



COUNTER INSURGENCY AND COUNTER TERRORISM:

A PRISM OF STABILISATION AND PEACE BUILDING EFFORTS



Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism:

*A Prism of Stabilisation and Peace
Building Efforts*

By Beenish Sultan and Gareth Boyd

2017

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Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism: A Prism of Stabilisation
and Peace Building Efforts

Beenish Sultan and Gareth Boyd

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National Defence University
E-9, Islamabad
Pakistan
Tel: 051- 9260651

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.....to date boldly

In a fair cause, and for their country's safety;

To run upon the cannon's mouth undaunted;

To obey their leaders, and shun mutinies;

To bear with patience the winter's cold

And summer's scorching heat, and not to faint

When plenty of provision fails, with hunger,

Are the essential parts that make up a soldier.

Philip Massinger, (1583-1640);

English Dramatist and Playwright

DEDICATION

..... To Love!

.....dedicated to the lost 'love' of terrorism victims, to the 'love' of soldiers in the line of duty, to those who have served their country for the 'love' of peace, security and prosperity!

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PREFACE

In this half of our century, terrorism and its manifestations continue to pose an existential threat to nation-states. It has not only managed to sustain a crucial position in their national security imperatives, but has also evolved as a major challenge to considerations of international security. Within this ambit lies the confusion of theoretically interchanging the phenomenon with militancy and insurgency. The fact remains that, the approaches to deal with these challenges have lacked a strategic initiative backed by blows designed mutually among States. We have been dealing with militancy, terrorism and insurgency without rendering to the ideas of violent extremism that inject resilience in such realities. Predominantly, this understanding has a major role to play once States are urged to politically subjugate the related challenges by devising stabilisation strategies in a conflict-prone environment.



In this regard, Pakistan and UK, with a long history of cooperation in different domains, may together, play a vital role in disseminating an understanding of the underlying principles of the phenomena of terrorism, militancy and insurgency, alongside their experience of contriving stabilisation efforts in close proximity. This has also allowed them to deliberate together on key issues of the environs in form of two international conferences, Wilton Park' UK (2016) and NDU' Islamabad (2017). The successes achieved are hence reflected in form of this research-based joint publication in the post-conference phase. It is heartening to note that their resolve and commitment to learn from each other's experiences has brought them a long way. Nevertheless, this publication is also a reflection of Pakistan's dedication towards peace and tranquility for the region and beyond.

Lietenant General Rizwan Akhtar, H.St,HI(M) (Retd)
Former President, National Defence University,
Islamabad, Pakistan

FOREWORD

In the post-cold war world and in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 battling to fight a war on terrorism, Pakistan is faced with strange realities. The shock waves emanating from Afghanistan, inflicted upon the country vulnerabilities of sub-conventional threats perpetuated by hostile elements on its soil. The threat matrix evolved amid the subversive acts of militants and terrorists, who targeted both military personnel and civilians alike. Hence,



Pakistan's national security imperatives were posed with a gruesome enemy from within, for which the military and political leadership were bound to take kinetic and non-kinetic measures simultaneously. Meanwhile, generating efforts for stabilising conflict-prone areas, especially which were densely populated, was also a major challenge.

Nevertheless, Pakistan's realisation of the threats and later efforts for curbing the related challenges have indeed been crucial. It has lost more than 60,000 precious lives in this war and is still engaged in a battle of overcoming the leftovers of hostility. The complexities amplify amid an instable neighborhood, where peace in Afghanistan is a mainstay for materialising Pakistan's stabilisation efforts on its own soil. It has through a whole nation approach given a heavy blow to militancy and terrorism and is now opting measures to fill gaps which would restrict the resurgence of hostile elements in the future. In this regard, countries like UK, which is engaged in Afghanistan since more than a decade, can learn from each other's experiences of fighting this menace, in their own setting. Although the nature of threats and responses opted differ in their cases, still Pakistan and UK have room for deliberating on gaps, successes and challenges in order to devise strategies that prove beneficial not only for both the countries but also for the region. The joint conferences and now this publication is indeed the right step towards joining hands to reach the goal of 'peace for all'

***Maj Gen Muhammad Samrez Salik, HI (M) Director General
ISSRA, National Defence University, Pakistan***

FOREWORD

I am delighted to contribute to this joint publication and welcome this initiative to draw together themes from the Conferences held thus far, whilst looking towards developing this opportunity for dialogue going forward. The UK and Pakistan enjoy a deep, long-standing relationship. We are joined through common bonds of history, culture, education and personal friendship. There are more than a million people in the UK with Pakistani roots. Last year, in 2017, we celebrated seventy years of these ties, between our two countries. Since my arrival in January 2017, I have been proud to be part of that celebration. It is an opportunity both to mark our shared history, and our common future in the 21st century. The relationship between our military forces is crucial. Our armed services enjoy a rich heritage, stretching back through decades and indeed centuries. However, we also face common security challenges, which require us to work together now and in the future. In today's world, security requires co-operation across borders and indeed continents.



As the UK, we pay tribute to what Pakistan has achieved in the struggle against terrorism and violent extremism, and the sacrifices which it has made. We know that peace is hard won. Military successes must be complemented by civilian efforts to build the foundations of a peaceful society. Justice, trade and administration of public services are all necessary if the seeds of a better future are to take root. There is no simple solution. Each situation is different. Success requires understanding, and a commitment for the long term. Having recently conducted the third iteration of the Conference on Counter-Insurgency and Stabilisation in the UK at Wilton Park, we now look forward to the fourth back in Islamabad in 2019: each conference being an opportunity to learn from each other, and deepen the personal ties which enable us to work together. I am grateful for the support of the National Defence University, for leading the initiative to deepen understanding of COIN and Stabilisation. Whilst these are subtly different, it is important that the UK and Pakistan are able to share their experiences and lessons learnt, both in the contemporary sense and also by looking at mistakes and successes of the past.

*Deputy British High Commissioner to Pakistan
Mr. Richard Crowder*

ABBREVIATIONS

- BSOS – (UK) Building Stability Overseas Strategy
- CA – Comprehensive Approach
- CFA- Commander Field Army.
- CGS - Chief of the General Staff.
- Civ-Mil – the Civilian / Military relationship
- CoG – Centre of Gravity.
- COIN – Counter insurgency.
- CT – Counter-terrorism
- CVE – Countering Violent Extremism
- DDR – Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
- DFID – UK Department for International Development
- DRC – Democratic Republic of Congo
- EOKA – Translation: National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters
- FATA – Federally Administered Tribal Areas
- Fd Army- Field Army
- FRY – Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
- GHQ – General Headquarters, Pakistan Army
- Govt – Government
- GSR – Ground Sensing Radar
- HMG – Her Majesty’s Government
- IISS – International Institute for Strategic Studies
- Ins - Insurgent
- IRA – Irish Republican Army
- ISR – Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance.
- KFOR – (NATO) Kosovo Force
- KLA – Kosovo Liberation Army
- KPC – Kosovo Protection Corps
- MCP – Malayan Communist Party
- MNLA - Malay National Liberation Army
- MO Dir – Military Operations Directorate, Pakistan Army
- MOD – Ministry of Defence, UK
- MRLA - Malayan Races Liberation Army
- NDU – National Defence University.
- NGO – Non-Governmental Organisation

- NI – Northern Ireland
- Ops Dir – Operations Directorate, PJHQ
- (Op) BANNER – the operational name given to the UK COIN campaign in Northern Ireland from 1969 – 2007
- (Op) HERRICK – the operational name given to UK operations in Afghanistan from 2006 to 2014
- (Op) TELIC – the operational name given to UK operations in Iraq from 2003 to 2009
- PISG – Provisional Institutions of Local self-government in Kosovo
- ROE – Rules of Engagement
- S.Armagh – SotuhArmagh, Northern Ireland
- Stab Ops – Stabilisation Operations
- STRATCOM – Strategic Communication.
- SU – UK Stabilisation Unit (xHMGorganisation)
- UK – United Kingdom.
- UN – United Nations
- UNMIK – United Nations Mission in Kosovo.
- UNSCR – United Nations Security Council Resolution
- WWII – World War Two.
- X-HMG – cross HMG (AKA cross Departmental)
- FCR – Frontier Crimes Regulation
- GOC – General Officer Commanding
- H.St – Hilal-e-Shujaat
- HI(M) – Hilal-e-Imtiaz (Military)
- KPK – Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
- Lt Gen – Lieutenant General
- Maj Gen – Major General
- NAP – National Action Plan
- Post- Ops- Post Operations
- PRT – Provincial Reconstruction Team
- Retd - Retired
- SSG – Special Services Group
- TDP – Temporary Displaced People
- TTP – Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan

INTRODUCTION

A young officer in a barren ruthless land where he spends days and weeks in tracking insurgents and terrorists, manages to finally eliminate a whole bunch only to see a fresh replacement in a few days; a commander is tirelessly busy planning and achieving tactical objectives; sometimes even with limited men and material, meanwhile a military spokesperson is at all odds trying to convince why insurgents and terrorists still hold ground despite successful kinetic operations against them. The plight of a counterinsurgency (COIN) and counterterrorism (CT)¹ campaign may not end here. Complexity is inevitable once the political objective of launching stabilisation and peace efforts in a conflict prone environment is regarded as the mainstay. In a conventional war where Napoleon's axiom of 'victory goes to the large battalion', can be followed as a preliminary law, conversely an unconventional war operates according to a strict contrary syllabus. It is a same war for both sides with two distinct objectives: political leverages through military tools and on the other hand, military preeminence through political support. It is this complexity that comes in way of efforts for devising strategies of peace building once a conflict prone area is 'cleared'.

Within this context, Pakistan and UK, as countries involved in kinetic operations in the domain of sub-conventional warfare, also

¹In view of the unique operational environment of Pakistan Armed Forces, the term sub-conventional operations was introduced in its military doctrine, particularly after 2001. It spelled out the operational preparedness, capacities and objectives of the Armed Forces while fighting the menace of terrorism and militancy at its own soil. For the purpose of this publication, 'counter-militancy cum terrorism' operations are used to define Pakistan's efforts within the ambit of its doctrine directing sub-conventional operations.

find each other engrossed in stabilisation and peace building in close proximity. For the UK, this theatre is manifold, while for Pakistan the challenge is to fight a war against elements of instability on its own soil and simultaneously bring the areas to normalcy. Hence, particularly after the event of 9/11, the national security imperatives of the West evolved, alongside revolutionising the perspective with which States in other parts of the World viewed their national security goals and objectives.

Today, challenges of a State like Pakistan are overwhelmed by internal compulsions, which are linked with external factors. Its diverse cultural and ethnic social fabric remains a fault line for perpetrators of instability within the ambit of macro war theatres in the region and its periphery. Particularly, the Afghan quagmire continues to haunt the efforts undertaken by Pakistan to subjugate challenges in the security and political domains.

In this regard, both Pakistan and UK can learn from each other's experiences of combatting terrorism and incur valuable lessons for peace building. This resolve paved way for two international conferences, held alternatively in both countries, with agreement on the third which was convened in UK' 2018. The significance of this endeavor is projected in the attendance of the conferences by the CGS- UK in the first and the COAS- Pakistan in the second. There is a reason as to why the two conferences have been such a success, and it is simply this—mutual trust and respect borne from a 'strong military and political partnership that is deep rooted in common history and culture'. The inaugural conference, held at Wilton Park, UK, in April 2016 provided an opportunity to share experiences of

conducting sub-conventional operations whilst also allowing for a frank and open discussion that has set the baseline for what can be achieved when candid dialogue is possible. One of the outcomes of the conference was an enthusiastic agreement that another conference would take place in Islamabad in early 2017. This was realized through the 2nd Pakistan-UK Stabilisation Conference held at the National Defence University, Islamabad. Confidence in the underpinning characteristics of openness and candor enabled this conference to continue in the same manner as the first. The thematic progression from deliberating on just the concepts of terrorism and insurgency to Stabilisation was important; whilst UK and Pakistan experiences may differ, as shall be explored in this joint publication there were common threads and lessons learnt that, through frank discussion, offered mutual benefit and in doing so, have set the conditions for enduring engagement (details of conferences held are placed at **(Annexure A)**)

The successes achieved in aforementioned conferences auger well to the formalisation of this research-based publication. It aims to provide a ready-reckoner to a larger audience about the experiences of both the countries in fight against the menace of terrorism and insurgency in their own setting. It allows the reader to answer some of the most basic questions on the phenomena, and also by picking up threads from the discussion highlight the stabilisation efforts of both Pakistan and UK in a conflict-prone environment. This is indeed critical for the nations who are busy fighting the menace of terrorism and amidst the complexity are compelled to bring the area towards normalcy. Is this possible? What are the challenges? Is there room for collaborating, for peace instead

of just for war? It is not only imperative to raise such questions at this point of history, but also to bring in consonance the abilities of States to ensure enduring peace. Nonetheless, this endeavor also marks the commitment between both Pakistan and UK to move forward together for the cause of peace for all.

Meanwhile, there is a bulk of literature that provides a debate on the theoretical underpinnings of terms like extremism, militancy, terrorism and insurgency. Much of the debate attempts to draw lines between these phenomena' while the rest delves upon their similarities and build a case for countering them through military means. The fact remains that much of this literature presents an analysis of the 'ideas' and 'thoughts' that eventually allow such phenomena to evolve into violent entities. This publication is an attempt to provide a link between such 'ideas' and the means used to alter them. It suggests that the peace building efforts and injecting stabilisation processes in a conflict-prone environment are in fact political methods employed to subjugate violent ideas. They are attempts to disengage potential perpetrators of violence from the environment by filling in gaps that created vacuum in a society in the first place.

However, it is easier said than done. Ideals of stability can be far fetched, while quarters of it can be counterproductive once there are chances for them to be used for spreading instability alternatively. Hence, Armies and political machinery are to be geared simultaneously in order to achieve the larger goal of stabilisation. This publication by highlighting efforts of UK and

Pakistan for securing this goal will allow the reader to incur similar and other valuable lessons.

Scope of the Study

Across the globe, countries are submerged in a war against elements of instability, for which words like insurgency, terrorism, militancy and even revolutionary war are used indiscriminately. The challenge for the UK was to fight this war on a foreign land with a coalition of forces against a local enemy. Iraq and Afghanistan have long been theaters of war where the nature of threat evolves by each passing day. Consequently, Pakistan has rather faced the impact of these wars and has been a front line state in the global war against pacifying the menace. In addition, the country is busy engaging these elements on its own soil through successful operations like Rah-e-Raast and Zarb-e-Azb. The recent offensive, Rad-ul-Fasaad is also an extension of this resolve. However, the threat still prevails. There are still stones unturned with resurgence of factions in newer forms with newer resolve. There are resolute underpinnings within the actions and statements of non-state actors, which the conventional forces have to fight with a decisive blow. Meanwhile, the commitment to invigorate the political and structural landscape of the conflict prone area is also a challenge.

It is in this perspective that Pakistan and UK decided to engage in a deliberative process in an aura of experience sharing and deducing lessons. The countries have since past decade fought an enemy that transcends borders and threatens the security of regions. The UK particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan have been a front line state in fighting insurgents and later trying to build and rebuild the political

machinery of these states along with the coalition forces. While Pakistan, has not only faced the brunt of these Wars but has also fought against the elements of instability on its own soil. Hence, this publication is an attempt to not only provide an account of the efforts towards dealing with the menace of terrorism and insurgency but also to revitalise the understanding of peace building efforts by both Pakistan and UK. Mainly divided over three main themes, the publication is written in collaboration with sub-themes divided between the two sides.

Methodology

Qualitative and exploratory research was conducted during the course of study which entailed: analysis of documents available at open sources and interviews of selected respondents. The questions were primarily open ended with respondents chosen through the snowball technique. Hence, data was collected with a four-fold focus:

- a. **Conference Reports.** Extracting the common threads from each conference from the Post Conference Reports to use as themes from which to expand upon.
- b. **Historical Research.** The authors conducted open-source research, articulated in a bibliography, to provide historical context on the kinetic operations.
- c. **Conference Speaker Notes.** Presentations delivered by speakers at each of the two conferences were used to provide background and context to the Conference themes
- d. **Post Conference Interviews.** Selected respondents according to their area of expertise and relevance to the themes of the joint publication were interviewed. The list is available at the end of this publication.

THEME 1

Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism:

Theory and Practice

- Counterinsurgency experience of UK
- Counterterrorism experience of Pakistan

**COUNTERINSURGENCY
(COIN) EXPERIENCE OF
UK**

Introduction

UK Counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine has evolved over the last 70 years, as an art that needs to be continually scrutinised from the strategic, operational and tactical perspectives, given the fact that external factors are evolving persistently. The dynamics to be considered in this perspective are both permanent and evolving, which include: social, economic, political, geographical and cultural as former, and technology, climate and demographic shifts as later ones. This was learnt by British Army's considerable experience of COIN operations since World War II, both internally and as foreign interventions in support of UK foreign policy.

Hence, before expanding on these themes, it is important to understand exactly what the UK considers by COIN and Stabilisation. As, they are sometimes used interchangeably, leading to a failure to grasp the full circumstances surrounding the stage of a campaign in which engagement is taking place. In this regard, the key UK definitions that apply are:

- a. **Security.**¹ Security is the condition where there is sufficient protection against hostile acts to enable civic and civil life to continue. Sustainable security is that condition where security can be maintained over time through the host nation's security, civic and civil institutions with reduced direct intervention from allies or partners.

¹ Army Field Manual Vol 1 Part 10, Chapter 1, Section 2

- b. **Insurgency.**² An organised, violent subversion used to effect or prevent political control, as a challenge to established authority.
- c. **Counter-Insurgency (COIN).**³ Those military, law enforcement, political, economic, psychological and civic actions taken to defeat insurgency whilst addressing the root causes.
- d. **Counter-Terrorism.**⁴ Counter-terrorism (CT) describes all preventative, defensive and offensive measures taken to reduce the vulnerability of forces, individuals or property against terrorist threats or acts.
- e. **Structural Stability.** This is a longer term political goal that stabilisation should set the conditions for. This incorporates legitimate political systems, as well as established and recognised rule of law, and also the delivery of security, basic services and human rights.

The British Army Principles of COIN.⁵

The principles of COIN, as taught in UK Staff Colleges today, are widely regarded to be developed as a result of the Malayan Emergency (1948 – 1960), with thinking being reflected in more contemporary campaigns.⁶

² Army Field Manual Vol 1 Part 10, Chapter 1, Section 2

³ Army Field Manual Vol 1 Part 10, Chapter 1, Section 2

⁴ NATO Military Committee Concept for Counter-Terrorism

⁵ As stated in Army Field Manual Vol1 ,Part 10

⁶ Doctrine developed during the Malayan Emergency, 1948 – 1960, was refined during the Cyprus Emergency (1955 – 1960), and in Aden, Borneo, Northern Ireland and more recently in Iraq and Afghanistan. The principles have not, however, changed.

Those principles are:

- a. Primacy of Political Purpose.
- b. Unity of Effort.
- c. Understand the Human Terrain.
- d. Secure the Population.
- e. Neutralise the Insurgent.
- f. Gain and Maintain Popular Support.
- g. Operate in Accordance with the Law.
- h. Integrate Intelligence.
- i. Prepare for the long term.
- j. Learn and adapt.

UK Approach to Stabilisation

In UK military doctrine, there is not a single definition of 'stabilisation'. Notions of stabilisation evolve, with change in nature of conflict and post-conflict scenario. Hence, an informal description of stabilisation is as described below:

*'The process that supports states which are entering, enduring or emerging from conflict in order to; prevent or reduce violence, protect the population and key infrastructure; promote political processes and governance structures which lead to a political settlement that institutionalises non-violent contests for power; and prepares for sustainable social and economic development'*⁷

In this regard, from the UK perspective, the key overlap between COIN and Stabilisation Operations is the need for political primacy.

⁷ UK Government's Approach to Stabilisation, Stabilisation Unit, 2014.

There may have been occasions during British COIN Operations, and more recent Stabilisation Operations, where the significance of this may have been lost; *whilst* the urgency to defeat the insurgent militarily has become the overarching requirement. Military action will almost always be required to deliver security, but cannot be viewed in isolation. The need for all agencies of Government to understand the purpose and end state should be the overarching theme. Similarly, it would be incorrect to view stabilisation as an activity that is begun once a secure environment is delivered.

However, there is one critical difference between classical COIN and Stabilisation Operations. During the UK post WW II, COIN Operations (Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus being good examples), *whilst* political primacy was acknowledged, the Governance in place was based upon British colonial rule—the systems were already in-place but required support from the military to re-enforce. Political structures, civil infrastructure and Governance existed—these were not ‘failed states’. Interventions in the 21st century, from Balkans to Iraq and Afghanistan were not the same. The UK was faced with an intervention where political infrastructure did not exist in any form that could support development in citizen-state relations. Understanding the paradigm shift from post-colonial era COIN to interventions in failed states is paramount to understanding the differences between COIN and stabilisation. The UK Stabilisation Unit describes Stabilisation as:

Stabilisation is one of the approaches used in situations of violent conflict which is designed to protect legitimate political authority, using a combination of integrated civilian and military actions to

reduce violence, re-establish security and prepare for longer term recovery by building an enabling environment for structural stability.

Core Components of Stabilisation

Within the UK Approach to Stabilisation, three mutually reinforcing components are enlisted: **Protect** (political actors, political system, and population); **Promote**, consolidate and strengthen political processes and; **Prepare** for longer-term recovery:

- a. **Protect.** The 'protect' function enables the deployment of military forces, but to a particular end state. In conflict affected states, the use of the military is justified in order to enable wider stabilisation activity. The UK Government approach to Stabilisation is explicit in acknowledging the use of military to 'manage existing violence and deter further outbreaks'. The use of military may be either direct, using combat forces, or indirect, providing capabilities lacking by legitimate state forces; logistics, ISR may be example in such circumstances. When using, or threatening to use, force, the purpose needs to be clearly understood. Identifying those most vulnerable, by gender, religion or ethnicity is one factor, but also those vulnerable by the nature of the role they serve, e.g. political, judiciary, security may also need to be protected in order to be given the freedom of action to deliver their unique effects. Failed and conflict affected states are complex and it may not always be possible to place a time frame on how long military action is necessary. The underlying principle should be that the military will deliver a 'protect' effect until this can be successfully carried out by

civilian security forces. It is beholden upon the military to factor this transition into its long-term planning.

- b. **Promote.** A stabilisation approach in itself will not deliver a lasting political settlement in fragile or conflict affected states. What it can do is provide an interim solution which sets the conditions for the long term political solution. In those states where a stabilisation approach is applied, it is likely that the political environment will be uncertain or completely lacking; there will be factions, with the population aligned to various groups, possible armed groups. A stabilisation approach seeks to strengthen whatever political status exists and prepare for transition to an enduring political settlement. It may be that a stabilisation approach at the national level is not viable; in this instance, an approach which focuses at local level and sets the conditions for broadening when the conditions allow, may be more appropriate.
- c. **Prepare.** A stabilisation approach should not be considered as a long-term solution. However, it should be considered as a means to set the conditions that will allow a long-term solution to be developed. It is likely that the reasons behind instability and conflict will have resulted in a failed citizen-state relationship that will need to be repaired. This will require the provision of security, the basis of a judiciary and rule of law as a minimum. Those that are most vulnerable will need careful consideration; it is likely that youth, women and girls, elderly, and ill may all fall into this category and hence the addressing of gender imbalance, the provision of basic services to include

health care, as well as need to generate income through livelihoods will need to be considered.

Internal COIN Versus Foreign Intervention

The UK's COIN experiences, less the Northern Ireland Campaign, Op BANNER, from 1969–2007, have been largely conducted in former British overseas colonies since the end of WWII and, more recently in overseas interventions. *Whilst* considering the case studies below, it should be borne in mind that internal conflict brings with it complexities, particularly in the long term civil and political arenas, that overseas interventions will still have to consider, but through a different perspective. Similarly, overseas intervention brings with it a whole host of issues such as logistics at distance, political credibility and cultural differences that need to be considered early in the planning process.

Case Studies

This chapter seeks to examine two post WW II, COIN operations that the UK was involved in, using the current UK Principles of COIN as a means of assessing her success. The following operations were chosen as case studies: Malayan Emergency (1948 – 1960) and, Cyprus Emergency (Cyprus: 1955-1960),

Malayan Emergency (Malaya: 1948–1960)

Considered in the British Army as an example of a successful COIN campaign, it is frequently used as a case study to define classical COIN doctrine; it is true to say that the principles for COIN that still form the current UK doctrine were developed because of lessons learnt in the campaign which saw success only after a period

of strategic re-direction. It serves as an example of how insurgents can grow a strong support base from population dissatisfaction, and how the need for security to be delivered by the military is but one strand of a solution whose core is political.

Malaya Socio-Economic and Historical Background:

The economy of Malaya, during the British Colonial period, was built upon the export of two products; tin and rubber. Historically, the Malay people provided the labor for both industries, although throughout the early part of the 20th century, this increasingly shifted to Chinese immigrants, particularly in the case of the tin industry. This left the Malay people focussing primarily on the rubber, itself subject to fluctuations in value according to global demand and economy; none of this was helped by the British taxation on Malayan exports. The situation thus was of a fragile economy, dependent upon global exports and entirely reliant on major industry.

There had been British interest in Malaya as early as 1771. The outbreak of war in the Far East saw Malaya falling under Japanese occupation and the farming industry, so long the backbone of the Malayan economy, was reduced deliberately to only that required by the Imperial Japanese Forces. Key exports, namely tin and rubber, all but ceased during the Japanese occupation, leaving the industry in complete disarray with plantations that were devoid of workers. With the major source of income failing, the Malay people were left to live a hand-to-mouth existence with the sole aim of producing

enough food to sustain the population—imports of key foods had also dried up as the economy collapsed.

The situation reached the stage of widespread famine in 1942, with the only optimism being that the end of the war would see a return to British control and a resurgence of the industries. It would be three more years before the British were able to regain control of Malaya, but by that time, the industries were beyond recovery and the economy had completely failed. Malay hopes of a British resolution to the disaster were initially unfounded with the British administration using any resurgence in economic output to support its own ailing economy at the end of WW II. By 1947, the Malay population, many of whom were Chinese immigrants working in the plantations and mines, were struggling with famine and believing that its own natural resources were supporting the British, rather than Malay, economies. This element of the Malayan population had begun to revolt and workers' strikes were being seen more frequently. The British dealt with any civil unrest harshly, itself compounding an already desperate population. Thus, the grounds for a popular uprising, leading to an insurgency supported by the population, were laid.

Rise of the Malay Insurgency

The situation in 1947 was ripe for militancy. The ever-desperate workers turned increasingly to protests and strikes. The vicious circle caused by militant action was a further depleted economy, exasperating the famine experienced by workers leading to greater discontent with British authorities. The inevitable first act of serious violence saw the deaths of three European rubber plant managers on

16 June 1948 resulting in the banning of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) by the British. The MCP withdrew into its rural strongpoints and, with popular support, formed the Malay National Liberation Army (MNLA), also referred to as the Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA). The MNLA as an insurgent force had its roots in the anti-Japanese movements of WWII. As such, arms and ammunition were still readily availability and the basics of guerrilla tactics were known to those veterans of WWII, trained ironically by the British, which emerged as the insurgency took shape. The key tenets of the insurgency were as follows:

- a. **Secure Location.** The MNLA built their bases in the centre of the inhospitable Malay jungle. Although the British had experience of such condition from fighting the Japanese in



Rural patrol, Malayan Insurgency

Burma, it was not scaled or resourced to conduct operations in such terrain. The MNLA could mount operations at key infrastructure and then move back into the relative security of the jungle without the threat of interdiction by British

Forces. From there, the insurgents could develop tactics, stores and a firm support base.

- b. **Popular Support.** The MNLA were made up of a mixture of ethnic Malays and indigenous Chinese workers. The MNLA support base consisted of a sizeable number of those ethnic Chinese that lived in small villages on the edges of the jungle. This support, given its size, location and ability to provide food, shelter and information to the MNLA deep in the jungle, proved a decisive factor in the ability of the MNLA to gain both capability and credibility.
- c. **Guerrilla Tactics.** The MNLA aims were simple; to further drive the Malay populations from the British authorities. The seeds for this were already sown, and by demonstrating that the British were unable to provide a secure environment, the MNLA were able to demonstrate weakness that could be exploited through their influence of the Chinese workers. Tactics focussed on sabotage of key infrastructure, destruction of rubber plantations and constraining the means of transporting the now limited export products. With a secure base, popular support and success reinforced with propaganda, the MNLA were well placed to develop their insurgency.

Conduct of the Campaign

The Malay Campaign came shortly after the end of WWII and although there remained considerable experience within the British Army in terms of conduct of operations in jungle terrain, British doctrine was still very much focussed on conventional warfare rather than COIN. As a result, the first few years of the Campaign

focused very much at the tactical level rather than addressing the root causes of the insurgency. The British posture was centred upon a defensive mentality—if key infrastructures were protected, the export industry would not be damaged and the economy could survive. It was only later that the British Army's Director of Operations, Gen Sir Harold Briggs, identified that these tactics were not underpinned by any strategy that would result in a satisfactory end state.

He identified the insurgent vital ground as being 'the support of



Maj Gen Templer



Maj Gen Briggs

the population'. Separating the insurgent from his support, disrupting supply lines, and adopting an offensive mind-set in the inhospitable jungle using small groups (including a re-formed Special Air Service) would, given time, result in the defeat of the MNLA. Despite some setbacks, Briggs's successor, General Sir Gerald Templer, was able to push forward the advantage over the next few years, setting the conditions for the eventual victory. of note,

Templer and the Permanent Secretary for Defence in Malaya, Sir Robert Thompson, forged a strong civil-military relationship and in doing so set about applying what would later become known as 'a Full Spectrum Approach' to the campaign

Outcome

By 1954, the insurgency had ceased to be a major threat to the British Administration in Malaya. The remaining 6 years of the campaign focussed on building the capacity of the various agencies, from the police, to administration official to indigenous military forces. Importantly, structures were created to enable a co-ordinated effort – the Full Spectrum Approach – to include military, civilian, and state agencies plus representatives from the civilian communities. The state of emergency was officially declared over in 1960, by which stage military operations had been surpassed by civilian primacy and state delivered security.

