that the Amir will evacuate all the districts held by him in the north of River Amu in the Pamirs Section while all the districts lying to the south and now not in his possession, be handed over to him in exchange.<sup>36</sup> An agreement to this effect was signed by the Amir and Mortimer Durand in Kabul on November 12, 1893. Amir Abdur Rahman was given the control of Wakhan despite his reluctance. He did not wish to have Wakhan due to its remote location. The distance between Faizabad, the capital of Badakshan province and the eastern end of Wakhan Corridor on Afghan-China

border "is almost as far as from Faizabad to Islamabad in Pakistan, without the roads."<sup>37</sup>

Britain and Russia exchanged a note in March 1895 regarding their sphere of influence on the Pamirs and delimitation of the border on the *Roof of the World*. Article No. 4 of the note says that "Her Britannic Majesty's and the Government of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia engage to abstain from exercising any political influence or control—the former to the north, the latter to the south—of the above line of demarcation."<sup>38</sup> But the British Government was determined not to have a common border with Russia even in the most remote and difficult region of the world. In order to achieve this objective, it decided that "the territory lying within the British sphere of influence between the Hindu Kush and the line running from the east end of Lake Victoria to the Chinese frontier shall form part of the territory of the Amir of Afghanistan; that it shall not be annexed to Great Britain; and that no military posts or forts shall be established in it."<sup>39</sup> This was a death blow to Mir Ali Mardan Shah and he migrated to Chitral, the state of his father in law. The Mehtar gifted him the Ishkoman valley in Ghizer who ruled it till his death in 1924. His father, Fattah Ali Shah's tomb is located at Ras Malack village of Punjah. The Mir used to levy taxes on trade *caravans* passing through his territory.

Side by side with these developments, rivalry was also on its full zenith between China and Russia in the Pamirs. In 1894, notes were exchanged between the two countries to define their common border between Fergana and Kashgar (China). Under the treaty, the crest of Sarikol range was declared as Sino-Russian de facto border. But Russia adopted delaying tactics in demarcation of the border so that it could make further advancement in the south. Beijing stressed the need for implementation of the treaty both in letter and spirit. Both the Ch'ing dynasty and People Republic of China never accepted the Anglo-Russian treaty. Till recently, China asserted that its territory is located much beyond of its present possessions and this remained the bone of contention between Beijing and Moscow till the disintegration of the Soviet Union.



China claims that from historical point of view, Pamirs are her territory. China was in control of Pamirs during the Tang Dynasty (AD 618-907). She once again established her control over the region in 1759 “when a Chinese army advanced as far west as Shugan and Wakhan on the right bank of Amu Darya.”<sup>40</sup> From Chinese point of view, Beijing had lost some 20,000 square kilometers territory to Czar Russia when the great game was in its full bloom. She was not a signatory to the Anglo-Russian treaty of 1895 under which “China lost seven of the eight Pamirs, only one remained as Chinese territory.”<sup>41</sup> With the advancement of the Russians in Central Asia, China suffered territorial loss and “the Pamirs became a part of the Kokand Khanate-which was itself a nominal tributary of the Chinese Empire.”<sup>42</sup> Kokand was captured and annexed by Russia in 1875-76 but “China did not protest.”<sup>43</sup> As China was no more able to play a dominant role in the international politics, therefore, she was ignored both by Russia and Great Britain while deciding the future of Central Asia and the Pamirs.

### **Pamir Boundary Commission**

Demarcation of boundary on the Pamir was necessitated by the principle that “at no point on the earth’s surface should the land frontiers of England and Russia meet.”<sup>44</sup> The task of delimiting the border in Wakhan was assigned to the Pamir Boundary Commission comprising nine British and Indians, ten Russians, two Afghans and one French. Following were members of the commission.

#### **British and Indians**

- Major General M. G. Gerard as a Commissioner.
- Colonel Sir Thomas Hungerford Holdich (Chief Surveyor Officer).
- Major R. A. Wahab (Survey Officer).
- Khan Sahib Abdul Ghaffar (Surveyor).
- Dan Sing (Surveyor)
- Asmatulla Khan (Draftsman).

- Captain E. F. H. McSwiney (Secretary to the Commissioner).
- Surgeon-Captain A. W. Alcock (doctor).
- Ressaïdar Zahirulla Khan as attaché.

### **Russians**

- Governor Fergana, General Povalo-Shveikovski as Chief Commissioner.
- Monsieur Benderski, Chief of the Topographical Staff. He was a prominent topographer and explorer.
- Captain Alexandrovitch, Assistant Topographer.
- Colonel Zaleski, Astronomer and Geodiste.
- Captain Krutorojin, Commander Escort.
- Dr. Welman, Medical Officer.
- Lieut. Orakolov, Interpreter.
- Colonel Galkine, of the Russian General Staff.
- Monsieur Ponafidine, Councillor of State.
- Captain Kutritonski.
- Monsieur Stiefel, French Professor.

### **Afghan Delegates**

- Sardar Ghulam Mohiuddin Khan (Governor Badakshan), as the chief delegate.
- Mufti Ashur Muhammad Khan.

It was agreed that the commission would complete its work within four months. Of this two months would be required for going to and from the Pamirs. The remaining two months would be spent on demarcating about the ninety miles long border from Lake Victoria in the Great Pamir to the Chinese frontier in the Sarikol range. Food items sufficient for three months for over one hundred staff members including five British officers, ten native non-commissioned officers and security personnel etc were arranged. The most difficult job was how to transport food stuff and other necessary items to such a remote area where communication was almost non-existence. The best animal for this work was Kashmir pony which "is a small but hardy animal with a very large capacity

for dealing with stiff gradients and bad roads..."<sup>45</sup> About 800 ponies were arranged for this purpose. Warm clothes and suitable boots were obtained from Srinagar.<sup>46</sup> Glasses were given to all the members of the party which left Bandipura (Indian Occupied Kashmir) for Wakhan via Gilgit-Yasin on June 21<sup>st</sup> 1896. The Chief Survey Officer of the Commission Colonel Sir Thomas Hungerford Holdich had at his credit an un-matching knowledge and experience as a survey officer in Africa and India. He had also served as the leader of survey party in the Russo-Afghan Boundary Commission of 1884. In the recognition of his services, Thomas Holdich was promoted to the rank of Colonel in 1887 besides receiving a gold medal from the Royal Geographical Society.

Many of the natives attached with Pamirs Boundary Commission suffered from snow blindness and the Europeans with the skin related problems due to their exposure to sun rays as we witness in Shandoor valley, Chitral. On 22<sup>nd</sup> July, General Gerard's team reached in the vicinity of Victoria Lake known among the Russians by the name of Zor Kul. The Russian team was already in the area doing surveying and mapping the region. The Russian commissioner invited his British counterpart to his camp. General Gerard accepted the invitation thus laying firm foundation of understanding for quickly disposing of the delimiting the border. Two days later, General Gerard hosted a dinner in honour of the Russians. General Gerard proposed that the range dividing Little Pamir from the Great should be named as Range Nicolas, the Russian emperor. The Russian commissioner not only hailed the proposal but also pledged to change the name of Zor Kul Lake as Victoria Lake in their maps. The first working meeting between the two commissioners was held next day. Both desired swift demarcation of the border. Four days later i.e. 27<sup>th</sup> July, the Afghan representatives arrived to participate in the proceedings of the commission. Next day, the first boundary pillar was erected near Victoria Lake and the first protocol was sealed on 2<sup>nd</sup> August. The delimitation process was accomplished slickly and in a friendly manner and a total of twelve boundary pillars were erected on this portion of the border. The commission surveyed 4,925 square miles area.<sup>47</sup>


Besides demarcating the border, the British and Russians also participated in sport competitions including shooting, tug of war, and foot race etc. Governor Fergana gave away prizes to the players. The whole proceedings of the commission including correspondence, discussions and documentation were conducted in French. The 9<sup>th</sup> and last protocol was signed on 10<sup>th</sup> September after getting approval from the respective governments. Next day, the Russians hosted a dinner for the British. Speaking on the occasion, the Russian Commissioner expressed the hope that "the agreement just concluded would be the beginning of more cordial relations between the two countries, and of a better understanding of mutual national aims and desires."<sup>48</sup> In this way, Russia at last acknowledged Wakhan as the Afghan territory. It was on the insistence of the British that Amir Abdur Rahman agreed to accept Wakhan as a part of Afghanistan. As the Amir says that "the province of Wakhan, which had come under my dominion, I arranged to be left under the British for protection, as it was too far from Kabul, and cut off from the rest of my country, and therefore very difficult to be properly fortified."<sup>49</sup> But the British too were unwilling to merge Wakhan either with Chitral or Gilgit as they did not want common Indian border with Russia. Instead, "the Government of India granted him [the Amir] an additional subsidy of Rs. 50, 000 a year, with effect from the 1<sup>st</sup> March 1897."<sup>50</sup> This amount was to be used by the Amir to smoothly run the administration of Wakhan strip. In this way, Wakhan started playing the role of "a natural wall between two empires."<sup>51</sup>

Despite the demarcation of the border in Wakhan, Afghan-Russia differences over the area in the periphery of Oxus persisted. It was on February 28, 1921 that the two countries signed an agreement to settle the issue. Article 9<sup>th</sup> of the agreement says that the Soviet Union would "hand over to Afghanistan the frontier districts which belonged to the latter in the last century, observing the principles of justice and self-determination of the population inhabiting the same." These districts include the area of Rivers Murghab, Pyandzh and

Kushka. However, no practical effort was made to implement this article of the treaty.

Later on differences emerged between the two countries regarding construction of a dam by the USSR on Murghab River as well as the Afghan utilization of water of Kushka River north of Chihil Dukter. To overcome these differences, they signed the Frontier Agreement in Moscow on June 13, 1946. The accord declared that Article 9 of the 1921 agreement has expired and lost its validity.<sup>52</sup> The two countries agreed to commence re-demarcation of the land frontier from Zulfikar to Khamiab as soon as possible on the basis of the documents and maps of the Anglo-Russian Demarcation Commission of 1885-1888.<sup>53</sup> It was agreed to appoint a joint Soviet-Afghan Commission for this purpose. The Soviet Union also agreed not to construct a dam on Murghab River while Kabul on its part pledged not to increase the volume of water being utilized from the Kushka River. It was agreed that thalweg of Amu and Pyandzh Rivers should be the border between the two countries and wherever, it is difficult to determinate the thalweg, the middle of both the rivers would be the border. The Soviet-Afghan Border Commission in 1947-48 gave control of some islands in both the rivers to Afghanistan. Moscow secured the right "to construct a dam on that portion of the Morhab River which marks the international boundary."<sup>54</sup> The Treaty Concerning the Regime of the Soviet-Afghan State Frontier concluded in Moscow on January 18, 1958 says that "the frontier between the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics and Afghanistan in the sector extending from Zulfikar to Khamiab" was re-demarcated... and "the sector extending from Khamiab to Lake Zor-Kul demarcated in 1947-48."<sup>55</sup>

In addition to her border dispute with the former Soviet Union, China also had differences with Afghanistan regarding its border in Wakhan. China considers the Pamirs as her land. She was not a signatory to the Russo-Britain treaty of 1895 by which she lost seven of the eight Pamirs; only one remained as Chinese territory.<sup>56</sup> But in 1960s, China gave up its historic stand regarding Pamirs. Under the Sino-Afghan treaty of



Wakhan prior to 1895

With Courtesy of H. Kreutzmann



1963, Beijing accepted Wakhan Corridor as the Afghan territory thus admitting the “disadvantages created by the 1895 to which she had not been a party.”<sup>57</sup>

### **Wakhan during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan**

Keeping in view its commanding position, Tsarist Russia wanted the occupation and annexation of the Wakhan Corridor, but Great Britain frustrated the Russian designs. After the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, the Soviet Union also perused the same objective and there was an imminent threat to the region. However, “the death of President Brezhnev and the rise to power of Gorbachev and the reformers prevented this happening.”<sup>58</sup> Following the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, the Russians “established strong military bases at places such as Zebak, Iskeshem, and all along the Wakhan Corridor. Strong military posts were established at Sarhad and up the Broghil Valley by the Zartgar Lake, commanding the pass to Chitral.”<sup>59</sup> The Red Army also constructed steel bridges in the area thus facilitating the local population. Due to the ongoing unrest, “some 1300 Kyrgyz led by Haji Rahman Qul” migrated from Wakhan and took refuge in northern areas of Pakistan.<sup>60</sup> In 1983, the Turkish government agreed to give them shelter on its soil. They were airlifted by the United Nations to Turkey and settled near to Lake Van in eastern Turkey.<sup>61</sup> Despite the fact that war is going in Afghanistan for more than thirty years, yet Wakhan has luckily remained safe from the violence.

### **Sino-Tajikistan Border Agreement**

China had a long standing territorial dispute with the Tsar Russia and later on with the Soviet Union regarding their border in the Pamirs region. China claims its 40,000 sq km area was occupied and annexed by Russia. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the centuries old border disputes re-emerged. New arrangements were needed to tackle these issues. In 1996, China and Tajikistan agreed to demarcate their border to pave the way for a durable solution to the problem. The demarcation was conducted in 2006 and



2008, erecting 101 boundary pillars along the border. They signed a formal treaty for this purpose in April 2010. Under this agreement, China relinquished her claims to 28,000 sq km area. In return, Tajikistan ceded 1142 sq km to China which is about three percent of the total disputed land. The agreement was ratified by Tajik Parliament (Lower House) on January 12, 2011.<sup>62</sup> This paved the way for greater cooperation among countries of the region.

Wakhan has a great potential for improving trade relations between Pakistan and Central Asian Republics. These difficult mountains have failed to stop commercial and trade relations between India and Central Asia for thousands of years. In contrast to the rest of Afghanistan, complete peace and harmony is prevalent in Wakhan Corridor. Environment is friendly for trade and business activities as “no highway robbery or theft is committed in the Wakhan territory.”<sup>63</sup> Pakistan is making efforts to expand its trade with the Central Asian Republics. Wakhan is the shortest route connecting Chitral with Gorno Badakhshan or Kuhistoni Badakhstan province of Tajikistan. There a number of passes linking Pakistan with Wakhan Corridor via Chitral. Some of these passes are Dorah, Nuksan, Khatinza, Agram, Sad Ishteragh and Broghal. The last one is the most important, easy and excellent pass “in the whole of the range from Herat to the eastern limit of Tibet, at all adapted to the passage of an army...if there was a gate to India, it was there.”<sup>64</sup> It is also known as “trade highway.”<sup>65</sup> It is this very Broghal which was termed by Fa Hain as the route of caravans. Under the Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement 2010 (APTTA), Kabul has agreed to open two passes in Wakhan for trade between Pakistan and Central Asia. These include Durah-Iskatul-Gulkhana-Ishkashim and Darkot-Broghal Pass-Sarhad Ishkashim. Pakistan can greatly benefit by doing trade with Tajikistan via Broghal pass.

President Zardari in a meeting with his Tajik counterpart, Emonali Rahmon in Turkey on the sideline of the Economic Cooperation Organization Summit in December 2010, asked Afghanistan to open a new route with Tajikistan via Wakhan.

All the above mentioned passes can be used for large scale trade with Central Asia in general and Tajikistan in particular provided Pakistan, Afghanistan and Tajikistan have the will power to do so. Although Islamabad wants trade with Central Asian Republics via Wakhan Corridor, yet it has so far failed to develop infrastructure for that propose. Roads and bridges connecting Chitral with the rest the country as well as Wakhan are in shabby condition. The Lowari tunnel has not been completed. Similarly, Chitral-Brughal road needs proper construction and expansion. Unless, infrastructure is developed on scientific lines, the idea of trade with Central Asia via Wakhan would remain just a wishful thinking.

Similarly, visiting Wakhan is a herculean task. Special permits are needed to enter the area either from Afghanistan or Pakistan. Afghan authorities in Faizabad, the capital of Badakhshan are always reluctant to issue permits to tourists and researchers to visit the area. Same is the case on the Pakistani side as the areas bordering Wakhan are included in the prohibited areas.<sup>66</sup> Similarly, Tajik authorities are not willing to allow tourists and researchers to pay visit to Wakhan from their country. Tourists and researchers not possessing special permits can go up to the areas located 30 miles located away in the southern side of the Pak-Afghan border in Wakhan. It is the responsibility of Pakistani, Afghan and Tajik leaders to think over how to revive the historic Silk Route linking all the countries right from China to the Mediterranean.

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# 5

## PAKHTUNISTAN ISSUE WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO BAJOUR AND DIR

It has been cherished desire of Afghanistan to gain control over the Pashto speaking areas of Pakistan particularly Malakand division and Bajour. Under Article No. 3 of the Durand Agreement, Kabul had agreed that it will at “no time exercise interference in Swat, Bajour or Chitral...”<sup>1</sup> But it never fulfilled the pledge and kept on interfering in these areas by sending its agents there before and after partition of the Sub-continent. This resulted in emergence of crises from time to time. One such Afghan agent named Faqir Shah alias *Mullah* (cleric) of Alingar created unrest in Mohmand, Bajour and Dir in 1927-28. He was a good orator and expert in playing with the religious sentiments of local people to advance the Afghan interest in the region.

He was born in Kunar in 1886.<sup>2</sup> He was disciple of the *Sandaki Mullah* (a religious figure from Shangla) and accompanied him to Swat in 1915. He had set up his headquarters at Alingar area of Laghman, Afghanistan. It was due to this very reason that he was known by the names of *Mullah* of Alingar. Virulently anti-British, he toured different areas of Mohmand in April and May 1927 to spread his

mission of *Amr-i-Bilmaruf* (promoting virtues) as well as to prepare people for *Jehad*. He was enjoying support of the "Afghan allowance holders i.e. Badshah Gul, the Babra *Mullah* and other anti-British agents, whose influence in Bajour was considerable."<sup>3</sup> The propaganda of pro-Afghan elements put Nawab Shahjehan Khan of Dir in a difficult position; and it became necessary for him to distribute a large sum of money as *lungis* [cash prizes] to his faction amongst the Salarzai, *Mullahs* of Bajour and other persons supporting his *dalla* [faction], to counteract this opposition.<sup>4</sup>

The anti government virus also spread to Dir. On January 27th, 1928, the people of Khal and Tormang Darra attacked a security post at Rabat and completely destroyed it besides taking away rifles and mail bags. Next day, a security check post and bungalow on the Laram Hill Top were attacked and burnt. The same day, Darora check post was also destroyed. In retaliation, a plane of the British Royal Air Force bombed a big gathering in Ushiri Darra on 29<sup>th</sup> January killing 13 people. The government decided to launch continuous bombing of the area from 31st January. However, a *Jirga* (delegation) of Painsa Khel met with the Nawab prior to expiry of the deadline and handed over some stolen rifles and mailbags. The *jirga* then visited Chakdara and signed an undertaking to return all the stolen rifles. They also accepted responsibility for the safety of Chitral road. The *jirga* of Painsa Khel and the Nawab handed over 1,500 rupees each to the Political Agent, Captain W.R. Hay as a compensation for the damages.

On February 16th, the Salarzai *lashkar* (armed group) gathered at Pasht in Bajour. Ten days later the *lashkar* moved to invade Jandul. It was also joined by the Mamund *lashkar*. The government sent aircraft on reconnaissance mission to Bajour. The *lashkar* which had reached the Ambahar valley fired on the plane. In retaliation, the government started air raids on the area from 8<sup>th</sup> March, which continued for a week. The bombing resulted in heavy casualties and damaged a number of villages as well. During the last months of that year, *Mullah* of Alingar collected a *lashkar* in Arang (Bajour) and assaulted the British troops camped at Bandagai on Dir-

Bajour border. Planes bombarded the *lashkar* killing about 50 followers of the *Mullah* of Alingar. 150 others were also injured as a result of the raids. *Mullah* of Alingar was now very much angry at Nawab of Dir and Khan of Khar for not supporting what he called "the Islamic cause." He then moved to Babukarra valley where he succeeded in raising another *lashkar*. On 17th March, it attacked Jandul. The *lashkar* was located and bombed on 18th and 21st March. Faqir Shah and his followers now directed the barrels of their guns towards the Nawab of Dir.

In order to strengthen the hands of Nawab, the government gave him one hundred and ninety rifles with twenty-three boxes of cartridges in August.<sup>5</sup> He was also permitted to purchase 50,000 rounds. The government was not in favour of prolonging the unrest in Bajour and wanted an early end to it. In his message sent to Political Agent Malakand on 24th August 1932, the governor stated, "If the Shamozaï are in any degree inclined to call a halt to hostilities, it is most desirable that the Nawab should meet them half way. It does not appear that he has anything to gain by prolonging the conflict."<sup>6</sup> Slowly and gradually participants of the *lashkar* fed up with fighting and dispersed. Faqir of Alingar tried his level best to raise another *lashkar* but his plan did not materialize. He moved from village to village to further his mission. He visited Upper (Bara) Totai and Khanori villages located near Agra in Malakand Agency in August 1934. As the inhabitants of these areas warmly received him, therefore, "the government fined Bara Totai 20 rifles and 15 heads of cattle. The Khanori was fined as 15 rifles and 10 heads of cattle."<sup>7</sup> The Faqir and his supporters tried to attack a column of British soldiers near Timergara on 11th and 12th October 1934. The column was on its way back to Peshawar from Chitral. The Nawab's men and the Royal Air Force again foiled his attempt and several supporters of the *Faqir* were killed.<sup>8</sup> The government kept constant watch on movement of the Faqir and reconnaissance planes were used for this purpose.<sup>9</sup> The Nawab on his part aborted all attempts of *Faqir* of Alingar's *lashkar* to cross Panjkora River between Sado and Bandagai. The British administration was so pleased



with the Nawab that he was made as K.B.E (Knight of British Empire) on June 3<sup>rd</sup> 1933 and was invested with the insignia by the Viceroy in New Delhi in March 1934.

Despite pursuing such vagarious anti British activities, Afghanistan never raised objection to any clause of the Durand Agreement prior to the announced of the 3<sup>rd</sup> June Plan 1947. Kabul was looking at demand of Muslims for a separate state on its border with keen interest. It initiated coordinated efforts to exploit the emerging situation for its own political ends. Afghanistan became highly disturbed at the Muslim League's successful campaign for creation of Pakistan in the NWFP. In the weeks prior to the outbreak of the World War 2<sup>nd</sup>, Sir William Barton, a man with a vast knowledge and experience on the Indian northern frontier, wrote of Afghanistan: "the country is landlocked, its foreign trade, except on the Russian side, has to move nearly 1500 miles to the sea across India; in such condition rapid expansion is impossible. The obvious remedy is a port and an approach corridor on the Arabian Sea. To have such a port is an ambition of the Afghan Government. Why does not Britain offer the concession?"<sup>10</sup> Barton thought that by floating this new idea favouring Afghanistan, he would be able to win Kabul's support against the Axis power. The Afghan authorities demonstrated extra-ordinary interest in the Barton's proposal. However, the British high ups both in London and Dehli disliked and dejected the proposal.

In the early months of 1940, the Afghan government expressed concern over the future of Muslims in India, especially the Pakhtuns of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA. In a series of dispatches, Kabul expressed its desire to absorb the Pakhtun areas located on the southern side of the Durand Line. The British authorities did not agree and termed it a worthless exercise. They sent a clear cut message to Kabul saying that "the British Government is going to see that India's frontiers remain inviolate."<sup>11</sup> When disappointed from the British, the Afghan authorities held talks with Germans from March to June 1941, reviewing the idea of joining the war on the side of the axis powers provided Kabul is given the

guarantee of receiving the whole Pakhtun belt of northern India right from Swat to Quetta and onward Karachi. However, this idea could not take practical shape. In their discussion with the British high ups from November 1944 to February 1946, the Afghan officials reiterated their intentions to cooperate on tribal affairs and promised to maintain a policy of non-interference as long as the British remained in India. They proposed that if India is going to be divided, the NWFP be allowed to join Afghanistan. The British authorities once again dismissed the proposal and termed it impracticable.

The announcement of partition plan of 3<sup>rd</sup> June 1947 further irked the Afghan authorities and they started making hue and cry to gain control over Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (formerly NWFP) and FATA. The same day, Kabul dispatched a note to London and Delhi arguing that "people of the NWFP and Baluchistan should be given the option of becoming independent of joining Pakistan or Afghanistan."<sup>12</sup> Like the previous proposals, this idea did not receive positive response from the British authorities. With this, Afghanistan put forward the idea of a separate Pakhtun state with the name of Pakhtunistan or the land of Pakhtuns. The term has been used as pretext to grab a vast land right from Gilgit-Baltistan to the shore of the Arabian Sea at Gowadar. Kabul "was confident that before long it would be able to incorporate a state of this kind in its own territory."<sup>13</sup>

Afghan authorities projected the right of self-determination for Pakhtoons of Pakistan with the hope that the new state would not be able to survive for long. The Afghan Ambassador to the UN, Abdur Rahman Pazhwak☆ burnt the candle at both ends projecting the Pakhtunistan issue at the international level.

☆ He served as the Afghan permanent representative to the UN for 14 years since 1958. He was elected President of the UN General Assembly in 1966. Abdur Rahman Pahwak also worked as Afghan Ambassador to India for three years (1973-76). He shifted to Peshawar in 1991 and died there on June 8, 1995.

He wrote a book, "Pakhtoonistan." He alleged that a number of Afridi tribesmen met at Tirah [Khyber Agency] and inaugurated the 'National Assembly of Pakhtunistan.'<sup>14</sup> Sardar Muhammad Daud and his supporters argued that self determination for Pakhtuns "meant either joining Afghanistan or creating independent Pashtun state friendly to Afghanistan, on the territory of British India."<sup>15</sup> The then Afghan Prime Minister, Muhammad Hashim Khan in an interview with an Indian paper said that "NWFP should be included into Afghanistan."<sup>16</sup> But the British government of India once again rejected the Afghan plea as totally unfounded.

It was decided that a referendum would be held in the NWFP to decide whether it should join India or Pakistan. The *Khudai Khidmatgars* pressed for the third option, i.e. independence for NWFP and FATA. The *Khudai Khidmatgars* were "actually working for an independent Pushtoon state."<sup>17</sup> But their demand did not receive support from people of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the British government of India. In order to ensure transparency of the referendum, Lord Mountbatten send the then Governor Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Sir Olaf Caroe on leave and appointed Lt. General Sir Rob Lockhart as the Acting Governor. A referendum was held in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in July 1947 under the supervision of Brig. J. B. Booth who acted as the Referendum Commissioner. More than fifty percent of the total of 572,798 votes were polled in the referendum. Pakistan secured 289,244 votes and India only 2874.<sup>18</sup> This referendum decided the matter once for all. The *Khudai Khidmatgar* movement boycotted the referendum. It was accused for separatist tendencies. Soon after partition, the princely states of Amb, Chitral, Dir and Swat signed instrument of accession joining Pakistan.