COIN Principles

Given the lack of doctrine supporting COIN operations in 1948, much was learnt from mistakes in the early part of the campaign from which many the principles that form the current COIN Principles were developed:

- a. **Primacy of Political Purpose.** The UK operates in support of legitimate political objectives. This is the key tenet of UK Foreign Policy, and COIN is no different to conventional warfare in that respect. In the contemporary environment, the media has a role to play; the fact that our TV screens are full of military 'action' belies the reality that this is only a small part of the Campaign.

Whilst the Malayan Emergency highlights the role of Briggs and Templer, it also serves to demonstrate that, once the latter and Sir Robert Thompson formed a strong civ-mil forum, understanding of strategic objectives became clearer and a coherent campaign plan, including the transition to civilian primacy for security, was formulated

- b. **Unity of Effort.** Defeating an insurgency requires all stakeholders to agree a single end state and to work in union to reach that end state. Failing to share information, individual agency agendas and an inability to agree the aim are all symptoms of a failure to demonstrate unity of effort – the chances of failure are increased significantly. The Malayan Campaign demonstrates the importance of ‘unity of effort’. The initial period, 1948- 1950, was characterised by military action that aimed to protect key infrastructure, and this was seen as the most important tissue. Little thought was paid, prior to the implementation of the Briggs Plan, to the coordination of the actions of non-military security agencies, other state departments, finance and economy officers and citizen representatives.
- c. **Understand the Human Terrain.** Understanding the insurgent CoG was the ‘population’ was key to developing the COIN strategy. Not until the Briggs Plan was implemented, was this truly understood and the strategy developed according to the identified CoG. One of the main issues faced in Malaya, which is still true today in many UK interventions, is the importance of language and culture. In 1948, the British Army in Malay was

more accustomed to conventional warfighting doctrine developed through WWII. It needed to be re-trained not only in the tactical operations of COIN, but also the strategic importance of understanding the population and its culture. This took time, but when properly understood and implemented, the benefit emerged and the key process of separating the insurgent from his popular support base could begin in earnest.

- d. **Secure the Population.** The Briggs Plan saw the first policies that separated the MNLA from the Chinese worker support base through the movement of village populations from the edge of the jungle into 'New Villages', supported by the British Administration, but isolated from the MNLA. The key to understanding human terrain is to go back to the root causes of the insurgency. The provision of the basics (security, food,



Rural Security patrol, Malayan Emergency

water, shelter and livelihood) were the root causes of discontentment amongst those people who became the MNLA support base. By delivering these, the British Administration gained credibility amongst the population and, in doing so, was able to sever the ties between the insurgent and his support.

- e. **Neutralise the Insurgent.** The early stages of the campaign saw British Military Forces used to secure infrastructure in key point defence. Whilst in the short term this maintained the capacity to govern and to export produce necessary to sustain the economy at the minimum acceptable level, it did not do anything to weaken the resolve or the strength of the MNLA. Not until the implementation of the Briggs Plan, and its subsequent reinforcement by Templer, was the military tasked with offensive operations in any meaningful way. Indeed, in the doctrinal publication that Templer developed from 1952, he states that'.... The responsibility for conducting the campaign in Malaya rests with the Civil Government....The job of the British Army is to kill or capture communist terrorists in Malaya....' As a campaign progresses, the failure of the security forces to neutralise the insurgent adds to their credibility–Briggs identified this and the need for offensive rather than defensive action, but within the context of a holistic, cross-agency strategy.
- f. **Gain and Maintain Popular Support.** The British Administration lost popular support because of the failure to address the cause of discontentment among the population. This, and a subsequent inability to deliver security in the early days of the insurgency, led to a vacuum that the MNLA were able to fill.
- g. **Operate in Accordance with the Law.** By 1949, the Malay Police were considered corrupt by most the population. Whilst the British Army understood their ROE and operated within them, the association with the Malay Police drew into question

their credibility. Given the need to ensure that the security forces, be that British Army or Malay Police, were viewed as legitimate and supporting the administration, there was a clear role for the military to build the capacity, and hence the credibility, of the civilian security agencies.

- h. **Integrate Intelligence.** Significantly, the ability of police intelligence agencies was largely overlooked by the military initially. Military operations were enhanced significantly using fused intelligence from all available sources.
- i. **Prepare for the Long Term.** GenTempler understood the need to evolve both the military and civilian agencies from independent activities into a coordinated and cohesive organisation. Addressing the root causes of the insurgency and putting into place cross-agency and department policies to prevent them happening again ensured a lasting peace long after the military campaign had finished. Long term success was clearly linked directly to the implementation of the 'Full Spectrum Approach'.
- j. **Learn and Adapt.** The British Army failed to grasp the nature of COIN in 1948. Understanding the CoG of the MNLA resulted in a change of operational and tactical direction. Implementing a 'hearts and minds' campaign to win back local support was key to denying the insurgent freedom of action. Most significant was the British Army acceptance that the campaign could not be won by military means alone.

Lessons learnt from the Malayan Emergency

The Malayan Emergency marked the first of a series of post-WWII Colonial COIN campaigns fought by the British military. Malaya in particular occurred whilst the military were recovering from 6 years of conventional warfighting in the plethora of theatres that constituted WW II. Doctrine was still very much focussed on warfighting and the role of the military. Twelve years of COIN resulted ultimately in the emergence of an entirely new doctrine and the understanding of the need to learn and adapt. Critically, the end of the colonial era was marked by conflict in other regions; Kenya, Cyprus in particular served to demonstrate that those lessons learnt from Malaya were not unique but represented a different form of warfare from that experienced in 1939–1945. The two critical components to campaign success were:

- a. **Political Primacy.** In 1948, the British Army was recuperating from WWII. Doctrine reflected that used in 1945 and was desperately in need of a review and refresh in the context of the post-War era and the evident decline of the British Empire. It took the failures in the early part of the Malayan Emergency, and the insight of Gen Templar, to understand that this was not a campaign that could be fought and won on military lines of operation. Political Primacy, and a clear political end state, was required within which the military objectives would deliver a large component of what was overall a politically led strategy. As stated by Sarah Spencer, BHC Islamabad:

'The military component is an important element of stabilisation but it is but one element. Stabilisation is about

the use of a multitude of tools and levers to achieve those broader political objectives'

Malaya evidently required a stabilisation rather than purely COIN approach and it was this identification of the military component as one element, albeit an important one in the defeat of the insurgent that was critical in the successful outcome in Malaya for the British Government.

- b. **Securing the Population.** The Malay population in 1948 were not unique in their desire to live in a secure environment and would support whoever offered the best opportunity for a secure environment in which they could thrive. A key component of British policy under Briggs Plan was to deliver security to the population, albeit by removing them from their own villages into areas that could be better protected by the Army. As well as delivering security to the population, this allowed the British to isolate the insurgent from its potential support base and limited the likelihood of civilian casualties from military action. Again, Sarah Spencer's view:

'An Army cannot fight an insurgency the same way that it does a standing army without risking unnecessary civilian casualties and collateral damage. It must deliver those basic services that are required by a population (healthcare, housing, water, sewerage etc) as soon as is practicable after the physical act of 'fighting' has ceased.'

The population, and the ability to provide security, and ultimately a better quality of life, underpins the principles of

stabilisation. The British Army in Malaya understood this in the latter stages of the campaign; providing the basics for human survival is a key component of security and a proven method of isolating the insurgent from a support base without which, the insurgency will cease to be viable. Similarly, the view of Ed Hadley, Stabilisation Unit, echoes that of Sarah Spencer:

Gen McCrystal encouraged 'courageous restraint' when Commander of the NATO Mission in Afghanistan with the reasoning that a more restrained approach, which minimized civilian casualties, was clearly in the line with a CoG that was population rather than enemy centric.

The need to minimize civilian casualties in Afghanistan was evident to Gen McCrystal. An approach that lacked restraint would play into the hands of the insurgent and strengthen the anti-ISAF narrative. Focussing on the population and not the insurgent was a clear change in strategy adopted by McCrystal who understood the need for a long term solution to address the root causes to the support for the insurgent. Again, it highlights the need for the provision not only of security against the insurgent but also of the basic services required for human survival.

Cyprus Emergency (Cyprus: 1955-1960)

Background

The island of Cyprus is found in the Mediterranean Sea, approximately 200miles West of Syria. Cyprus was originally governed by Britain since 1878 and, following the outbreak WWI,

was annexed completely when Turkey entered the war on the side of Germany. Cyprus remained under British rule throughout WWII and, after 1945, became strategically important during the Cold War due to its proximity to the Middle East. The Cypriot people are broadly divided into two main denominations, Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot. Whilst there were historic tensions, both broadly lived contentedly together and under British rule. Throughout the early 1950s, this balance began to show cracks with the emergence of two prominent Greek Cypriot far-right nationalists, Archbishop Makarios and Georgios Grivas. Makarios, the head of the Greek Orthodox Church in Cyprus was an ardent anti-British nationalist who believe in unison with Greece – Enosis. Grivas was a retired Greek Army officer, again with far-right beliefs and staunchly anti-British in his views. He too believed in Enosis and the removal of British Rule and Turkish Cypriot presence in Cyprus and formed the EOKA movement (interestingly EOKA appear to be referred to as either 'movement', paramilitary organisation or terrorist organisation dependent upon the perspective held).

The key difference in the Cyprus Emergency to the Malayan Emergency was the CoG. The population of Cyprus was hugely split on support for the Enosis proposed by Makarios. Turkish Cypriots, and Turkey itself, were opposed to seeing it as a means for Greece to remove all Turkish presence from the Island. The coastal towns also saw many Greek Cypriots who were living comfortable, and profitable, lives under British rule and the economic opportunities that offered. Although there were Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot ethnic tensions, exploitable by Makarios and Grivas, there were not the economic reasons for the genesis of insurgency that were

prevalent in Malaya. There was no widespread hunger, famine or poverty and many Cypriots were either comfortable in the opportunities afforded by the British Administration or were, at worst, ambivalent. As a result, EOKA focussed their attention on the Cypriot youth, some of whom were idealistic in the views of Enosis and, as is not uncommon in passionate youths, were seeking alternatives as a political statement.

Conduct of the Campaign

EOKA officially began military operations on the 1 April 1955, targeting the Cyprus Broadcasting Station in Nicosia, and the British Army Wolseley Barracks. Whilst both attacks were unsuccessful in terms of impact, they did serve to awaken the British Administration to a threat that had not previously been taken seriously. Intelligence on Makarios, Grivas and EOKA was scarce meaning that the response



Arch Bishop Makarios Cyprus

was entirely reactive and lacked detailed planning. The timings are also significant; although the British Army had experience in other former colonies of fighting uprisings (MNLA in Malay, Mau-Mau in Kenya) it did not seem possible that this could happen in Cyprus. More conceivable was that these attacks were isolated and related more to Cold War threats, given Cyprus's location to the East-West interface.

The challenge to the British centred on a number of areas. Strategically, they needed to first counter the growing support to EOKA through the provision of security for those who feared for their lives if they did not support and by separating those sympathizers from the insurgents themselves. In this respect, terrain plays a role again. In the same way that the MNLA were able to retreat to the jungles supported by the villagers living on the jungle extremes, so were EOKA able to blend into the mountainous terrain of the Troodos supported by the villages in the mountain foothills. Without the support of the population, identifying EOKA members from ordinary citizens proved difficult – a common thread when considering intelligence based operations in the early phases of a COIN campaign. Eventually, EOKA were subdued and by early 1957 were forced to lie low through the impact of the British Army operations. Militarily at least, the insurgency was being subdued. Politically, the situation was more complex. Enosis was clearly supported by a minority in Cyprus, but backing for Grivas and Makarios, was clearly evident in Greece. The complexity of relationships between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots led to outbreaks of violence which, although never really resulting in significant loss of life, did nonetheless separate further the

population on ethnic lines adding weight to Makarios's ideology of unison with Greece. With the Religious backing of the Head of the Greek Orthodox Church, aligned with the fear spread through Grivas's acts of terror, the anti-British sentiment arose again throughout 1957 and 1958. Whilst the British Army could maintain operations to mitigate the threat posed by EOKA, it could not defeat it without a political solution that satisfied all parties; Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots and the parent countries of Greece and Turkey themselves.

Outcome.

By late 1958, a significant action took place that changed the perspective on the political dimensions of Cyprus. The British Administer, Field Marshall Sir John Harding, was replaced as Governor by Sir Hugh Foot. Foot, himself a previous Colonial Administrator, realised that the campaign being fought was military in nature, and focussed entirely on EOKA. The solution to the Cyprus Emergency lay not in the defeat of EOKA; this was but one element, but the diplomatic solution to the grievances of all Parties. Foot set about laying the foundations for a new Cyprus that satisfied the three Governments; Greece, Turkey and Cyprus. Strategic level agreement, he argued, would set the conditions for peace at the tactical level. To a certain extent, he was correct. Greece in particular became increasingly keen to distance itself from the Cyprus problem, knowing that Enosis would in fact lead to a huge administrative burden to itself, with very little economic gain to be had. The offer of an independent Cyprus with Archbishop Makarios as President, offered the solution in that there would be a strong

Greek voice in Cyprus, but without the administrative burden itself.

Turkey, realising that Turkish Cypriots were in the minority, would be content with policies to deliver security whilst enabling them to have a voice in the Cypriot Government, although distrust of the new Government was ever present, ultimately laying the seeds for future conflict. The agreement for Britain, itself feeling the economic pinch following the independence of many of its former Colonies, was content with retaining a number of Sovereign Territories, primarily as military cantonments. The only areas of dissatisfaction came from EOKA itself and all those who had supported it, willingly or otherwise, over the previous five years. Ultimately Grivas realised that without the credibility of Makarios in support, Enosis was a pipe-dream that would never be realised. Despite his failure, he returned to Greece as a hero. Imprisoned members of EOKA were released and returned to normal lives within their communities.

COIN Principles

- a. **Primacy of Political Purpose.** The Cyprus Emergency differed significantly from the Malayan Emergency as already discussed. Whilst elements of the population supported Makarios's ideology, many did not and were forcibly coerced through fear to support the insurgency. On the face of it, and given the primary target for EOKA attacks were British military, it would seem that military primacy should resolve the issue. What in fact emerged were the concerns amongst both the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots on what may happen to their

communities in the future – Makarios in particular played on those concerns to elevate the Cypriot issues into a regional, politically based conflict.

The movement of the campaign away from purely a military one into the civilian space, under John Harding, ultimately resulted in a satisfactory political agreement for the major stakeholders; Britain, Greece and Turkey. Building the capacity of police and local institutions, whilst not on the same scale as Malaya, were also significant, but not without setbacks. Harding's decision to empower the Turkish Community through the recruitment of Turkish Cypriot only police Units fuelled the propaganda peddled by Makarios and Grivas and in some way contributed to the EOKA resurgence in 1958. Ultimately, it was the political resolution, not military victory that ended the Emergency.

- b. **Unity of Effort.** Since the British annexation in 1915, Cyprus had been ruled as a British Colony with a British Governor. Most officials were either British or were Cypriot (Greek and Turkish) but supportive of the British Government. Cyprus was, and is, a relaxed island by nature and, with the end of WWII in 1945, had existed under relative peace and tranquillity. Government institutions, administrators and civilian law enforcement agencies went largely independently about their business whilst the military presence was focussed on securing Cyprus as a key strategic asset that could support other campaigns should they arise in British colonies in the Middle-East or further afield. The requirement for all agencies to operate together did not exist – if

the early 1950s the idea that Cyprus would be subject to a Greek nationalist insurgency, was rarely considered, and, if it was, was dismissed as highly unlikely given the relative economic strength and strong Governance that the island experienced. When the first EOKA attacks took place on 1 April 1955, the realisation that the nationalist ideology, supported by an armed insurgency itself commanded by a former Greek Army officer, posed a very real threat to British control of the strategically important island resulted in the need for a thorough analysis of the response at the tactical, operational and strategic levels. The resulting structure, formulated under Sir Hugh Foot, resembled what we would now call a Full Spectrum Approach under a political lead. Security, delivered by a coherent merge of the military and civil law enforcement agencies, underpinned by fused intelligence from all agencies and working towards a clear political aim delivered by Foot, was the basis upon which the unified response was formulated. Ultimately, it required all three levels, tactical, operational and strategic, to deliver effect to support the political aims for the campaign to be concluded successfully.

- c. **Understand the Human Terrain.** The human terrain in Cyprus was complex in 1955. There were ethnic tensions, although not routinely leading to violence, between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. Within each community were those who supported nationalistic views and those who did not. The British Army was faced with the difficult task of providing security to those who did not support EOKA, whilst separating the active insurgents from those who did. It is certainly true that EOKA were dealt serious blows through 1955 and 1956, but the

hierarchy of EOKA remained largely intact. What the British did identify early in the campaign was that support for EOKA was clearly divided. If the nationalist ideology spread by Makarios and Grivas could be discredited, there lay a solution to the challenge. The most obvious was to deliver this was to discredit the whole concept of Enosis, and what better way to counter Greek nationalism in Cyprus than from the Greek Government itself.

- d. **Secure the Population.** The target of the EOKA campaign was purely the British military and instruments of Governance. What is clear, however, is the brutish thuggery used EOKA to subdue the local population and force support—subtly different from Malaya where the support base of the population on the fringes of the jungle required little persuasion given the strong thread of social discontent already present. The British Army identified that, in many cases, support to EOKA was based upon fear and not shared ideology and hence support base would diminish significantly should protection be given. This was most evident in the rural villages of the Troodos but, given the nature of the terrain, would be difficult to achieve. More significantly, the anti-British sentiment that underpinned EOKA activity and the political strategy of Makarios, had begun to manifest itself into a greater anti-Turkish sentiment, mainly following the attacks on the Greek community in Lefka. On 30 July 1958, on the Xeros-Pyrghos road, a Turkish bus was attacked by hand grenades and shotguns members of EOKA. Although no-one was killed and those guilty of the attack were quickly arrested by the security forces and held to account, it nonetheless fuelled the divide

between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Given the identified nature of a political solution between Greece and Turkey, such activities were capable of disrupting the peace process and creating an ethnic divide that could make a political solution much harder to agree.

- e. **Neutralise the Insurgent.** Makarios was an enigmatic leader, with a strong religious credibility as head of the Greek Orthodox Church in Cyprus. Even now, monuments to him are common throughout Cyprus. EOKA, whilst not having a strong support base in the coastal cities did, nonetheless, find enough support in the rural and mountain villages of the Troodos to enable attacks to be launched. Common to most insurgencies fought by the British Army since 1945, separating the insurgent from its potential support base, especially those who supported through fear rather than ideological agreement, was critical to military success. The fact that the British Army was a stated target of EOKA (in its initiation oath and declaration of existence, it stated that the British Army was EOKA's main target), meant that the neutralisation of the insurgent was important not only in order to secure the population, but also to ensure that, in the eyes of the population, the security forces were credible and clearly able to deliver security should the [population choose not to support the insurgency. Notably, EOKA exported its campaign of violence against the British Army into the urban areas—a total of 53% of the 1,144 recorded armed clashes between EOKA and the British Army, occurred in built up areas. Ensuring security in these economic hubs was critical to gaining and maintaining

popular support. Failure of Enosis as an ideology, therefore demonstrated the socioeconomic failings to the Cypriot people.

- f. **Gain and Maintain Popular Support.** Ultimately, popular support in Cyprus for Enosis was arguably never really a decisive factor. Certainly, there were those, largely based in the rural areas and away from the economic centres, that supported Makarios and his ideology, but the numbers were never large. Support for EOKA was, in many cases, under duress or based upon fear of attack or reprisal. As discussed above, for the British Army to gain support of those who would potentially, willingly or otherwise, support EOKA, there was a clear need to provide security, ideally with an appropriate civilian face, be that police recruited from the Greek Cypriot or Turkish Cypriot communities. Many senior officials in Cyprus were in support of the British rule given the success that it had brought to the economy and the relatively comfortable lives afforded to most people in the towns and cities. Enosis offered uncertainty and



Cyprus emergency, police, army joint patrol

division along ethnic lines; this, for many, represented a risk to livelihoods and Cypriot economy and was not welcomed. STRATCOMs played a huge part in ensuring that this message was clearly understood amongst the Cypriot population.

- g. **Operate in Accordance with the Law.** Allegations of torture were made against British soldiers during the Cyprus Emergency, and even as recently as 2012, there was a suggestion that lawsuits against the British Government were being considered by EOKA veterans. There is scant evidence to suggest that any of these allegations were ever based on fact, although allegations of mistreatment in captivity of suspected EOKA members were made and are still raised by veterans' organisation. There is, however, considerable anecdotal evidence of the brutality shown towards both Greek and Turkish Cypriots by EOKA to leverage support. Assassinations amongst Greek Cypriots not loyal to the nationalist cause were not unheard of, and this, followed up with more general warning and intimidation, created an uneasy relationship between EOKA and the Greek Cypriot population that, for EOKA at least, provided support at best and ignorance at worst. EOKA credibility was seriously flawed as a result of their methods.
- h. **Integrate Intelligence.** There were several issues that the British authorities faced in the early years of the campaign. The British Army was committed elsewhere throughout the 1950s as de-colonisation of the former British Empire took hold. With scarce military resources in 1955, it was simply not possible to have a strong enough military presence to provide a detailed intelligence picture of EOKA members and locations. However,

the main issue related to the fusion of whatever information that was gathered across multiple agencies into confirmed and usable intelligence. On replacing Sir John Harding as Governor of Cyprus, Sir Hugh Foot set about creating what was effectively a cross departmental approach to intelligence. The term 'Head of Special Branch' was renamed 'Director of Intelligence', and the incumbent replaced with the dynamic John Prendergast. The role of the Director of Intelligence was significant in the overall efforts to galvanise all intelligence agencies into a more potent and coherent intelligence gathering network. The Director of Intelligence was afforded the same status as the senior police and military officers (Commissioner of Police and Army Director of Operations respectively) and was given direct access to the Governor. Such a relationship, with the Director of Intelligence as 'prima inter pares' would have undoubtedly caused friction given the previous independence of the other, equally senior, officers, however given the nature of intelligence gathering amongst a population keen to avoid suspicion of collusion from EOKA members, it was key to have an individual identified with the responsibility of fusing all intelligence agencies together. There was a clear requirement to provide a single, accurate version of the truth, both at the tactical level for the military activities to neutralise the insurgent, and also at the political-strategic level.

- i. **Prepare for the Long Term.** The political solution agreed between Turkey, Greece and Britain solved the immediate issues that faced Cyprus in the 1950s. The fact that from 1957, Makarios altered his strategy away from Enosis in what many saw as a betrayal of the ideology that ignited the Emergency in

the first place meant that the policy of gradual de-colonisation that the British Government followed since the end of WWII could continue with Cyprus but without the need to continue the insurgency. The result was a return to relative normality by 1960 with Cyprus as an independent Republic, but with designated British Sovereign Territory which enabled the retention of key, strategic sites in the Mediterranean. This did however, result in an emergent crisis, which would subsequently haunt Cyprus for the next generation. The apparent change of mindset of Makarios to Enosis, and his subsequent appointment as the first President of the Republic of Cyprus, caused deep resentment amongst the Turkish Cypriot community who believed that they had been betrayed. Lt Col James Gladwin, Stabilisation Unit was clear on the long term nature of stabilisation operations:

This can only be delivered by a long term political vision enabled by an agreed, cross-government strategy.

Governments must be prepared for long term political planning and not short term military victories.

- j. **Learn and Adapt.** When considering the COIN Campaign in Cyprus, it is important to remember that the UK was in the position of being able to draw upon the lessons that were learnt in the early years of the Malaya Campaign from 1948. Replacing Sir John Harding, a military man by profession and by nature, with the more politically attuned Sir Hugh Foot, immediately gave the Campaign the political primacy which was evident would be required. Whilst the military mission could focus at the tactical level on neutralising EOKA and providing a secure environment for the population, the political leaders could focus

on the strategic level and 'neutralising' Greek Cypriot nationalist cries for Enosis. More significantly, the removal of Makarios was a key event—his arrest and deportation from Cyprus to Kenya (plus similar fates for a number of other key political activists) enables enough breathing space for political discussion on the future of Cyprus to take place. The re-integration of Makarios is a case in point; the British Government realised that a fervent nationalist, anti-British Makarios could never be allowed to hold a position of power in Cyprus. A more malleable Makarios could, however, enable a peaceful end to the campaign and a transition to Cypriot rule with Britain's retaining key strategic sites. This is exactly what subsequently took place. Arguably, what did not take place, or if it did the implications were not considered, was a long-term strategy for the provision of a Turkish Cypriot voice, which would be heard, to represent the Turkish Cypriot communities. Inevitably, the granting of Independence under the Presidency of Makarios may well have ended the notion of Enosis, but opened the way for the decades of deep distrust and violence between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, ultimately leading the way to the Turkish Invasion of 1974.

**PAKISTAN'S COUNTER
TERRORISM
EXPERIENCE**

Introduction

Since the past decade, Pakistan is fighting a 'crucial' war against militant and terrorist factions on its own soil.⁸ Within this ambit, it has managed to subdue entities, which otherwise had an intrinsic potential to 'resurrect' after a kinetic operation. With their tentacles spread across the country, the challenges they posed were far lethal than the ones by mere criminals or bandits. It was due to this compulsion that, Pakistan declared them to be the 'biggest threat' to its national security,⁹ particularly in the wake of US led war in Afghanistan and its regional fallout. Earlier the threat matrix primarily evolved around the dynamics of eastern border and hostilities from India.

The realisation for vitality in curbing internal threats heralded a chapter of *sub-conventional warfare*¹⁰ in Pakistan's military doctrine. Although the conventional threat did not recede, still challenges posed from militancy and terrorism cautioned the military planners and policy framers alike. In fact, international media even reported this declaration as an update which should not be misread or ignored.¹¹ Hence, this was an indication of the country's compulsion

⁸ major military operations started from the border areas with Afghanistan in the year 2001.

⁹ 'New Doctrine: Army identifies homegrown militancy as the biggest threat', *Tribune*, January 2013.

¹⁰ Mansoor Jafar, 'Pakistan's new military doctrine under Indian threats', *Al-Arabiya news*, 08th Jan' 2013.

¹¹ 'Pakistan's new military doctrine shouldn't be misread', *rediff news*, 06th jan' 2013, <http://www.rediff.com/news/column/pakistans-new-military-doctrine-shouldnt-be-misread/20130106.htm>

for dealing with challenges which were otherwise under the ambit of limited conflict, but were instigated by perplexing regional environs.

In this regard, in Pakistan's struggle, at the tactical level on one hand, there was a kinetic endeavor to pacify 'militancy' generating violent opposition to the State¹² through terrorism, while on the other hand; there was also an urgency to bring back the conflict prone areas to normalcy. In other words, the attempt was to swiftly streamline these two efforts, for achieving successes in the overall '*counter-militancy cum terrorism*' campaign, under the ambit of sub-conventional warfare. Generally, the idea has rested on the notion of launching stabilisation efforts sometimes even amid a military operation, particularly in areas with heavy civilian presence.

As an illustration in North Waziristan Agency (NWA), 'sequencing of operations was done as part of strategy, which included the clearing up of periphery areas first and then gradually

LESSONS LEARNT!

- STABILISATION EFFORTS NEED TO BE DELIBERATED UPON PRIOR AND LAUNCHED AMID A MILITARY OPERATION.
- CAPACITY BUILDING OF CIVILIAN INSTITUTIONS IS INDEED A MAJOR PART OF STABILISATION AND PEACE BUILDING EFFORTS IN A CONFLICT-PRONE ENVIRONMENT.
- DENYING SPACE TO TERRORIST FACTIONS IS A STRATEGIC GOAL, COMPLEMENTED BY TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL ADVANCES.

¹² Yusuf, Moeed, ed. '*Pakistan's Counter Terrorism Challenge*', George Town University Press, Washington D.C., 2014, p. 15.

moving towards the core.’¹³ While as part of the stabilisation efforts capacity building of civilian institutions was the priority. Though Pakistan armed forces have come a long way in enhancing their capabilities to take on kinetic prong of national counter terrorism approach but the most wanting aspect remained capacity building of institutions including Executive, Judiciary and Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies. Hence, in this war Pakistan realized that the fight may continue on the strength of armed forces but realized that success would not be achieved till the time capacity building issues of all institutions were not addressed.’¹⁴

Within this purview, a looming academic debate also persisted about the need of classifying the challenge as either ‘militancy’, ‘terrorism’ or ‘insurgency’ in Pakistan. With the fear of oversimplifying, there is a bulk of literature that tries to convince policy relevant circle and others about the classification of the ‘enemy’ in Pakistan that justifies or otherwise, ongoing military operations within the country. However, the fact remains that the canvas through which Pakistan views its challenge is distinct and diverse. Its counter terrorism campaign viewed at the operational and strategic level is two-pronged: *deny space to militancy and violent extremism and eliminate all forms of terrorist factions and manifestations*. Earlier, particularly operation in Swat, these factions enjoyed the romanticism of a ‘strategic initiative’ and the State responded in way of collecting reminiscences, linking their pattern and behavior with the past to the present.

¹³ Interview by Electronic Reply: Maj Gen Hassan Azhar Hayat- GOC 7 Division. Interview no.2 Appendix-2

¹⁴ Ibid.

This part of the book sets the pace for the larger discussion on stabilization and peace building efforts in Post-Operation-(Post- ops) phase. It provides an insight into notions of militancy and terrorism as it is understood in the Pakistani setting. It is necessary to pick up threads from this point onwards for understanding how Pakistan has dealt with the threat emanating from both militancy and terrorism and what were the options resorted to for launching stabilization efforts in conflict-prone areas in its aftermath. It records Pakistan's 'counter militancy *cum* terrorism' campaign with a four-fold focus: Theoretical debate on terrorism and militancy, Pakistan's perception of threat and the phenomenon, what these elements of instability aim to do, how has the Pakistani State fought back and what lies ahead.

The 'Militancy', 'Terrorism' and 'Insurgency' Debate

Terrorism is a global phenomenon, devoid of a universally acceptable definition.¹⁵ It is a merger of disjointed or otherwise, violent acts with different motives. In contrast to insurgency, as a mode of attaining political supremacy, terrorism is a violent tool used by individuals to challenge the writ of a government.¹⁶ The threats emanating from these acts evolve and present themselves in newer forms with a new resolve. The individuals involved attempt to confuse, divide, humiliate, demoralise and break down previously

¹⁵ Acharya, U. D. (2008). "War on Terror Or Terror Wars: the Problem in Defining Terrorism." *Denver Journal of International Law and Policy* 37: 653.

¹⁶ 'The Global Regime for Terrorism', Issue Brief, Report by International Institutions and Global Governance Program, Council on Foreign Relations, August 31, 2011.

existing political relationships making it possible for themselves or others working alongside to prevail.¹⁷

Consequently, in an attempt to deliberate upon the phenomenon of terrorism, it is rather critical to delve upon the ideas that instigate it. There is a distinct debate on what kind of environment breeds individuals motivated towards terrorism, and also insurgency. The trail of former leads to 'violent extremism' and 'militancy' as the root cause, while for an informed mind socio-political underpinnings of a society with lack of education and poverty for a distressed class, are determined as source for the latter.

Nevertheless, in a war torn World the terms militant and terrorist are two words that have reached the familiarity of common household. These two terms are also being used interchangeably all over the world, despite carrying distinct connotations. For the purpose of this study, a discussion on their differences is indeed critical.

The Debate

Although there is not a single universally accepted definition of terrorism, still there is room for deliberation on the phenomenon from the prism of deliverables. It is not a tangible phenomenon itself, and prevails as an act and tool for spreading violence and challenging the writ of a State. Hence, in a conflict situation, terrorism is an act conducted by a violent individual who is motivated to spread terror. This individual is referred to as a

¹⁷ Ed. Gerard Chaliand,,*'The History of Terrorism: From Antiquity to Al-Qaeda'*, University of California Press Ltd, London, England.

militant. The word is derived from the 15th century Latin term "*militare*" that translates in to "to serve as a soldier"¹⁸;¹⁹ In the modern times, it may be defined as:

.....'A militant is an individual who is aggressive, violent or intensely active usually for a cause in which they believe in.....'²⁰

Similarly, another definition implies that, a militant is
.....'*an individual who utilizes vigorous and extreme means of achieving an objective that is not usually political*'...²¹

Within this purview, it may be ascertained that, militants may not always use physical violence or combat to attain their means. Hence, militancy is sometimes invisible and it also takes time for it to breed from violent extremism that evolves to extreme connotations of inflicting physical abuse.²² It is due to this understanding that it is also often referred to as 'militant extremism'.²³

Meanwhile, defining terrorism remains a contentious issue. Generally, it may be referred to an act of

..*individual who utilizes terror as a means of coercion, using violence as a means of attaining a religious, political or an ideological goal.....*²⁴

Terrorists deliberately target civilians or disregard their safety when in battle and usually employ acts of unlawful violence and war

¹⁸Merriam-Webster". Merriam-Webster. Retrieved 13 November 2011

¹⁹ Hassan Abbas, '*Pakistan's Drift into Extremism- Allah, Army and America's War on Terror*', Routledge Publishers, New York, 2005.

²⁰ Gerard Saucier and others, '*Patterns of thinking in Militant Extremism*', Association for Psychological Science, Vol: 4, No. 3, 2009.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid

²³ Ibid

²⁴ Bruce Hoffman, '*Inside Terrorism*', The New York Times, Colombia University Press, 1998.

in order to reach their targets. While there are no definite definitions for the word terrorism, a terrorist is usually responsible for the destruction of property, heavy bloodshed, crimes against humanity and etc. Some popular terrorist groups that have been plaguing the world more recently can be named as the Al-Qaeda and ISIS or even Boko Haram, who have been responsible for significant bloodshed around the globe.

Generally, both militant and terrorist are two words that are used interchangeably; which is theoretically misleading. A militant and a terrorist both have their own agendas and mostly, these agendas are political. The difference however, lies in the means with which they hope to achieve their desired goal. Terrorists utilize fear for attaining their desired goal. The way in which they instill fear in people or the state is by using armed violence, destructing public property, destroying and killing innocent people and thereby posing as a threat to human lives and the overall well being of a country or a nation. They often choose civilians as their targets, thus drawing the attention of the authorities towards themselves while they also target government organizations for their attacks. Militants on the contrary, do not use physical violence. They are usually seen to be using verbal violence, taking extreme action to achieve a desired goal. They do not target civilians as terrorists do, and have no desire of instilling fear in people and gaining their objective through fear. Militants usually rebel against the state and the authorities.

However, it is a commonly known fact that a militant will resort to terrorism if he or she cannot gain his or her objectives through peaceful means. There is proof that most terrorists initiated their operations as militants, gradually making their way into becoming

fully fledged terrorists. It is said that most militants all over the world support terrorist groups with the aim of gaining their support in fulfilling their respective ambitions. Either way it is clear that usually both the terrorists and militants are extremists (in the sense of holding a view at the extreme end of a spectrum on a particular subject matter) who indulge in unlawful activities and therefore become a threat to the nation. In view of this discussion, differences between militants and terrorists are enlisted below:

MILITANTS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • All terrorists are militants, but not all militants are terrorists. • Militants may or may not actively engage in physical violence, but they are certainly very aggressive, verbally or use verbal violence to achieve their desired goals. • Militants usually do not resort to harming civilians to champion their cause, instead use confrontational or violent methods against the establishment in support of a political or social cause.
TERRORISTS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Terrorists resort to physical violence. • They utilize terror as a means of coercion and use violence as a necessary means of attaining their political, religious or ideological goals, thereby causing harm and death to innocent people and maximum damage to property. • Terrorists, usually target civilians, instill fear and psychological effect on them in order to gain the attention of the authorities. As terrorist organizations, they will commit violent acts by murdering scholars, religious leaders and sanctioning of extortion and demanding ransom.

Hence, it may be agreed that, both militants and terrorists as terms also converge when the former find that they have no recourse to achieve their goals other than resorting to terrorism. In this regard, *guerilla warfare* and *insurgencies* are often assumed to be synonymous with terrorism. One reason for this is that insurgencies and terrorism often have similar goals. However, if we examine insurgency and guerilla warfare, specific differences emerge. *Firstly*, a key difference is that an insurgency is a movement - a political effort with a specific aim. This sets it apart from both guerilla warfare and terrorism, as they are both methods available to pursue the goals of the political movement. *Secondly*, the intent of the component activities and operations of insurgencies versus terrorism. There is nothing inherent in either insurgency or guerilla warfare that requires the use of terror. While some of the more successful insurgencies and guerilla campaigns employed terrorism and terror tactics, and some developed into conflicts where terror tactics and terrorism became predominant; there have been others that effectively renounced the use of terrorism. The deliberate choice to use terrorism considers its effectiveness in inspiring further resistance, destroying government efficiency, and mobilizing support.

Meanwhile, insurgency has been an area of interest for many political and social scientists. It has been a global phenomenon and has often been characterized in distinction with armed struggle; both being defined separately primarily on the basis of semantics. However, major definitional aspects are broadly agreed upon. Insurgency being a diverse phenomenon is of numerous kinds and classifications, it may be defined as: *A struggle between a non-ruling*

*group and the ruling authorities in which the no ruling group consciously uses political resources (e.g., organizational expertise, propaganda, and demonstrations) and violence to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the basis of legitimacy of one or more aspects of politics.*²⁵

Or

*'An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict... [In other words] an organized protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control'*²⁶

Steven Metz and Raymond Millen define insurgency more precisely as:

.....'A strategy adopted by groups which cannot attain their political objectives through conventional means or by a quick seizure of power. It is used by those too weak to do otherwise. Insurgency is characterized by protracted, asymmetric violence, ambiguity, the use of complex terrain (jungle, mountains and urban areas), psychological warfare, and political mobilization all designed to protect the

²⁵Brad. O. E. Neill, "Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare", Washington DC: Brassey's, (1990), 28.

²⁶Nagl, John A., James F. Amos, Sarah Sewall, and David H. Petraeus. The US Army and Marine Corps, Counterinsurgency Field Manual: U.S. Army Field Manual no. 3-24 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007): 8.

*insurgents and eventually alter the balance of power in their favor.....*²⁷

On practical grounds, insurgency is an 'armed resistance' from within a State, which challenges its control. The insurgents use guerilla and hidden force for achieving their goals. An active insurgent group has an organization that consists of a mobile main force and two paramilitary forces (regional force and local militia) that conduct limited operations to augment the effect of main force. Since the insurgency is based on manipulative motivations, its first goal is to survive. All insurgencies have important commonalities, but each one of them has distinct and peculiar features.

Motivation

Every insurgent movement has a key origination factor that plays the role of driving force making the energy of masses to orient in certain direction. Here various origination factors will be discussed that may act as the purpose of mental as well as psychological motives for an insurgent group to involve in violent and aggressive activities to articulate the origins of certain human aggressions.

First, Insurgencies Based on Ideological Grievances. Ideological basis that lead to insurgent movements are among the most frequent causes of insurgency. Islamic and communist insurgencies are the most prominent types of ideological based insurgencies in the contemporary world. The more divided and mal-communicated a

²⁷Steven Metz and Raymond Millen, "Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the Twenty First Century: Re-Conceptualizing Threat and Response," Carlyle: US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute (2004), 4.

society is, the more chances are there for rebel and insurgent movements to originate.²⁸ So in divided societies, ethnic conflicts and insurgent movements are at the center of politics, and pose an obvious challenge to the cohesion of state and sometimes to peaceful relationships among states. These divides create powerful, affiliations that are often at the root of violence as a result of their perceived deprivations.

Second, Insurgencies Based on Greed. Greed is the main driving force of origination of various insurgent movements.²⁹ For many individuals or groups, a conflict becomes an opportunity to make career in terms of finance and they see conflicts as ways of gaining benefits out of it in form of power, influence and wealth. This greed element is seen also reduce the insurgent movements to mere criminality sometimes like in the case of economically under developed or developing countries where the rich and poor divide is wide, in these countries the ideological or political origins of the insurgent movements are masked by greed of power and wealth.

Third, Insurgencies Based on State Capacity. Governance and state capacity that include measures of government effectiveness, rule of law, corruption, as well as economic development are interrelated with the vulnerability of insurgency. The inability of any government to meet the ever increasing expectations of the masses generates what Ted Robert Gurr refers as

²⁸ Donald L. Horowitz, "Ethnic groups in Conflict", (Berkeley, CA: University of California 1985), 12.

²⁹ Hirshleifer, "The Dark Side of the Fore: Economic foundations of conflict theory", (Cambridge: University Press, Cambridge 2001), 15.

'Relative Deprivation', which serves as an important prerequisite for frustration among population leading to violent expression.³⁰

Objectives

The nature of an insurgent movement is well understood on the basis of its objectives. The objective is in fact a key for determining the future shape and orientation of an insurgent behavior. Similarly, the prominent insurgent movements after the Cold War Era had objectives classified as Revolution, Reformist insurgency, Separatist movements, insurgencies based on resistance and Commercial insurgencies.

First, Revolutionary Insurgencies. These types of insurgent movements are aimed at replacing the existing political order and transforming the political as well as social transformation of the statute. Revolutionary insurgencies are more of spiritual insurgency which is the fruit of the Cold war, driven by the problems of modernization at a rapid pace. The Third World states faced an inability to meet the psychological need of their populations, especially during the rapid development, originating frustration and discontent that was used by the insurgent strategists which is civil wars and insurgent movements took momentum after the Cold war era.

Second, Reformist Insurgencies. The core of this insurgency is dismissal of a regime including its formulated political, economic and social system. The broad term of a 'reform' or 'modernisation' are used to indicate the clear objective of such insurgent motivations

³⁰Robert Ted Gurr, "Why Men Rebel", (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), 121.

where arms are lifted and violence is used for the purpose of bringing about a change or altering the existing policies of an existing government. Insurgents often tend to blame certain Western ideas and practices that were borrowed and defectively applied by the local elites on the society. The insurgent strategists thus use this discontent and provide alternative system which they think serves the purpose of having authenticity and a good adaptability to their nation state's institutional framework.

Third, Separatist Insurgencies. Most states are divided by ethnicity, culture, opportunity, and sometimes power or wealth. The energy for separatist insurgencies springs from a particular deprived segment of the population who feel unbearably excluded from the state's political, economic or social opportunities. They aim at independence or separation for a certain clan or group of people who are the majority inhabitants of a region within a state and feel that they are not being given the right of self-determination and freedom to choose their path.³¹

Lastly, Resistance Insurgencies. This type of insurgencies aim at compelling foreign power (military) to withdraw from an area or region. The dependence of a state government upon presence of a foreign military force within the boundaries can spark great opposition for the population of that state. It often acts as a unifying narrative for insurgent groups who can use this foreign intervention as a tool to launch an armed insurgent movement against the external military powers.

³¹Mackinlay John, "Globalization and Insurgency", London: Routledge, 2013), 68.

Regardless of the causes and motivations that govern the insurgent movements, one objective of insurgency is to mold the perception of public regarding its legitimacy, which is often challenged. In this regard, violence is used as an instrument of persuasion, which eventually serves the purpose of attracting and mobilizing the supporters, threatens the opponents of insurgency and finally isolates them from the state framework. The 'armed propaganda',³² hence uses or threatens to use the military power in order to shape the perception of public and opponents as well as allies about their ideology, situation and influence that their consequent decisions and course of actions are going to be based upon.

Drawing Lines between the Phenomena

The debate above allows us to ascertain that, although, there are places where terrorism, guerilla warfare, and criminal behavior all overlap, groups that are exclusively terrorist, or subordinate "wings" of insurgencies formed to specifically employ terror tactics, demonstrate clear differences in their objectives and operations. Disagreement on the costs of using terror tactics, or whether terror operations are to be given primacy within the insurgency campaign, have frequently led to the "urban guerilla" or terrorist wings of an

³²Metz and Millen gave the concept of 'Armed Propaganda' in their book *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the Twenty First Century: Reconceptualizing Threat and Response* (2004) which facilitates political mobilization as well as establishes the awareness in the public. In strategic terminology it is similar to the concept of international relations that describes the deployment of armed forces called as 'armed suasion'. The term was explained by Thomas Schelling in his famous book *Arms and Influence* (1967). This tactic involves using guerrilla activity along with motivational mobilization to maintain their political momentum for shaping people's perception for an unstoppable, ever growing insurgency

insurgency splintering off to pursue the revolutionary goal by their own methods. The ultimate goal of an insurgency is to challenge the existing government for control of all or a portion of its territory, or force political concessions in sharing political power.

Furthermore, insurgencies require the active or tacit support of some portion of the population involved. External support, recognition or approval from other countries or political entities can be useful to insurgents, but is not required. However, a terror group does not require and rarely has the active support or even the sympathy of a large fraction of the population. While insurgents will frequently describe themselves as "insurgents" or "guerillas", terrorists will not refer to themselves as "terrorists" but describe themselves using military or political terminology ("freedom fighters", "soldiers", "activists").

Terrorism relies on public impact, and is therefore conscious of the advantage of avoiding the negative connotations of the term "terrorists" in identifying themselves. Terrorism does not attempt to challenge government forces directly, but acts to change perceptions as to the effectiveness or legitimacy of the government itself. This is done by ensuring the widest possible knowledge of the acts of terrorist violence among the target audience. Rarely will terrorists attempt to "control" terrain, as it ties them to identifiable locations and reduces their mobility and security. Terrorists as a rule avoid direct confrontations with government forces.

A guerilla force may have something to gain from a clash with a government combat force, such as proving that they can effectively challenge the military effectiveness of the government. A terrorist

group has nothing to gain from such a clash. This is not to say that they do not target military or security forces, but that they will not engage in anything resembling a "fair fight", or even a "fight" at all. Terrorists use methods that neutralize the strengths of conventional forces. Bombings and mortar attacks on civilian targets where military or security personnel spend off-duty time, ambushes of undefended convoys, and assassinations of poorly protected individuals are common tactics.

Insurgency on the other hand, need not require the targeting of non-combatants, although many insurgencies expand the accepted legal definition of combatants to include police and security personnel in addition to the military. Terrorists do not discriminate between combatants and non-combatants, or if they do, they broaden the category of "combatants" so much as to render it meaningless. Defining all members of a nation or ethnic group, plus any citizen of any nation that supports that nation as "combatants" is simply a justification for frightfulness. Deliberate de-humanisation and criminalization of the enemy in the terrorists' mind justifies extreme measures against anyone identified as hostile. Terrorists often expand their groups of acceptable targets, and conduct operations against new targets without any warning or notice of hostilities.

Ultimately, the difference between insurgency and terrorism comes down to the intent of the actor. Insurgency movements and guerilla forces can adhere to international norms regarding the law of war in achieving their goals, but terrorists are by definition conducting crimes under both civil and military legal codes. Terrorists routinely claim that were they to adhere to any "law of

war" or accept any constraints on the scope of their violence, it would place them at a disadvantage vis-a-vis the establishment. Since the nature of the terrorist mindset is absolutist, their goals are of paramount importance, and any limitations on a terrorist's means to prosecute the struggle are unacceptable and this is where violent extremism and militancy play a role in perpetrating the phenomenon in the society.

The Challenge in Pakistan

Picking up threads from the discussion a pertinent question arises regarding the nature of threat in Pakistan. Is it posed with an insurgent challenge from different quarters of the country? Or there is a militant breakout which is sometimes pacified and at other times evolve with violent connotations. On the other hand, can the challenge also be termed as terrorism? This section will argue that, Pakistan is posed with a '*militant cum terrorist*' challenge and has not faced any organized form of insurgency. It is both a militant and terrorist challenge, due to the presence of such individuals who are motivated by deprivations and exploited by various factions to conduct terrorist and violent activities to instill fear in the public. There has been a major campaign by these individuals to physically inflict hurt on civilians, Government properties and even schools and hospitals, not for any political motive, but for weakening the State from within.

According to an interviewee 'this classification of an enemy is crucial in Pakistan, amidst the systematic evolution of wars from their traditional outlook to a more sophisticated 'hybrid' nature.' However, where terrorism follows the model of an insurgency, it is

challenging to define the perpetrators. He further argues that ...'in Pakistan, the challenge has evolved innately without a popular support from the local public. Hence, it poses a loosely knitted terrorist challenge to the State. Theoretically, the entity is supposed to be confined in a specific territory, with its administrative setup overshadowing the operational wing. On the contrary, for Pakistan, this enemy's real power rests in its scheme of operations and transcends territory.'³³ Hence, the challenge in Pakistan is that of a militant nature which when evolves from violent extremism resorts to acts of terrorism.³⁴

This confusing nature of challenge in Pakistan generated international criticism. Particularly, Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), was termed as the 'most dangerous region in the world' by Former US President Bush, in 2008.³⁵ This he referred to in the backdrop of his understanding of the environment for breeding terrorist safe havens, primarily Al-Qaeda in the country. However, a closer consideration of the area reveals another side of the coin. Few years after the US launched its war in Afghanistan in 2001, the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) was formed. This comes in the backdrop of persistent haze in the underlying notion of the War in the international arena as well.³⁶ This group motivated by anti-Americanism started breeding in FATA due

³³ Interview Lt. Gen Rizwan Akhtar H.St, HI(M) (Retd), Former President NDU, Appendix 2, Interview 5.

³⁴ Hassan Abbas, 'Pakistan's Drift into Extremism- Allah, Army and America's War on Terror', Routledge Publishers, New York, 2005

³⁵ Anwar Iqbal, 'Bush calls FATA most dangerous region', 13th April 2008, available at: <https://www.dawn.com/news/297957>.

³⁶ Interview- Maj Gen Fayyaz Hussain Shah CI (B)(DIV)- NDU, Appendix 2, Interview 6.

to its murky political and economic structure. The area is a buffer zone between Pakistan and Afghanistan inhabiting approx. 5.002 Million Pakistani tribesmen.³⁷ Due to its geo-strategic location, it rather became a playground of opportunities for regional and global forces striving to extend their sphere of influence. In any case, it was not expected that the Taliban led militancy in the FATA region would swell up to the level of a full-fledged 'terrorist group'. It was only after the change in tactics adopted by the Taliban in the year 2004 which paved their way towards this transformation.

Consequently, it is argued that due to the major US led war in Afghanistan and later abrupt drawdown in the year 2014, a regional security vacuum was created which had a fallout on Pakistan and particularly FATA. It provided a lucrative opportunity to exploit by anti-state and extremist entities. This was in fact rescheduling of instability, similar to the one after the Soviet retreated from Afghanistan after a battle with the 'Afghan Mujahideen' and other fighters in the year 1979. Eventually, these 'trained' warriors converged into 'war lords'; mainly as they were abandoned and were not able to integrate into the country's mainstream. This also created numerous 'enemies' for the State of Pakistan that posed serious challenge to the well-being of the country. They evolved as a major national security challenge, conducting operations across the country and spreading based on a militant ideology taking roots in FATA. It is worth mentioning that, war mongering was not new to the society in FATA but militancy and violent extremism leading to terrorism was unprecedented. Hence, contrary to popular belief,

³⁷ Official figures by FATA Disaster management authority, available at: <http://www.fdma.gov.pk/federally-administered-tribal-area-fata>

they did not spread based on religious grounds only, but also because of gaps due to governance issues in FATA and other adjacent areas.

An interviewee also comprehends this understanding as he states that, 'it was not the differences based on religious underpinnings, but extreme poverty that fueled gaps in the society allowing the tentacles of terrorism to spread. 'Enemy' was the one that was left astray after the Russo war in 1991. The West had to leave abruptly and leave behind a comity of 'trained' individuals who had the impositions of a regional war. The wave of 'militancy' that evolved into violent extremism and then to terrorism was initially fueled for securing wherewithal. Alongside, the area's political and social status was perplexing. The 'ilaqa-ghair' was a victim of clash of narratives for which we failed to give them a superior narrative. It was fight between the 'Mimbar' and 'Hujra' or in other words a tussle between the haves and have nots. A new battle for power and money broke in the area, with the 'Mullah or have not's being successful in gaining power. They used extreme violence and inflicted terror to establish their writ and the locals cowered down with fear. It was a battle of narratives fought through tools of terrorism.'³⁸

Hence, the main objectives of the Taliban after gaining adherence from the locals of FATA by inflicting terror, was to unite all anti-state factions and launch attacks on Pakistani military forces and the imposition of Shariah (Islamic rule) in some areas, while in the rest of the country they operated by subversive tactics and sabotage. While main training facilities and bases situated in South and North

³⁸ Interview Lt. Gen Khalid Rabbani, HI (M) (Retd), Appendix- 2 Interview 4.

Waziristan Agencies, members were mainly recruited from religious Madrassas in South Punjab, Karachi and other parts of state, with deprivations and grievances as motivating factors.

These Taliban generally carried an anti-West complexion as a re-enactment of resistance in the post-Soviet era. Hence, they emerged as the most significant threat to the state of Pakistan by maintaining a reign of terror in the effected regions. Their 'armed propaganda' operated in such a way that after gaining sufficient amount of control over a region, they would subdue the local people from supporting the government and aid the Taliban in implanting their propaganda. Those who did not agree to follow them were threatened with death as in the case of execution of many tribal leaders who opposed their ideas and were a hurdle in the strengthening of their rule. The people suspected to be spies were executed publically several times. Many criminal gangs and other commercial terrorist groups were also attached with them in order to pursue their own interests in the umbrella of the Taliban. These splinter groups and criminal gangs employed looting, kidnapping, smuggling and arms dealing in order to generate profits for their own selves while fueling their movement in the long run.

Hence, there was no popular support extended by the masses to Taliban. In this regard, the locals who did not have a clear consensus, and were motivated either by socio-economic pressures, half-baked knowledge of Islam, and also lack of education and awareness perceived them as righteous. On the other hand, the elite and educated population having sound knowledge and exposure regarded the ideas of Taliban as a spillover effect from the Afghan

Taliban and regarded it as alien for Pakistan's system of governance and socio-political structure.

While the Taliban carried on their aggressive and coercive acts for destruction of society, they also in some areas manipulated the religious sentiments by declaring to have a noble agenda of establishing Shariah (Islamic rule) in the country. People, who were deprived of social justice and economic incentives groaning under the heavy weight of poverty and insecurity, tend to overlook these acts of the so called Jihadist. The government in Pakistan first adopted measures like bar of support from tribal's to Afghan Taliban and convening tribal jirgas, 'Amanlashkars' and sanctions. However, when these measures did not serve the purpose, due to the close religious and cultural proximity, an armed attack in the form of military operations were also conducted. Military operation did not yield effective results till then. Jirgas, economic sanctions, lashkars, payment of money, registration, use of force and even peace agreements failed to cope up with the increasing militant surge in the FATA region, and ultimately Pakistani Taliban, emerged as one of the most significant '*militancy cum terrorism*' challenge to the Government of Pakistan and kinetic measures were resorted to in order to deal with them.

The Response

Since Pakistan's status as a front line State in the Global War on Terror, there have been quite a few large scale military operations in the FATA. Though all the military operations were designed and targeted towards the local and foreign terrorists, particularly Al-Qaeda, Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and few other foreign

militant groups, but still they all carry certain differences and significance along with similarities. Starting from Al-Mizan (2001), these operations were focused on initially sealing the Western borders and conducting Intelligence Based Operations (IBO), for capturing and killing miscreants. On the other hand, non-kinetic measures like inclusion of a National Action Plan in year 2014 for major reforms in the country were opted. Hence, the response of the State of Pakistan was both kinetic and non-kinetic which was

The list of major military operations conducted by armed forces against terrorists include:

Ser.	Military Operation	Target Area
1.	Operation Al-Mizan	2001 to date
2.	Operation Rah e Haq	2007 (Swat Valley)
3.	Operation Zalzal	2008 (South Waziristan)
4.	Operation Black Thunderstorm	2009 (retaking Buner, Lower Dir, Swat and Shangla districts)
5.	Operation Raah-e-Raast	2009 (2 nd Swat war)
6.	Operation Sher Dil	2010 (Bajour Agency)
7.	Operation Rah-e-Nijat	2009-2010 (South Waziristan)
8.	Operation Koh-e-Safaid	2011(Kurrum Agency)
9.	Operation Zarb-e-Azb	2014-2016 (North Waziristan-country-wide)
10.	Operation Rad-ul-Fasaad	2017-onwards (Country-wide)

The first major operation by Pakistan military against the terrorist groups operating in Pakistan was Operation Al-Mizan. The

force deployed in FATA was around 70,000-80,000.³⁹ The force deployed in the operation was huge, given the fact that it was Pakistan's first major operation inside the country. This also incurred a heavy loss of 1,200 and 1,500 soldiers. This huge loss was mainly due to the lack of information about enemy methodology, their hideouts and limited information about the terrain. Full convoys became the target of the Taliban militants at the initial stages and military had to suffer a lot of casualties. Besides, regular infantry, Special Forces units of the Pakistan army, the elite SSG, were also directly engaged in fighting the militants. Operation Al-Mizan comprised of several smaller operations, such as Operation Kalosha II, which took place in South Waziristan. Lack of public and national support at that time also created hurdles for the smooth progress.

Consequently, Swat, Mangora, Buner, Shangla and lower Dir remained under heavy influence of Taliban and Operation Black Thunderstorm was started in April 2009 and continued to June 2009. This operation also caused a refugee crisis but it was managed afterwards. Operation Sher Dil which started in August 2008 and continued till February 2009 in Bajaur Agency also caused a huge displacement of the local and tribal people who flee the area and seek refuge in makeshift camps in other cities. Among all the major operations, operation Rah-e-Rast was the most successful operation against militants and terrorists in the sense that it effectively

³⁹ Zahid Ali Khan, "Military operations in FATA and PATA: implications for Pakistan," Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad (ISSI), (accessed on May 24, 2017), http://www.issi.org.pk/publication-files/1339999992_58398784.pdf

removed them from Swat, ensuring the return of displaced people back to their homes. In all these operations aerial support came first followed by the advancement of ground troops. This helped the ground forces to move in the area with force and effectiveness. Locals were evacuated from the area and then Army bombed Taliban positions using heavy artillery, jets and helicopters. After softening their positions, the military moved in with ground forces.

Operation Koh-e-Safaid was conducted in Kurram Agency with only 4,000 troops, supported by heavy artillery, armor units and air power, participated. The operation commenced with infantry battalions from the Sindh Regiment (SR) and the Northern Light Infantry (NLI), a specialized mountain warfare unit. Though, it also displaced around 100,000 residents of the agency, nearly one-fourth of the agency's population.

Zarb-e-Azb was delayed due to the peace talks between Pakistani government and the militants. A continuous failure of dialogue between the two parties resulted in a deadlock situation and a faction of militant groups resumed terrorist activities in the country. Meanwhile the militants attacked the Jinnah International Airport in Karachi and it impacted the security situation all over the country. This attack seemingly cancelled all sorts of dialogue and through a mutual consensus and approval by the government, support by the opposition and civil society an operation against the militants and their sanctuaries in North Waziristan Agency was initiated

According to ISPR, on 15 June 2014, armed forces of Pakistan launched a comprehensive operation "Zarb-e-Azb" against foreign and local terrorists and their sanctuaries in North Waziristan

Agency. The targeted groups included Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Al-Qaeda, the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and the Haqqani network. As one of the major operations so far, nearly 30,000 troops participated in this operation with the help of air force, artillery and tanks. Besides normal infantry troops, the Special Services Group (SSG) commandos were also taking part in this operation.

The pre-eminent aspect of this operation until now is the targeting of the militants without any discrimination. It was asserted that no terrorist on the Pakistani soil will be spared in this military operation. With the truth of this assertion, this measure has been viewed as a huge paradigm shift in the policy pursued by the security establishment. So the assumption that this operation was selective has been dispelled by Pakistan Army. Unlike previous operations, this operation has seen less number of casualties on part of military forces, as PAF fighter jets were involved at the initial stage and the ground forces entered the area later. So the assistance by the aerial force provided great help to the ground forces for their clearing operation afterward. Ground troops were moved nearly after two weeks of air strikes and artillery bombardment against militant hideouts followed by evacuation of all civil population. Immense support of local tribes and elders was also a key factor of this operation.

The methodology of Operation Zarb-e-Azb was also bit similar to the Operation Black Thunderstorm, Operation Raah-e-Raast and Operation Sher Dil. Since both Operation Zarb-e-Azb and Operation Rah-e-Nijat that started in June 2009, nearly 30,000 troops

participated, the former one was conducted in North Waziristan and the later one was conducted in South Waziristan. The main aim of the Operation Rah-e-Nijat was to capture the ground lost to Taliban and the military was quite successful in this mission. This operation like Zarb-e-Azb caused huge damage to the Taliban fighters, though many fled to the bordering area in Afghanistan.