Similarly, all tribal *jirgas* of tribal agencies including Malakand, Khyber, Kurram, North and South Waziristan agencies voted for Pakistan. The then Governor Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Sir George Cunningham hold talks with the tribal *jirgas* in November 1947. Cunningham says that "I interviewed the *jirgas* of all the big tribes from end to end of

the frontier. Without exception they stated and confirmed in written statements that they were part of Pakistan, and wished to preserve the same relations with Pakistan as they had with the British. This agreement was ratified by the Pakistan Government.”<sup>19</sup> They announced joining Pakistan by signing ten lines treaty. “Thus, Pakistan was formed with the full approval of the people now living in the country. The people of the frontier and the tribal areas were as much the architects of their new state as any other people living in Pakistan.”<sup>20</sup> The Pakhtuns of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and tribal areas declared that “Pakistan was independent already, themselves being part of her.”<sup>21</sup>

However, Kabul did not change its hostile attitude towards Pakistan and Prime Minister Sardar Najibullah Khan “presented his country’s demand for the formation of Pakhtoonistan.”<sup>22</sup> This Pakhtoonistan should be “independent enough to have separate links with Afghanistan but would be subsidized by Pakistan.”<sup>23</sup> Responding to the Afghan demand, the father of the new nation, Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah said that “Pakistan respected the autonomy of the tribal belt and as result had withdrawn its regular army from the area, it would not hand over the area to Afghanistan.”<sup>24</sup> With the emergence of Pakistan, Afghanistan adopted a hostile attitude towards it. Many countries and their nationals were surprised at the reaction of Kabul towards the partition of the Sub-continent and “the appearance of Pakistan...Hindus India itself was hardly more alarmed or distressed by the successful campaign of Mohammed Ali Jinnah for a new Muslim nation than were the Afghans.”<sup>25</sup> Afghanistan was the only country in the UN General Assembly that opposed Pakistan’s entry into the UN. Speaking in the General Assembly on 30<sup>th</sup> September 1947, Hussain Aziz, the Afghan envoy to the UN, said that “Afghanistan does not wish to oppose the membership of Pakistan in this great organization, but it is with the deepest regret that we are at this time unable to vote for Pakistan. This is unhappy instance is due to the fact that we cannot recognize the North West Frontier as part of Pakistan so long as the people of the NWFP have not been given an opportunity free from any kind of influence and I

repeat free from any kind of influence to determine for themselves, whether they wish to be independent or become a part of Pakistan.” However, Kabul withdrew the negative vote on 20<sup>th</sup> October 1947 and recalled Hussain Aziz back home. This brought a positive change in relations between the two countries to some extent.

Talking to the Afghan envoy, Sardar Najibullah Khan, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah said that “the Government and the people of Pakistan entertain nothing but feeling of warmest friendship towards the Muslim Kingdom of Afghanistan which is our closest neighbour and with whom for many centuries and for many generations the people of Pakistan have had countless religious, cultural and social ties...I desire that the relationship between these two sister Nations may be the greatest and the most lasting friendship, and I hope that the two Governments will soon be able to settle and adjust, in a spirit of goodwill for the benefit of both, all those matters which require our immediate attention...”<sup>26</sup> Similarly, the Afghan ambassador to Pakistan while addressing a reception arranged in his honour by Aligarh Old Boys Association in Karachi on 14<sup>th</sup> June 1948 dispelled the impression that Afghanistan has any claim on the Frontier territory.

Despite these reconciliatory moves, tension persisted in relations between the two neighbours. A Pakistani jet fighter while engaged in action against anti state elements in tribal areas, inadvertently bombed an Afghan village located some two thousand yards inside the Afghan territory. Later the matter was settled through diplomatic channel and Pakistan paid compensation for the losses. But King Zahir Shah at the inaugural session of the Afghan National Assembly on 30<sup>th</sup> June 1949, made anti Pakistan speech. The *Loya Jirga* or the Grand Assembly passed a resolution repudiating all treaties, conventions and agreements signed between the Afghan Government and the British Government before the emergence of Pakistan. It was after the passage of this resolution that Afghanistan accelerated anti-Pakistan propaganda by raising the Pakhtunistan issue. Three Afghan

*lashkars*, “crossed the Durand Line in 1950 and 1951 with the avowed intention of planting Pushtunistan flags on the Indus River.”<sup>27</sup>

Kabul abetted separatist tendencies in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan to “weaken its southern neighbour and obtain access to sea...”<sup>28</sup> Ian Stephens has termed Pakhtunistan as “a Central Asian intrigue of the finest quality, opening up almost limitless possibilities for speculation...”<sup>29</sup> Separatist elements led by Faqir of Ippi launched subversive activities with the backing and support of the Afghan government. The Faqir declared in May 1948 that Pakistan was a creation of the British. Some Afridi tribesmen gathered at Tirah Valley of Khyber Agency on August 12, 1949 and “announced the establishment of a new nation, Pukhtunistan or Pushtoonistan, for which they adopted a flag with a red mountain fronting a rising sun.”<sup>30</sup> Side by side with these moves, the Afghan consulates in Pakistan acted as centers of hostile propaganda.<sup>31</sup> Pakistan, in retaliation “ceased the transport of a petroleum shipment into Afghanistan in 1950 and held the cargo for three months...”<sup>32</sup> In November 1950, the US Ambassador to Afghanistan, Ely Palmer proposed a meeting of the Afghan and Pakistani officials to ease tension. Afghanistan immediately accepted the proposal. But Pakistan rejected the idea as it would boost up the Afghan point of view regarding Pakhtunistan. Following the rejection, Afghanistan again withdrew its ambassador from Pakistan.<sup>33</sup> The US did not favour the idea of Pakhtunistan and asked Afghanistan to restore diplomatic ties with Pakistan and “completely drop their Pushtunistan demands.”<sup>34</sup>

Afghanistan failed to win support of the international community on the question of Pakhtunistan. To the most Western eyes the idea of “Pakhtoonistan is gibberish.”<sup>35</sup> Except the former Soviet Union and India, no other country favoured the idea of Pakhtunistan. New Delhi from the very beginning supported and promoted the Afghan stand. It also signed a “treaty of eternal friendship” with Afghanistan on January 1, 1950. Pushtunistan Day was celebrated in major

Indian cities from time to time and "Indian orators and editors upheld the Afghan claims."<sup>36</sup> The Soviet Premier Nikolai Alexandrovich Bulganin during his visit to Kabul in December 1955 declared that "We have sympathy for Afghanistan's attitude to the Pakhtunistan problems and think that the Pathans should be consulted on the solution of the problem."<sup>37</sup> A communiqué issued during the visit of President Khrushchev to Kabul on 4<sup>th</sup> March 1960, stressed the need for solution of the "problem on the principle of self-determination on the basis of the United Nations Charter."<sup>38</sup> Next year saw, improvement in Pak-Soviet relations and the two countries signed a deal for oil exploration in Pakistan. Kabul got the message that Moscow was not willing to support Pakhtunistan, at least openly.<sup>39</sup> Leaders in Kremlin were now of the view that "Afghan ruling circles while emphasizing the national unity of the Afghans on both the side of the frontier, are taking every step to deprive the national movement of the expatriate Afghans of revolutionary anti feudal and anti imperialist character."<sup>40</sup>

Despite these foreign policy failures, Kabul did not give up its stand viz-a-vis Pakhtunistan. In early 1950s, Sardar Muhammad Daud offered payments to the Pashtun tribesmen in a dual effort to destabilize the government and policy of Pakistan while increasing the distribution of propaganda.<sup>41</sup> In December 1953, he abrogated the Anglo-Afghan treaty of November 1921 under which Kabul had acknowledged the Durand Line as the Indo-Afghan frontier. The formation of one unit in October 1955 invited unprecedented reaction from Afghanistan. Sardar Daud severed diplomatic ties with Pakistan. He argued that "since Pakistan had no jurisdiction over the NWFP and Baluchistan, these provinces could not be incorporated into the rest and must be maintained as separate entities."<sup>42</sup>

Anti Pakistan protests were held in Kabul, Kandahar and Jalalabad. Pakistani flag was pulled down from its embassy building in Kabul and the flag of Pakhtoonistan was hoisted there. Kabul refused to give explanation regarding the flag incident. This resulted in breaking down of diplomatic

relations and ambassadors were once again recalled. In the mean time, Iran intervened and persuaded King Zahir Shah "to tune down his support of Pakhtoonistan and improve relations with neighbouring Pakistan."<sup>43</sup> This eased tension and President Iskander Mirza paid a visit to Kabul in 1956. The same year, the Afghan Prime Minister Sardar Muhammad Daud visited Pakistan which was followed by the visit of Prime Minister Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy to Afghanistan in June 1957 thus restoring diplomatic relations between the two countries. The Afghan King Zahir Shah visited Pakistan in February 1958. All these visits were the signs of improvement in Pak-Afghan relations. However, the sentiments of good-will were washed away by a diplomatic storm two years later when Afghan troops crossed the Durand Line and attacked Bajour.

Tension prevailed and diplomatic relations between the two were suspended in September 1961 when Pakistan closed its missions in Afghanistan for the alleged harassment of its diplomats. Pakistan also asked Kabul to close its consulate and trade agencies on its soil "because they had been indulging in subversive and anti Pakistan activities."<sup>44</sup> In retaliation, Afghanistan cut off diplomatic relations with Pakistan, sealed the border and halted its trade with the rest of the world via Pakistan's territory. Sardar Daud announced that "the border will remain closed till the Pashtunistan issue is settled."<sup>45</sup> This inflicted severe economic losses to Afghanistan as it was unable to export its fruit. The former Soviet Union helped Afghanistan in minimizing the losses. Pakistan also refused to allow the several hundred thousand Afghan nomads known as *powindas* to enter its territory without proper travelling documents i.e. passport and visa. King Zahir Shah became so angry with the unrealistic policy of his cousin that he dismissed the government of Sardar Daud Khan in March 1963 and replaced him with Dr. Mohammad Yusuf, a German educated non-Pashtun technocrat. The new Afghan Prime Minister declared that the Pakhtunistan issue was not necessarily linked with the closure of border and that Afghanistan would like to restore diplomatic relations with Pakistan.<sup>46</sup>



With Daud Khan's departure, the Pakhtunistan issue became subsided paving the way for improvement of Pak-Afghan relations. Mediation on the part of Iran resulted in signing of the Tehran agreement. Under the agreement (inked on 28<sup>th</sup> May 1963), Pak-Afghan diplomatic ties were restored. Both the countries also agreed that "they will make their best efforts to create an atmosphere of good understanding, friendship and mutual trust."<sup>47</sup> President Ayub visited Kabul on July 1, 1964 and held talks with King Zahir Shah in friendly atmosphere. During the Indo-Pak war of 1965 and 1971, Afghanistan proved itself as a good neighbour by not creating troubles for Islamabad along the Durand Line. But the emergence of Bangladesh encouraged Kabul to revive the Pakhtunistan issue and the Afghan representative raised the same in the UN General Assembly in October 1972.<sup>48</sup>

When Sardar Muhammad Daud came to power through a coup d'état on 17<sup>th</sup> July 1973, he not only intensified the Pakhtunistan propaganda but also started official celebration of Pakhtunistan Day. Some experts were of the opinion that the coup was primarily engineered against the interests of Pakistan. However, Sardar Daud rejected this impression by saying that "he overthrew the monarchy for domestic rather than international reasons."<sup>49</sup> Throwing light on Pak-Afghan ties, he said "as regards our relations with Pakistan, we have a political dispute with that country..."<sup>50</sup> Amin Jan alias Malang Jan who used to write poems and songs to promote the cause of Pakhtunistan, was declared as the Afghan national poet. The state machinery was put in the top gear to flourish and encourage Pakhtunistan issue both at national and international level. In order to counter the Afghan move, Islamabad encouraged anti Daud Islamists and provided shelter to Gulbadin Hikmatyar and Prof. Burhanuddin Rabbani etc.

In 1976, Sardar Daud apprehended the Soviet aggressive designs and tilted towards the US and Pakistan. On June, 7, 1976, Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto visited Kabul on official visit and held talks with Sardar Daud. The two leaders agreed to stop propaganda warfare against each other 'for the

time being'. His visit was followed by Daud's arrival in Pakistan in August 1976. In a statement addressed to the Pakistani nation, Sardar Daud said, "Pakistani brothers, I can assure you that we came to your country with the utmost goodwill and sincerity...We will be able to solve our political problems and one day will live as very close and intimate brothers."<sup>51</sup> He had agreed to recognize "the Durand Line as an international boundary in return of the general amnesty granted to the National Awami Party leaders."<sup>52</sup> Next year during his visit to Saudi Arabia, Daud assured the Saudi authorities "by putting his hands on the Holy Hajar-e-Aswad" that he would improve relation with Pakistan.<sup>53</sup>

In October 1977, General Zia ul Haq paid an official visit to Kabul. He and Daud agreed to hold further talks on strengthening Pak-Afghan ties. But this process could not be started due to the Saur revolution of April 1978 in which President Daud and his family members were killed and the People Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) headed by Nur Muhammad Taraki came into power. At the initial stage, the PDPA government adopted a flexible approach towards the issue of Pakhtunistan. General Zia-ul-Haq visited Kabul in the last quarter of 1978. The Afghan President Nur Mohammad Tarkai during his talks with Zia-ul-Haq expressed the hope that political differences between the two countries would be resolved through amicable means. The then Afghan Foreign Minister Hafizullah Amin stated that he would not mention the Pakhtunistan issue "in such a manner as to be misinterpreted by the enemies of friendship and brotherhood."<sup>54</sup> But situation in Afghanistan abruptly changed. It was the day of Christmas, 25<sup>th</sup> December when the Red Army moved in Afghanistan and with this, the miseries of the Afghans started and over four million of them fled from their homes and took refuge in Pakistan. Islamabad refused to recognize the PDPA government and termed it the Soviet puppet. The PDPA's government then started issuing statements in favour of Pakhtunistan. Some reports suggest that the late Afghan President, Noor Muhammad Taraki had proposed to General Zia ul-Haq that "Afghanistan would recognize the Durand Line as the international border

between the two countries if Pakistan stopped helping the mujahideen.”<sup>55</sup> Other reports say that the former Soviet Union informed General Zia ul Haq in 1984 that both Kabul and Moscow would recognize the Durand Line as an international border provided Pakistan closes the Afghan Mujahideen bases on its soil. Kremlin also pledged to denounce the Pakhtunistan issue. The proposal did not receive positive response from Islamabad as it was not ready to give up what it called the principled stand on the Afghanistan. In September 1985, the Afghan government organized a *jirga* of Pakhtoon tribes on both sides of the Durand Line. Addressing the *jirga*, the then Afghan President Babrak Karmal, “openly called for the reunification of the separated ethnic groups...under Afghan sovereignty.”<sup>56</sup> The government of Noor Muhammad Tarakai, Hafizullah Amin, Babrak Karmal and Dr. Najibullah kept the Pakhtunistan issue alive by issuing press statements from time to time. However, with the fall of Dr. Najibullah administration in 1992, an interim Afghan government was formed. The Interim President Prof. Sibghatullah Mojadeddi during his visit to Pakistan the same year (1992) announced that “the Durand Line is the official border between Pakistan and Afghanistan but unofficially there is no border between the two countries.”<sup>57</sup> The Pakhtunistan question went into background during the interim government of the Afghan Mujahideen and the Taliban regime.