Up till now the total number of martyred army personnel operation Zarb-e-Azb is 593, which is far below than the previous operations conducted by Pakistan Army. One can undeniably assert that due to the consistent training and preparation from past operations, increase in the sophisticated weaponry and aerial support from PAF has actually increased the effectiveness of the operations and reduced the loss of lives of the military personnel. In this operation, there was also huge displacement of local people from Waziristan. Nearly four million people fled North Waziristan before the ground troops started combat mission. Almost the same situation happened during Operation Zalzal, which was launched in South Waziristan Agency in January 2008 against Baitullah Mehsud and his supporters. Roughly 200,000 locals were displaced by the Operation Zalzal, though it cleared most of the parts of SWA and security forces destroyed over 40,000 houses. The impact of Operation Zalzal was quite similar to the impact of Operation Zarb-e-Azb. Also in Operation Raah-e-Raast which started in May 2009 and continued till July 2009, there was a huge displacement of locals from Swat that were later sheltered in camps and moved to other cities.

Operation Zarb-e-Azb followed the footsteps of Operation Rah-e-Rast in defeating and eliminating terrorists from North Waziristan, bringing an end to a decade old war and facilitating the displaced people back to their homes. As Former Director General ISPR-Lt. Gen Asim Bajwa, Tbt HI (M), stated that “Operation Zarb-e-Azb is the biggest and most well-coordinated operation ever conducted against terrorists” and it is a ‘war of survival’, so this operation hold the most significance among all the operations conducted so far”.

Hence, drawing a comparison between the methods employed in the conduct of various operations provides ample room for learning. Besides being trained as a force for conventional warfare, presently Pakistan military forces have become well equipped and trained to fight unconventional warfare very effectively. The ground forces are well acquainted with the terrain, and local tribal population. The last decade, though witnessed a huge loss of civilians and military personnel, but was the hardest and most effective training Pakistan army would ever undergo. There is a visible use of aerial support in recent operations as compared to the earlier ones. Besides, more sophisticated and precise weapons have been used by Pakistan military in the recent combat missions. The table below illustrates a considerable reduction in casualties and injuries after the successes achieved in the kinetic operations.

CASUALTY DATA				
YR	Military		Civilian	
	Shaheed	Injured	Shaheed	Injured
2015	269	1199	17586 (since 2001)	33709 (since 2001)
2016	145	699		
2017 ⁴⁰	179	718		

⁴⁰ The figures are inclusive of casualties and injuries after IBO's conducted in adjoining areas of FATA under Ops Rad-ul- Fasaad

It is worth mentioning that, in conducting such operations, an army may always be short of troops, but strategy is important than capacity. This was the punchline followed by Pakistan armed forces in conducting the operations. They were conducted sequentially with the help of public support. Hence, it can be said that it has achieved what no other army was able to achieve in the past (this includes US-NATO over 100,000 troops in Afghanistan). However, Pakistan has also paid a heavy price, it lost more than 60,000 lives of civilians (over 5000 soldiers), \$120 billion economic losses were incurred, and damage to social fabric and even reputation, alongside it also hosted over 2.5 million Afghan refugees. *Hassan Abbas* in his book, *Allah, the Army and America's War on Terror* refers to these three A's as the main characters in Pakistan's current situation. It is in fact worth mentioning that there is the fourth 'A'-Afghanistan. The instability in Afghanistan, has a direct impact on Pakistan and hence peace and stability there will also be beneficial. It supports an Afghan led and an Afghan owned peace process.

National Action Plan

Alongside, the military operations, Pakistan instituted the twenty-point National Action Plan (NAP) on Dec. 24, 2014, as a comprehensive, consolidated list of steps needed to be taken by the state and law enforcement institutions to curb terrorism and extremism in the country. For Pakistan to finally take this step, it took a horrendous attack on school children at the Army Public School in Peshawar that left 141 dead, including 132 children. The *first* of the 20 points in the NAP was the lifting of the moratorium on the death penalty in Pakistan, which had been in effect since 2009.

As of today, a total of 176 people have been executed in Pakistan since this decision, putting Pakistan on course to match the country with the most number of executions, Iran, which had 289 executions in 2014. (Experts believe thousands are executed in China every year, but since executions are considered a state-secret, no reliable data is available.) For comparison, the United States, which voted against the United Nations' resolution for a global moratorium on death penalty, executed 17 people within the first six months of 2015.

Second, the military courts were formed within two weeks of the NAP going into effect. On Jan. 5, 2015, the 21st Constitutional Amendment and the Army Act Amendment were unanimously passed, providing the legal and constitutional cover for military courts to prosecute civilians. There are roughly 11 military courts that have been set up across Pakistan; three in KP, three in Punjab, two in Sindh and one in Balochistan. The intention was to provide speedy prosecution for “jet black” terror suspects those who have committed violent crimes. Since February 2015, a total of 274 individuals have been convicted in military courts. So far, the army has sentenced 161 individuals to death, 12 of whom have been executed and 113 have been given jail terms (mostly life sentences).⁴¹

⁴¹ This Data is till the year 2017, provided by Dawn news, available at: <https://www.dawn.com/news/1306792>. Updated Mar 06, 2017 05:52pm

Third, several points in the NAP deal with banned outfits, their operations, communication networks, and funding sources. One concrete step the government took was to try and register all mobile phone SIM cards in circulation and tally them against the user's National Identity Card number, thereby digitally tracking SIM usage. As of March 10, 2015, 57,335,550 SIM cards were registered.

The NAP also contains other counterterrorism steps including strengthening the National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA), establishing a dedicated counterterrorism force, as well as generic goals for eliminating terrorism like Operation Zarb-e-Azb in North Waziristan, though it was launched on June 15, 2014. A year later, the then Inter-Services Public Relations Director General Major General Asim Bajwa, shared some impressive numbers. In one year since the start of the operation, 2,763 terrorists had been killed, 837 hideouts destroyed, and 253 tons of explosive recovered. He also shared that 347 military officials and soldiers had died.

A report presented to Prime Minister on March 10, 2015 stated that 303 actionable calls were received on the terror hotline and 2,237 intelligence-based operations were conducted across the country. Law enforcement agencies arrested 25,896 people across Pakistan on various charges, while security agencies conducted 24,844 "combing" operations across the country. The military hails this as a resounding success, and media coverage has been overwhelmingly positive. It must also be said that the intensity and momentum of terror attacks has subsided significantly, though by no means has it been eliminated.

Some of militants' biggest attacks since Operation Zarb-e-Azb include a failed attempt by 10 attackers on two airbases in Quetta, another foiled attempt to hijack a naval ship in Karachi, a suicide bombing at Wagah border closing ceremony that claimed 60 lives, attacks on churches and Shia imambargahs in Lahore, and bombings and attacks in Peshawar, Karachi, Rawalpindi, and Shikarpur. While this may seem like a lot, a 2014 U.S. State Department report puts Pakistan at the top of the list of countries that observed a decrease in terror attacks, and acknowledge the military operation as a major factor in that drop.

The NAP also covers against spreading hatred, sectarianism, and intolerance. In Pakistan, the loudspeaker is used at mosques to deliver sermons. Some laws exist to limit the use of the loudspeaker, such as the Punjab Sound System (Regulation) Ordinance 2015, which allows only one speaker for Azan and restricts Arabic sermons to Friday. For violating the loudspeaker law, the police have arrested a total of 3,906 people, including 2,874 in Punjab, 169 in Sindh, 322 in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, three in Baluchistan, and 90 in the federal capital. In a landmark decision, an Anti-Terrorism Court sentenced a prayer leader in the city of Kasur to five years in prison for delivering a hate speech at a public gathering.

The NAP also attempted to address local conflicts in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Karachi, and Baluchistan. The FATA conflict was being addressed partially by driving out the militants under Operation Zarb-e-Azb. Sections of the NAP also call for a stop to the glorification of the jihadist elements, and promises strict action against media that promotes sectarianism,

hatred, or incites violence. Action against hate literature, especially is a daunting task, as there was requirement of mechanism to monitor or control its dissemination. As an example, the government imposed a ban on 22 magazines after the 9/11 attacks.

The NAP also calls for a comprehensive policy for registering Afghan refugees and rehabilitating the Pakistani population displaced due to internal conflicts or military operations (#12, #19). According to the report presented to former PM Nawaz Sharif on March 10 2015, around 6,408 Afghan refugees were deported, whereas 328,034 were registered. The military also planned to repatriate the displaced population in the operational theaters by December 2016, though that was subject to the security situation.

The last point in the NAP list pertains to reforming and drastically improving the criminal justice system in Pakistan. Reforming the Code of Criminal Procedure, experts believe, is one of the most crucial steps needed to improve the law and order situation in the country. To date, little-to-no progress has been made on this front. Like several other points in the NAP, the political will seems to be there, but the operational mechanisms remain elusive.

Pakistan's Challenges and Threats: A Regional Context

Pakistan as a key player in the South-Asian arena has faced the brunt of this militancy since quite a while now. As a country, it has been a victim of vested interests of major powers and consistent rivalry with India. As extremism acquired newer dimensions in a post-9/11 world, wars got painted in the colors of ideology and radicalization. The trend of this 'ideological warfare' spread across the region from Lebanon to Pakistan. In this backdrop, there is a

need to carry out an analysis of the linkages of this raging conflict and wave of militancy across the Broader Middle Eastern region. Popularly, the impetus is rested on the notion that, Islam and its bifurcations are the root causes for such uprisings. The 'Wahhabi' Middle Eastern setting is fighting against the 'Shias', splitting the region into two halves where both the groups follow a certain ideology for the dominance of one self. How true this perception is only time would tell however, what is pertinent to analyze at this point of history are the motives and root causes behind such a trans-regional militant uprising and delve to find ways to curtail it.

According to Maj Gen Noel Khokhar, HI (M)(Retd), 'as the region has not been able to let go of the 'baggage of history', in terms of hot beds of conflict like Kashmir, Afghanistan and Iraq, so has Pakistan's approach to deal with subsequent challenges like militancy and terrorism remained analogous'. Picking up threads from here, it is pertinent to first understand the rationale of the regional instability to be termed as militancy. From a lay man's perspective it may be considered as organised crimes of terrorism motivated through extremist ideologies. On the other hand a theoretical insight may further establish the phenomenon as an armed Islamist insurgency, popping out from the entire Muslim Middle Eastern region. The fact remains that, this instability remains devoid of a tangible and acceptable characterisation in theoretical terms. Where 'one man's terrorist' is another man's freedom fighter', there is no universally accepted definition of terrorism up till now. Civil wars take the form of armed insurgencies and revolt against a government that is less than an organised revolution and that is not recognised as belligerency. While on the other hand, any act of violence to inflict

terror in the minds of local population, armed and unarmed both, is generally termed as terrorism. Militancy, is a phenomenon which depicts extreme determination like terrorism, however a militant may not always use violence to achieve his goal. Hence, militancy can spread through verbal violence and extremist ideologies either based on religion, caste or creed.

Nonetheless, militancy in the broader Middle Eastern region has shifted from individual insurgent movements to goal based 'terrorism' surpassing borders, both physical and ideological, pushed through a radical militant ideology. It is one of its kind of an ideological warfare, which finds its motivation mostly in inflicting the supremacy of Islam. Its genesis is traced back to the formation of Israel through the Balfour declaration of 1917, which initiated a vicious cycle of violence between the Arabs and Israel. On the other hand, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, and the formation of 'Muslim Guerrilla fighters' in the name of Jihad are considered as watershed events in the name of Islamic militancy in the region. These events will be discussed in detail in the latter part of the paper, however, what is needed to be stressed at this point is that, the ramifications of political subjugation through the colonial powers, is heavily laid upon the radicalization of individuals. Religion was used in politics in order to spread a revolutionary agenda amongst the masses against corruption, nepotism and injustice.

This concept of revolution based on deen, was further catalysed through anti-Americanism and foreign intervention in the region. Nonetheless, the wave of instability through militancy got trans-

regional in no time. Today, it is actually posing threats to the sovereignty of not only at the regional level but also at the global one. In this regard, it is pertinent to analyze the trans-regional militant linkage amongst the Middle East and South Asia. This comes in the backdrop of a shared sense of burden of history and ramifications of foreign intervention. For this purpose, linkage between the scenarios of Pakistan and Middle East is taken as a case study.

What does this mean for the region and Pakistan in particular? And also that, why are such factions still prevalent despite numerous steps taken by the respective countries and international community to eradicate them once and for all? There might be numerous answers to the issues raised; however the major hypothesis leads to the premise that this trans-regional threat is based on shared experiences of the entire countries. Furthermore, the events following the Cold War precipitated the region's steadfast rise of politico-religious extremism and terrorism. Other events include the revolution in Iran, Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the 9/11 twin tower attacks, which brought the region under a flux. Ironically, Pakistan and the Middle Eastern arena have a similar historic experience as far as impressions from the colonial era, persistent hot-beds of conflict and emergence of a radical Islamist ideology is concerned.

Instability in the region is a legacy of the colonial era and Islamic ideology converting into radicalism is a recipe of foreign interventions. After the faulty demarcations of borders in the Middle East and latter independence of Pakistan, turbulence has been on the

rise. Inter-state rivalries between major countries like Saudi Arabia and Iran, were painted the color of sectarian and religious conflicts. On the other hand, Pakistan's traditional rivalry with India and a turbulent neighbor- Afghanistan, further effected the fragile country ever since its inception. Simultaneously, evolution of ideology towards a radical one, is contingent upon persistent hot-beds of conflict like Kashmir and Palestine in the region which fueled a sense of motivation for practically safeguarding the rights of Muslims amongst militant factions. Al-Qaeda is one such organisation which places its motivation on fighting against the West.

On the other hand US led wars in Iraq and Afghanistan acted as catalysts of a trans-regional militant wave. In fact, the threads of civil wars in Iraq, Syria, Libya and Yemen, bringing forth various militant groups, the most recent being the Daish-Islamic State in Iraq, all go back to the reaction against foreign intervention in the region. A new class of ideologically motivated radical militants spread across the entire region, not necessarily physically but through ideological motivation. Some found it in religion, others in 'anti-Americanism' while the rest in only money. In this regard, the next section will highlight the role of watershed events in trans-regional militancy in detail.

Watershed Events

As discussed earlier, the broader Middle Eastern region possesses immense strategic interests of the Western countries especially the US. It has been a 'battle ground of opportunities' amidst the instability swelling outside borders. In addition, the unvarying conflicts have also attracted many foreign terrorists with

diverse militant agenda's either based on ideology, greed or thirst for adventure. Today, there is a struggle amongst the regional countries and the rest of the world to eradicate this menace once and for all. Although a narrow prism of the 9/11 twin tower attacks and subsequent counter-terror campaign is used to view the wave of trans-regional militancy, however, it can be used as a benchmark for furthering the instability in light of the subsequent events. Out of which the American led wars in Iraq and in Afghanistan are crucial for the subject.

American Led War in Iraq

The American led war in Iraq ranging from the years 2003 to 2011, is a classic example of foreign intervention causing a recipe of furthering instability. Fought in two phases, the war launched in 2003 defeated the military and paramilitary forces in Iraq. Following which, an 'insurgent' movement posed opposition to the American occupation of the country, which is often characterised as the birth year of Al-Qaeda in Iraq.

Ever since, various militant factions have emerged from the region, in the name of 'Anti-Americanism' or a radical Islamist awakening. Simultaneously, the regional grievances based on sectarian differences have also been exploited by local actors in the name of Islamic ideology one likes to follow. As an antidote to Iranian proxies in Syria, a much larger and graver militant faction the ISIS emerged on the regional radar screen. It even announced Caliphate for the entire Muslim countries in the region and sought adherence to their ideology from other regional militant factions. US launched a yet another operation against the ISIS this time with no

boots on the ground and just through air strikes. However, the fact remains that even if the international community manages to curtail the ISIS, possibilities of some other militant faction following the same ideology may emerge against the foreign oppressions and sectarian rifts.

American Led War in Afghanistan

Triggered from the Al-Qaeda led twin tower attacks, the American War in Afghanistan in the year 2001, was primarily a self defence initiative. However, today after the drawdowns, the US foreign policy is still overwhelmed with the future of Afghanistan. This comes in the backdrop of the instability in the Middle East which creates ripples in the Afghan arena as well. Taliban still remain a threat to the peace and stability of the region while they follow the policy of no tangible negotiations with foreign forces on ground. Threats emanating from the situation may not be this simplistic and involves numerous factors. However, one of the critical remains regarding the linkage between the militant linkage between the Middle East and Afghanistan.

There are two opinions in the realm of contemporary strategic environment regarding the trans-regional militant linkage across these regions. One believes that Al-Qaeda or even the ISIS is not likely to revert back to Afghanistan, given the current circumstances when there is a unity government and Taliban presence with immense potency. Second, asserts on the fact that, no matter how grave the situation is, given the strategic importance of Afghanistan for Al-Qaeda it would not like to lose ground in this arena.

Nonetheless, no matter what presumption one follows, it remains a fact that, Al-Qaeda and now ISIS in the Middle East view the Afghan arena as a playground for furthering its militant goals. It is contingent upon numerous factors, including Afghanistan's geo-strategic location, neighboring Iran, Central Asia, China and Pakistan along with being a hub of militant activities and instability following the US led war. Today, despite of such a hefty war, Afghanistan is still heavily under the control of the Taliban. Ghazni, Musa Qila, Sangin and Helmand are some districts which slipped out of the control of the Government quite swiftly. Taliban spokesperson also welcomed the gains of ISIS in Iraq and Syria and even promised to send fighters in order to support their cause. Groups like the Jais-ul-Adal have already started to imitate the ISIS type militant tactics on the Iranian border posts. Hence, posing a trans-regional linkage and threat of a higher magnitude. The trans-regional militant linkage hence surpasses any physical boundaries and indeed emerges as one of its kind of an ideological threat.

Setting this aside the biggest regional concern also remains of the stability of not only Afghanistan but also of its neighboring Pakistan. State failure in Pakistan brokered by the Taliban could mean regional chaos. Preventing such a catastrophe is clearly a vital national interest of the United States and cannot be accomplished with a few drones.

Conclusions

According to Lt Gen Rizwan Akhtar H.St HI (M) (Retd) 'Identifying threats and challenges has indeed been crucial for Pakistan, particularly in the backdrop of the regional turmoil.



Initially there was confusion about who is the enemy in Pakistan, when Taliban Regime in Afghanistan was dismantled. Some of the sympathizers and old time Jihadi friends of Afghan Taliban stood in their support. They created TTP. These supporters gave a 'Fatwa' that Pakistan is siding with infidels; therefore, Jihad against Pakistan is legitimate. When TTP stood against its own state that made it look like akin to a situation whereby "Muslims are fighting against Muslims". But this stage was over quite quickly. Today Pakistan, its armed forces and people are very clear. Those who are fighting against Pakistan by way of violence are our enemy; this may be TTP and their affiliates, Baloch sub-nationalists and extremists.

Lt. Gen Naseer Khan Janjua HI (M) (Retd)
National Security Advisor



However, in order to craft a response the country had to prioritise between these threats. In this regard, where kinetic and non-kinetic measures form part of the larger counterterrorism campaign, consequently, there is a need to uproot violent extremism as a subset of terrorism in the country. Regional fissures can only prevail once internal fault lines are accentuated by them. Hence, the root cause of terrorism needs to be identified, prioritized and dealt with accordingly...'

A counter terror strategy is thus a response to dismantle the network's capability of performing these acts. Problem arises when sometimes these acts are undertaken by individuals in isolation of an

allegiance to an organisation or outfit. Extremism and fundamentalism have thus taken much the space of the debate for deliberating on these issues. Hence, Pakistan's counter terrorism approach has been directed towards a quick response through kinetic and non-kinetic options in large pockets of areas including Swat, South Waziristan Agency and now North Waziristan Agency. Alongside an initiative of across the board attempts through the National Action Plan and judicial and police reforms took center stage after incidents like the APS attack in 2014. Meanwhile, the irony of the 'do more' syndrome of the West imposes a sense of distrust, declaring the tribal region of Pakistan as an epicenter of global terrorism. However, the threat remains. It evolves and presents itself in newer forms with a newer resolve.

In the backdrop of threats emanating from militancy and extremism, Pakistan finds itself as one of the biggest stakeholder. After the twin tower attacks and the US led trans-regional counter-terrorism campaign, Pakistan was stuck between its internal compulsions and the role it can play at the regional level. However, the gravity of the situation within in the form of Taliban and 'ghosts' of sectarianism and religious extremism evolved after the Soviet war in Afghanistan demanded a resolve to defeat this menace with an iron hand. The war was hence not of any individual country, but of the region as a whole. However, unfortunately, in the process Pakistan became a victim of militancy and extremism itself. In this regard, Pakistan's national security considerations emanate both from internal and external fronts.

Internally, Pakistan's major challenge is rooted in eradicating home grown militant factions, including the Taliban along with restricting any foreign militant presence may it even be ideological. Other concerns relate to revitalising the ailing economy, dealing with the energy crisis, promoting avenues of better education and generating jobs for the youth in order to restrict chances of a demographic disaster. Unfortunately, Pakistan has put security on top of its national agenda due to the cruelty of geography, along with a capricious neighborhood and main fault lines of geopolitics, and the burden of history. Currently, Pakistan faces numerous conventional, traditional and non-traditional challenges. Externally, Pakistan's challenges are overwhelmed with its relations with India and Afghanistan. They have caused consistent security impasses for Pakistan. That is why Pakistan has, over the years, tried to avoid being confronted by a two-front situation. Continuing tensions on the Line of Control and firing across the Working Boundary when the Pakistan Army is engaged on the western front and fighting militancy within its frontiers is but the latest manifestation of this security dilemma.

On the other hand, in the global trend of competition rather than cooperation, Pakistan finds itself in the middle of an unstable trans-regional environment. There is an aura of fading 'uni-polarity' and emergence of new power structures, which is enhancing uneasiness in the major powers. These tensions have in fact sharpened the premise of global instability. In this regard, three-tier strategic developments at the global level have direct implications for Pakistan's national security.

First, the trans-regional chaos in the Middle East having a burden of history from the fragmentation of borders in the post-World War order in the Arab realm; The danger posed by ISIS militants and their threat to seek allies and recruits in our region is one that Pakistan's security planners take very seriously, even as the military offensive in North Waziristan and actions elsewhere in the country continue to shrink the space for terrorist groups. Second, a new world order and Great Game in the region due to the rise of China and the US Asia Pivot policy, America's 'pivot' is also consequential to Pakistan's security challenges. The pivot is widely seen here, as elsewhere in Asia, as aimed to contain China's rise, even as America simultaneously pursues economic engagement with Beijing. If this policy involves an endeavor to build India as a counterweight to China, this will have implications for South Asian stability. US plans to supply India advanced weaponry and technology will accentuate the growing conventional and strategic asymmetry between Pakistan and India and further undermine the delicate regional equilibrium.

Third, enhanced anxiety amongst a Russia which is resurging and the West, which is also being considered as a new cold war. Renewed tensions in Europe have already produced a closer relationship between Russia and China. Moscow is likely to adopt a more balanced posture in South Asia, opening the prospects of cooperation with Pakistan on a range of issues including Afghanistan, counterterrorism as well as defence and security. This is already being reflected in greater diplomatic engagement between the two countries. The Russian defence minister's recent visit to

Pakistan indicates this as well as military and economic agreements forged by the two countries.

In this realm of conventional and non-conventional challenges the Pakistani forces are simultaneously operating in two arenas both external and internal security. This engagement at two fronts has reflected in the evolution of the doctrine of 'comprehensive response'. Its operationalisation will however continue to pose tough choices and a constant review of strategy in response to a changing threat environment.

Nonetheless, currently, the major security requisite for Pakistan remains to counter militancy and extremism, both home bred and the ones have foreign linkages. Kinetic operations in the FATA region, first in South Waziristan and Swat and now operation Zarb-e-Azb in North Waziristan, have successfully disrupted the lines of militants and restored the writ of the State. However, the major threat emanating from sectarian and ideological extremism still hovers over the fault lines. In this regard, Pakistan's relations with its neighbor Afghanistan are fundamental in its resolve for a war against such militancy.

Considerations with the Afghan Arena

It is pertinent to emphasize at this point that, the success of Kinetic operations being conducted in the FATA region by Pakistan army heavily depends upon cooperation and coordination with Afghanistan. Elements like the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan and Levant's have indeed sought sanctuaries across the porous Western border.

On the other hand, the geographical, historical, demographic and cultural linkages between Afghanistan and Pakistan have proved to be factors which made Pakistan face the brunt of instability in Afghanistan since a very long time. Pakistan also hosts the largest number of Afghan refugees and is ready to help Afghanistan in reaching a state of peace and stability without acting as an intruder in Afghan affairs.

In this regard, the 'national unity' government in Afghanistan has indeed revived the possibility of improving Pak-Afghan relations. Pakistan is keen to assist in Afghanistan's crucial post-drawdown security, economic and political transitions. Similarly, President Ashraf Ghani's visit to Pakistan is a good step towards easing off the political atmosphere and enhancing cooperation in various areas, including intelligence sharing.

However, in order to reach fruition with regards to the security dialogue between the two countries, the next step should be of speedy implementation. This involves the resolve to restrict any elements to use each other's territory against the other. Furthermore, operations against militants on either side should be devoid of distinction. On the other hand, Pakistan's major national security concern is also related to Indian involvement in Afghanistan. The Pakistan-India relations are mired by suspicion and hostility, which makes Pakistan's eastern border very sensitive. India's presence on the Western side is posing major security threats for Pakistan.

Keeping up with the discussion above, it is pertinent to ask at this point that, is there a way forward for the quagmire of the

Broader Middle Eastern region? The shared burden of history, consistent conflicts and foreign interventions has indeed contributed towards pushing the region into instability. Today, the situation has gone far worse and the trans-regional militant linkages have entirely changed the strategic and security dynamics of the region. Issues are multi-faceted and any foreign intervention would again act as a catalyst for furthering the instability like one view in the form of American led Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

However, as a starting point going from individual to regional initiatives could offer a step in the right direction. Kinetic and non-kinetic options have been used by States in order to materialize this approach. However, the threats still continue to flourish. Hence, the basic ideas of the coordination amongst the militants need to be revisited in order to reap the fruits of the counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency campaigns. Ideologies ranging from religious, sectarian to anti-Americanism remain the biggest connector amongst the militants. In this regard, in the Muslim world as a whole, including Pakistan, a counter-narrative that takes into consideration these ideological factors as ingrained in the societal growth should be built upon. This should be in consonance of mutuality of interests of the entire regional States without having a hidden strategic motive of their own. As John Nash a leading mathematician also stated in his famous game theory that, "each player is assumed to know the equilibrium strategies of the other players, and no player has anything to gain by changing only their own strategy". Hence, to offer a win-win situation, every State at the regional level, should offer a similar strategy for achieving a similar goal through coordinated efforts. While the goal remains of eradicating the

menace of this ideological warfare once and for all, efforts for shedding off factors from the past should be a part of the wholesome package.

Nonetheless, Pakistan has been far successful than ever in its attempts of pacifying the threats emanating from terrorism. Numerous efforts that project these successes are also well received by the local and international audience. Still, the dilemma of how much more Pakistan should invest in this war remains rampant. Pakistan needs to be upfront about how much we have invested and in the process lost amidst our efforts of fighting an enemy which transcends borders. There is a need to project our economic, social, political and legal efforts in milieu of the projections of successes achieved by military operations. In the international arena there is a need to project the clarity in our understanding of our domestic and regional environment, along with our insight of dealing with the situation at operational and tactical levels. We need to project to a larger audience, that the war is being fought within our borders but not for erecting new ones. We are cognizant of hearts and minds of our people, and for that matter, we have already been successful in winning them.

THEME 2

Military in a Conflict Prone Environment: *Stabilisation and Peace Building Efforts*

- An Illustration of 'Clear, Hold, Build and Transfer Stages of a Stabilisation Campaign.
- Stabilisation Efforts of the UK Military in Conflict
- An Account of Pakistan Army's Stabilisation Efforts

***CLEAR, HOLD, BUILD AND
TRANSFER STAGES OF A
STABILISATION
CAMPAIGN***

Abstract

Counter-terrorism (CT) and Counter insurgency (COIN) follow an uneven track of strategy formulation and implementation. This also raises the specter of irregularity in the future of a military in a conflict prone environment, once kinetic objectives are materialised and stabilisation is the mainstay. A popular approach, particularly for the former US President Obama in Afghanistan remained the Clear-Hold-Build-Transfer stages of these campaigns. It prevailed in the psyche of US and ISAF forces owing to its 'uncontestable' sequencing of operations and the attendant promise of a linear path towards peace. Hence, it remained a dominant approach in CT and COIN operations, followed by implementation in stabilisation phase. However, it may be argued that, despite its popularity, the approach remains contestable, as far as its nature as a strategy is concerned. It should not be considered as a tangible strategy towards peace building, as it lacks tactical maneuvering. It may establish hopes that may not be fulfilled in the end and puts on an army, an unprecedented burden of bringing swift progress. This part of the study highlights the stages adopted by an army, particularly as proposed by the theory, while adopting this approach in a conflict-prone environment.

Introduction

The principles of Clear-Hold-Build and Transfer, point to the need for a far deeper understanding of how security, development, and governance interact at the local level. Military must understand the relationships between aid and security, Government and governance, and between state and periphery. Where the central government is predatory or lacks support, clear-hold-build also raises difficult questions of authority, legitimacy, and control. These are questions that a military must be capable of answering. Thus, “problematic” clear-hold-build emerges as a framework with *heuristic* utility; a scheme that can be helpful in planning but which must at the time of application be populated by knowledge, substance, and skill. The implications of these requirements are troubling, particularly for those governments still in the business of armed intervention. Also, particularly when stabilisation is loosely knitted with COIN and CT. Nevertheless, few stages, as mentioned above, are illustrated in detail in the following paragraphs.

Preliminary Phase: Shape

This phase is primarily for planning and preparation. For the efforts to be successful, representatives from all military mission elements must participate equally in building a macro-level plan. As one element’s needs may drive the actions of others. *It is critical that planning for all the elements should be integrated from the beginning.* For example, if successful economic development in a particular area requires uninterrupted electrical power, economic development planners should convey this requirement to the security planners so that they conduct their operation accordingly. Special emphasis

should be placed on planning transition points between one mission element and another to ensure there is no gap in momentum of mission or service to the population. Each mission element should share special considerations regarding timing, location, measures of success, and follow-up actions. At the micro-level of economic development planning, military, interagency, and military personnel should actively participate, even if it slows down the process.

In addition to the planning, the Shape phase is devoted to the identification and acquisition of necessary resources. To prevent a security development gap from occurring, the financial mechanisms, personnel, and key equipment must be ready in advance. Moreover, economic developers should identify, train, equip, and exercise development of the team members. Due to the questionable security environments and severe locations in which they will operate, the military members should possess a wide variety of skills. If development skills are lacking, states should consider initiating educational programs in return, for their obligatory government service.

Phase 1. Stabilise

This phase is divided into two stages. The first stage begins while the security mission is still conducting clearing operations. As kinetic operations are ongoing, primarily military leads this phase, using special operation forces along with civil affairs teams who have been trained in economic development tasks. As the environment becomes more secure, economic development responsibilities shift to civilian experts and joint civil-military Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). Economic development in

this early stage focuses on providing advice to the military combatants on how best to terminate their operations in order to facilitate economic development success, assessing humanitarian damage for planning refinements, and providing emergency humanitarian assistance. As the security effort transitions from Clear to Hold, economic developers play a greater supporting role by helping the reconstruction team conduct initial needs assessments and stability surveys with returning the internally displaced population. They also work together to initiate small-scale projects designed to build on the optimism of population, all the while actively managing their expectations.

The second stage of this phase occurs when security has become fairly constant and the environment is relatively safe for civilian workers. This effort is led at the tactical level with the PRTs providing support when necessary. As the military's presence can be a destabilising force within some communities, PRTs should limit their involvement to providing advice and access to development funding for projects, as needed. There is a need to concentrate on conducting stability surveys, mobilizing the population to prioritise the community's needs in a systematic way, and providing the community members with necessary training to follow-on infrastructure projects.

At the operational level, development experts work within key government development ministries. They advise the government departments, train civil servants, and act as liaisons between the Military chain of command and the Government, as well as between the tactical development teams and the central government. In

addition, they advise the government on strategic messaging and help it navigate the complicated financial rules of funding. Just as tactical developers seek to gain the trust of the people at the community level, operational developers seek to gain the trust of these dedicated government officials.

Phase 2. Build

This phase begins as the environment becomes more consistently secure and trust develops between the military, Government machinery and populace. At the tactical level, developers continue to collect stability data, but their emphasis transitions to the resolution the sources of instability using the previously collected and analysed information. During this phase, they utilise the construction of new infrastructure projects as a vehicle for mentoring communities through the development process by training, advising, and monitoring the community's efforts. Developers also begin to interact more frequently with experts from the political mission element in anticipation of the upcoming political thrust. Throughout this phase, PRTs continue to distance themselves from the day-to-day mission, and PRT expertise either moves from the tactical level to the operational, or prepares to move to the next community.


At the operational level, developers concentrate almost exclusively on building long-term capability. They emphasize their role as advisors rather than implementers and seek to transform tactical successes into broader government legitimacy by helping the government with its information operations. Former PRT members with unique development skills (for example, civil engineers,

agricultural specialists) move from the tactical level to the relevant operational ministries, further increasing the Governmental capacity. At some point in this phase, the Government should attain sufficient legitimacy and capability to act with minimal technical assistance.

Phase 3. Transfer

This phase must be an overall COIN and CT decision, not just an economic development decision. It is the least complicated phase to explain, but potentially the most difficult to complete. Planners, in conjunction with the government, should agree upon a timetable and criteria for an area's readiness, as well as long-term commitments regarding advisors and financial resources. A figure below illustrates the phases in pictorial form:

Figure 2. Security and Economic Development Comparison



Source <http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/Article/702054/economic-development-in-counterinsurgency-building-a-stable-second-pillar/>

While military forces have a legitimate role in each of the mission elements, their primary expertise lies in providing a secure

environment so that political and economic development can occur. To this end, the debate advocates using a “Clear-Hold-Build” approach for “specific, high-priority area[s] experiencing overt insurgent operations” in order to “create a secure physical and psychological environment; establish firm government control of the populace and area; and gain the populace’s support.”

To date, political and economic developers have not created comparable models to guide their actions or inform their mission partners. Consequently, their efforts appear somewhat reactive and disjointed, and may, as a result, be perceived as being subordinate to the security mission. To address this weakness, key five principles are proposed that should guide economic development activities in a counterinsurgency, and it presents a four-phase conceptual model that can be used by economic developers, as well as security and political planners, to better synchronize all COIN efforts. It does not, however, offer a context-independent recipe for COIN success or an easy-to-follow checklist that simplifies COIN complexities. No matter how efficiently a COIN and CT campaign is run, success depends on a number of complicated factors, many of which are outside the economic developers’ control. Most importantly, COIN success presupposes a capable government partner that is willing to make the changes necessary to win popular legitimacy. Secondly, it assumes that a state wants to defeat the insurgency and not merely alleviate some lesser risk. Both of these are weighty assumptions that may, at some stage, prove inaccurate. This chapter hopes to provide general guidance that will increase the probability of COIN success, alongside the Clear-Hold-Build-Transfer campaign with case studies of both the UK and Pakistan’s military experiences.

**STABILISATION EFFORTS
OF THE UK MILITARY IN
CONFLICT**

Introduction

Having considered two British COIN Campaigns, the Malayan and Cyprus Emergencies, this chapter seeks to explain the differences between COIN and Stabilisation as two approaches to conflict resolution. It is important to understand that, although this chapter is entitled 'Stabilisation Efforts of the Military in Conflict', the military is but one element of Stabilisation and military effect is not an end in itself. As previously discussed, military action can create a short-term period of security to enable other actors, be that political, humanitarian, judiciary, to deliver effect within an overall approach that is underpinned by the need for an enduring political settlement. To demonstrate the UK approach to Stabilisation, this chapter will examine the NATO campaign in Kosovo from June 1999 and the UK's role within it, specifically from a military perspective.

Background

Kosovo is a disputed territory and partially recognised state in south-eastern Europe that came to international awareness following the Kosovo War in 1998/1999. The history of ethnic conflict in the Balkans is long and complex. The most recent Kosovo War itself lasted from March 1998 until June 1999, the end of which was marked by the Kumanovo Treaty agreeing to the withdraw of Yugoslav and Serbian Forces from Kosovo to be replaced by a NATO led international stabilisation force (KFOR). Post-conflict, Kosovo was marred by ethnic divide, lack of security and economic uncertainty all underpinned by the lack of political settlement. Kosovo as a case study serves to demonstrate well the characteristics of Stabilisation.



Notwithstanding the considerable, centuries old conflicts between Serbs and ethnic Albanians in the region known as Kosovo, what is clear is that from the early 1980's, large number of Kosovar Serbs had left the region to return to Serbia citing increasing security concerns over increasing Kosovar Albanian hostility. During the late 1980s, a leading Serbian Communist, Slobodan Milosevic, rose to eminence in Serbia and on 26 December 1990, became elected as the President of Serbia. Over the next 8 years, Kosovo slowly slipped towards war through an ever-increasing Serbian aggression towards any notion of Kosovo independence, alongside the emergence of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), ethnic Albanian paramilitary organisation that sought independence for Kosovo from Serbia through violent means. Classifying the KLA is extremely difficult; certainly, in the mid-1990s, there were atrocities committed against

Serb civilians in Kosovo that were attributable to the KLA and from which earned them 'terrorist' status from Republican elements in US Congress, insurgent status for the Yugoslav Government and 'freedom fighter' status from most Albanians. In 5 Mar 1998, the official outbreak of the Kosovo War was initiated by an alleged Serb Army massacre of 60 Kosovar Albanians, including women and children, in the Drenica Valley—a KLA stronghold in Kosovo.

The Kosovo War was characterised by atrocities, committed by both Serb Army and KLA, leading it to the centre of world attention by late 1998. Arguably, the pivotal moment in the Kosovo War came when the Serb and Yugoslav Armies entered Kosovo to clear the KLA from the Serb / Kosovo border. The widely-witnessed atrocities against ethnic Albanian citizens and the forced displacement of civilians by the Serb Army led to an increasing NATO political effort and an agreed ceasefire, followed by Serb Army withdrawal on 27 October 1998. To support the ceasefire, NATO launched Op EAGLE EYE, an air mission to demonstrate NATO intent throughout the ceasefire.

The ceasefire between the Serb Army and KLA broke down in late 1998 and the following months saw increasing ethnic violence marked by assassinations, murder and ethnic cleaning. Whilst there is evidence of this on both sides, world opinion steered towards laying the blame for the worst of the atrocities, on the Serb authorities. NATO decided that the conflict could only be resolved by military intervention to keep both sides apart leading to a peace enforcement mission. Ultimately the NATO military response took the form of an air mission from 24 Mar to 11 Jun 1999, with targets

identified specifically as Yugoslav air defence and high value military targets. Agreement by Milosevic on 3 June 1999 prevented the deployment of NATO forces in a conventional, offensive warfighting role leading instead to a withdrawal of Serbian forces and agreement for a NATO peacekeeping deployment in Kosovo. Details were ratified by the North Atlantic Council on 10 June 1999, followed quickly by NATO cessation of offensive air operations. Following UN approval, through UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244, NATO peacekeeping forces arrived in Pristina, the capital city of Kosovo, on 12 Jun 1999.

Conduct of the Stabilisation Campaign.

UNSCR 1244, issued on 10 Jun 1999, authorised the deployment of an international civilian and security presence in Kosovo with the sole purpose of ensuring that the population were able to live in peace and that conditions were set for regional stability. Specified security force tasks included:

- a. Observing the withdrawal of all Federal Republic of Yugoslavian authorities and Serb Army.
- b. Demilitarisation of the KLA and other armed Albanian groups.
- c. Provision of a secure environment to enable humanitarian relief.
- d. Ensure a safe environment for refugees to return.
- e. Deterring new hostilities.

The deployment of an international civil and security force, including a military component, was centred upon two organisations; the United Nations Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) provided the civil component and the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) the military. These two components were required to

work in tandem to overcome the multitude of ethnic complexities and the lack of security and governance.

Core Components of Stabilisation.

- a. **Protect (political actors, political system and the population).** Given the levels of violence experienced in Kosovo between Serb and Yugoslav forces and the KLA, particularly over the winter of 1998 /99 but in reality, for the entire decade, there was a very clear requirement to provide a secure environment within which civilian agencies could develop. UNSCR 1244 required the withdrawal of all FRY and Serb military, police and paramilitary organisation and to cease violence and repression of Kosovar Albanians with immediate effect. In addition, it required all KLA and armed Kosovo Albanian groups to be demilitarized. To enforce this required a considerable NATO force, KFOR, to be deployed with a peacekeeping mission.

As described earlier, military forces can deliver short term peace to enable other agencies to deliver effect required by the stabilisation approach and this is the effect that KFOR were required to deliver. By establishing an immediate separation of warring factions, and a means of protecting those most vulnerable from all ethnicities, KFOR would create the conditions for the civil agencies, UNMIK, to establish provisional institutions of local self-Governance (PISG) in Kosovo as required under UNSCR 1244. One aspect of UNSCR 1244 that required particular attention due to its contentious nature was the demilitarisation of the KLA and identifying what subsequently would be required to deliver civil led security post KFOR.

The UN mandated solution was the establishment of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), itself formed by Kosovar Albanians, many of whom had previous links, either directly or



Security over watch – Kosovo, 1999

indirectly with the KLA. This mandate, whilst not popular with Kosovo Serbs for obvious reasons, was nonetheless pragmatic and the first step towards delivering a self-generated police and security force in Kosovo, required to fill the vacuum left by FRY agencies. It also served as an ideal way to ensure DDR of the KLA and other armed Albanian groups.

Another key role of the international security force was to ensure that the conditions prevailed to allow the considerable number of Kosovar Albanian Refugees to return to their homes from Macedonia and Albania. The military is well placed to deliver such a function given the time imperative to return refugees – KFOR delivered such an effect whilst ensuring that the

return of large numbers of 'angry' Kosovo Albanians, did not subsequently result in an increase in violence, and enforced removal from their homes, of those Kosovar Serbs who chose to remain after the withdrawal of FRY and Serb authorities and security forces.

b. **Promote, Consolidate and Strengthen Political Processes.**

In Kosovo, post June 1999, the basis for the process of promoting and consolidating political institutions was through UNSCR 1244 and the establishment of a permanent civilian presence under a UN Secretary-General appointed Special Representative. The Special Representative was tasked with establishing the international civilian presence and providing an interim governance until the establishment of PISG could be enabled. Within this remit fell all the institutions required to perform civilian administrative functions. These included the planning and delivery of free and fair elections, maintaining law and order, protecting human rights and ensuring the safe return of refugees. It is important to remember the role that KFOR provided, through military presence, of enabling UNMIK the space and freedom to carry out their actions need to deliver that interim governance and set the conditions for long term self-governance of an autonomous Kosovo.

- c. **Prepare for Longer Term Recovery.** The deployment of KFOR and UNMIK under UNSCR 1244 was clear in its end state. The military presence was to deliver an environment free from violence that enabled the international civil agencies to have the freedom required to deliver interim governance. The requirements of long term recovery were also identified;

complete end to ethnic violence, autonomous governance, rule of law and the safe return of displaced personnel and refugees would be required. of note, a Kosovar declaration of independence was made on 17 February 2008 that, despite falling outside of the original UNMIK framework, was nonetheless endorsed by the International Court of Justice on 22 July 2010.

Application of Lessons from Kosovo to the Conduct of Operations in Afghanistan.

- a. **Full Spectrum Approach.** On overseas operations, the key Government Departments are Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), Ministry of Defence (MOD) and Department for International Development (DFID). The FCO works at the state-to-state level with the intention of promoting British interests overseas; DFID is focused on poverty reduction and humanitarian assistance; MOD (British Armed Forces) focus on the delivery of a secure environment through the use (or threat of use) of force. These three Government Departments need to work closely to gather with agreed policies and end state in order to deliver stability. In Kosovo, the ability to deliver a balanced cross Govt approach was challenging. In Afghanistan, this was overcome using sub-national integrated teams, e.g. Provincial Recovery Teams (PRTs) and the inclusion of civilian SMEs in military HQs.

- b. **PRTs.** One of the key factors that limit integrated, cross-Govt working can be the lack of physical representation in the operational environment. Typically when overseas, FCO will

work at the strategic level, MOD will work at the operational / tactical level and DFID at the operational level (and at the tactical level through third parties). PRTs were developed in Helmand to bridge the differences between the three Govt Depts and ensure that a Full Spectrum Approach was delivered at the tactical level. PRTs included representation from the political, military and humanitarian areas to ensure that planning at the formation level was coherent with Govt policy and the agreed end state. Whilst PRTs proved their value in Afghanistan by delivery the necessary cross-Govt coherence, they were specific for that operational theatre only. Longer term, the ability to 'second' between departments is still necessary to grow the cadre of expertise within the concept of the Full Spectrum Approach; this statement is clearly borne out by the comments made by Sarah Spencer, BHC – the need to ensure that the UK continues to grow individuals with the correct characters and experience to work in a cross-Government context is critical to our ability to conduct overseas interventions effectively. The use of the PRTs in Afghanistan was highly successful and a good model to take forward; the capacity of the UK to deliver a similar capability in the future exists, but it is not yet routine business.

- c. **Civilian SMEs in Military HQs.** The British Army quickly discovered that there was a clear gap in the subject matter expertise with formation Headquarters. This was apparent in Iraq, 2003 – 2009, and also in Afghanistan. As pointed out by Sarah Spencer, steps have been made by the UK military to address this gap. *'The military has taken a number of steps to improve understanding across Govt of the way it operates. The*

recent example if the 'Working with Military' course held at PJHQ with a pan-Govt focus'. Courses are now routine that invite civilian SMEs to understand how the military operates when deployed and for reciprocal understanding within the military of the role and operating methods of the other Government Departments. Whilst still at an early stage of development and conscious that there is a long way to go to, nonetheless, the UK is slowly building a cadre of experience at operating cross-Government which can only strengthen the UK ability to deploy into conflict affected areas to deliver stability.

Overcoming Government Department Cultures.

- a. **Planning Timeframes.** There are a number of planning processes that the British military are able to call upon. The Operational-level Planning Process is typically used at the campaign level and the Tactical Estimate (TE) at the formation level. The planning processes typically used by FCO and DFID are conducted over a longer timeframe and are, arguably, not in the precise, clearly defined steps favoured by the military. Similarly, there is a difference between the time horizons that effects are expected to be realised, with FCO and DFID measuring over considerably longer periods. Overcoming the differences, and satisfying each Department need for planning and measuring effect, needs to be carefully thought through. As the MOD discovered in Afghanistan, there may well be a need to slow down military activity to ensure strategic alignment with the policies of other government Departments. This required a cultural change in the military and a need to understand that it

did not necessarily have to operationally advance at the pace that it was able to, but needed to advance at no greater speed than its partners across Government to ensure coherence between the military and political objectives.

- b. **The Stabilisation Unit.** Recent operations, not just in Afghanistan, but in also in Iraq and Libya as examples, demonstrated the need for an operational cross-Government department agency capable of responding to crises overseas and support the delivery of stability. The Stabilisation Unit (SU) was therefore formed to address such a gap; it consists of those Government Departments that are required to help address the root causes of instability and insecurity, namely MOD, FCO as the civilian police and justice SMEs. Humanitarian aspects are dealt with by a strong DFID presence in SU. As such, the Stabilisation Unit is an organisation that can respond rapidly to emerging crises and is supported by each element of Government and supporting agencies required to deliver stability. It is the exemplar of the Full Spectrum Approach. Cross-departmental financing needs to be considered at an early stage; the humanitarian relief required necessitates significant funding. As Ed Hadley observed:


'The Stabilisation Unit itself is a good example of how the Comprehensive Approach could be applied at each of the strategic, operational and tactical level but, importantly, the finances required to support this approach need to be joint as well. The UK approach has been to develop the Conflict, Security and Stabilisation Fund, CSSF, as a cross-Government

fund that delivers stabilisation objectives. It has been widely used in Afghanistan and Iraq.'

The CSSF is a cross-Departmental fund that can be used for stabilisation, but not direct military, activity. It was set up to enable funds to be accessed rapidly to support humanitarian efforts, but also counter -terrorist activity when appropriate. Being able to utilise the CSSF rapidly, makes the Stabilisation Unit a potent organisation when faced with conflict prevention and resolution.

- c. **Training and Education.** Lessons learnt from Afghanistan, demonstrated the need for cross-Government training and education. Courses run by MOD to educate other Government Depts in the role of the military when deployed have been discussed already. Similarly, the SU is able to deploy small teams globally, as well as in the UK< to deliver training across all Departments in areas such as security and justice, women in conflict and conflicts sensitivity. In doing so, the root causes of instability are raised to the widest possible audience to those UK personnel involved in the delivery of stabilisation.

**AN ACCOUNT OF
PAKISTAN ARMY'S
STABILISATION EFFORTS
FATA AND SWAT**



A map illustrating Taliban controlled areas before the operations in Swat and Waziristan

Abstract

Generically, a successful counter insurgency and counter terrorism campaign hinges on the 'linear path towards peace'- Clear, Hold, Build and transfer doctrine. For the military this may work either ways where the local population can start depending upon it entirely for furthering peace in the conflict prone area or on the contrary start being viewed as a hostile entity. Irrespective of the viewpoint, the vitality of a narrative and opinion of the local population in such areas may not be denied. Even more critical is how these opinions are shaped in a post-operation phase, as the insurgents, militants and terrorists have the probability to resurge based on the overall outlook. Narrowing down the debate to FATA and particularly to the 'hot beds' of North Waziristan, alongside the 'success' story of Swat, it is in fact extraordinary how the Armed Forces have managed to fight against hostile elements and enroot presence through their part of 'building' of the campaign. It has built a strong positive opinion amongst the locals as far as the military's foothold is concerned. However, this should not be at the stake of the role of administrative setup of the area. This chapter intends to deliberate on the key notions of peace building through operationalizing the administrative setup of FATA, particularly NWA. It also highlights the salient features of the military's role in the area in the post-operation phase and how this role is in consonance with the administrative setup.

The Swat Valley: A Success Story

Background

Viewing the compulsions of COIN, CT and stabilisation in isolation of how the administrative setup behaves during and after a military operation may be delusional. Ideally, there is a room for striking a balance between the military doctrine of Clear, Hold, Build, Transfer phases and the administrative machinery to flex its muscles in the area. Hence, an effective administration is in fact the key for ensuring sustained stability and peace in such areas. The often termed 'success' story of Swat, a scenic valley in Northern Pakistan, part of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province remains as an illustration. It faced militant challenges since the mid-1990s when hardliner cleric



A Picture of the Swat valley in winters

Sufi Muhammad staged an uprising for the implementation of Shariah in the valley. However, it was the actions of Maulana Fazlullah that necessitated a Pakistan Army security

operation. The Swat valley endured three parallel military operations in different parts including Operation Rah-e-Haq –III, Operation Black Thunderstorm and Operation Rah-e-Rast, because militants managed to resurge after every operation. They had created havoc, captured several villages, police stations, and Government infrastructure. This militant uprising (2006-2007), banned women from markets, closed CD shops by force and proscribed music and gained support either by force/deterrence or through influencing narrative by using illegal FM radio station.

It was not until July 2007 that a major military operation was launched against Maulana Fazlullah and his men. The first phase of Operation Rah-e-Haq (2007) involved deployment of troops and mechanized units, and hailed over the usage of heavy artillery supported by gunship helicopters. It is worth mentioning that this operation was requisitioned by the Provincial Government when the political administration became completely ineffective and was dejected. The army claimed to have killed scores of militants and to have dislodged them from their bases. Nevertheless, attacks on the security forces continued, causing the government to sign a peace agreement with Fazlullah in May 2008.

Tensions emerged again when Fazlullah's men refused to lay down their arms and demanded the withdrawal of army troops from Swat as a pre-condition for respecting the May 2008 agreement. This forced the Pakistan Army to launch the second phase of Operation Rah-e-Haq in July 2008.


The Taliban destroyed infrastructure in Swat, blowing up bridges and burning down school buildings. They also beheaded and

shot to death dozens of locals on charges of spying. These actions severely disrupted the local population. Nearly 2.5 million people left the valley and were settled in camps as well as in houses with relatives and friends in other cities.

Operation Rah-i-Rast aimed at clearing Swat of the Mullah Fazlullah-led militants in 2009 was seen a success story of being able to rid the region of extremist militancy. True, that operation had a number of lacunae, but there were positive aspects that could serve as a political, strategic and operational model to help the present civil and military establishments take informed decisions. The military had a clear view that, it had virtually no chance of success without popular support for its actions. Political support with elements like national integration and cohesiveness demonstrated unflinching concepts of bravery and heroism, was appreciated and acknowledged over the lengths and breadths both domestically and globally. The government and the military got the much-needed backing from the country's populace, barring a few minor exceptions; leaders of political parties from across the broad spectrum supported the efforts to eliminate the menace of religious extremism and terrorism, but cautioned against collateral damage or alienation of the general public.

The ideology behind these operations was to counter the threat not solely through the narrow prism of casualty figures. It envisaged a comprehensive approach. The threat from Taliban in Swat was realized based on its impact on state and society as a whole. The Swat 'quagmire' was in fact the first test of Pakistan Army to fight against the Taliban with a major support of the nation. They beat the

Guerrilla warriors of the TTP at their own game. The strategy was to surround them, with choking every escape route and forced them in to joining battle. At the tactical level, small groups of ground forces were made logistically independent and given the initiative to operate independently of orders. The military cleared all entrances to Swat Valley, Buner, Malakand, and Dir (lower and Upper). It then entered the valley from all three directions-south, west and east. Nonetheless, by mid-June 2009, within four weeks of the military's campaign, the Taliban vacated Mingora and sought escape routes in small groups along less-known routes.



A Picture of phamplet in Urdu, titled: 'Message of Peace', distributed by the District Administration Swat

Stabilisation of Swat

The success achieved in kinetic domain for Swat, had to be corroborated with a swift stabilisation campaign, in which the administrative setup was to be reinvigorated. In this regard, 'winning hearts and minds' was the lead thought of the military operations. Although employing this on one's own people may also

seem to be surprising for some strategists. This was also the view of one of the interviewee that, *the WHAM strategy, as it is known popularly is not applicable in one's own country, and is slogan chanted by a foreign army.*⁴²

Nonetheless, the military operations by Pakistan armed forces were in fact a success due to the concerted support of the people and such a strategy seems to be foreign to Pakistan's understanding.⁴³ However, the other interviewee believed that *Pakistan's model of WHAM was employed in Swat for effective counterterrorism and stabilisation campaign.*⁴⁴

Since, we were fighting a war in our own country hence the approach was multi-pronged, people centric with limited use of force. Hence, where the military operations were an amalgam of hard and soft power, the counter terrorism doctrine focused on defeating the terrorists, and factoring WHAM since the very outset of operations. This included a well thought out philosophy of securing the peace loving people, using and restricting the use of force to bare minimum for defeating the spoilers of peace. Hence, when it is said that, 'no love stories are born out of military operations', Swat was a clear illustration of soft pronged military thought.⁴⁵ Meanwhile, at the operational level, the stabilisation phase in the area included four main pillars: REBUILDING, REHABILITATION, POLITICAL STABILITY AND DE-RADICALISATION. Interestingly, Swat was also a

⁴² Interview- Maj Gen Fayyaz Hussain Shah- CI (B)(DIV) NDU- Interview-2, Appendix-2.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Interview- Lt. Gen Naseer Janjua (Retd). Interview No.1, Appendix-2

⁴⁵ Ibid.

case study for viewing how the employment of clear-hold-build-transfer phases of stabilisation campaign is delusional. As in Swat, build and rehabilitation was applied as policy since the outset of operation, along with gaining popular support.

- a. **Rebuilding.** The challenge in Swat was 'rebuild' rather than build, as it was a densely populated area. The devastation caused by presence of Taliban and miscreants and continuous fighting was immense. Infrastructure, police stations, schools and other facilities were destroyed to a level where rebuilding was a major challenge. Meanwhile, shaping the lead thought of locals was a major part of strategy adopted. One interviewee was of the view that, *this played an imperative role in stabilising Swat and brought lessons with a four-fold focus: army is not able to operate in an area without the popular support of locals, it should avoid collateral damage, should be perceived as saviors and superiority of narrative should be generated by doing justice.*⁴⁶

There was a task to rebuild the infrastructure and facilitate in improving the administrative setup of the area. As the interviewee also suggested that, stabilization efforts are to be launched in consonance of operations. As once an area is 'cleared' from elements of instability the Army is expected to roll back and allow the political machinery to exercise.

- b. **Rehabilitation.** A majority of the 2.5 million of the region's displaced people returned to their homeland in the hope of rebuilding tehrifs in swat. They launched a housing society on some of the land that they occupied during the operation. Hope

⁴⁶ Interview with Lt. Gen Khalid Rabbani HI (M) (Retd).

was also injected in the region's women, who started to reclaim their positions they lost under the Taliban. For nearly a decade, they were not allowed to leave their homes. In the post-ops phase many were counting on women to bring order back. Some lead women- only Jirga's (traditional assemblies of leaders according to the teachings of Islam, making decisions by consensus) – the first of their kinds were also established. Others became lawyers to represent women in the courts, a profession that the women of Swat had never before considered.


- c. **Political Stability.** The single most commonly cited factor blamed for the rise of militancy in Swat has been limited access to justice. With the lack of financial resources, non-availability of professional cadre of lawyers, judges and court officials, the formal legal system quickly became backed up with poorly understood legal proceedings, undue delays, bribery, and the misuse of Riway (traditional law). After the military operation in Swat, the legal setup and other administrative decisions were taken over by military as a process of stabilisation. The District Commissioner was put in place and authorized to coordinate between the different institutions at the local level. The army withdrew thousands of troops and handed over responsibility for security to the local police and other civilian law enforcement agencies in Shangla and Buner districts. The proposed timeline for the transition from military to civilian control was approved by the apex committee for policy coordination, a body of senior level civilian and military officials formed in early 2008 to improve the provincial government's ability to respond to issues of militancy and governance in a confidential forum. The apex

committee also devised a strategy for transferring governance responsibilities to the civilian control. The divisional administration was restored and strengthened, and a regional committee was established in the commissioner's office with both civilian and military representation in order to improve coordination and facilitate the transition.

Efforts have also been made to bolster the capacity of the civilian government through increased man power and training programs. The primary task of the civilian government in the interim was to restore public confidence in the emerging system, while civil society organizations including the diaspora, have been instrumental in providing humanitarian relief in response to the floods.