When Hamid Karzai came to power with explicit and implicit support of Pakistan, his first and foremost task was to once again revive the dead issue of Durand Line by misinterpreting the treaty. He has branded the Durand Line as the “line of hatred.” Hamid Karzai says that he did not accept it as an international border as “it raised a wall between the two brothers.”<sup>58</sup> Kabul started celebrating Pakhtunistan Day on 31<sup>st</sup> August each year. Pro-Pakhtunistan posters were in Peshawar some time back which was condemned by all political forces including the ANP. Official circles are of the view that Kabul is directly and indirectly involved in the ongoing unrest in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in general and tribal

areas in particular. Similarly, Afghan authorities allege that Pakistan is supporting the Taliban.

The never ending Afghan efforts for Pakhtunistan have failed to win sympathy either in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan or inside Afghanistan itself. In spite of the importance attached to the Pakhtunistan issue by most of the Afghan Governments like annual celebration of Pakhtunistan Day, re-naming squares in Kabul and Jalalabad, and issuance of annual postage stamps- "at least half of the population of Afghanistan remained apathetic or hostile to Pakhtunistan issue."<sup>59</sup> The slogan of Pakhtunistan is the most unattractive to the Afghan minorities from political and cultural point of view. To them, as it means to further strengthen the grip of Pakhtuns and their language at the cost of Tajiks, Uzbek, Turkman and Hazara etc. Afghan ethnic minorities consider Durand Line as a non issue at all.

### **Afghan efforts to gain hold in Dir and Bajour**

Nawab Shah Jehan of Dir fully supported the cause of Muslims of Sub-continent for creation of Pakistan. He gave a donation of three hundred thousand rupees for this purpose in 1945-46.<sup>60</sup> Before partition of the Sub-continent, Afghan authorities approached the Nawab with the request to join Afghanistan but he flatly refused.<sup>61</sup> After Pakistan came into being, he acceded to the newly born Muslim state on 8th November 1947. An agreement to this effect was signed by the Nawab and Political Agent Malakand, Sheikh Mahboob Ali. The agreement was verified by father of the nation, Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah. The other three princely states in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa i.e. Chitral, Swat and Amb also acceded to Pakistan. Personal rights, privileges, dignities and titles hitherto enjoyed by the rulers of the "Frontier States" and their family members were guaranteed by the Government of Pakistan under merger agreement with the respective rulers.<sup>62</sup> They were exempted from Municipal or other property tax and from personal appearance in courts. They were entitled to hold 'Diplomatic Passport and to use

V.I.P. rooms at airports, to hoist their personal flags at their residences and cars.<sup>63</sup>

The rulers of Chitral, Amb and Swat signed Supplementary Instruments of Accessions to further strengthen their links with Pakistan. Mehtar of Chitral, Saifur Rahman signed the Supplementary Instrument of Accession on 29th March 1953, Major Sir Muhammad Farid Khan of Amb on 29th April 1953 and Mian Gul Jehanzeb, the Wali of Swat on 12th February 1954. The Nawab of Dir declined to execute any such agreement.<sup>64</sup> Under the supplementary Instruments of Accessions, the rulers of these states surrendered their powers to Government of Pakistan, empowering it to enact laws in the like manner as in the case of other parts of the country. They also declared that the Constitution of Pakistan shall be the Constitution of their States and shall be enforced in their respective territories. Unlike other Acceded States of Pakistan, no merger agreements were executed with the Rulers of Frontier States. These States nevertheless were incorporated in the Province of West Pakistan in October 1955 as provided in Section 2(v) of the Establishment of West Pakistan Act 1955. Section 2(iv) (3) of the Act also provided that nothing in this Act shall authorize any change in internal administration of the tribal areas and Frontier States except by means of regulations made by the Governor with the approval of the Governor General. Since no such regulation was promulgated, the rulers continued to exercise temporal powers with their respective jurisdiction under the local laws, customs and usages.<sup>65</sup> Their rights and privileges also protected under Article 202 of the 1956 Constitution. These states were duly represented, as a group, in the Constituent Assembly and they were allotted nine seats in the Provincial Assembly in 1955-56. However, the Nawab refused to send his representatives to the West Pakistan Legislative Assembly. In the following years, the rulers of these states except Dir introduced reforms in their respective states. The Government of Pakistan sanctioned Privy Purses annually to the rulers of the Frontier States: -

	Rs.
➤ Wali of Swat	6, 50,000

➤ Nawab of Dir	4, 75,000
➤ Mehtar of Chitral	90, 500
➤ Nawab of Amb	15, 000

Reluctance of Nawab-e-Dir to sign Supplementary Instrument of Accessions, to send his representatives to the West Pakistan Legislative Assembly and to introduce reforms including opening of schools and hospitals etc, created cracks in his ties with the government of Pakistan. He also opposed the national forest policy of the government of Pakistan, which was agreed by both Chitral and Swat.<sup>66</sup> However, the Nawab was awarded Hilal-i-Quaid-e-Azam in 1959 for his services in the Kashmir War of 1948.

The Nawab due to his irrational policies, had earned enmity of many people. When Pakistan came into being, these annoyed elements came out of their hibernation and formed different organizations and affiliated them with Pakistan Muslim League with the sole aim to dislodge him from power. In September 1948, Dir State Muslim League was formed with Hassan Ali Khan and Advocate Akhunzada Bahrawar Saeed as its President and General Secretary respectively. These people started a malicious propaganda against the Nawab by sending letters to President of Pakistan, Governor NWFP and press to damage his reputation. When the matter was brought into the notice of NWFP Governor, he issued a statement on 22<sup>nd</sup> November 1948 saying that "there is nothing genuine about the Muslim League in Dir State."<sup>67</sup> The NWFP Chief Secretary presented a report to (State and Frontier Regions (SAFRON) on 26<sup>th</sup> February 1949 saying that allegations against the Nawab were highly exaggerated. Persons concerned are "in fact no more and probably no less Muslim Leaguers in true sense than Nawab himself, who has made and continues to make, great sacrifices for Pakistan."<sup>68</sup> Clarifying the situation, President Pakistan Muslim League, Chaudhari Khaliqauzaman in a press statement said that "I am surprised to find that certain persons in the States acceded to Pakistan, have started some organizations which they now call as the Pakistan Muslim League Organizations in the States. I hereby inform all those persons who are carrying on this propaganda,

to desist from using the name of Pakistan Muslim League, because they have no right to do so.”<sup>69</sup> However, those who wanted to harm Nawab further accelerated their campaign with a well calculated motive.

### **Tension in Bajour**

The total area of Bajour is 1290 square km and its population according to the census of 1998, is about six hundred thousand people. Bajour is inhabited by the two principal tribes, the Tarkani and the Uthman Khel. The areas of Tarkani tribe had been ruled by one of its sub-section, the Ibrahim Khel Khans and other petty Chief, viz the Khans of Khar, Pasht, Kotki, Nawagai, Malik Khanzada Mamound and Malik Abdul Hakim Mamund. The Uthman Khels were not directly under any of these Khans but they used to join the *lashkar* of either during crisis.

Before partition, the Indian government was dealing with tribes of Bajour through the Nawab of Dir who had considerable influence over them. He used to pay subsidies of ten thousand rupees per annum to the Khan of Khar, Rs.3, 000 to the officers of the Khan's forces, from one to two thousand rupees to the Khan of Pasht besides cash rewards and presents, such as horses and hawks, to the Khans of Kotkai, Nawagai and Khalozai.<sup>70</sup> When Pakistan came into existence, Bajour became the hot-bed of intrigues for the Afghan officials and their allowance holders. They became extra-ordinary active to win support of the local people for Afghanistan and Pakhtunistan. The Afghan government sent its agents to different areas to further the cause of their country in Bajour. The leader of these agents was known as *Rais*. He was in charge of all the affairs of his areas as a representative of the Afghan Government with instruction to undertake regular tours and maintain direct contacts with the local tribesmen. Two *Rais* were active in Bajour during 1950s. Abdul Razaq alias Shal Pacha was the *Rais* for Salarzai area while Muhammad Shuaib Jan was *Rais* for the Uthman Khels. Under them were the *Wakils* (representatives), *Maliks* (tribal

elders) and *Khassadars* (tribal security personnel) who were paid regularly for their services.

In 1948, a pro-Pakistan Malik Khanzada Khan, Mamund of Khaloizai was ousted from Bajour by Malik Abdul Hakim, an Afghan agent. Malik Khanzada took refuge with the Khan of Kotkai. Two years later, he shifted to Dir.<sup>71</sup> The pro-Afghan elements in Bajour, thereby, scored a victory. Malik Khanzada Khan was roaming around, endeavouring to enlist support to get himself re-instated. On the other hand, the Nawab of Dir wanted annexation of Bajour in Dir state. The Government of Pakistan informed him that he (the Nawab) cannot do so as stipulated in the agreement signed by his father, Muhammad Sharif Khan with British authorities in December 1898. The agreement had defined the boundaries of Dir with Swat, Chitral, Bajour and Afghanistan. With this, the Nawab adopted hostile attitude towards Pakistan. In 1949, the then Governor NWFP Sahibzada Khurshid during his visit to Chakdara, gave "a severe warning to the Nawab of Dir."<sup>72</sup> The Nawab denied the charges and offered his services in Bajour in order to prove himself "a true well wisher" of Pakistan. The Governor "accepted his offer and permitted him to work in Bajour and to expel all pro-Afghan elements from there."<sup>73</sup> The Nawab succeeded in bringing back Malik Khanzada Khan to Bajour. The Nawab also posted 800 of his men to safeguard the Malik.<sup>74</sup> On the other hand, the Khan of Khar was encouraging and entertaining Afghan agents in their anti-Pakistan activities in Bajour to pressurize the government of Pakistan to recognize him as the Nawab of the whole Bajour, and support him against his enemies, which had been his father's and his long cherished dream.<sup>75</sup> In retaliation, the Nawab of Dir in October 1950 suspended cash allowance of Khar and Pasht Khans.<sup>76</sup> In his four pages report presented to the government on 17<sup>th</sup> November 1950, the then Secretary Defence Lt. Colonel Iskander Mirza recommended that the hands of the Nawab should be strengthened.<sup>77</sup> Later on, the Nawab arranged several meetings between Khar Khan and the state authorities. During these meetings, the Khan succeeded in convincing authorities that he had neither accept any



money from Afghanistan nor having promoted anti-Pakistan propaganda in Bajour.<sup>78</sup>

Shal Pacha [Afghan agent] started a tour of Salarzai and reached Pasht village on 14<sup>th</sup> April 1952 "to win over as great support in Bajour for Afghanistan as possible."<sup>79</sup> Thirty Afghan soldiers, two officers and a doctor accompanied him. Next day, he convened a Salarzai *Jirga* in the *Khawar* [a seasonal dry nallah] between Dandokai and Pasht and distributed Pakhtunistan flags there. He was opposed by Malik Shato of Lakiyano and Malik Nangrez of Chinargo. Both of them declared that "neither Pakhtoonistan nor Hindu Raj was acceptable to them." The people of Bajour rejected Shal Bacha's plea and only three persons hoisted Pakhtunistan flags on their houses. Pasht Qilla (where Shal Pacha was staying) was ambushed several times during the nights of his stay. The pro-Pakistan party of Lar and Bar Sadin sent a message to Shal Pacha warning him against the consequences of distribution of flags and money in their areas and was asked to quit Salarzai area. The warning and attitude of Salarzais made Shal Pacha so much nervous that for the most of the time, he confined himself to Pasht and could not move out unless he was surrounded by a large number of armed men for protection.