- d. **De-Radicalisation.** Pakistan's first de-radicalisation program was launched in September 2009, after completion of operation Raah-e-Raast (The Righteous Path) against Pakistani Taliban in Swat. Most of the militants caught during the operation were teenagers who were trained as suicide bombers. A need was felt to introduce a rehabilitation program. In Pakistan's understanding radicals are '*Individuals or groups becoming intolerant with regard to basic democratic values like equality and diversity, as well as a rising propensity towards using means of force to reach political goals that negate and/or undermine democracy*'. It may be considered as a process of political socialization towards extremism. Alternatively, it may also be viewed as a process of conflict escalation in terms of increased use of illegal methods of political action when confronting an opponent. It is a mobilization and recruitment

process, masterminded by manipulative political or religious entrepreneurs. Or as a conversion process, a life changing transformation from a more individual-centered personal identity to a new, collective-centered identity which makes the vulnerable individual subservient to the demands of an extremist religious cult while making him or her think of belonging to a superior group of true believers. The process starting from being a radical and becoming a terrorist is explained in the following diagram:



Hence, civilians with cooperation of Army run six main de-radicalisation programs throughout the country: namely, Sabaoon (Morning Light), Mashaal (Candle, Lamp), Rastoon (Returning Back), Sparlay (Spring), Nawa-e-Sahar (New Morning, New Beginning) and Heila (Hope). The Swat de-radicalisation program comprises Sabaoon for the militants (12-18 years), Rastoon (19-25 years) and Mishal centres (for the family of militants to create awareness about care and monitoring the rehabilitated individuals). The program is run through private-public partnership. A representative body of local civil society and non-governmental organization, Hum Pakistan Foundation is primarily responsible for managing the affairs of the largest rehabilitation center (Sabaoon). Since 2009, Sabaoon has rehabilitated around 200 militants, while the Rastoon has

rehabilitated 1196 militants. Rest of other de-radicalization centers are operating on a relatively small scale. (the picture of classroom in

A similar de-radicalisation program was launched in Punjab and was designed and modelled on the pattern of Swat's Sabaoon center. It started by incorporating 350 militants in the first phase in an effort to de-radicalize the de-tracked and brainwashed youth. The program is based on influencing ideological beliefs and behavioral modification pattern. The Punjab rehabilitation program focused on ex-militants of groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT, Army of the Pure), Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM, Muhammad's Army) and anti-Shia militant groups such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), Army of Jhangvi) and Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP). The program was designed on a multi-pronged strategy of prevention, rehabilitation and after-care. It had three modules: psychological assessment, religious rehabilitation and vocational training. Three batches of around 311 participants completed the training. Swat model was developed in a post-militancy perspective and the counter argument modules focus on defusing anti-state tendencies. The national-level de-radicalization program tend to focus less on ideological aspects. The rehabilitation efforts have been divided into four main modules, including an educational module comprising formal education, especially for juveniles, to enable them to continue their education.

Another module includes psychological counseling and therapy for developing independent and logical thinking. The social module includes social issues and family participation and the fourth module includes vocational training, such as repairing home appliances, etc., to equip the detainees with skills that enable them to make a decent

living. Although Pakistan's rehabilitation program in Swat is not part of a comprehensive policy and is a counter-militancy initiative introduced by Pakistan Army, but if implemented judiciously it can provide the basis for a broader de-radicalization strategy.

In a society like Pakistan, de-radicalization, counter terrorism strategies are likely to crisscross paths and most of the steps taken to accomplish either of the two would also help in strengthening the other, either directly or indirectly. It would be appropriate that a comprehensive strategy should cater for both. The four approaches that may operate on security, societal, ideological and political levels are based on the concepts of de-radicalization.

The fusion of these approaches is very effective as all aim at neutralizing the security threats. The table below illustrates the merger

Approach	Means	Ends	
Security	Detainees	Rehabilitation	Reducing security threats
Societal	Vulnerable Communities	Engagement	Developing moderate tendencies
Ideological	Clergy	Highlighting religion's emphasis on Peace	Developing counter arguments/narratives
Political	Society at Large	Winning hearts and minds	Neutralizing security threats

Altogether, the Swat model should be viewed through the prism of allowing governance and administrative setup to function

properly. The army had achieved kinetic successes, but the actual success lied in the revamp of civil machinery and law enforcement mechanisms. Particularly, it is worth mentioning that, the major challenge of Internally Displaced People (IDP's) as a result of operation, was recused by local initiative of the people alongside the military. The scenario raises the specter of an undue challenge that the military is posed with once it has successfully cleared an area. The locals start depending on their ability to deliver and remain reluctant to allow the previous setup to take charge yet again. Nonetheless, the Swat battle and its later successful transfer to stabilization remains a benchmark for Pakistan Army's efforts in curbing the menace of terrorism and militancy in the country.

Stabilisation Efforts in FATA

Following the efforts in Swat to stabilize and merge the area, socially in the country, the mainstay was also stabilisation of the



conflict-prone areas in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). After Swat, from where the miscreants had ran and fled to different areas in the 'lawless' areas of Waziristan, the South Waziristan was brought in limelight. These tribal areas which were also referred to as 'the

epicenter of terrorism' after the incident of 9/11, was a big challenge for Pakistan's counter militancy cum terrorism campaign. This was mainly due to two factors: the unavoidable fallout of Afghan instability on this area and neglected nature of these tribal areas from the rest of the country. It had its decades old law-Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR), still intact with shadowed socio-economic setup. Meanwhile, the porous nature of the international border between Pakistan and Afghanistan-the Durand Line, allowed influx of miscreants alongside refugees from Afghanistan. Altogether the area was posed with grave security, political, economic and social challenges.

The major battle was fought in South Waziristan, where the Army occupied the TTP's territory through a methodical advance that adopted lessons from previous operations in the KPK and denied propaganda victories to the enemy. According to Shauqat Qadir, before undertaking the operation in SWA in September 2009, the military orchestrated a public information campaign. This actually helped in denying space to militants for spreading their narrative. It was done by throwing pamphlets by Government from helicopters, indicating the resolve of operation.⁴⁷ TTP resistance, while initially relatively strong, melted away under the military's advance, partially because the TTP did not adapt to the military's new, successful tactics. The Pakistani public strongly supported the operation in Waziristan; support for strong action against the extremists in Pakistan spiked after increased militant activity in Swat, Buner, and neighboring areas in the KPK in spring 2009. After the Pakistani

⁴⁷ The author had read some of the leaflets himself.

forces finished clearing the territory in Waziristan, the hold and build phases began. Although the army conducted numerous operations in FATA, however, the Swat battle and SWA operation were the ones that hit TTP at the center. It was not until that North Waziristan Agency also made headlines as a breeding ground for Haqqanis, who were considered to be conducting insurgency in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, after facing losses in SWA, the TTP had also shifted their command center to NWA. Hence, with the bloody APS attack in December 2014, the Army announced its major operation with the name of Zarb-e-Azb, which was aimed towards eliminating the menace of terrorism indiscriminately. As a result a cohesive National Action Plan was also formulated (these aspects are referred to in chp 1). Hence, Zarb-e-Azb was not just an operation it was an entire concept.⁴⁸

Stabilisation of North Waziristan Agency

Miranshah, regional headquarters of NWA, is a barren land with treacherous mountains and terrain. The battle fought in this area was yet again a military doctrine of clearing the periphery areas first and then reaching the core. After successful kinetic operation, the army in its build phase for the Agency opted to allow development of locals. The challenge in Swat was to 'rebuild' the infrastructure, the challenge in these rugged mountains was to actually build from scratch.⁴⁹

⁴⁸ Interview- Lt. Gen Rizwan Akhtar H.St, HI (M)

⁴⁹ These are the personal impressions of author after visiting the area.

This is true because, when the operation was conducted in NWA, the administrative setup was already disrupted by militants and terrorists. The levies and Khasadars had left their positions out of fear causing a further security vacuum. Only the Political Agent was available who was coordinating with the Army in order to ensure rehabilitation of the locals.⁵⁰ After the operation, the Levies and



Khasadars were brought back and were also provided training by the army in order to secure the area.

In this regard it is worth mentioning that, the major role played by Pakistan Army in NWA are the deliberative efforts to reinstate administrative setup of the area. This is in the backdrop of a vacuum caused by nominal control of the Political Agent over schools,

⁵⁰ Telephonic discussion of Author with Mr. Kamran Afridi- Political Agent NWA.

hospitals and Government machinery once militancy was in full bloom. After the stabilisation efforts were launched, issues like lack of transparency in already approved developmental projects alongside destroyed infrastructure and insignificant security apparatus were given special attention. In its efforts to bring peace to the area, the Army attempted to craft a healthy environment for the functioning of the political machinery. Particularly, rigorous steps were taken for developing infrastructure, capacity building of levies and Khasadar's, profiling in the health and education institutions, and rationalization of facilities like schools and hospitals. Special focus was given to ensuring transparency in developmental projects through materializing the Annual Developmental Plan-ADP.⁵¹

In addition, Temporary Displaced People-TDP relief operations set newer standards in NWA for bringing sustainable peace. The operation had caused displacement of more than one million tribal from the area. They were shifted to TDP camps in Bannu and some also settled in Peshawar. In the stabilisation phase there was a TDP secretariat set up for institutionalising the process. The TDP secretariat while acting as a bridge between FATA secretariat and some UN donors enabled the initiation of iconic projects all over the agency. Meanwhile, an immediate rehabilitation fund enabled the resettlement of TDP's in the area. On the other hand, the Army also facilitated the administrative setup by leading an Agency Development Committee and an Agency Petition Committee for the resolution of disputes. Meanwhile, there is also an agency wide De-

⁵¹ Interview of GOC 7 Div, Appendix-2, Interview 2.

weaponisation program which will ensure sustained peace for the area in the long run.

Meanwhile the area has exclusively undergone a major social change in the post-operation phase. Today the locals are privy to living in model villages and any chance of fragmentation in the society is minor. Hence, one odd incident of militancy or terrorism may not define the overall setup of the area. This is in the backdrop of its improved civil administration and security apparatus. Hence, there are no chances for militancy to resurface. In order to reap the fruits of this situation, introducing considerable FATA Reforms is the need of the hour. People are supposed to be made responsible for themselves and should be empowered. This is possible by merging FATA with the province of KPK.⁵²

For over a century, FATA has been governed under a colonial-era system of indirect rule, embodied by the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR) of 1901, first promulgated by the British Raj's frontier administration. Based on problematic ideas about frontier space and tribal society, the system enabled the Raj to project power beyond its administrative boundaries with minimal investment and effort. Supposedly created to govern "independent" tribes under local "traditions and customs," the FCR and the frontier administration fundamentally transformed the realities of tribal existence trapping the region's governance in an alleged timeless past, exposing its inhabitants to brutal forms of coercion and violence, and insulating them from growth and development in the rest of the country.

⁵² Ibid.

Particularly, quite recently the abolishment of decades long Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR), the infamous law that governs FATA is on high priority. A FATA reforms committee is working towards mainstreaming the area, in which the jurisdiction of Pakistan's Supreme Court would be extended and decade's long Khasadar system will be exchanged by a police force.⁵³ According to some estimates more than 20,000 strong police force would be required for the area. The 2016 FATA reforms committee report, in this context, represents a sea change in Pakistan's sovereign assertions, narrative-building, and strategic thinking on the frontier. It outlines plans for the withdrawal of the security forces from the area, the extension of the provincial boundary of KP right up to the international border with Afghanistan, and provision of previously unavailable rights and services on par with the rest of Pakistan. Most groundbreaking among the committee's recommendations are those in the administrative and legal-judicial spheres, including reduction in the powers of political agents, repeal of collective punishment, rationalization in the role of jirgas, and extension of the superior judiciary's jurisdiction in the region.

Political mainstreaming of FATA would be a very complex process because it would also involve legal, administrative and security mainstreaming. Equally important would be the sequencing of these reforms and their complementarity in terms of timing and scale. Different attempts for reforms in the past 40 years, though useful, did not bring about a fundamental mainstreaming of FATA because these elements were missing. Hence, it is a lengthy process

⁵³ Contents of this book include the attempts of FATA reforms before they were approved by last Government in the year 2018.

and will require some bold steps, but these are 'steps' in the right direction.

Conclusion

In the past three years, the Pakistani security forces have launched a number of operations in order to deal with its militant cum terrorist challenge. Each of these operations brought challenges of bringing the area, either densely populated or otherwise, to normalcy. It has been able to do so with success as the stabilisation mechanisms were deliberated upon before the initiation of the operation, especially in South and North Waziristan. The Swat battle acted as a test case and allowed the army a learning opportunity as well. It has cleared the area for the administrative setup to flex its muscles in a manner that, the resurfacing of militancy may not be possible. Generically, development in a conflict-prone area cannot be viewed in isolation of the societal changes in a post-operation phase. Hence, the Pakistan Armed Forces have provided an environment to the local Government for regrouping resources and enabling the administrative machinery to carve out an environment, which is people centric and delivers the basic necessities, which will ultimately restrict resurfacing of militancy and terrorism.⁵⁴ Undoubtedly, what the Pakistan Army and the Government did in dealing with elements of instability in the country, particularly FATA and later bringing normalcy in the war ridden areas is phenomenal. However, the three most critical endeavors were: Firstly, crafting the 'World's most dangerous place

⁵⁴ Interview- Maj Gen Fayyaz Hussain Shah CI (B)(DIV)- NDU, Appendix-2, Interview 6.

in the World' into the 'Safest place' through both kinetic operations and peace building efforts. Secondly, revitalizing the administrative setup of the FATA region by bringing back the order of political machinery who had vacated the area and reinstating TDP's. There is no example for this in the World. And thirdly, the swift and extraordinary development in FATA is bringing back hope in this area.



A Man attends a computer class at the Wana Institute of Technical Training, SWA.



De-Radicalization Emancipation Program is in progress



Former Taliban fighters attend a physics class at Deradicalisation Centre in Bara



Pakistan Army soldier distributing food items among children




Pakistan Army distributes relief items to North Waziristan TDPs.




President Mamnoon Hussain addressing the Cadets at Cadet College Wana, South Waziristan




British CGS, Gen Nicholas Carter is being briefed about Pakistan Army's Efforts in NWA



Gomal Bridge (Road connecting Tank-Gomal-Wana)



Jandola tunnel connecting Tank-Jandola-Makeen



Road connecting Bannu-Miran Shah-Ghulam Khan




Road connecting Peshawar-Torkham




Road Wana-Shakai-Makeen



Miran Shah Bazar, NWA Constructed by Pakistan Army



Army Public School Constructed in NWA



Waziristan Institute of Technical Education (WITE), Sararogha



Younis Khan Sports Complex in Miranshah



Wana Grid Station.



Women Vocational Training Center

THEME 3

A Politico-Lego Prism of Peace Building

Special focus on the Refugee Crisis and Border Management

- Border Management between Pakistan and Afghanistan:
The legal and political compulsions
- Afghan Refugees in Pakistan: A Tale of two Decades
- UK perspective on Border Management of the Pak-
Afghan International Border and Repatriation of
Refugees in Afghanistan

**BORDER MANAGEMENT
BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND
AFGHANISTAN:
THE LEGAL AND
POLITICAL COMPULSIONS**

Abstract

Approximately 2640 kilometers long, the former Durand Line is the common international border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. It was established between British India and Afghanistan in November 1893 to fix the limits of their respective rule. Thereafter, both governments agreed not to interfere in the affairs of the other, thereby avoiding a direct clash between them. Successive Afghan governments did not raise between Afghanistan and British India. However, after the creation of Pakistan in August 1947, Afghanistan accused Pakistan of keeping Afghan territory forcibly, raising objections to the Durand Line and refused to recognize it as the international border. Pakistan on the other hand, as a successor state to British India, contended that it had inherited the Durand boundary as an international frontier and refused to discuss the issue with Afghanistan. However, in recent years, the issue of the Durand Line has resurfaced in the context of the American invasion of Afghanistan and the launching of the “war on terror” in the region. This raises compulsions both in the legal and political domain, where effective border management remains crucial for formalising peace and coexistence between the countries.

Introduction

Effective border management between Pakistan and Afghanistan is a panacea for restoring peace and curbing terrorism in the region. A managed border becomes imperative to not only control infiltration of miscreants but also drug smuggling. Moreover, effective border management will also allow both the countries to deal with blame game, as it would offer a strict check on both sides to counter the free movement of terrorists and drug mafia lords, who are important factors in the deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan and its obvious backlash on Pakistan. Both the countries have previously suggested many initiatives to resolve their differences. However, as fast as these solutions were suggested, they disappeared due to a lack of follow-up.

Until recently Pakistan has started off with the plan to fence up most of the frontier despite Kabul's protests that the barrier would divide families and friends along the Pashtun tribal belt straddling the initial Durand Line drawn up



by the British in 1893. *(The picture illustrates a view of the border fence outside the Kitton outpost on the border with Afghanistan in*

North Waziristan, Pakistan October 18, 2017. REUTERS/Caren Firouz Reuter). The fence was termed as a paradigm shift by the Pakistan Army in its quest for effective border management. However, the complexities that lie ahead with respect to movement across the border may not be denied. This is true because, in the legal domain, intricacies of the Pak- Afghan border are immense. It is not as simple as people crossing border every day. When a person carries a step against a writ of the state it is an act of waging war against a state under Pakistan Penal Code Section 121. Legally, border management comes into play during ventures of trade and tourism, but what we face across the Pak-Afghan border is waging of war paradigm. The non state actors on both sides of the border have exempted themselves from the Constitution of both Pakistan and Afghanistan. They have started to disobey the Constitution by holding arms against state and building their own armies. International law tells about the state's obligation to cooperate with the other state when hostile elements at one side of border take illegal actions on the other side under the extradition laws.

In this regard, there are two approaches: one is war approach i.e. using force straight away against non-state actors and finding collaborative strategy; the second is law enforcement approach, which envisages a move of conveying justice. Unfortunately, there has been no extradition requests

on both sides of the Pak-Afghan international border and its management has unluckily become a one sided paradigm, where Afghanistan denies the legal status of the border. It is worth mentioning that, the border has been accepted as an international border by Security Council documentation and by bilateral agreements between the two countries. Afghanistan, along with Pakistan, USA and USSR, has recognized the Durand Line as an international border under the Geneva Accords, 1988. Meanwhile, the issues of refugees remain on the forefront and their repatriation is questioned. As per international law, when the danger or instability from the country of origin minimizes, refugees are to be repatriated from the host country as its obligation ends. However, in the situation where the refugees prolong their stay and engage in economic ventures at the host state, then visa and immigration laws are applied as they acquire the status of an economic migrant. These laws are in fact quite relevant for the status of Afghan refugees in Pakistan.

The Political Debate

The Pak-Afghan international border (former Durand line) begins in the alpine region of Sarikol range of the Pamir Mountains in the north and runs south-west till it reaches the Iranian border near the Koh-i-Malik Siah, in the desert near the Helmand River. Passes through these rugged mountain ranges provide trade and communication links between the two

countries, thus making both dependent on each other in many ways. Since the line is not well-defined in most places, it is essentially non-existent for the local population. Locals on both sides of the border have never bothered with formalities, nor are they willing to pay heed any government regulations. They simply cross the border as they please and at their own convenience. Another reason why they do not take the border seriously is that it is not well-demarcated on the ground: except for a few places, there is no formal control by any government. It runs through many villages and towns inhabited by Pashtuns who share a common language, religion, culture, as well as customs and traditions. These tribesmen have intermarried and are little concerned with border regulations. Interestingly, many local people have their homes and *hujras* (guest houses) on the Pakistani side of the border and their agricultural land or property on the Afghanistan side of the Pak-Afghan international border. On certain occasions, e.g. the Muslim festival of *Eids* or funeral and marriage ceremonies, the associated events take place on both sides of the border.

Given this intricacy, a major political debate within the Afghan arena overpowers the idea of fencing the border from Pakistan's side. A circle believes that, escalation of tension at the Pak-Afghan international border is deliberately engineered by elements opposed to peace talks and improvement in

bilateral relations between the two countries. Tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan flare up to a level that there have been incidents of Afghan troops firing on Pakistani posts and civilian population, resulting in casualties. Due to the unexpected unfriendly action by the Afghan government, Pakistan was forced to send more troops to the border. According to legal experts, Pakistan can lawfully fence its side of the border without Afghanistan's consent by following "the precedence of the USA-Mexico border, which has been unilaterally fenced by the USA under the Secure Fence Act 2006.

This has been deemed lawful under the international law since the USA as a sovereign state is entitled to protect its territory, integrity and national security through the implementation of immigration policy."As a trust building initiative, an effective border management mechanism will be beneficial for both countries. Moreover, such establishment will also plug in many loopholes exploited by terrorists to conduct cross border terrorism. There is no basis to the Afghan objections to the settled issue of the Durand Line. However, some resistance shown by a few Afghan academics and politicians exists.

The long and porous Pak-Afghan international border requires more effective management for all infiltration to stop. Therefore, it is imperative for both countries to develop a

framework for strategic dialogue, focused on short, medium and long term solutions. Various forms of illegal activities such as smuggling of weapons, narcotics, vehicles, timber and electronic goods are routine matters. The health hazards over the years due to the spread of polio and other viruses through free movement also pose another challenge. While the Durand Line constitutes the legal border between Pakistan and Afghanistan under International Law, the legal rubric of rubric of 'easement rights' to the various Pashtun and other tribes along its sides has come to be misunderstood as facilitative of cross border movement at will.

Contrary to popular belief, the easement rights have nowhere been expressly mentioned or implied in the Durand Line Agreement of 1893 but have evolved outside its framework through practice by tribes divided by the international border. Based on the premise of easement of rights, the former Durand Line has emerged as a soft border or legally an entity less than an international border, which is a hollow argument. The practice of easement rights does not in any way dilute or diminish that legal status while it is also important to understand that the easement rights are only exercisable by members of the tribes divided by the Pak-Afghan international border and are not available to other ordinary nationals of Afghanistan or Pakistan.

It can be argued that the decision to fence the international border will not require any changes to the Durand Line Agreement and will not vitiate the non-treaty easement rights of the divided tribes. Moreover, notwithstanding these rights, the Agreement permits Pakistan to legitimately stop and check people sporadically crossing over the international border. The paper argues that as a matter of international law, both Afghanistan and Pakistan are compelled by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 to “deny safe haven to those who finance, plan, support, or commit terrorist acts, or provide safe havens” and to “prevent those who finance, plan, facilitate or commit terrorist acts from using their respective territories for those purposes against other states or their citizens.”

The Government of Pakistan should consider enacting a comprehensive legislation, which enables it to document persons crossing the international border. In order to institute an effective system of checks and balances along the international border, the proposed legislation should define easement right users and issue special 'easement right user IDs' to individuals falling under this category. Other key aspects of the proposed legislation include: Introduction of a category of persons crossing the international border into the territories of Pakistan as the Afghan refugees. The proposed law may provide that a refugee shall remain confined to a designated premise, his/her particulars shall be documented

by issuing a document specifying his/her refugee status and his/her movements shall be monitored.

The law should spell out that those conferred with refugee status should not be automatically granted Pakistani citizenship. Critically, the length of stay of a refugee in Pakistan may not confer on him/her a right to insist on Pakistani identification or citizenship status. The proposed law should also provide the Federal Government or the Provincial Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa the power to repatriate the Afghan refugees for settlement in relatively stable provinces of Afghanistan. The proposed legislation should also provide for the legal and objective basis of resettlement of Afghan refugees in other states such as Canada and Australia. Importantly, the suggested law must include appropriate sanctions if an Afghan refugee abuses this refugee status and indulges in drug trafficking across the Pak-Afghan international border or supports militants and terrorists targeting state structures in both Pakistan and Afghanistan.

The Legal Prism

Following a loyajirga, the Afghan Government on July 26, 1949, unilaterally declared that it considered the Durand Line as an imaginary line and that all previous Durand Line Agreements were henceforth void. Many groups in Afghanistan refuse to accept the legality of the international border on a

number of tenuous legal grounds, one of which is not recognising Pakistan as a 'successor state' but rather as a 'clean state', which must renegotiate a fresh border agreement with Afghanistan. However, as per international law, Pakistan clearly qualifies as a successor state, defined as 'the State which has replaced another State on the occurrence of a succession of states,' a position legalised by the Indian Independence Act 1947 and the United Kingdom Government in 1950.

Moreover, customary international law as codified in Article 11 of the Vienna Convention on the Succession of States says that 'a succession of states does not as such affect (a) a boundary established by a treaty; or (b) obligations and

Lessons Learnt!!

- Pakistan can lawfully fence its side of the border without Afghanistan's consent by following "the precedence of the USA-Mexico border, which has been unilaterally fenced by the USA under the Secure Fence Act 2006.
- Contrary to popular belief, the easement rights have nowhere been expressly mentioned or implied in the Durand Line Agreement of 1893 but have evolved outside its framework through practice by tribes divided by the former Durand Line.

rights established by a treaty and relating to the regime of a boundary.' Therefore, Pakistan, according to law, inherited the Durand Line Agreement as the successor state to British India and is under no legal obligation to renegotiate or conclude a new border agreement with Afghanistan. Afghanistan has been prevented from unilaterally renouncing the Durand Line Agreement due to the international law principle of *utipossidetis juris*, directly applicable in the context of decolonization, which provides that newly decolonized states should have the same borders that their preceding dependent area had before their independence.

The International Court of Justice has repeatedly upheld the principle of *utipossidetis juris* 'as a principle that transforms former administrative borders created along the colonial period into international frontiers.' To bring finality to colonial disputes and avoid future conflicts, this principle has been repeatedly applied in the decolonization process across various continents including Asia. Accordingly, Afghanistan is legally prohibited from unilaterally changing its borders with Pakistan that were settled under international law at the time of partition of India in 1947 pursuant to the extant Durand Line Agreement between Afghanistan and the British India Government.

Conclusion

The Pak-Afghan international border is frequently described as one of the most volatile and dangerous places in the world largely due to the presence of terrorist safe havens and lax Governmental control. Various forms of illegal activities such as smuggling of weapons, narcotics, vehicles, timber and electronic goods are routine matters. Most of the drugs produced in Afghanistan find their way into Pakistan. A growing concern today is the rise of terrorism and insurgencies by non-state actors from across the region. The porous nature of the international border enables the militants to conveniently seek sanctuaries in Afghanistan and Pakistan by crossing the border with ease. As a matter of international law, both Afghanistan and Pakistan are compelled by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 to 'deny safe haven to those who finance, plan, support, or commit terrorist acts, or provide safe havens' and to 'prevent those who finance, plan, facilitate or commit terrorist acts from using their respective territories for those purposes against other states or their citizens.

Afghanistan is bound by international law to cooperate with Pakistan in this respect. Since the commencement of Operation Zarb-e-Azb, those crossing from North Waziristan into Afghanistan via the Pak-Afghan international border fall under two distinct categories. The first cohort includes

civilians who have been displaced by conflict. The Afghan Government is obligated under international law to treat such individuals as refugees and take care of their welfare, accommodation and other needs. It can also document them or identify camps specifically for those displaced from North Waziristan. The second category of individuals includes non-state actors, militants or terrorists. Significantly, Afghanistan is bound by international law to either arrest such individuals or militarily neutralize them. A related question here is whether Pakistan can lawfully fence its side of the border without Afghanistan's consent. The USA - Mexico border has been unilaterally fenced by the USA under the Secure Fence Act 2006. This has been deemed lawful under international law since the USA as a sovereign state is entitled to protect its territory, integrity and national security through the implementation of immigration policy. Pakistan can thus, likewise unilaterally fence its border with Afghanistan due to its pressing national security imperatives and in furtherance of the fulfillment of its international legal obligations to effectively counter terrorism in the country.

**AFGHAN REFUGEES IN
PAKISTAN:
A TALE OF DECADES**

Introduction

In milieu of the border management issues between Pakistan and Afghanistan, lie the critical question of dealing with the Afghan refugees in Pakistan. Ever since the Russo war in Afghanistan, the refugees fled to bordering Iran and Pakistan for a safer place to live. Ironically, they found land to live safely, but are put to question as far as their legal status in these countries are concerned. On the other handan estimated 4 million Afghan refugees are hosted in Pakistan since the past decade. This is the largest number of refugees hosted by any country in the world. The country has now become home to the third generations of these refugees. However, all of the interviewee agree that, the efforts undertaken by Pakistan to provide shelter to these refugees are not acknowledged by Afghanistan and infact there have been host of national security issues triggered by their presence in the country.

One interviewee argued that, 'I do not wish to hurt the sentiments of Afghan Refugees who are residing with us since last nearly four decades. Today even their children own and love Pakistan as we had welcomed them with open arms. Shared our bread, shelter and even the businesses with them. We have had inter-marriages and today our children are growing together. Despite these facts let me say, yes there is a link with our national security challenges. Presence of Afghan Refugees is virtually made use of as a cover. Terrorists, inter mingle and merge in them and conduct heinous activities.

Their camps are used as hide outs. It's too hard for refugees to divulge any information on terrorists as this could be at the peril of their lives. Refugees therefore knowingly or unknowingly, unfortunately, serve as a conduit. Since these refugees are unable to return due to poor security situation in Afghanistan, this link and concomitant, threat has turned out to be existential for Pakistan'.⁵⁵ Hence, what can Pakistan do to deal with these challenges?

What Does International Humanitarian Law Entail?

Humanitarian law has developed in line, started from brutal battle in Italy 1864 followed by Geneva Convention. After the successful termination of the Geneva Conference of 1863, the Swiss Federal Council, on the initiative of the Geneva Committee, invited the governments of all European and several American states to a diplomatic conference for the purpose of adopting a convention for the amelioration of the condition of the wounded in war. The conference, at which 16 states were represented lasted from 8-22 August 1864. The draft convention submitted to the conference, which was prepared by the Geneva Committee, was adopted by the Conference without major alterations. The main principles laid down in the Convention and maintained by the later Geneva Conventions are: Relief to the wounded without any distinction as to nationality, neutrality (inviolability) of medical personnel

⁵⁵ Interview with the National Security Advisor.

and medical establishments and units; and the distinctive sign of the red cross on a white ground.

During the decolonisation period international organisations expanded, however, institutionalizing the distribution of aid is a problem. The governments, NGOs do not use aid for humanitarian purpose. Humanitarian Aid is not perfect nor it is the solution to all problems, it does require civilian and military efforts, humanitarian assistance should be linked properly to succession of peacekeeping, civilian law, military law and international humanitarian law. From decolonization period by 90's break down of two large countries, which created huge number of refugees and massive crisis across Gus Lavonia and Soviet Union humanitarian assistance continuously, grows as the disasters have grown. International Criminal courts ICC has been established, special courts in Sierra Leone, Rwanda, ex-Yugoslavia special courts for the Protection of Civilians in domains 'Combatants to prisoners of war to civilians and forexpanding human rights movement for all people. To internalise the aid it needs growth of non-governmental organizations and also global appeals & exposure such as Famine in Ethiopia and Ex-Yugoslavia.

To develop code of conduct and Emergence of 'humanitarian intervention' The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) United Nations (UN) body was formed in December 1991 by General Assembly Resolution. The core humanitarian principles is Humanity

(Moral imperative to respond: saving lives, alleviating suffering), Neutrality, Independence and Impartiality. To talk about Refugee Policy one of crucial aspect is '1951 Refugee Convention' which was focused on "owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country"

The Humanitarian Strategic Plan addresses the needs of 2.23 million people in Pakistan. In 2017, the humanitarian partners supported 0.14 million people that were displaced from FATA, .48 million TDPs that returned to FATA, 1.34 million registered Afghan refugees, and 0.27 million malnourished children and women. In addition, humanitarian partners supported the Government with disaster preparedness and coordination strategic objectives of the humanitarian community in Pakistan

It is hence required to support the humanitarian and protection needs of TDPs that remain displaced and those that have returned, ensuring a smooth transition to longer-term recovery and development, ensure protection, provide assistance and seek lasting solutions for Afghan refugees in Pakistan, and reduce rates of acute malnutrition among children under five years, and pregnant and lactating women in disaster affected areas by strengthening humanitarian

preparedness for a coordinated and effective response at local, provincial and national levels.