Shal Pacha was greatly disappointed at the treatment meted out to him by the Salarzai tribe. He cut short his tour and left for Afghanistan on 26<sup>th</sup> April 1952. On his way, he received invitation from the Khan of Khar and availing of the same, he reached Khar on 28<sup>th</sup> April. He summoned a *jirga* of Salarzai, Utmankhels and Charmangis near Khar on 9<sup>th</sup> May 1952. Shahabuddin Khan, the Khan of Jandul is said to have asked his supporters in Bajour to attend the *jirga* in a large number and to make it a complete success. Pro-Pakistan leaders also attended the *jirga*. The gathering was addressed by Shal Bacha and Muhammad Shuaib alias Jan Sahib. Muhammad Shuaib, his brother Mian Gul Jan (son of Babar *Mullah* of Charmung) was instrumental in making hectic "propaganda in favour of Afghanistan in Bajour."<sup>80</sup> They were "paid Afghan agents and deadly enemies of Pakistan."<sup>81</sup> The

Afghan Government had given them six hundred thousand rupees for distribution among people of Bajour.<sup>82</sup> They requested the people of Bajour to hoist Pakhtunistan flags on their houses. Pro-Pakistan Maliks strongly opposed the idea of hoisting the flags and warned this was dangerous to their freedom. The *jirga* unanimously agreed to their suggestion and demanded the immediate removal of Shal Pacha from their areas. Later the Khan of Khar changed his behaviour towards Pakistan and started working for discouraging the anti-state elements.<sup>83</sup> The distribution of money in Bajour by the Afghan agents was a matter of concern for Pakistan and pro-Pakistani people of the area. Pakistan will find it more difficult to control situation in Bajour "especially when money is being paid to them lavishly by the Afghan Government."<sup>84</sup> No doubt, the Afghan agents distributed "large amount of money, ammunition and even transistor radios in an effort to sway loyalties from Pakistan to Afghanistan...Efforts to create disaffection proved largely unsuccessful."<sup>85</sup>

The Nawab wanted to grind his own axe from crisis in Bajour. He put forward some unreasonable demands. Those include handing over Bajour to him; to treat Wali as junior to him; and allowing him free hand in exploitation of Dir's forests. Situation in Bajour fastly deteriorated after the Nawab was granted permission to work on behalf of the Government of Pakistan. All the Khans of Bajour registered protests against the Nawab and asked the Government of Pakistan that they should be dealt with directly without an intermediary. Therefore, the government changed its policy and wished to have direct dealings with the Khan of Khar, Dilawar Khan of Kotkai and Malik Khanzada but the Nawab did not wish the same. In retaliation, the Nawab started encouraging the pro-Afghan elements. He actively encouraged the Khan of Khar, to go over once again to the Afghan side in order to neutralize the efforts of the Political Agent, Malakand to establish direct contacts with Utmankhels and the Salarzi tribes.<sup>86</sup> He was encouraged by the Afghan authorities. His son, the Khan of Jandul according to Political Agent Dir, Swat and Chitral was a bitter enemy of Pakistan.<sup>87</sup> India, which wanted to make things difficult for Pakistan, sent 1200 hand grenades and

dynamites via Afghanistan for subversive activities in major Pakistani cities.<sup>88</sup> The Afghan Government also intensified its campaign in Bajour to make things difficult for Pakistan. Radio Kabul started malicious propaganda. It dubbed the Nawab as a hero of "Pukhtunistan Movement."<sup>89</sup> Now the Nawab was riding a tiger.

Side by side with these developments, differences emerged between the Nawab and his son, Shahabuddin Khan, the Khan of Jandul. The Khan also had the apprehension that after the death of his father, the legitimate heir, Khisrau Khan might snatch his area. He, therefore, announced the independence of Jandul from Dir with the hope that the government of Pakistan would welcome his decision. But this did not happen. The frustrated Khan turned towards Afghanistan and a number of Afghan agents and officials including *Mudir Qabail* or Director Tribal Affairs Jalalabad, Abdul Majid visited him. In August 1960, the Khan paid a secret visit to Afghanistan via Bin Shahi pass without informing his father. He met King Zahir Shah and Prime Minister Sardar Daud in Kabul. Both the leaders assured him financial and military support. On his return to Jandul, the Khan received a gift of arms and ammunition from the Governor of Jalalabad, Guhlan Farooq Khan.

No doubt, the Nawab did not approve the visit of his son to Afghanistan but he himself had many grievances. He was not satisfied with the government of Pakistan and always complained against her ill intentions towards his state. He used to whine that his services in Kashmir and Bajour have not been rewarded by Government of Pakistan. In his meeting with Political Agent Dir, Swat and Chitral on 26<sup>th</sup> August 1951, the Nawab said that he was now almost a bankrupt due to expenditure incurred by him in Kashmir Jihad and Bajour campaign.<sup>90</sup> The affairs of Kalam, too, aggrieved the Nawab, he thought that the Wali was allowed free hand in the affairs of Swat Kohistan, to jeopardy his own claim in that area.<sup>91</sup> He opposed introducing reforms. By putting up resistance, the Nawab believed, that 'he would be able to postpone the evil day for some time to come.'<sup>92</sup> After the merger of Amb in

Pakistan; the Nawab became suspicious that the same could also happen to Dir. He said that the Nawab of Amb was fool to mention in the agreement of accession that his life and property belong to Pakistan.

The Jandul Khan's decisions were short sighted without keeping in view its future repercussions. In other words, the storm was about to burst which was bound to wash away both the father and the son. This was the greatest strategic disaster in Dir's history. The government of Pakistan decided to get rid of the Nawab once for all. Official circles were sure that except Sultan Khel and Painsa Khel, the whole population of Dir would be happy being liberated from the brutal policies of Shah Jehan.

### **Arrest and Disposition of the Nawab**

History moved on gradually and not in sudden leaps. Despite his unrealistic policies, the Nawab was not in bad books of the government of Pakistan till unrest in Bajour. The matter can be well judged from the fact that the Governor General on 14<sup>th</sup> August 1951 granted honorary commission in the rank of Brigadier in Pakistan Land Forces to Nawab Shah Jehan.<sup>93</sup>

Shah Jehan in general and his son, Jandul Khan in particular created difficulties for Pakistan in Bajour. This was a serious miscalculation. With every passing day, bridge between the government of Pakistan and the Nawab widen. The government came to the conclusion that the Nawab and Jandul Khan would not change their behaviour viz-a-viz Pakistan. The Political Agent Dir, Swat and Chitral in his report about situation in the area wrote, "We cannot any longer tolerate the existence of an unfriendly Nawab of Dir and a hostile Khan of Jandul."<sup>94</sup> Under these circumstances that the government of Pakistan realized that it should rethink of its strategy of extending a too warm hand to the Nawab. A meeting regarding situation in Dir and Bajour was held in General Headquarters, Rawalpindi on 16<sup>th</sup> September 1960. It took the following particular decisions in regard to Dir: -

- Nawab of Dir and Khan of Jandul and Utmankhel Maliks to be given stern warning against misbehaviour, failing which they will be treated as traitors and punished accordingly.
- Khan of Jandul who had promised cooperation should be told to prove his loyalty and friendship with Pakistan by allowing safe conduct of arms, ammunition and wireless sets through his territory to Khar.

A special note prepared by SAFRON on 19<sup>th</sup> September 1960 under directives of the then President says that the Nawab of Dir and his son, the Khan of Jandul are bitterly against all sorts of developments in their areas and as result the tribes over there are living in misery. The reports coming from various sources also clearly show that they are inciting tribes against Khan of Khar who has agreed to the construction of Munda-Khar Road on the suggestion of Pakistan Government. In these circumstances, therefore, Pakistan Government will have to liquidate the old Nawab and put Wali Ahad on the *Gadi* [seat] if and when a suitable opportunity arises.

In the meantime, Afghan soldiers in disguise attacked Bajour. The Afghan soldiers “were fighting with fellow Muslim frontiersmen for whom they had been shedding crocodile tears.”<sup>95</sup> The valiant people of Bajour successfully resisted the invading army and thus gave a strong slap on face of the so called Pakhtunistan. Meanwhile, a brigade of Pak army with long range artillery and tanks was moved to Khar, the headquarters of Bajour. It was commanded by Brigadier Tor Gul. The Afghan contingents were located at three places within the radius of twenty miles from Tor Gul’s base. Brig. Tor Gul chalked out a plan which was approved by Director of Military Operation, GHQ, Brig. Gul Hassan Khan (later promoted to the rank of Major General). The Afghan *lashkar* was attacked from the air and compelled to disperse with heavy casualties.<sup>96</sup> At least twenty Afghan soldiers were killed and the remaining fled across the border. Pak army suffered no casualties.<sup>97</sup>

Side by side with this, Khan Hidayatullah Khan, Joint Secretary Government of Pakistan, Ministry of States & Frontier Regions was stationed at Malakand to keep watch on the situation. He prepared report about the anti-state activities of Jandul Khan. This had very serious implications. It inflicted a major blow to the credibility of the Nawab. The son and father could not realize how grave and tense the situation was? They were striking axe on their own feet. The government of Pakistan could no longer tolerate anti-state activities of the Nawab and his son because enough is enough. Army men were slowly moved into Dir from Malakand side. At last the unthinkable happened and Nawab of Dir and Khan of Jandul were arrested by Brigadier (later on promoted as full-fledged General) Sharif on 8<sup>th</sup> October 1960 under Section 3(1) of the Security of Pakistan Act, 1952. The Nawab was sent to Risalpur via helicopter while Jandul Khan shifted to the same destination by road. From there, both were taken to Lahore. It was a momentous and historic development. It would not be out of place to say that this was the step of unparalleled magnitude in history of Dir. This day is being remembered in Dir as a red-letter day. After removal of Shah Jehan, his son, Khisro Khan became the Nawab of Dir. He took oath of his office at Chakdara on 9<sup>th</sup> November 1960. The new Nawab issued a decree banning listening to Radio Kabul in territorial jurisdiction of Dir state. Anyone found violating the order would be fined 500 rupees.<sup>98</sup>

So far the question of Pakhtunistan is concerned; the Pashto speaking people of Pakistan have no interest in it. Afghanistan has no sympathy with the Pashto speaking people of Pakistan rather it has its own axe to grind. Kabul since the time of Amir Dost Muhammad Khan, is making efforts to gain access to sea. Amir Abdur Rahman also asked the British for giving a strip of land to Afghanistan so it could get access to sea. For Afghanistan, the Durand Line means remaining a land locked with no access to sea except with the consent of either Pakistan or Iran. In order to overcome this natural drawback, Kabul is playing the music of Pakhtunistan to incite Pakhtuns on this side of the border to revolt. But people of tribal areas and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa know very well the

Afghan designs and have, therefore, never shown any enthusiasm in it. When the Afghan National Assembly cancelled all the treaties signed with the British government of India including the Durand Agreement, "neither the people of Waziristan nor Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa show specific interest in an independent Pashtunistan."<sup>99</sup>

The Pakhtuns living on this side of the Durand Line have never participated in Afghan political system and they do not wish to do so in future as well. They have attached their destiny with Pakistan and this can be judged from the fact that when the Afghan forces attacked Bajour, the people of that area fought bravely to defend their soil from Afghan aggression. If we accept the Afghan claim regarding linguistic and cultural ties between the Pakistani Pakhtuns and Afghan Pakhtuns then the Iranian claim is more valid than this one. For much of its history, Afghanistan has been part of the Iranian sphere of political and cultural influence. Even now it is still regarded by Iranian nationalists as an essential part of greater Iran, 'Khorasan', the lost lands to the north and east which constitute their ideal state.<sup>100</sup> But the Afghan people are not ready to give any value to the Iranian claim as their link with Iran is only cultural one and the past political links are now dead. Afghanistan is using the pretext of common language, culture, race and history with the Pakistani Pakhtuns to occupy and annex their areas. If the frontier of a country has to be re-defined just on the basis of ethnicity and language as claimed by successive Afghan governments, this would push Afghanistan itself towards disintegration. But the Afghan ambitions are not based on these factors; "instead, solid strategic and economic reasons are responsible, the aim of obtaining territory with access to the Indian Ocean, to end the landlocked status of Afghanistan."<sup>101</sup>

Kabul is not clear about the idea of Pakhtunistan as no country has ever existed with this name in the history of this region. Afghanistan has never mentioned to include its Pashto speaking areas in the proposed Pakhtunistan. Olaf Caroe has termed the Afghan case "as one prompted by a veiled irredentism...to exploit changing political condition to win

back an ancient love.”<sup>102</sup> They argue that the Pashto speaking areas of Pakistan should be included in Afghanistan as these areas had been ruled by Afghans in past. Responding to this point, the former President of Pakistan Ayub Khan who himself was Tareen Pakhtun, said that “ all this concern for the Pathans in Pakistan was based on the claim that at one time in history Afghanistan held sway over some parts of what is now West Pakistan. But there were also times, of much longer duration that Delhi’s sovereignty was extended upto Kabul and even beyond. If old conquests were to be our guide, then Pakistan should have more interest in the future of Pathans living in Afghanistan.”<sup>103</sup>

During the Mughal rule over India, their frontier was much inside the territory what is now Afghanistan. The Mughal lost Kandahar during the reign of Shah Jehan. When the ex-Afghan Foreign Minister, Muhammad Naim, visited Pakistan in January 1960, his Pakistani counterpart, Manzoor Qadir gave him an unexpected proposal. He said that the wishes of Pakhtuns on both sides of the line should be ascertained as to whether they all desire to live together in Afghanistan or Pakistan. Since the Pakhtuns of Pakistan have already declared in favour of Pakistan in a referendum, it remains to be asked the Pakhtuns living on other side of the border. Muhammad Naim only reply to the proposal was that “he had not come to negotiate.”<sup>104</sup> As two-third of Pakhtuns lives in Pakistan and only one-third in Afghanistan, it is more rational for the minority to join the majority. Pakhtuns may have grievances but they are as loyal to Pakistan as any other Pakistani national. They have never taken up arms to part away from Pakistan and join Afghanistan. They have attached their future with Pakistan and Afghan authorities have made wrong assessment of the Pakhtun’s love for their motherland. Pakhtuns have never expressed their willingness to join Afghanistan rather they have “condemned Afghan propaganda against Pakistan in resolutions passed in tribal meetings from Chitral southwards, rejecting Afghan espousal of their cause and emphasizing their loyalty to Pakistan.”<sup>105</sup> However, internal weakness invites intervention and aggression from others including neighbours. The Afghan claims have always



become stronger when Pakistan is faced with internal problems. With a strong and stable government in Pakistan, the Afghan claims become weak and ineffective.