Afghan Refugees in Pakistan: A Legal Prism

Under the auspices of the Tripartite Agreement of March 2003 between the Governments of Pakistan & Afghanistan and the UNHCR, the Afghan refugees are to be repatriated to their home country on voluntary basis. The statistics shows that from 1990 to date 6.3 million refugees returned to Afghanistan, the main impediments to those voluntary returns were lack of shelter, access to land and livelihood, security and lack of socio economic infrastructure. In this regard. Pakistan Government has established infrastructure, alongside sufficient International and UN support. Resolution strategy for the refugee management is to adopt an overarching policy. Pakistan along with Afghanistan would have to adhere to regional approach in this matter.

There are also some factors highlighted which influence repatriation. It is a misperception that the refugees are pushed back to Afghanistan. The problem lied in the fact that when Torkham border was regulated it disturbed the normal way of refugee lives as they had developed a habit of two homes i.e. moving back and forth in Afghanistan and Pakistan whenever they wanted. In addition, Government of Afghanistan took an initiative to call its people to come back to own ground.

The Afghan government's sustainable reintegration is crucial for refugee settlement back in their homes. The pillar two of SSAR is Sustainable Reintegration in Afghanistan with emphasis on security related issues. The political dynamics of Afghanistan could not be ignored. 15 billion US\$ pledged at Brussels Conference were provided

Lessons Learnt!

Repatriation of Afghan Refugees is guided through the international Humanitarian law, which suggests that after the formation of 'National Unity Government' in Afghanistan, the environment of their host country is conducive for their return.

There is no universally acceptable definition of a refugee in international humanitarian law, hence, the understanding is operational and their handling varies from case to case.

as humanitarian assistance. Not only the refugees but the host community also benefited from these initiatives. It is an important aspect of security that the refugee camps do not foster terrorism while ensuring that the registered Afghans ever have been part of any terror incident. Some challenges in hand are security related issues when it comes to dispersed urban refugee settlements. On the other hand, the dwindling International support is making it hard to manage the refugee population anymore.

The way forward lies in peaceful repatriation of refugees back to their homeland. Afghanistan needs to have long term strategic planning in this regard. For this, long term Afghan political stability is essential. Sustained reintegration and reform agenda regarding refugee return is the dire need of the time. Meanwhile, on our side, proper documentation of the refugees living in host communities is necessity of time.

**UK PERSPECTIVE ON
BORDER MANAGEMENT OF
THE PAK- AFGHAN
INTERNATIONAL BORDER
AND REPATRIATION OF
REFUGEES IN AFGHANISTAN**

Introduction

The importance of border management of the Pak-Afghan international border was briefed by Pakistan speakers during both the first and second COIN / Stabilisation Conferences. The presentation by the Inspector General Frontier Corps- KPK during the 2nd Conference highlighted the problems of border management along the international border that the Frontier Corps faced frequently. The Pakistan Army has built 3295 border posts across the Pak-Afghan international border and in addition to border posts, official crossing points, and forts, the Pakistan Army were also using fencing (where possible) underground sensors, unattended ground surveillance systems, mobile surveillance and target acquisition radar, plus UAVs. The British Army experience in N. Ireland, and particular S. Armagh, was not dissimilar, although the length of border and resources committed were considerably less. As briefed at the second COIN Conference, the principles that the British Army has developed for ISR are:

- a. Discrimination.
- b. Persistent.
- c. Networked.
- d. Integrated.

Border Management Case study - Op BANNER

- a. **Background.** The troubled history of Ireland is long and complex. It is widely accepted that the period commonly known as 'The Troubles' began in 1969 following an increase in sectarian violence between the Nationalist Catholic Community of Northern Ireland (N. Ireland) and the Loyalist Protestant Community, although the term 'Troubles' is broadly associated with Irish revolutionary action throughout the centuries. Following a steady increase in violent clashes between Nationalists and Loyalists throughout 1969, British soldiers were deployed under Op BANNER on 14th August, ostensibly to keep the peace between the two communities in the major cities of Belfast and Londonderry.





OP BANNER, Northern Ireland. Securing the population

- b. Whilst the Official Irish Republican Army (OIRA) had existed for many years in both Ireland, and following partition, the emergent terrorist organisation in N. Ireland post-1969 was the Provisional IRA (PIRA) formed as a breakaway from OIRA when the latter ceased its operations in May 1972. PIRA experienced support from the Republican⁵⁶ communities in hard-line areas of N. Ireland, including urban areas of Belfast, Londonderry as well as rural areas including East Tyrone and South Armagh. The

⁵⁶ A Republican differs from a Nationalist through his / her willingness to use / support the use of terrorist activities to further political causes.

latter came to be known as 'bandit country' and contained those that were, arguably, amongst the most hard-line of Republican terrorists within PIRA. The emergence of S. Armagh PIRA as a proficient and ruthless terrorist organisation with a well-developed support network stretching throughout the county and across the border became an issue that needed to be specifically focussed upon by the security forces.

- c. **Border Management in S. Armagh–The Need.** The S. Armagh PIRA had formed a stronghold in and around the village of Crossmaglen near the border between N. Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. Attacks against security forces, both police and British Army, were not uncommon and the use of the border as a means of smuggling money, weapons, ammunition and personnel was commonplace throughout the 1970 and 1980s. Security Forces were faced with an increasing threat and little in the way of surveillance to give prior warning. Travel by vehicle in S. Armagh was not possible from early 1980s onwards and the threat to helicopters likewise increased during the same period.

ISR Principles–Application to Border Management in Northern Ireland

- a. **Discrimination.** Ensuring that terrorists are clearly identified and separated from the population and that the population, whom themselves are the victims of terrorism,

are not discriminated against by CT measures purely because of where they live. The presence of observation towers in S. Armagh was most definitely a cause of friction with the local, republican community, and as such arguably contradicted the need, as per COIN principles, to isolate the terrorist from the population. However, there is arguably a point that is reached whereby the need for improved security through enhanced information, and subsequently intelligence, outweighs the negative effect. This was the case in S. Armagh. The towers enabled the British Army to identify far better those involved in terrorist activity from those going about their daily lives, through the establishment of a pattern of life. From this came the ability to discriminate between terrorist activity and normal, everyday activity leading to far greater opportunity for intelligence based arrest operations conducted by the police service supported by the military.



OP BANNER, Northern Ireland. Rural patrol in S. Armagh

b. **Persistent.** Border management, and in particular surveillance (either through deployed manpower or technical solutions) needs to be free of gaps in coverage either through time or geography. Manned towers in N. Ireland were extremely useful when introduced, but needed to be supplemented by Ground Sensing Radar (GSR) to enable coverage of 'blind spots' caused by complex and mountainous terrain.

The terrain in S-Armagh as briefed by Brigadier Bowder during the second COIN/Stabilisation

Conference, did not lend itself to static, infrastructure based, surveillance only. To achieve persistent

surveillance in complex terrain required a combination of static,


manned hardened infrastructure plus mobile patrols, static (covert) patrols and aviation surveillance when the situation allowed. Only through this blended mix of surveillance, using all assets available, was persistence enabled. Again, as discussed in the second COIN /



Border Security Watchtower,
S.Armagh, Northern Ireland

Stabilisation Conference, technology has moved on considerably since the mid-1980s when the S. Armagh observation towers were built. Whilst the need for manned surveillance may, arguably, never be entirely replaced, the use of drones is becoming more prevalent today and offers an effective alternative both at the tactical and operational level.

- c. **Networked.** A lesson learnt by the British Army in Northern Ireland was that systems need to be linked together to enable tracking and subsequent operations by the military or police. Systems that are unable to communicate information to each other rapidly are ineffective (link to Gen Capewell's presentation and his assertion of the importance of investment in communications and exploitation of the information age). At the height of the Troubles in N. Ireland, the means of delivering networked systems was quite basic, only maturing to a level whereby results could be clearly seen, by the 1990s. In the 21st Century, the technology is not only available to enable networking, but is in fact commonplace. It could be argued that interoperability of systems is not a technological issue, but more of a cultural one compounded by complexities surrounding acquisition.



Northern Ireland – permanent vehicle checkpoint, South Armagh

- d. **Integrated.** Linked to 'networked'. Systems must be integrated and speak to each other; for example – surveillance cameras in N. Ireland were integrated with a vehicle registration plate recognition system that enabled rapid acquisition and tracking of suspect vehicles.
- e. **Policing and Co-Operation.** As stated above, the border between NI and RoI is approximately 400kms and, as such, is considerably shorter than the 2500kms of the Durand Line. It is, however, characterised by complex terrain that hinders surveillance, and is porous in areas. Surveillance solutions, including patrolling and technical assets

describes above, have done much to tighten those porous areas but the need for cross-border cooperation has existed since the formation of NI and has not always been simple to implement. A Northern Ireland Affairs Committee Report⁵⁷, dated Jun 2009, stated that routine contact occurs at formal and informal level between the PSNI and An Garda Síochana⁵⁸...'. It also states the informal relationship between police station on either side of the border where informal liaison occurs as routine business. This low level cooperation is important to ensuring a common situational awareness but the relationship needs to manage to the lowest levels of the police force. Cooperation between police forces occurs at the highest levels as well. The Chief Constables are stated as having a close relationship that enables cooperation on border management, counter-terrorism and criminality; cooperation between the two '...just makes common sense....'

- f. **Security and the Community.** Even as recently as 2009, relationships between the security forces and the police in the border areas of NI was challenging. Certainly, the ability for the police to patrol without British Army in support, made them more approachable. The building of

⁵⁷ Parliamentary Affairs Committees are cross-Parliament bodies that are responsible for reviewing Government Policy and its impact in specific areas. The Northern Ireland Affairs Committee exists to review policy in Northern Ireland.

⁵⁸ The police service of ROI normally referred to as the Gardai.

trust between the PSNI and the local community was absolutely paramount in maintaining situational awareness. As Assistant Chief Constable Gillespie summarise ‘...What we really need do need....is what we call ‘community intelligence’, members of the public who are prepared to come forward and give is information about dissident republican activists⁵⁹’.



⁵⁹ Dissident republican activists refers to active members of the Real IRA, Continuity IRA and INLA. These are republican terrorist organisations that merged as a result of the Provisional IRA agreement to disarm.


Applying Border Management Lessons from NI/ RoI to the Pak-Afghan International Border.

As was discussed during the 2nd Pakistan-UK COIN / Stabilisation Conference, there are clearly similarities between the border of NI and RoI and the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan; complex terrain that challenges surveillance and is resource intensive, a complex political scenario⁶⁰ are common. There are however key differences; the length of the Durand line and a far more challenging terrain undoubtedly requires greater resource than that of RoI and NI if the principles of ISR are to be applied being one such example.

- a. **Technical Solutions.** It is clear that the continued presence of the British Army in border areas of NI, such as S. Armagh, was a cause of great resentment within the nationalist communities in the area. This presence included observation towers as well as permanent VCPs and Army patrols. Herein lies the dichotomy; the need for cross-border security to defeat terrorism, and associated cross-border criminality, was a key aspect of UK policy but the very presence of those tools needed to deliver that security was at odds with the need for a unified community that supported the security force and would enable a return to normality. Technology provided one means in the

⁶⁰ At the time of writing, the status of the UK border with RoI is under discussion as Brexit negotiations continue.

border areas of S. Armagh to enable the reduction of overt military presence without the loss of persistent surveillance that could be used to trigger a response from elements of the security forces located away from the most contentious areas. Given the length of the Pak-Afghan international border, the complexity of the terrain and the drain on resources required to deliver persistent surveillance, there would seem to be a case for exploring technical solutions that, whilst they may not totally replace the need for a military presence, may present a means to reduce the permanent military presence in the region.



- b. **Cross-border Cooperation.** The UK experience from NI demonstrates that whilst there are complex challenges at all levels, political to local security force, the need for cross-border co-operation to combat illegal cross-border activity, be it security or criminality related, is beyond doubt. It is

therefore incumbent to ensure that relationships are formed at the tactical, operational and strategic levels to enable this cooperation to take place, cognisant that there will be differing opinions on each side that will require open channels of dialogue either bi-laterally or enabled by a third party.



- c. **Community Confidence.** Relationships between the border communities in NI and the security forces throughout the period of the Troubles⁶¹ were difficult at best, and non-existent in certain areas. Critical to the 'normalisation' of security in the border areas was the reduction of the military and the provision of civilian only policing. In particular, the ability for a police force, with a balance of protestant and catholic, recruited from the area,

⁶¹ The Troubles refers to the most recent period, 1969 – 2005, the military response to which was conducted under Operation BANNER.

provided a more appealing model and one which the local community could engage with in a way that was not previously possible when a police patrol needed to be secured by a British Army patrol, often at Company level. There is similarity here between the UK experience and the Pakistan experience in FATA; a security force that recruits from within the community will inevitably create the confidence in the community that a military force, drawn from a wider area, will struggle to do. With the increase in



confidence at the tactical level, comes a strengthening of relations that begins to impact at the strategic level through a belief that security can be delivered without a permanent military presence.

CONCLUSIONS

Introduction

Stabilisation is indeed an approach for establishing enduring legitimate political authority. Contrary to popular belief, it is not a series of activities with a set template. It is different from stability which is a transitional process and is threatened by conflicting interests of various actors. At local level, stabilisation is a problem solving community driven approach, embedded in a strategic context of the society. Hence, it should be dynamic and adaptive to expectations of the local populace.

Pakistan and UK, as two states engrossed in Counter terrorism and Counterinsurgency operations in close proximity, have a wide ranged experience of employing methods for achieving sustainable peace in conflict-prone areas. During the course of this publication, it was agreed that both the states have diverse experiences, yet the lessons learnt by them in their own setting remain relevant for each other. In fact, where militancy, terrorism and insurgency have transgressed international borders, lessons learnt in campaigns of individual states to curb them, and later on employment of stabilisation efforts, also have an international character.

Hence, in order to examine transaction to sustainable peace in a conflict-prone environment, we need to develop personal relationships. This is what the UK learnt in both its classic and

recent COIN and stabilisation efforts, and also what Pakistan inferred from its 'counter militancy cum terrorism' campaign alongside the stabilisation processes. This chapter intends to draw conclusions of the study and also enumerate lessons from the CT, COIN and stabilisation drives of both Pakistan and UK.

Drawing Conclusions

The UK COIN doctrine has evolved over the past 70 years by considering varying intervening factors. It is a decades old understanding with evolution in strategy and tactic within the ambit of various case studies including Malaya, Cyprus and most recent Afghanistan. It has learnt that COIN and stabilisation are two distinct yet intertwined processes. On the other hand, Pakistan's counter terrorism experiences are reflected from a war on its own soil, instigated by backlash of instability in the neighbourhood, particularly Afghanistan. The militancy cum terrorism became an existential threat to the state, where political institutions, specifically in FATA failed to deliver. As a result, the campaign initially established security centric approach with the primacy of stabilisation efforts focused on political well being.

Pakistan's internal war alongside the influence of instability from the neighbourhood was an altogether different process, it rose issues pertaining to restricting flow of instability in the

entire country and simultaneously curbing security threats in the conflict prone areas and ensuring stabilisation. Whereas; UK's COIN experiences and later stabilisation have been that of foreign intervention in the recent history and in former British colonies after WW II. The complexities were manifold yet distinct from internal campaigns.

Whilst the similarities between UK and Pakistan approaches, it should be noted that there is a significant difference. Pakistan defines its on-going campaign as counter terrorism cum militancy, an element of which is stabilisation. The focus of these operations was, by their nature, military centric, although now, with the FATA Reforms Package approved, there is clearly a political emphasis going forward. Pakistan's approach has been to eliminate elements of instability, concurrently providing space to stabilisation; the challenge has been to ensure security simultaneously. Hence, the lessons learnt by both the countries are discussed in detail as following:

UK Lessons Learnt: COIN and Stabilisation

- a. **Doctrine.** COIN and Stabilisation are often seen as the same. They are not. Notwithstanding the identification of 'primacy of political purpose' within British COIN Doctrine, COIN has, by nature, a strong military purpose. Stabilisation is all about the political effect—military action is but a

means to provide short term security to enable political activity to take place. What can be learned clearly from the campaign in Malaya is that, although ultimately a successful campaign, an approach more akin to stabilisation, rather than a militarily focussed COIN campaign, may have delivered more discernible impact amongst the local population at an earlier stage. It should be remembered, that many of the senior British Army officers during this period had learnt their business conducting conventional operations in WWII, albeit in theatres as diverse as N. Africa and S. Asia as well as Europe. The temptation to see every situation where an 'opposing force' existed, as was the case in Malaya and Cyprus, as being a problem with a purely military solution, would have been easy to do. The ability to see beyond warfighting and into the need to address root causes of instability through political means, took time and a cultural change. As identified by Lt Col James Gladwin, Stabilisation Unit, tactical success in itself may defeat insurgency in the short term, but long term stability requires the root causes of the insurgency to be addressed; strategic success therefore lies in political resolution and not military victory.

- b. **Timeframe.** The stabilisation approach requires long term planning. What may be regarded as a military victory is but a small component of long term political settlement, capacity building of civil agencies and political settlement.

One weakness of the military, as demonstrated in both Malaya and Cyprus, is that short term military victories can have an inaccurate and unbalanced sense of campaign success attached to them; the same could have been said of UK involvement in campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan more recently. The stabilisation approach demands that the long-term impact is planned alongside the short-term activities required to deliver tactical security. A failure to address this may result in the root causes of instability being overlooked for the immediately more obvious successes delivered by the military which, although invaluable, are but one building block in the overall path of long term stability. As alluded to by Sarah Spencer, BHC Islamabad, the delivery of 'hard effect', using the military, is required to improve security, but is not an end in itself. Using military power to enforce ceasefires creates the space for further stabilising activities. Typically this could be humanitarian assistance or cross-Govt teams, PRTs being a good examples, to deliver a specific stabilisation effect. Ceasefires can be fragile and the military will be required to constantly enforce, but again, only to create the conditions for other organisations, be that NGOs or OGDS to have an effect.

- c. **Political Primacy.** As discussed in chapter one, both Malaya and Cyprus were ultimately successful examples of post WWII COIN operations. Critical to each was the

identification of the root causes of the insurgency and the means for addressing these politically. The military was required throughout the campaigns to enable the environment through which the political end state could be achieved; ultimately, it was primarily the political and not the military means through which success was delivered. Perhaps the clearest example of this in British COIN history is Op BANNER, NI. As Lt Col James Gladwin summarises:

It is important that strategic effect requires time to deliver, which may not always be apparent to the military at the tactical level who see rapid effect at the tactical level

Military victories at the tactical level punctuate Op BANNER throughout the near 40 years of its duration. The implementation of border management through layered surveillance undoubtedly hampered, although did not completely cease, the ability of terrorists to operate across borders, whilst kinetic operations certainly curtailed IRA activity. The long term solution was, and remains, political and not purely military. Military, tactical activity set the terms for political, strategic success.

- d. **Single, Integrated Approach.** Military and civil agencies need to work in tandem towards a single military end state. If that end state is not identified, there will be no unity of purpose and the root causes of instability will not be addressed. The successful campaigns in Malaya and Cyprus bear this out quite clearly. The establishment of the UK

Stabilisation Unit has done much to ensure coherence between Government Departments as well as delivering the capability for to deploy integrated, cross-Govt teams rapidly to prevent the outset of conflict or subsequent escalation. The Stabilisation Unit draws expertise from FCO, DFID, MOD, Police as well as NGOs and think-tanks, making it fully able to deliver the Full Spectrum Approach. Although not covered specifically in this publication, UK experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrated that the lessons learnt, particularly in Malaya, with regard cross Govt Dept synthesis, whilst understood, were much harder to put into practice. The Stabilisation Unit is a means to ensure that a cross-Departmental organisation exists as a norm and not as a bespoke organisation that needs to be formed as an afterthought during each state intervention.

- e. **Border Management.** Managing borders is a key area of both COIN and Stabilisation. To achieve effective border management using security forces alone will be constrained by available manpower and complexity of terrain. To achieve constant coverage regardless of terrain and visibility (due to weather) requires a combination of



static locations, mobile forces and technical solutions to deliver the necessary persistent coverage. As the British learnt during Op BANNER, there is a balance to be struck. By design, the existence of observation towers along a border is intrusive. It delivers an effect upon the terrorist in that it denies freedom of movement and enables the security forces to build a pattern of life and identify the abnormal from the normal. This is key to military operations. It also, however, impinges upon the everyday lives of those not involved in terrorist, or related, activities. There is therefore a decision to be made which balances the need for short term security to enable long term political resolution versus the effect on re-enforcing those factors which contributed to the root causes of insurgency in the first place. Ultimately, the need to isolate the insurgent / terrorist from the population support base needs to be considered when designing a persistent and comprehensive border management plan.

- f. **Maintaining Popular Support.** In each of the case studies above, arguably the common thread throughout, in addition to the need for political primacy, is the imperative to maintain the support of the population. In doing so, the legitimacy of government is maintained whilst the support base to the insurgency is mitigated. As coalition forces found to their cost in Afghanistan, collateral damage resulting in civilian casualties, and unnecessary

infrastructure damage, has a severe negative effect and adds weight to the insurgent narrative. This is best surmised by Gen McCrystal:

An Army cannot fight an insurgency that same way that it does a standing army without risking unnecessary civilian casualties and collateral damage. It must deliver those basic services that are required by a population (healthcare, housing, water, sewerage etc) as soon as is practicable after the physical act of 'fighting' has ceased. This is necessary to support address the root causes of insurgency and promote political objectives. The risk of not doing this are that the population retains as a sense of grievance allowing the insurgents to return.

- g. **Refugee Management.** Violent conflicts will inevitably lead to the creation of refugees. It is the internationally accepted responsibility of the host nation to provide security to refugees, and to manage the repatriation to their parent country of those refugees in a manner which ensures their safety and protection

Pakistan Lessons Learnt: Counterterrorism and Stabilisation

- a. **Identifying the Enemy.** In a major counter terrorism campaign it is crucial to identify the nature of enemy and threats. This is imperative for later employment of stabilisation efforts and ensuring Clear-Hold-Build-

Transfer processes. It is true because, the nature of enemy effects the level of participation of local populace in stabilisation processes. Hence, Pakistan is posed with a 'militant cum terrorist' challenge and has not faced any organised form of insurgency. It is both a militant and terrorist challenge, due to the presence of such individuals who are motivated by deprivations and exploited by various factions to conduct terrorist and violent activities to instill fear in the public. There has been a major drive by these individuals to physically inflict hurt on civilians, Government properties and even schools and hospitals, not for any political motive, but for weakening the State from within.

This classification of an enemy was crucial in Pakistan, amidst the systematic evolution of wars from their traditional outlook to a more sophisticated 'hybrid' nature.' However, where terrorism follows the model of an insurgency, it is challenging to define the perpetrators. In Pakistan, the challenge has evolved innately without a popular support from the local public. Hence, it poses a loosely knitted terrorist challenge to the State. Theoretically, the entity is supposed to be confined in a specific territory, with its administrative setup overshadowing the operational wing. On the contrary, for Pakistan, this enemy's real power rests in its scheme of

operations and transcends territories. Hence, the challenge in Pakistan is that of a militant nature which when evolves from violent extremism resorts to acts of terrorism.

b. **CT and Stabilisation are Simultaneous Campaigns.**

For Pakistan, at the tactical level, on one hand, there was a kinetic struggle to pacify 'militancy' generating violent opposition to the State through terrorism, while on the other hand; there was also an urgency to bring back the conflict prone areas to normalcy. In other words, the attempt was to swiftly streamline these two efforts, for achieving successes in the overall 'counter-militancy cum terrorism' campaign, under the ambit of sub-conventional warfare. Generally, the idea has rested on the notion of launching stabilisation efforts sometimes even amid a military operation, particularly in areas with heavy civilian presence, like Swat.

From FATA and particularly NWA, it was rather learnt that, the stabilisation efforts need to be deliberated upon prior to a military operation. This entails prior planning for capacity building of civilian institutions as major parts of stabilisation and peace building efforts in a conflict-prone environment. Meanwhile, denying space to terrorist factions is a strategic goal, complemented by tactical and operational advances.

A counter terror strategy is thus a response to dismantle a terrorist network's capability of performing terrorist acts. Problem arises when sometimes these acts are undertaken by individuals in isolation of an allegiance to an organisation or outfit. Extremism and fundamentalism have thus taken much the space of the debate for deliberating on these issues. Hence, Pakistan's counter terrorism approach has been directed towards a quick response through kinetic and non-kinetic options in large pockets of areas including Swat, South Waziristan Agency and now North Waziristan Agency. Alongside an initiative of across the board attempts through the National Action Plan and judicial and police reforms took center stage after incidents like the APS attack in 2014.

- c. **Invigorating the Administrative Setup.** Viewing the compulsions of COIN, CT and stabilisation in isolation of how the administrative setup behaves during and after a military operation may be delusional. Ideally, there is a room for striking a balance between the military doctrine of Clear, Hold, Build, Transfer phases and the administrative machinery to flex its muscles in the area. Hence, an effective administration is in fact the key for ensuring sustained stability and peace in such areas. The often termed 'success' story of Swat, a scenic valley in Northern Pakistan, part of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province remains as an illustration.

Since, Pakistan was fighting a war on its own soil, hence the approach was multi-pronged people centric with limited use of force. where the military operations were an amalgam of hard and soft power, the counter terrorism doctrine focused on defeating the terrorists, and factoring WHAM since the very outset of operations. This included a well thought out philosophy of securing the peace loving people, using and restricting the use of force to bare minimum for defeating the spoilers of peace. Hence, when it is said that, 'no love stories are born out of military operations', Swat was a clear illustration of soft pronged military thought. Meanwhile, at the operational level, the stabilisation phase in the area included four main pillars: Rebuilding, Rehabilitation, Political Stability and De-Radicalization.

- d. **Fencing the Porous Border.** The Pakistan-Afghanistan border is frequently described as one of the most volatile and dangerous places in the world largely due to the presence of terrorist safe havens and lax Governmental control. Various forms of illegal activities such as smuggling of weapons, narcotics, vehicles, timber and electronic goods are routine matters. Most of the drugs produced in Afghanistan find their way into Pakistan. A growing concern today is the rise of terrorism and insurgencies by non-state actors from across the region. The porous nature of the border enables the militants to conveniently seek

sanctuaries in Afghanistan and Pakistan by crossing the border with ease. As a matter of international law, both Afghanistan and Pakistan are compelled by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 to 'deny safe haven to those who finance, plan, support, or commit terrorist acts, or provide safe havens' and to 'prevent those who finance, plan, facilitate or commit terrorist acts from using their respective territories for those purposes against other states or their citizens.

Afghanistan is bound by international law to cooperate with Pakistan in this respect. Since the commencement of Operation Zarb-e-Azb, those crossing from North Waziristan into Afghanistan via the Durand Line fall under two distinct categories. The first cohort includes civilians who have been displaced by conflict. The Afghan Government is obligated under international law to treat such individuals as refugees and take care of their welfare, accommodation and other needs. It can also document them or identify camps specifically for those displaced from North Waziristan. The second category of individuals includes non-state actors, militants or terrorists. Significantly, Afghanistan is bound by international law to either arrest such individuals or militarily neutralise them. A related question here is whether Pakistan can lawfully fence its side of the border without Afghanistan's consent. The USA-Mexico border has been unilaterally fenced by the

USA under the Secure Fence Act 2006. This has been deemed lawful under international law since the USA as a sovereign state is entitled to protect its territory, integrity and national security through the implementation of immigration policy. Pakistan can thus, likewise unilaterally fence its border with Afghanistan due to its pressing national security imperatives and in furtherance of the fulfillment of its international legal obligations to effectively counter terrorism in the country.

On the other hand, dealing with the situation of Afghan refugees in Pakistan is entirely a political decision. Meanwhile, as a long term measure, enhancing security in the border region is essential. In this regard, Pakistan took steps like abolishing the easement rights and establishing border security posts across the Durand Line. Pakistan is also undergoing rigorous border management steps which include fencing. Ironically, this is not reciprocated from Afghanistan. Hence, for sustained stability and significantly improving the security situation in conflict prone areas, managing border is indeed crucial.

- e. **Repatriation of Refugees.** There is no universally acceptable definition of a refugee in international humanitarian law. However, whenever there is a conflict situation in a country, the issues of refugees is instigated. In fact, internally displaced people are prone to threats, similar to the ones crossing over borders. From

experiences in Swat and NWA, it was learnt that before initiating any military operation, ensuring safety of civilians and providing them passage to evacuate the area is indeed crucial.

Conclusion

Today we live in a highly competitive World, where the challenges are of complex nature. Hence, Counterterrorism and Counter Insurgency operations are in fact employed for curbing generational challenges. In this regard, maintaining 'strategic patience' is the key. As, ensuring stabilisation is not about achieving a status quo, but it's about initiating a journey. Time and patience is required for achieving its goal, alongside relative benefits and dis-benefits.

Today, both Pakistan and UK are aware of the nature of challenges posed in their relative setting and have learnt to adapt to them by considering their evolving nature. In this regard, for greater regional order, convergences and divergences should be deliberated amongst States. The initiative between Pakistan and UK Armies to discuss the processes, alongside the related stabilisation efforts, is indeed the right step in the right direction. The conferences enabled both the sides to share relevant experiences in an open and candid environment, whereas, this research based publication

marks the beginning of a further enhanced deliberative process.

In a nutshell, where the UK has come a long way in its COIN and Stabilisation processes, Pakistan also believes with great optimism that it has turned the table and has embarked on a journey where it would be in a position to generate 'peace within' and 'peace without'- under a democratic order which sustains enduring conditions of stability.