Rapprochement between the two countries is impossible until and unless Afghanistan abandon the Pakhtunistan issue and its objections to the Durand Line. Afghanistan instead of trying to grab a Pakistani territory, should try to put its own house in order as "national unity and national integration has become an old story."<sup>106</sup> Minorities especially Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara have organized themselves and they are more powerful than ever. They no longer indentify themselves with the name of Afghans rather prefer to be called by Tajik, Uzbek, Hazara and Turkman. These ethnic minorities are now demanding the establishment of "an independent Khorasan state and believe Afghanistan is the country of the Pashtuns and not the Afghans."<sup>107</sup> General Rashid Dostun, Vice President General Amin Fahim, the Information Minister Dr. Syed Makhdoom Raheen, former head of the Afghan secret service, (KHAD) Amrullah Saleh, Atta Muahhmad and Ismail Khan etc are in the forefront of this campaign. They are demanding maximum autonomy, "to the extent of changing the name of Afghanistan."<sup>108</sup> They have now gone far ahead and want the division of the country into Khorasan, Hazaraistan and Pashtunistan. Even the US Deputy National Security Advisor Robert Blackwill has supported the idea of dividing Afghanistan on "ethnic lines." Musa Khan Jalalzai is of the opinion that "being already divided on ethnic lines, Afghanistan appears to be moving toward a permanent dismemberment."<sup>109</sup>

So far the Pakhtoon nationalists of Pakistan are concerned; they have struggled for the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa autonomy within the federation of Pakistan and have never expressed their desire to join Afghanistan. Dr. Khan Sahib while throwing light on the Afghan's stand regarding Pakhtoonistan says that "we have learnt for the first time that Afghan government has officially approached the government of India. We have been placed in an unenviable position, naturally, the Afghan government is taking advantage of it and

exploiting the situation.”<sup>110</sup> Khan Abdul Ghaffar, the founder of the *Khudai Khidmatgar* [the *servants of God*], a non violent movement, had stated several times that “he was advocating an autonomous Pathan province of Pakhtunistan, not an independent state.”<sup>111</sup> To him, Pakhtunistan had “merely meant a renamed province within Pakistan but unified the Pashtuns of the tribal and settled areas of Pakistan...He never did pursue the idea of an independent Pashtunistan.”<sup>112</sup> After the referendum of 1947, Ghaffar Khan while addressing his followers said that all he demanded was “full freedom for the Pathans to manage their internal affairs as a unit within Pakistan State.”<sup>113</sup> A two day meeting of the *Khudai Khidmatgars* was held at Sardaryab near Peshawar on 3-4 September 1947 in which they pledged full support to Pakistan. A resolution passed on the occasion says that “The *Khudai Khidmatgars* regard Pakistan as their country and pledge that they shall do their utmost to strengthen and safeguard its interest and make every sacrifice for the cause.”

Addressing the Constituent Assembly on December 16, 1948, Ghaffar Khan said “I admit that it was my honest opinion that India should not be divided; India should not be partitioned. But now that it is done, the dispute is over...I repeat that I am not for destruction of Pakistan...You see that the people inhabiting the Province are called Sindhis and the name of their country is Sind. Similarly the Punjab or Bengal is the land of the Punjabis or Bengalis. In the same way, there is the North West Frontier. We are one people and ours is a land. Within Pakistan we also want that mere mentioning of the name of the country should convey to the people that it is the land of Pakhtoons.”<sup>114</sup> Again addressing the Constituent Assembly on March 25, 1954, Ghaffar Khan said “...we are five brothers in Pakistan. There is Bengal, there is Punjab, there is Baluchistan, there is Sindh and we ourselves make up fifth. Our four brothers have each a name...In the same way we too have a country of our own but it has no name of its own. No one can visualize our country, the country of Pathan, until it has an expressive name of its own...It is just this much and no more...”<sup>115</sup> He fully supported the government of Pakistan on the question of Kashmir. None of the ANP leaders have openly

declared to join Afghanistan. Instead of the state, they have had troubles with the successive Pakistani governments on the question of the provincial autonomy. This can be judge from the fact that the ANP is supporting the government of Pakistan in its war against terror and has lost the largest number of leaders and workers in this war. The party is more than happy over the 18<sup>th</sup> constitutional amendments. Afghanistan has never “been able to prove that the Pathans really want either to join Afghanistan or gain their independence from Pakistan with the help of Afghanistan.”<sup>116</sup> How can Pakistani Pakhtoons opt for Afghanistan? There can be no comparison between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The former is more developed in every sector as compare to Afghanistan which is one of the most backward, poorest and illiterate nations on the globe. Even in 1949 Pakistan was spending fifty million rupees on providing subsidies to the tribal elders. It amount was more than total the Afghan annual budget. It makes no sense that happy and rich person would give up his fortune just for nothing. The Pakhtuns of Pakistan are far advanced and educated serving on key posts. Therefore, the slogan of Pakhtunistan has badly failed to catch attention of the people of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and tribal areas. Even Afghan nationals are not interested in Pakhtunistan. They want to see Pakistan a peaceful, stable, strong and prosperous nation. The matter can be judged from the fact that many Afghans especially from the Ghilzai tribe went to Kashmir to fight shoulder to shoulder with their Pakistani tribal brethrens against the Indian army in 1948 despite repeated warning and requests by the Afghan government not to do so.

Instead of wasting its resources on a futile exercise, Afghanistan should try to leave behind the past and work for improvement of its relations with Pakistan. Afghanistan should desist from raising the slogan of Pakhtunistan while Pakistan should treat Kabul on equal footing and not as a junior partner. An Afghan writer Agha Amin questioned that “Why cannot Pakistan and Afghanistan having a common religious, historical, and cultural background move out of the vicious circle of conflict and rivalry...”<sup>117</sup> This matter needs

immediate attention of leaders of the two countries to think over it how to settle the issue of Durand Line once for all and promote bilateral cooperation for the benefit of their people and the world at large. How long Pak-Afghan relations will remain hostage due to difference of opinion regarding some historical events? This question needs to be answered by politicians, academicians and journalists of Pakistan and Afghanistan.

## Notes

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- <sup>7</sup> TRC File Malakand/99 p.124.
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## CONCLUSION

Keeping in view, historical facts and agreements, one come to the conclusion that the Durand Agreement was not meant for one hundred years as claimed by some circles. There is no time limit in it. This is a perpetual treaty and can't be cancelled unilaterally under the international law. The Afghan claim regarding Bajour, Dir, Chitral and Swat has no ground as these areas had their own independent governments functioning long before the emergence of Afghanistan as an independent and sovereign country. Similarly, it is also incorrect as argued by some writers and scholars that the Pak-Afghan border has not been demarcated. The whole border right from Wakhan to the Iranian frontier has been demarcated with the exception of about 28 km. It includes 24 km long Mohmand-Afghan border and 4 km at Sikaram hill top in Kurram Agency. Similarly, Afghanistan did not cede a single inch of its territory to the British India under the Durand Agreement. History and historical record show that Kabul achieved maximum benefits from this treaty. It gained control over Asmar, Hissara, Marawara and Shortan areas of Bajour under this accord. It may be recalled that Afghanistan since 1861 was making hectic efforts to gain control over Asmar. But its hopes were always dashed to the ground by the British authorities. When this area was occupied by the Afghan Commander-in-Chief, Ghulam Haider Khan, the Viceroy sent a letter to Amir Abdur Rahman in June 1892, registering protest over the intrusion. The issue of Asmar was



the toughest topic of negotiations between Amir Abdur Rahman and the Indian Foreign Secretary Sir Mortimer Durand. In order to achieve the breakthrough, Mortimer Durand acceded to the Amir's demand and allowed him to have Asmar under his control.

It is undeniable fact that Afghanistan also benefited at the time of the delimitation of the border in Chitral, Dir and Bajour. Amir Abdur Rahman appointed his Commander-in-Chief, Ghulam Haider as the Afghan Commissioner to the Asmar Boundary Commission. The Amir knew very well that being physically and mentally extra-ordinary strong, Ghulam Haider Khan would be able to obtain as much land as possible by using different tactics including not initiating the delimitation work in time and widening rifts between the British and Umra Khan of Jandul. The Khan was annoyed with the British for handing over Asmar to Afghanistan and Ghulam Haider Khan fully exploited the situation. He sent friendly messages and gifts to Umra Khan on behalf of the Amir. He also kept on warning Umra Khan from time to time about the impending threats to his administration from the British. In this way, the Pathan Napoleon was trapped and he declined to attend proceedings of the Asmar Boundary Commission. His absence was the cherished goal of Kabul.

The Durand Agreement has been violated on several occasions, right from the start. The border as denoted by the treaty does not exist on the ground at several places. At the time of delimitation, big and drastic alterations were brought out in the border thus changing it from the one as envisaged in the Durand Agreement. These changes were made by the British Commissioner Sir Richard Udny and his Afghan counterpart, Ghulam Haider Khan. There are several reasons for that. First, the British authorities were not happy with the non-cooperative attitude of Umra Khan of Jandul regarding his reaction to the Durand Agreement. Despite repeated

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messages, Umra Khan did not participate in the proceedings of the Asmar Boundary Commission. He even did not send his representative. He wanted to get back Asmar. He involved himself in the affairs of Chitral and sent a force there to exert pressure on the British authorities to agree to his demand. He arrested more than ten Indian soldiers and two British officers i.e. Lieutenant Edwardes and Lieutenant Fowler while some others were besieged in the Chitral Fort. This was an extreme step on his part. The Indian Government arranged the Chitral Relief Force commanded by Colonel Kelly. Umra Khan was unable to resist the mighty power and he fled to Afghanistan. The British authorities were angry with him and they did not bother about the territorial losses of his area (Bajour).

The Afghan Commissioner, Ghulam Haider Khan had a purpose in mind i.e. to grab as much Bajour and Chitral's territory as possible. He created hurdles in smooth working of the commission to achieve this objective. On the contrary, Sir Richard Udny had just a wish of quickly finishing the work assigned to him. He was fed up with the delaying tactics adopted by Ghulam Haider Khan. Sir Richard Udny was in haste. He had no interest that who is becoming winner and loser in deviating from the border as identified in the Durand Agreement. In this way, the Afghan-Bajour and the Afghan-Chitral border was completely changed. Many areas of Bajour and Chitral were given to Afghanistan. Sir Richard Udny appeased his Afghan counterpart, Ghulam Haider at the cost of Bajour and Chitral. He even accepted the Afghan claim over Bashgal Valley. It should be noted that under the Durand Agreement, Chitral had to retain this valley as practice for centuries. Article No. 3 of the Durand Agreement says, "His Highness agrees on the other hand that he will at no time exercise interference in Swat, Bajour or Chitral including the Arnawai or Bashgal valley." But both Ghulam Haider Khan and Sir Richard Udny violated the Durand Agreement i.e. the former by claiming Bashgal valley and the later by accepting the claim and handing over the area to Afghanistan. The British Commissioner failed to discharge his responsibility

honestly. He inflicted great losses to both Bajour and Chitral by not delimiting the border as stated in the Durand Agreement. He demonstrated extreme incompetency by agreeing to the Afghan proposal to replace the words Bashgal and Arnawai with the name of Landi Sin in the Nashagam Agreement. This prepared ground for the Afghan all out war against the people of Bashgal. Many Bashalis were slaughtered and many more re-settled in other areas. Their area was renamed as Nuristan.

The Afghans also laid a claim over the whole of the Mohmand and this made further demarcation impossible. Later on, the British authorities tried their level best to delimit the remaining 160 km border. But their efforts did not bear fruits. On September 2, 1912, the Afghan security forces occupied Dokalim, another area of Chitral. The Mehtar of Chitral Shuja ul Mulk filed several petitions with the British authorities to recover his lost territory but all his requests fell on deaf ears. In June 1932, the Dokalim Boundary Commission was constituted. The Indian side was represented by Captain W. R. Hay and the Afghan side by Aliqadr Sadaqatmaab Habibullah Khan Tarzi. The Commission gave the area in the control of Afghanistan. Again Chitral and the Chitralis suffered due to the indifferent attitude of the British. Seven pillars were erected along the border in Dokalim. Chitral was deprived of its traditional all weather route.

Keeping its straight record of victories, Kabul succeeded in gaining some 700 meters territory near the Indo-Afghan border in Torkhram after the 3<sup>rd</sup> Anglo-Afghan war. A commission headed by Sir Henry Dobbs was constituted after the war to demarcate the border in Khyber. The commission gave the area and several hill tops in Khyber to Afghanistan. At the time of partition of the Sub-continent, Afghanistan made hue and cry to get hold over FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. However, it failed to achieve its objective as the

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British did not agree to the Afghan demand this time. Similarly, people of tribal areas and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa opted for Pakistan. This further irritated Kabul which in retaliation raised the Pakhtunistan issue and the Durand Line. It resulted in breakdown of diplomatic relations between the two countries as well as closure of their border. The issue subdued during the brief rule of the Taliban in Afghanistan. However, the question of Durand gained momentum when Hamid Karzai became the Afghan President after the fall of the Taliban administration.

The question of Durand Line is the main hurdle in improvement of Pak-Afghan relations. Kabul is exploiting the ignorance of Pakistani authorities about the Durand Line. It is need of the hour that Pakistani high ups should get maximum knowledge about the issue from academic perspective so that they could respond to the Afghan propaganda in a proper manner. It is also in the interest of Afghanistan to desist from making hostile propaganda aimed at damaging Pakistan. The two neighbours need each other. They will further suffer if they did not resolve their differences. But their mutual cooperation will usher a new era of development and prosperity in the region. They should revive the historic Silk route connecting South Asia with Central Asia through Wakhan Corridor. This route can be extended up to Bangladesh in the east and Europe in the west. This will result in more trade, more investments and creation of more job opportunities. All this needs tension free relations among countries of the region. But tension and conflicts increase difficulties. The governments and people of the region particularly Afghanistan and Pakistan have to choose whether or not they want bright future. Their future will remain secured if they left behind the legacy of British colonial era and cooperate with each in all walks of life. People of the two countries have already suffered too much due to the ongoing waves of terror. You can easily change your friends but not neighbours. Instead of others, the people of Afghanistan and Pakistan should rely on each other. A good neighbour is

blessing. A Czech proverb says that do not protect yourself by a fence, but by your friends. A great ancient Greek poet, Hesiod once remarked that a bad neighbour is as great a calamity as a good one is a great advantage. Instead of enmity, Kabul and Islamabad need each other cooperation to overcome their colossal problems.

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# APPENDIXES

## Appendix-A

### Chitral-Kashmir Agreement-1878

True translation of an Engagement made by Aman-ul-Mulk, Ruler of Chitral with His Highness the Maharaja of Kashmir, -----1878.

Aitchison, C.U., A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads Relating to India and Neighbouring Countries, Vol. XI, p. 427.

“With the sincerity of purpose and the cordiality of will, I (the Aman-ul-Mulk) do hereby execute this deed on my own part and on the part of my children, consisting of the following articles: ---

#### ARTICLE 1

“I engage that I will always sincerely endeavour to obey and execute the orders of His Highness the Maharaja, the Wali of Jammu and Kashmir, that I will overtly and covertly consider His Highness’s well-wishers, and friends as my friends, and the enemies of his Government as my enemies, that I will present the following ‘nuzzerana’ to His Highness annually as an acknowledgment of his paramount power:---

“Three horses,

“Five hawks,

Five tezi dogs (hounds)

ARTICLE 2

“One of confidential Agent of His Highness shall always reside in Kashka (Chitral) and another at Yasin. Due attention and consideration shall be paid to them.

“In the like manner a confidential agent of mine shall reside at the Maharaja’s Durbar, and another on the part of the Ruler of Yasin shall remain at Gilgit for the purpose of carrying out His Highness’s orders.

ARTICLE 3

“I shall receive a yearly mawajib (subsidy) of Rs. 12,000 Srinagar coinage, from His Highness’s Government on condition of my acting upon the above articles and giving satisfaction of His Highness in very way.

“If one of my sons be appointed in the place of one of the agents (abovementioned) His Highness’s Government will assign him an extra allowance----

	Rs.
To self .	10,000
To Sardar Nizam-ul-Mulk .	2,000

Appendix-B



Muhammad Sharif Khan. 1943-1954

**Appendix-C**



Umar Khan of Jandul

## Appendix-D

Agreement between His Highness Amir Abdur Rahman Khan, G.C.S.I., Amir of Afghanistan and its Dependences on the one part, and Sir Henry Mortimer Durand, K.C.I.E., Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, representing the Government of India on the other parts,--1893.

Aitchison, C.C., A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sands etc., Vol. XIII, pp. 256-257

Whereas certain questions have arisen regarding the frontier of Afghanistan on the side of India, and whereas both His Highness the Amir and the Government of India are desirous of settling these questions by a friendly understanding, and of fixing the limit of their respective spheres of influence, so that for the future there may be no difference of opinion on the subject between the allied Governments, it is hereby agreed as follows:-

- The eastern and southern frontier of his Highness's dominions, from Wakhan to the Persian border, shall follow the line shown in the map attached to this agreement.
- The Government of India will at no time exercise interference in the territories lying beyond this line on the side of Afghanistan, and His Highness the Amir will at no time exercise interference in the territories lying beyond this line on the side of India.
- The British Government thus agrees to His Highness the Amir retaining Asmar and the valley above it, as far as Chanak. His Highness agrees on the other hand that he will at no time exercise interference in Swat, Bajaur, or Chitral including the Arnawai or Bashgal valley. The British Government also agrees to leave to His Highness the Birmal tract as shown in the detailed map already given to his Highness, who relinquishes his claim to the rest of the Waziri country and Dawar. His Highness also relinquishes his claim to Chageh.

- The frontier line will hereafter be laid down in detail and demarcated wherever this may be practicable and desirable by joint British and Afghan commissioners, whose object will be to arrive by mutual understanding at a boundary which shall adhere with the greatest possible exactness to the line shown in the map attached to this agreement, having due regard to the existing local rights of villages adjoining the frontier.
- With reference to the question of Chaman, the Amir withdraws his objection to the new British Cantonment and concedes to the British Government the rights purchased by him in the Sirkai Tilerai water. At this part of the frontier, the line will be drawn as follows:-
  - From the crest of the Khwaja Amran range near the Psha Kotal, which remains in British territory, the line will run in such a direction as to leave Murgha Chaman and the Sharobo spring to Afghanistan, and to pass half way between the New Chaman Fort and the Afghan outpost known locally as Lashkar Dand. The line will then pass half way between the railway station and the hill known as the Mian Baldak, and, turning southwards, will rejoin the Khwaja Amran range, leaving the Gwasha Post in British territory, and the road to Shorawak to the west and south of Gwasha in Afghanistan. The British Government will not exercise any interference within half a mile of the road.
- The above articles of agreement are regarded by the Government of India and His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan as a full and satisfactory settlement of all the principal differences of opinion which have arisen between them in regard to the frontier; and both the Government of India and His Highness the Amir undertake that any differences of detail such as those which will have to be considered hereafter by the officers appointed to demarcate the boundary line, shall be settled in a friendly spirit, so as to remove for the future as far as possible all causes of doubt and misunderstanding between the two Governments.

*Appendixes*

- Being fully satisfied of His Highness's goodwill to the British Government, and wishing to see Afghanistan independent and strong, the Government of India will raise no objection to the purchase and import by His Highness of munitions of war, and they will themselves grant him some help in this respect. Further, in order to mark their sense of the friendly spirit in which His Highness the Amir has entered into these negotiations, the Government of India undertake to increase by the sum of six lakhs of rupees a year the subsidy of twelve lakhs now granted to His Highness.

H. M. Durand,  
Amir Abdur Rahman Khan.  
Kabul; *12th November 1893.*



## **Appendix-E**

Treaty with Amir Habibullah Khan continuing the agreements which had existed between the British Government and Amir Abdur Rahman Khan, 1905.

Aitchison, C.C., A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sands etc., Vol. XIII, pp. 282-283.

HE is God. EXTOLTED be HIS PERFESCION!

His Majesty Siraj-ul-millat-wa-ud-din Amir Habibullah Khan, independent King of the State of Afghanistan and its dependencies, on the one part, and the Honouable Mr. Louis William Dane, C.S.I., Foreign Secretary of the Mighty Government of India and Representative of the Exalted British Government on the other part.

His said Majesty does hereby agree to this, in the principles and in the matters of subsidiary importance of the treaty regarding internal and external affairs and of the engagements which His Highness, my late father, my God enlighten his tomb! concluded and acted upon with the Exalted British Government, I also have acted, am acting and will act upon the same agreement and compact, and I will not contravene them in any dealing or in any promise.

The said Honourable Mr. Louis William Dane does hereby agree to this that as to the very agreement and engagement which the Exalted British Government concluded and acted upon with the noble father of His Majesty Siraj-ul-millat-wa-ud-din, that is, His Highness Zia-ul-millat-w-ud-din, who had found mercy, regarding the internal and external affairs and matters of principle or of subsidiary importance, I confirm them and write that they (the British Government) will not act contrary to these agreements and engagements in any way or at any time.

*Appendixes*

Made on Tuesday the 14<sup>th</sup> day of Muharram-ul-Haram of the year 1323 Hijri, corresponding to the 21<sup>st</sup> day of March of the year 1905 A.D.

(Persian seal of Amir Habibulla Khan)  
This is correct. I have sealed and signed.

AMIR HABIBULLA.

Louis W. Dane,  
*Foreign Secretary representing the  
Government of India.*

## **Appendix-F**

TREATY OF PEACE between the Illustrious BRITISH GOVERNMENT and the Independent AFGHAN GOVERNMENT, concluded at Rawalpindi on the 8<sup>th</sup> August 1919, corresponding to the 11<sup>th</sup> Ziqada, 1337 Hijra.

Aitchison, C.U., A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sands etc., Vol. XIII, pp. 286-287.

The following Articles for the restoration of peace have been agreed upon by the British Government and the Afghan Government: ----

### ARTICLE 1

From the date of the signing of this Treaty there shall be peace between the British Government, on the one part, and the Government of Afghanistan on the other.

### ARTICLE 2

In view of the circumstances which have brought about the present war between the British Government and the Government of Afghanistan, the British Government, to mark their displeasure, withdraw the privilege enjoyed by former Amirs of importing arms, ammunition or warlike munitions through India to Afghanistan.

### ARTICLE 3

The arrears of the late Amir's subsidy are furthermore confiscated, and no subsidy is granted to the present Amir.

### ARTICLE 4

At the same time, the British Government are desirous of the re-establishment of the old friendship that has so long existed between Afghanistan and Great Britain, provided they have guarantees that the Afghan Government are, on their

*Appendixes*

part, sincerely anxious to regain the friendship of the British Government. The British Government are prepared, therefore, provided the Afghan Government prove this by their acts and conduct, to receive another Afghan mission after six months for the discussion and settlement of matters of common interest to the two Governments and the re-establishment of the old friendship on a satisfactory basis.

ARTICLE 5

The Afghan Government accepted the Indo-Afghan frontier accepted by the late Amir. They further agree to the early demarcation of by a British Commission of the undemarcated portion of the line west of the Khyber, where the recent Afghan aggression took place, and to accept such boundary as the British Commission may lay down. The British troops on this side will remain in their present positions until such demarcation has been effected.

ALI AHMAD KHAN,

A.H. GRANT,

Commissary for Home Affairs  
and Chief of the Peace  
Delegation of the Afghan  
Government.

Foreign Secretary to the  
Government of India and  
Chief of The Peace  
Delegation of British  
Government.

**Appendix-G**

FROM THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA,  
TO THE CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF THE  
PUNJAB.  
FOREIGN DEPTT.

SIMLA,  
the 28th JUNE 1892.

SIR,

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of the correspondence ending with your letters, No. 490 of the 21<sup>st</sup>, and No. 497 of the 23<sup>rd</sup>, June 1892, regarding the state of affairs in Bajaur.

From the information now before the Government of India, it appears that a conflict has actually taken place between the Afghan forces and the Mamund tribe, aided by the troops of the Khan of Jandol at Shurtan. Detailed information has not yet been received, and General Ghulam Haidar Khan may not have actually advanced in the face of the warning conveyed to him in April, but his presence in the vicinity of Asmar is a standing menace to Umra Khan and the independent tribesmen, leading to a spirit of unrest throughout the country, and, as events have shown, to actual conflict.

With reference to the doubts which have been expressed by the Punjab Government whether Asmar forms a part of Bajaur proper, it observed that the Commissioner of Peshawar now refers to Asmar as "properly part of Bajour," and adds that, unless the Sipah Salar is ordered to retire, complications of this kind will constantly recur. These views are in accordance with those of the Government of India, by which Asmar is regarded as one of the group of Chiefships included under the designation of Bajaur, upon the preservation of whose independence the Government of India has, at different times, insisted in the strongest manner. Asmar, as His Honour the Lieutenant Governor has pointed out in your telegram No. 23

C. of the 3<sup>rd</sup> April, is certainly not within the limits of Afghanistan, and so long as it continues to be occupied by an Afghan force, there can be no security for peace upon this part of the frontier.

Under these circumstances, the Governor-General in Council has addressed the Amir in a letter, of which a copy is herewith enclosed.

With reference to your statement that "when at the end of March last, the Amir's troops occupied Asmar and the question was considered as to whether the prohibition we had addressed to the Amir against entering Bajaur applied to Asmar, it was apparently held by the Government of India that it did not; and it was only a month later when the Amir's Commander-in-Chief threatened to advance from Asmar to Jandol that it was thought necessary to remonstrate," I am to say that it was not the intention of the Government of India to acquiesce in the Amir's occupation of Asmar. On receipt of information that an advance on Asmar was impending, a letter to His Highness was drafted, cautioning him against entrance into territory to which, according to the information then before the Government of India, he had no right. Before this letter could be issued, the actual occupation of Asmar had taken place. It was then proposed to inform the Amir that Asmar must be evacuated, but, while this proposal was under consideration, the still more serious news arrived that the Afghan force was on the point of advancing into the interior of Bajaur. This event led to the warning issued under the order of the Government of India by the Commissioner of Peshawar on the 27<sup>th</sup> April. But the question of the Amir's right to Asmar was one which the Government of India reserved for further consideration, and the omission to make any special reference to the subject must not be regarded as having involved a recognition of the validity of the Amir's claim.

In the fourth and fifth paragraphs of your letter last cited, it is stated that Umra Khan's agents have applied to the local authorities at Peshawar for permission to take to Bajaur the ammunition which they have been recently allowed to

purchase in British territory, and they have also asked for the 200 Snider rifles offered to Umra Khan, under certain conditions, last year. The Lieutenant-Governor considers that both these requests should, under present circumstances, be refused. The Government of India admit that there are objections to allowing Umra Khan to obtain from British territory arms and munitions of war while he is engaged in actual hostilities with the Amir's troops; but they cannot accept the view that Umra Khan should be prevented from obtaining possession of the arms and ammunition which he has already been permitted to purchase for his own protection against his tribal neighbours. The commissioner of Peshawar may be addressed upon this point in the terms of the draft telegram enclosed herewith.

With regard to the remarks in the 8<sup>th</sup> and 9<sup>th</sup> paragraphs of your letter of the 21<sup>st</sup> of June, the Governor-General in Council observes that Umra Khan has not yet accepted the terms of the agreement proposed by the Government of India, but has substituted for it another differing in some important details. A separate communication will be made to you on this subject hereafter; but it may be desirable in answering Umra Khan to point this out to him. A copy of the letter sent to Umra Khan should be furnished to this office for record. I am particularly to request that it may be of a reassuring character, and that in the absence of further evidence as to the events which have occasioned the recent collision, it may not be assumed that the Khan has been in the wrong. It would be most unfortunate if the result of our present action were to alienate from us the only important Chief in Bajaur who has refused to come under the Amir's influence.

I have the honour to be, SIR,

Your most obedient servant,  
(Sd.) H. M. DURAND,  
*Secretary to the Government of India.*

**Appendix-H**

Kharita, No. 91 P.O dated Simla, the 28<sup>th</sup> June 1892.  
From---- His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of  
India,

To----His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its  
Dependencies.

MY HONOURED AND VALUED FIREND,

I have had for some weeks past under my most anxious considerations the unsatisfactory state of affairs in Bajaur, since Your Highness's forces advanced on Asmar.

In your letter of the 25<sup>th</sup> February, you mentioned that in your opinion the matter of Bajaur should remain under abeyance until Your Highness had either had a meeting with myself or with a British Mission; but that Asmar, as a matter of urgency, should be taken possession of, because it was the frontier of your country and was included within the limits of Kunar. Soon after his, it was reported to me that Your Highness's troops, under General Ghulam Haidar Khan, had actually occupied Asmar. I was about to address Your Highness on the subject when I received information that Your Highness's advance on Asmar was only preliminary to more extended operations in the interior of Bajaur.

I accordingly wrote to Your Highness's Commander-in-Chief on the 27<sup>th</sup> April, through the Commissioner of Peshawar, warning him that, if the peace of Bajaur were broken by him or his allies at this instigation, the Government of India would hold him and Your Highness responsible, and that if he advanced into Bajaur, his action would be regarded as an act of hostility to the Government of India. A copy of the letter was sent to Your Highness, and I was gratified to learn from your letter of the 7<sup>th</sup> May that you had not issued any orders for an advance into Bajaur, and that you adhered to the opinion expressed in your letter of the 25<sup>th</sup> of February that the Bajaur question should be held in abeyance, pending the



arrival of British Mission in Afghanistan. I could not fail, however, to notice that Your Highness maintained that the Chiefs and people of Bajaur ought to belong to the Afghan Government, in spite of the directly opposite view so distinctly explained by the Government of India Afghan Government to Your Highness and your predecessors ever since the year 1861. You also in the same letter claimed the right to "chastise Umra Khan if the latter has caused any harm to Nawagai or Asmar, because the Chiefs of Bajaur have from former times had relations with the God-granted Government of Afghanistan." This claim to interfere in the internal affairs of Bajaur was one which the Government of India could not have recognized, and I should, in any case, have written to you to this effect. As to Asmar, although I cannot admit your right to that Chiefship, I did not call upon you summarily to evacuate it when you first occupied it, because the matter seemed to me to be one which might perhaps be dealt with in connection with the other frontier questions which I had invited you to discuss amicably with me. The information which now reaches me indicates, however, that arrangements are being made by your officials for the permanent annexation of Asmar to Afghanistan; and I have also learnt to my great regret that a conflict has already taken place between Your Highness's troops and the Mamund tribe, allies of Umra Khan, who, as Your Highness is aware, is the leading independent Chief of Bajaur in the present day and in friendly relations with the Government of India. I have always foreseen that conflicts between Your Highness's troops and the independent tribesmen would inevitably ensue if Your Highness retained a footing in any part of Bajaur, and recent events have proved the correctness of this view.

Detailed information of the conflict between Your Highness's forces and the Mamund tribe has not yet reached me, and it may be that, since General Ghulam Haidar Khan received the warning to which I have above referred, he has not made any forward movement against the Khan of Jandol; but it has become evident that further conflict will be inevitable unless Your Highness's force retires from Asmar.

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Knowing that you believed yourself to have claims to Asmar, I was reluctant to interfere so long as Your Highness's troops remained in the Kunar valley, and so long as the peace was kept: but peace has now been broken.

I have in various letters expressed to Your Highness my readiness to personally discuss with you outstanding questions relating to Your Highness's boundary, and to settle a frontier with Your Highness. The question now under discussion is one of those which require immediate settlement, but pending a decision with regard to it, it will be impossible for me to tolerate acts of warfare, the effect of which might render an amicable settlement impracticable.

I am therefore causing a strict warning to be sent to Umra Khan that I cannot allow him to wage war upon Your Highness, and I must now in like manner warn Your Highness not to attack Jandol or any of the Bajaur States. It must be evident to Your Highness that the continued occupation of Asmar by your troops is calculated to lead to further collision between the Khans of Bajaur and Your Highness. Should your troops or those of your allies occasion any such collision, it would become necessary for the Government of India to require you to withdraw your troops without delay from Asmar to the limits of the territory formerly in your occupation, subject to any future decision as to the position of your frontier at this and other points. I rely on Your Highness's good sense and friendly feelings towards the Government of India to at once put an end to a state of things, the continuance of which so imminently threatens to destroy the friendly relations existing between Your Highness and my Government.

-----

**Appendix-I**



Ghulam Haider Khan

## **Appendix-J**

Proclamation from Mr. R. Udny, Commissioner of the Peshawar Division to all the independent tribes of Bajaur, Mohmand, &c., from the Kabul River to the southern limits of Chitral who live on the side towards India of the boundary lately agreed upon between the British Government and His Highness the Amir of Kabul.

WHEREAS certain questions had arisen regarding the frontier of Afghanistan on the side of India, and whereas both His Highness the Amir and the Government of India were desirous of settling these questions by friendly understanding so that for the future there might be no difference of opinion on the subject between the two allied Governments, the British Government with the consent of His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan, sent a mission to Kabul under Sir Mortimer Durand in September 1893—the month of Rabi-ul-Awal 1311 H., and by the grace of God on the 12<sup>th</sup> November 1893=2<sup>nd</sup> Jamadi-ul-Awal 1311 H., in accordance with the friendly relations between existing between the two Governments, an agreement was concluded regarding the boundary of the territories of His Highness the Amir in the direction of India for many hundred koss from Wakhan in the north to the border of Persia on the south.

At the same time it was agreed between the two allied Governments that the Government of India will at no time exercise interference in the territories lying beyond this line on the side of Afghanistan, and that His Highness the Amir will at no time exercise interference in the territories lying beyond this line on the side of India.

For the purpose of facilitating and expediting the demarcation of this long boundary line, it has also been agreed between the two allied Governments that it should be divided into sections, and that each section should be laid down in detail and demarcated, wherever this may be desirable, by joint British and Afghan Commissioners.

I accordingly notify to you that I have been appointed Commissioner on behalf of the Government of India for the purpose of thus demarcating the portion of this boundary which concerns the tribes named in the heading of my present proclamation. I shall probably therefore be going in a short time to the limits of the Afghan territory in Asmar and shall there co-operate with a Commissioner appointed by His Highness the Amir in laying down the boundary of the Afghan dominions from Asmar towards the Kabul River. I shall then, I hope, be able to point the boundary out to you on the spot, and until I can do so it is not easy to explain to you in writing its exact position; but meanwhile you will understand its approximate position from the following description.

Since the British Government have agreed to His Highness the Amir retaining Asmar as far northward as Chandak on the Kunar or Kashkar River, the boundary, commencing from Chandak will run southward as far as the neighbourhood of Kunar at an average distance of hour English miles from the Kunar River on the Bajaur side. From the neighbourhood of Kunar the boundary turns southward to the peak known as Silala Sar on the Silala Sar the boundary runs through the Silala Kotal along the crest of the range which divides the water draining down the Bohai Dag Valley to the Pankora River, from the water running down the Silala Darra into the Kabul River, and finally the boundary reaches the Kabul River at Palosi.

From this you will see that besides the country in the basin of the Kunar River on the Indian side of the boundary above described. His Highness the Amir has agreed to hold aloof from the whole of the country draining eastward into the Panjkora River and also from that portion of the Mohmand country which drains into the Kabul River below Palosi.

In future therefore your political relations will be solely with the British Government, and I trust that the same friendship will gradually grow up between you on the one hand and myself and other British frontier officers on the other as

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already exists between those officers and all other independent tribes on the border of the Peshawar District.

Lastly, I desire to assure you that the Government of India have no wish to advance beyond the present frontier of British India or to interfere in any way with your country or independence.

---

## Appendix-K

*Agreement dated Camp Nashagam, the 9<sup>th</sup> April 1895=13 Shawal 1312.*

Khaibar-Bajour and Mohmand Boundary, Foreign Frontier Department File No. 1, (Simla: 1894), pp.4-5.

For as much as, under Article (4) of the Convention concluded at Kabul on the 12<sup>th</sup> November 1893, between His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and Sir Mortimer Durand on behalf of the Government of India, we the undersigned have been appointed by our respective Governments for the purpose of demarcating in concert the frontier of His Highness the Amir's dominions on the side of India in this neighbourhood of Chitral and Bajour, it is hereby agreed as follows: -----

That on the western side of the Kunar river, this frontier will be the further or eastern watershed of the stream which in the idiom of Afghans is notorious and known as the Landai Sin pertaining to the limits of Kafiristan, and which in the Survey map is also written by the name of Bashgal, so that all the country of which drainage falls into the Kunar river by means of this stream belongs, and will belong, to Afghanistan, and the eastern drainage of this watershed, which does not fall into the Landai Sin stream, pertains to Chitral.

That on the eastern side of the Kunar river, from the river bank, up to the crest of the main range which forms the watershed between Kunar river and the country (lit. direction) of Barawal and Bajour, this frontier follows the southern watershed of the Arnawai stream which falls into the Kunar river close to the village of Arnawai, leaving to Chitral all the country of which the drainage falls into the Kunar river by means of this stream, while the southern drainage of this last-mentioned watershed, which does not fall into the Arnawai stream, pertains to Afghanistan.

That this frontier line, on reaching the crest of the main range which in this neighbourhood forms the watershed between the Kunar river and the country (lit. direction) of Barawal and Bajaur, turns southward along this watershed, which it follows as far as a point in the neighbourhood of the Nawa Kotal, leaving all the country draining into the Kunar river within the limits of Afghanistan and all the country draining towards Barawal and Bajaur outside the limits of Afghanistan; but beyond the aforesaid point in the neighbourhood of the Nawa Kotal the frontier has not at present been demarcated.

That on both sides of the Kunar river this frontier, as described in the three preceding articles, for the most part requires no artificial demarcation, because it is a natural boundary following the crests of mountain ranges; but since at present inspection *in situ* is impossible, when the ground is examined on the spot, it is probable that in the places where these mountain ranges abut on the Kunar river from either side, demarcation by pillars for a short distance from the water's edge on both sides of the river will be found desirable for the purpose of separating the boundary of Afghanistan from Arnawai pertaining to Chitral and the limits of the Kafir country (lit. Kafiristan) of the Landai Sin from Chitral. In that case these pillars will be erected along the line of the watershed described in the first and second articles of the present agreement, subject to any slight divergences from this line which may be necessary to protect the local right of villages adjoining the frontier.

That the frontier pillars, wherever considered desirable, will be erected hereafter by any officer of the Government of India and an officer of His Highness the Amir acting in concert.

That these watersheds forming the frontier agreed upon as described in the first three articles of the present agreement, have been marked by a red line on the survey map attached to this agreement, which like the agreement itself, has been signed by us both. In three places, viz., (i) for a short distance




from either bank of the Kunar river, (ii) in the neighbourhood of the Binshi Kotal, and (iii) in the neighbourhood of the Frepaman Kotal, this red line has been broken up into dots because the exact position of the watershed in these localities has not been ascertained with perfect accuracy; but wherever the watershed may lie the frontier will follow, subject only to any slight variations from the watershed which may be considered necessary under Article (4) of the present Agreement.

That, since on the map attached to the Convention [Durand Agreement], the stream was drawn on the western sides of the river in the place of the Landai Sin of the Kafir Country (lit. Kafiristan) which has been decided to pertain to the Afghan Government, and, since after enquiry and inspection of the same it was clearly ascertained by the Survey party that the aforesaid stream is situated on the eastern side of the Kunar river, and falls into the river near the village of Arnawai, and that the drawing of it on the western side of (of the river) in the place of the Landai Sin was a mistake, this Arnawai stream has (now) been drawn and marked on the present survey map in its own proper place, and that stream which was drawn in the Convention map on the western side of the river was the Landai Sin stream of the Kafir country (lit. Kafiristan) which has now been decided to pertain to the Government of Afghanistan and to be included in the limits of Afghanistan. Accordingly in the present survey map it has been marked with the name of Landai Sin and has also been written with the name of Bashgal. Moreover, Sao and Nari and Birkot, and the village of Arnawai, were not written on the map attached to the Convention, (but) now in the new Survey map the name of all these four above mentioned villages have been entered, the village of Arnawai being written on the Chitral side of the boundary line, and Sao, Nari and Birkot on the side of the Government of Afghanistan.

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**Appendix-L**



Demarcation of the border in Oryza sativa, 1919

**Appendix-M**

PILLAR ERECTED ON THE INDO-AFGHAN BORDER  
IN THE VICINITY OF ARANDU IN JULY 1932.

Pillar No. 1