Annexure-A

UK - Pakistan Joint Conferences

Background. The origins of the UK / Pakistan series of COIN / Stabilisation Conferences stems from a joint initiative between Defence Section Islamabad and MO Directorate, General Headquarters. There was joint agreement that both UK and Pakistan had much to learn from each other from shared experiences, and from the capacity for frank and candid exchanges borne from mutual respect. Why were themes selected? For each of the two iterations of the Conference, themes were selected and discussed between both parties before being agreed as mutually beneficial.

Stabilisation Conference - 2016

- a. **Theme One: Comparing UK and Pakistan Approaches to COIN.** A very generic opening address, but one that was necessary to establish a baseline understanding of how the UK and Pakistan approach COIN operations. It is important to note that this was entirely a discussion on COIN and not stabilisation operations. Equally as important, there is a significant difference to UK experience of COIN post-WWII when compared with the Pakistan experience of COIN since 2001. Pakistan is quite clearly conducting COIN within its

own state borders, whereas the UK has conducted interventions at distance. Internal COIN and Interventions each come with their own distinct and complex characteristics; militarily and politically. These will be discussed in more detail later.

- b. **Theme Two: Strategic Communications and Messaging.** Strategic Communication (STRATCOM) is widely accepted as being good policy to underpin successful COIN and Stabilisation Operations. It is also accepted that STRATCOM needs to be integrated into campaign planning at the earliest stages, and not added as an afterthought once the campaign plan has been formulated. The real importance of this theme was to share experience on best practice for STRATCOM and establishing narratives. The 'enemy' is capable of putting out its message to a wide audience very quickly through social media; it is important to be able to be proactive rather than reactive. Counter-narratives are necessary, especially when the insurgent is not confined by the need for truth and accuracy, but the importance of being 'on the front foot' and sending out our message first should not be underestimated. This theme also explored the difference between 'the domestic narrative' and STRATCOM when the operation is conducted as an intervention. The UK experience from Malaya and Cyprus appears different from that of the Pakistan Military in FATA but there are many similarities.

c. **Theme Three: Broad Spectrum Security Operations.**

The purpose of this theme was to focus primarily on the civil-military relationship and the importance of understanding who the single campaign authority is when conducting Stabilisation Operations. Political oversight, fusing of multiple intelligence agencies, management of expectations and differing security standards and cultural differences all need to be understood and managed - COIN / Stabilisation Operations are more demanding of these characteristics than conventional warfare. Add to the mixture the UK experience of multinational alliances, and the Pakistan experiences of the need for cooperation on the Pakistan / Afghanistan Border, then the need to fully understand the significance of broad spectrum operations is clearly apparent

d. **Theme Four: Governance and Institutional Capacity Building.**

The UK and Pakistan have different experiences in these areas. The UK experiences in Cyprus have demonstrated the complexity of establishing credible Governance institutions that were accepted by the majority of the population. Failing to satisfy the population socio, political and economic expectations can often exasperate the root causes of the insurgency. Pakistan experiences in the FATA are different. The tribal nature of the FATA, largely destroyed by the insurgency, is culturally important to that region and re-empowering this system by the

military was a key aspect of the counterinsurgency campaign. Regardless of the circumstances, the underpinning principle of legitimacy of governance is one that needs to be understood in the regional, state and international context.

- e. **Theme Five: Economic and Infrastructure Development.** Planning for reconstruction post conflict should be an integral part of COIN and Stabilisation Operations. The significance of this theme was to understand where the responsibility lay for reconstruction, including the requirement of governance infrastructure and basic services delivered to the citizens of conflicted affected areas. The crucial discussion centres around civ-mil primacy and who should lead on reconstruction efforts. The military is well placed in the short term as reconstruction efforts are intrinsically linked with security, but is this the optimum solution for long term planning? There is clear overlap with long term political planning and a commitment to transition from military to civilian, but there is conversely a requirement from 'quick win projects' to generate faith in government structures as early as possible.

Stabilisation Conference- 2017

The Conference held at NDU in March 2017 saw a shift from purely COIN to Stabilisation. It is probably a fair assessment to

say that, in many ways, the importance of this Conference was in exploring what was understood by stabilisation, beyond classical COIN. The themes covered were

a. **Theme One: Stabilisation Efforts: Sharing Experiences (Military Support of Governing Authorities during Hold, Build and Transfer stages of a Campaign).**

This was an extremely important theme from the UK perspective; it was broken down into two sessions. The first session was delivered by Ms Sarah Spencer, the UK Head of Conflict, Security and Stabilisation Fund, formerly of the UK Stabilisation Unit and focussed on looking at the lessons that the UK have learnt from recent interventions and stabilisation operations in several regions. The second presentation was delivered by Lt Gen (Retd) Capewell, former Chief of Joint Operations, and looked globally at challenges surrounding failed states and military interventions. The cross-governmental nature of these briefs underpinned the overarching theme of the Conference and the move from COIN to wider stability operations.

b. **Theme Two: The Law and Stabilisation Efforts: Constraint and Practical Solutions.** From the British Army perspective, the legal aspects of COIN were analysed using an N. Ireland example, delivered by Brig Ben Barry, IISS. N. Ireland is unique in all the examples used by UK

speakers in that the campaign was conducted within the borders of the UK. The key issues discussed were in relation to how legal parameters prevent over-reaction and in doing so ensure that the insurgent is not able to gain support through propaganda. There are clearly parallels with STRATCOM and superior narratives which will be discussed further in this paper.

c. **Theme Three: Border Management-Issues and Challenges.**

Border management is something that the British Army has experience of through four decades of conducting COIN operations. Many of the lessons learnt from N. Ireland have clear parallels with those that the Pakistan Military have gained in FATA. Whilst the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland at 400km is considerably smaller than the 2500kms that the Pakistan Military are faced with, the principles are nonetheless very similar. Challenges surrounding complex terrain and the ability to provide constant surveillance regardless of the weather provide a problem not unique to Pakistan. The principles that the British Army have developed for successful ISR operations are as follows:

- 1) **Discrimination.** Ensuring that insurgents/terrorists are clearly identified and separated from the population and that the population, whom themselves may be the victims of terrorism, are not discriminated

against by CT measures purely because of where they live.

- 2) **Persistent.** Border management, and in particular surveillance (either through deployed manpower or technical solutions), needs to be free of gaps in coverage either through time or geography. Manned towers in N. Ireland were extremely useful when introduced, but needed to be supplemented by other means, including Ground Sensing Radar (GSR) to enable coverage of 'blind spots' caused by complex terrain.
- 3) **Networked.** A lesson learnt by the British Army in Northern Ireland was that systems need to be linked together to enable tracking and subsequent operations by the military or police. Systems that are unable to communicate information to each other rapidly are ineffective (link to Gen Capewell's point on the importance of investment in communications and exploitation of the information age).
- 4) **Integrated.** Linked to 'networked'. Systems must be integrated and speak to each other; for example - surveillance cameras in NI were integrated with a vehicle registration plate recognition system that enabled rapid acquisition and tracking of suspect vehicles. Border management in COIN is complex and linked intrinsically with local, state and international factors and considerations. The principles of COIN

include 'understanding the human terrain'. This becomes a key consideration when freedom of movement across the border is an expected right of the citizens on both sides—as was the case in Northern Ireland. At what stage does the necessity to secure the border to prevent easy passage to terrorists, prevent security forces from 'gaining and maintaining popular support'. This will be considered in more depth in Chapter 3 of this paper

- d. **Theme Four: Managing the Narrative.** It is vitally important to understand local cultures and the history that contribute to situations. Understanding local issues and addressing them is some way towards defeating the propaganda of militancy, particularly if the story is told by 'local voices'. Effective communication of terrorist organisations such as Daesh is based upon the ability to disseminate rapidly a clear and simple message based on historical and ideological basis, but backed by the spread of fear and use / threat of terror, is important to understand in order to be able to counter it. The terrorist frequently uses 'fake news' to support their message –it is the role of the state to re-enforce the truth and manage perceptions to counter militancy. Again, there are clear links between this theme and the principles of COIN. For a story to be believed the story teller must have credibility—this is gained through 'securing the population' and by 'gaining and maintaining

popular support'. With these being achieved, those that we seek to influence, i.e. the population, are faced with a choice of whom to believe. Inevitably, credibility lies with those that promise the delivery the basic services required for human survival and subsequently deliver upon that promise.

- e. **Theme Five: Refugee Management and Repatriation.** The UN says a record number of people have been displaced by conflict globally, estimating that 65.3 million people were either refugees, asylum seekers or internally displaced at the end of 2015. The UK has recently agreed to accept 20, 000 refugees, fleeing from conflict in Iraq and Syria, into the UK. There is quite clearly a moral need globally to provide security for refugees until the point where it is possible to repatriate to their parent country. The UK believes that this is conditions based, i.e. security of returning refugees are of primary importance must be managed carefully – i.e. the security situation permitted it, and enough planning had gone into shelter, food and water for those returning.

Recommendations – The Next Conference

- a. **Annual Event.** This joint publication is important. There have now been two conferences and common threads are starting to appear that are both mutually beneficial in developing common understanding of COIN and Stabilisation Operations. By capturing those threads, and comparing them with experiences, from both UK and Pakistan, of previous and current campaigns, it should be possible to conduct planning over the next few years for a continuation of the series of COIN / Stabilisation Conferences. From the UK perspective, the current model of alternating between UK and Pakistan works well and is something that should be maintained.

- b. **Attendance.** Both Conferences conducted so far have been very well attended from the military, but less so from civilian agencies. It would be beneficial if the invite were extended to include a wider political attendance beginning from the next Conference, proposed to be held in UK. The lead for planning and conducting the conference should remain the BHC Defence Section and MO Dir, GHQ, for the foreseeable future with a planning officer selected from both UK and Pakistan. The balance between serving and retired military offers depth and perspective beyond current campaigns—the need to remain conscious of the successes and failures of the past is important.

c. **Themes.** Moving from classic COIN to Stabilisation Operations has been evident between the two conferences. If it is accepted that COIN, whilst having political primacy as one of its principles in UK doctrine, is still predominantly a military led campaign, then Stabilisation is the natural progression that sees a Full Spectrum Approach from the outset employed with a clear political endstate. The themes have reflected this move. There is much that can still be discussed on COIN, and it is right that the series of conferences include a strong military presence. To fully embrace Stabilisation Operations, there needs to be greater political engagement. From the UK perspective, a greater FCO and DFID attendance at the next conference would be beneficial, with a commensurate inclusion of civil themes to balance military ones. Areas that would benefit from further discussion and exploration may include:

(1) **Military Contribution to Stabilisation.**

Building on the military presentations and discussions from both conferences. The next conference should seek to unique military contributions to stabilisation operations and employing the Full Spectrum Approach successfully.

(2) **Civilian Security Force Capacity Building.**

Sharing experiences of civilian security force capacity building and lessons learnt from UK

experiences in recent interventions compared with Pakistan experiences e.g. Frontier Corps and civilian police.

(3) **Governance and Institutional Capacity Building.**

Primacy of Political Purpose is the over-arching principle of COIN campaigns. What is the role of the military in governance and institutional capacity building, both locally and at federal level?

(4) **Border Management.** Developing the discussions held in Islamabad to include greater exploration of the issues surrounding border management of the Durand Line. This would benefit from a wider political audience, in addition to the military one.

(5) **Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan.** A UK presentation on the background to the formation of PRTs and the benefits realised through deploying an operational focussed, sub-national organisation with representation from across the full spectrum of Govt Depts.

Appendix-I

Questions for Respondents (Pakistan) Theme-I

- Q no 1. Is it possible to classify an enemy, albeit its intrinsic potential of evolution?
- Q no 2. For Pakistan, are the identification of threats and subsequent steps to combat them viewed through the lens of a 'baggage of history' at the regional level?
- Q no3. How crucial has been the public opinion in Pakistan's counter terrorism campaign, particularly when it was also launched in densely populated areas?

Theme-II

- Q no 1. How has the administrative machinery managed to evolve its role in an agency alongside the presence of military in the area and its involvement in developmental projects?
- Q no 2. Jirga's being an integral part of the society in FATA also have an important role to play in legitimizing social contracts. What efforts can be undertaken by the administrative setup to enhance their role in regulating and implementing family laws and equity? (One of the tools used by militants to integrate in the society was inter-marriages and forcefully marrying from the families of tribal heads)
- Q no 3. How far is the exercise of reform in an agency based on the assumption of not inducing perpetual fragmentation of the locals?
- Q no 4. Is the administrative frame today rationalized in harmony with the societal changes in a post-operation phase, in order to stem out notions of probable resurfacing of militancy?

Theme-III

- Q no 1. Afghan refugees and national security challenges to Pakistan. Is there a link?
- Q no 2. What key factors will be significant in ensuring effective border management between Afghanistan and Pakistan?
- Q no 3. How successful have we been able to pursue the slogan of 'Winning Hearts and Minds'?

Appendix-II

Transcripts of Interviews from Pakistan

Interview 1

**Lt. Gen Naseer Khan Janjua (Retd) - National
Security Advisor, Pakistan**

(5th June- NSA Office PM Secretariat)

Q no 1. Afghan refugees and national security challenges to Pakistan, Is there a link?

Ans. Indeed there is a link. I do not wish to hurt the sentiments of Afghan Refugees who are residing with us since last nearly four decades. Today even their children own and love Pakistan as we had welcomed them with open arms. Shared our bread, shelter and even the businesses with them. We have had inter-marriages and today our children are growing together. Despite these facts let me say, yes there is a link. Presence of Afghan Refugees is virtually made use of as a cover. Terrorists, inter mingle and merge in them and conduct their heinous activities. Their camps are used as hide outs. It's too hard for refugees to divulge any information on terrorists

as this could be at the peril of their lives. Refugees therefore knowingly or unknowingly, unfortunately, serve as a conduit. Since these refugees are unable to return due to poor security situation in Afghanistan, this link and concomitant threat has turned out to be existential.

Q No 2. Is there a lack of clarity in ‘who is the enemy in Pakistan’?

Ans. No, we are very clear as to who is our enemy. Initially there was confusion when Taliban Regime in Afghanistan was dismantled. Some of the sympathizers and old time Jihadi friends of Afghan Taliban stood in their support. They created TTP. These supporters gave a ‘Fatwa’ that Pakistan is siding with infidels; therefore, Jihad against Pakistan is legitimate. When TTP stood against its own state that made it look like akin to a situation whereby “Muslims are fighting against Muslims”. But this stage was over quite quickly. Today Pakistan, its armed forces and people are very clear. Those who are fighting against Pakistan by way of violence are our enemy; this may be TTP and their affiliates, Baloch sub-nationalists and extremists.

Q no 3. How successful have we been able to pursue the slogan of ‘winning hearts and Minds’?

Ans. Winning hearts and minds is in fact a “lead thought” of our military operations. Since we are fighting terrorism in our

own country and in our own people, therefore, we have multi-pronged people centric approaches and very effective TORs towards limited use of force. Military operations conducted in Pakistan are therefore, fully mixed with soft power. While our Counter Terrorism doctrine and rationale focuses on defeating the terrorists, guidelines on winning hearts and minds of the people are also factored in right from the outset. This includes a well thought out philosophy of securing the peace loving people, using and restricting the use of force to bare minimum for defeating the spoilers of peace. Nonetheless, we have come a long way in our military thought; as I always say 'No love stories are born out of military operations'. Our soft approaches are, therefore, illustrated in our every operation in FATA, Swat, Karachi and Balochistan. Our effective endeavors to manage Internally Displaced People speaks volumes of our people centric approaches. Not only that armed forces are imbued with this spirit, our whole of the nation is filled with this sentiment. They have set examples in looking after their brothers in distress.

Interview 2

**Maj Gen Sardar Hassan Azhar Hayat HI (M)
General Officer Commanding 7 Division**

(March 24th-Electronic Reply)

Q no 1. In attempts of promoting the ideals of 'enduring peace'. How aptly can we segregate between the notions of 'violent extremism' and 'terrorism'? (In our domestic setting).

Ans. Although terrorism is ultimate form of violent extremism and distinguishing lines between both are blurred; yet by identifying the basic motive behind any violent action the segregation is possible. Having fought the menace of terrorism successfully over 15 years, the agenda of various groups / parties involved in violence is now clear. Role of Hostile Intelligence Agencies, fighting as proxies, and financial motives are helping in differentiating between terrorism and violent extremism around the globe.

Q no 2. In Pakistan's efforts of countering terrorism, is there a juggle between capacity building and sequencing of operations? (This aims at projecting how well prepared we are in this war)?

Ans. Discussing about national counter terrorism approach, the juggle continues, where requirement of operations most of

the times remained in the hand, but capacity building has remained in the air. Though Armed Forces have come a long way in enhancing their capabilities to take on kinetic prong of national counter terrorism approach but the most wanting aspect remained capacity building of civilian institutions including Executive, Judiciary and Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies. We may continue fighting this war on the strength of Armed Forces but won't achieve success till the time capacity building issues of all institutions are not addressed. Moreover, sequencing of operations was done as part of strategy (clearing periphery areas first and then gradually moving towards core areas). Situation along Eastern Border and Internal Security Front also effected availability of forces on Western Border. Over the years concerted efforts of capacity building of all institutions involved in fighting terrorism have started paying dividends.

Q no 3. How successful have we been able to pursue the slogan of 'Winning Hearts and Minds?'

Ans. WHAM as a Whole is mostly taken as a drill by the institutions. Winning hearts required a different approach than from winning minds. Minds may be won by bringing peace, giving basic civic facilities and creating economic opportunities but to win hearts relation of mutual respect is required to be built between the institution and the locals, where they are no more aliens to each other. This could only be achieved by

sharing pain and anguish of locals by each individual of the institution. At this point of time we have won minds and strategised to win hearts. In this regard, the people centric approach has given dividends to Pak Army in WHAM operations. It may be noted that WHAM is understanding of people psychology/need and requirements. We proudly claim success and our efforts will pave way to end menace of terrorism in coming days.

Interview 3

**Maj Gen Noel I. Khokhar (Retd)-Executive
Dean F.C. College, Lahore**

(11th June- Electronic Reply)

Q no 1. Is it possible to classify an enemy, albeit it's intrinsic potential of evolution?

Ans. The word 'enemy' is delusional in Pakistan's setting. It is the challenges that have evolved over a period of time and sustained as a major threat to the national security of Pakistan. Hence, it is pertinent to classify the real threat in milieu of the environment that nurtured the challenges.

Q no 2. For Pakistan, are the identification of threats and subsequent steps to combat them viewed through the lens of a 'baggage of history' at the regional level?

Ans. Indeed! As the region has not been able to let go of the 'baggage of history', in terms of hot beds of conflict like Kashmir, Afghanistan and Iraq, so has Pakistan's approach to deal with subsequent challenges like militancy and terrorism remained analogous.

Q no 3. How crucial is public opinion in a counter terrorism campaign, particularly when it is launched in a densely populated area of a country.

Ans. Public opinion is vital in any counter terrorism campaign. For Pakistan, the question is about its critical nature for continuing the campaign in form of major military and intelligence based operations.

Interview 4

Lt Gen Khalid Rabbani HI (M) (Retd)

(13th June- Former Commander 11 Corps)

(MD Office - Army Welfare Trust)

Q no 1. Is it possible to classify an enemy, albeit it's intrinsic potential of evolution?

Ans. Well it is a very loaded question. For classifying the enemy we should first deliberate on why it evolved to an extent of becoming a major security threat to Pakistan. Contrary to popular belief, it was not the differences based on religious underpinnings but extreme poverty that fueled gaps in the society allowing the tentacles of terrorism to spread. 'Enemy' was the one that was left astray after the Russo war in 1991. The West had to leave abruptly and leave behind a comity of 'trained' individuals who had the impositions of a regional war. The wave of 'militancy' that evolved into violent extremism and then to terrorism was initially fueled for securing wherewithal. Alongside, the area's political and social status was perplexing. The 'ilaqa-ghair' was a victim of clash of narratives for which we failed to give them a superior narrative. It was fight between the 'Mimbar' and 'Hujra' or in other words a tussle between the haves and have nots. A new battle for power and money broke in the area, with the 'Mullah

or have not's being successful in gaining power. They used extreme violence and inflicted terror to establish their writ and the locals cowered down with fear. It was a battle of narratives fought through tools of terrorism.

Interviewer: **So how did the Army manage to operate in an area and gain popular support where terror was inflicted upon the locals?**

Interviewee: Initially, the Army did not conduct any clean sweep operations and tried to negotiate with the Taliban. But in vain! They not only denied any kind of options for settlement, but also accentuated their activities till Swat. This time their narrative was guided by religion while terror remained their utmost tool to establish their writ. The Army managed to win support of the locals by revealing their concoction and using tools like media to build a perception against them.

Q no 2. **For Pakistan, are the identification of threats and subsequent steps to combat them viewed through the lens of a 'baggage of history' at the regional level?**

Ans. Yes, indeed they still are!

Q no 3. How crucial is public opinion in a counter terrorism campaign, particularly when it is launched in a densely populated area of a country.

Ans. Public opinion is extremely important. This is illustrated through our successes in Swat which also brings us some significant lessons with a four-fold focus: Army is not able to operate in an area without the popular support of locals, It should avoid collateral damage, should be perceived as saviors, and superior narrative should be generated by doing justice.

Interviewer: So how do we generate stabilization and peace in such areas?

Interviewee: Well, stabilization efforts are to be launched in consonance of operations. As once an area is 'cleared' from elements of instability the Army is expected to roll back and allow political machinery to exercise. However, it can assist the administration in bringing normalcy to the areas, building infrastructure, schools and hospitals. Similar to which the Pakistan Army did in Swat and now doing in Waziristan. Needless to say, that the Army actually helps in re-establishing writ of the Government in conflict-prone areas

Interview 5

Lt Gen Rizwan Akhtar H.St, HI (M)

**(3rd July-President National Defence
University) (President NDU Office)**

Q no 1. Is it possible to classify an enemy, albeit it's intrinsic potential of evolution?

Ans. Classification of an enemy is crucial amidst the systematic evolution of Wars from their traditional outlook to a more sophisticated 'hybrid' nature. However, where terrorism follows the model of an insurgency, it is challenging to define the perpetrators. Nevertheless, in Pakistan, we are very well aware of our enemy! It has evolved innately without a popular support from the local public. Hence, it poses a loosely knitted terrorist challenge to the State. Theoretically, such an entity is confined in a specific territory, with its administrative setup overshadowing the operational wing. On the contrary, for Pakistan, this enemy's real power rests in its scheme of operations and transcends territories.

Q no 2. For Pakistan, are the identification of threats and subsequent steps to combat them viewed through the lens of a 'baggage of history' at the regional level?

Ans. Identifying threats and challenges have indeed been crucial for Pakistan, particularly in the backdrop of the

regional turmoil. However, in order to craft a response the country had to prioritize between these threats. In this regard, where kinetic and non-kinetic measures form part of the larger counterterrorism campaign, consequently, there is a need to uproot violent extremism as a subset of terrorism in the country. Regional fissures can only prevail once internal fault lines are accentuated by them. Hence, the root cause of terrorism needs to be identified, prioritized and dealt with accordingly.

Q no 3. How crucial is public opinion in a counter terrorism campaign, particularly when it is launched in a densely populated area of a country.

Ans. There is no doubt in the idea of acquiring popular public support for the Army, before and during a military campaign is launched. This is critical both in densely populated areas or otherwise. It is illustrated in the launching of Operation Zarb-e-Azb as a whole concept invigorating Ends- Ways- Means. Particularly, once this campaign also targeted the Facilitators, Abettors and Financiers of terrorism in the country. Hence, our successes in both kinetic and non-kinetic operations against terrorism, auger well to the support tendered by the people of Pakistan to the Pakistan Army and Government.

Interview 6

**Interview with Maj Gen Fayyaz Hussain Shah
Chief Instructor (B DIV)
30th August 2017
(CI B DIV Office)**

Q no 1. In attempts of promoting the ideals of 'enduring peace' how aptly can we define the notions of 'violent extremism' and 'terrorism'? (In our domestic setting).

Ans. Contrary to popular belief, the phenomena' of Violent Extremism (VE) and Terrorism may not merely have academic connotations. Firstly, extremism starts with rigidity, where an 'extremist' individual may not be convinced with the best of the knowledge and resorts to violence once senses opposition. Viewed through the operational prism, this VE also has the potential to swiftly transcend from the individual to higher societal level. Large groups are formed within the realm of their beliefs, which are devoid of a 'political motive'. They are extremely vulnerable to exploitation and can be used by entities with vested interests. It is worth mentioning that, extremism itself is a precarious entity, irrespective of it being resorted to violence or otherwise.

On the other hand, terrorism alongside a dubious meaning and lack of consensus in its definition is intrinsically a politically motivated entity. Violence is used as a tool by individuals/groups and the motive remains that of attaining political and financial gains. It has the potential to be exploited by foreign elements for their vested interests. Overall, in this juggle of VE having manifestations of terrorism, the idea of ensuring enduring peace for the populace remains the priority.

Q no 2. In Pakistan's efforts of countering terrorism, is there a juggle between capacity building and sequencing of operations?

Ans. Generically, once the War was initiated in Afghanistan-year 2001, there persisted a haze in the underlying notions of the War even at the international level. Hence, when Pakistan was contacted to play a role in this war, it obliged without returns. It extended full support by sealing borders in order to restrict the possibilities of nurturing safe havens in its territory, by conducting intelligence based operations and capturing and killing terrorists in major cities and towns. We actually got a dent in our efforts in 2002, with the Indian Parliament attack. As a result, India assembled its forces on Eastern border thus our focus had to be managed simultaneously at both East and West. A similar situation was created by India in 2008 / 2009 again. This impacted our efforts on the Western border.

Meanwhile, the operations in Pakistan starting from Al-Mizan were initially focused on sealing the Western borders and conducting intelligence-based operations and capturing and killing terrorists and miscreants. However, major threat emerged with the formation of TTP in the year 2007. They actually posed a serious threat to Pakistan, which paved way for major military operations in the Country, amongst which the Swat 'Battle' was the most significant. This was followed by major operations in South Waziristan Agency (Operation Rah-e-Nijat), North Waziristan Agency (Operation Zarb-e-Azb) and Operations Khyber 1 to 4 completing in 2017 to clear the tribal areas of all terrorists without discrimination. Operation Radd-ul-Fasad continues to hunt the remaining terrorists hiding across length and breadth of the Country.

As far as the capacity is concerned, in this type of war one is always short of troops. However, it is worth mentioning that, strategy is important instead of capacity. We have successfully completed major military effort against terrorists through our sequential efforts with the help of public support. Undoubtedly, the armed forces have achieved, which no other Army was able to achieve (this includes US-NATO over 100,000 troops, who after decades of war in Afghanistan are still not able to subdue terrorism). However, Pakistan has also paid a heavy price for this success, including lives of over 60,000 civilians (over 5000 soldiers), \$120 billion economic losses,

damage to social fiber and even reputation, alongside hosting over 2.5 million Afghan refugees. Pakistan has suffered the most in this war and will benefit the most once stability and peace returns to Afghanistan. Hence, amidst multifarious and multidimensional challenges, Pakistan supports a political initiative to deal with the instability in Afghanistan and has done its best in order to ascertain 'enduring peace' not only for its own people but also for Afghanistan and the Region.

In a nutshell, it should be acknowledged that Pakistan has come a long way. Initially, there was a stressful environment posed to the Country in its efforts for combating instability both at the tactical and strategic level. However, today the armed forces have the potential to combat elements of instability for ensuring a peaceful environment for its populace.

Q no 3. How successful have we been able to pursue the slogan of 'winning hearts and minds?'

Ans. Classically, the Winning Hearts and Minds- WHAM strategy is not applicable in Pakistan. It is a slogan chanted by a foreign army in a land which it has occupied. All military efforts by Pakistan Army were for and in the support of people of tribal areas. The War we fought was in our land, amongst our people, with their utmost support. Nevertheless, Pakistan Army has been involved in the developmental works in

affected areas and has focused on provision of basic amenities, health, education and economic opportunities in addition to infrastructure reconstruction. This enabled early return and rehabilitation of the displaced families. As a result, we have been able to provide a secure environment for civilian institutions to ensure that all amenities and economic opportunities are provided to the people of affected areas.

Q no 4. Is the administrative frame in the conflict prone area, rationalized in harmony with the societal changes in a post-operation phase? This is critical in order to stem out notions of probable resurfacing of militancy.

Ans. Development in the conflict prone area cannot be viewed in isolation of the societal changes in a post-operation phase. Once this war started in FATA of Pakistan, the Maliks lost authority to the clerics stressing the decades old governance system under Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR), also making it questionable.

The armed forces have largely done their part in combating the elements of instability in the areas prone to conflict. Post successful military operations, a new people friendly social contract and administrative structure is required to be put in place in FATA. Such administrative infrastructure should bring the people of FATA into the folds of mainstream of Pakistani

society by merging FATA into the existing administrative unit(s) of the Country.

With all the environment provided by armed forces, now it is up to the Government for regrouping resources and enabling the administrative machinery to carve out an environment, which is people centric and delivers the basic necessities, which will ultimately restrict resurfacing of militancy and terrorism.

Interview 7

Mr Ahmer Bilal Soofi

**President Research Society of International
Law**

2nd August 2017

(Office of Mr Ahmer Bilal Soofi)

Q no 1. What are options in legal domain in order to deal with issues pertaining to Afghan refugees in Pakistan? Can we compare the policies opted by Iran and the West in this regard?

Ans. In order to deal with the Afghan refugees in Pakistan, it is necessary that Government of Pakistan should enact a federal law in which Afghan Refugees should be defined. Further, the said law would also categorize refugees in section of economic migrant, asylum seekers etc. The definition of the refugees should contain legal features drawn from description of refugees under international law. Furthermore those who have started participating in the commercial activities such as opening shops, getting employment as drivers etc. or doing trading of goods will be called as economic migrant and should be defined accordingly likewise those who face a genuine threat of persecution and can be viewed as asylum seekers. Some may need to be defined as aspirants for citizenship rights particularly when they have married Pakistani spouses. It should be noted that the West has far more stringent laws for refugees and they also treat them separately as asylum seekers, economic migrants etc. Iran similarly has strict laws to regulate refugees. It is only Pakistan which has omitted to make any

legislation to deal with refugees. As a result the executive branch of the state of Pakistan including provincial Governments, FC, Fata authorities find it difficult to deal with a refugee and the policy remains confused.

Q no 2. How can Pakistan's Counterterrorism Campaign be viewed through the prism of international law?

Ans. Pakistan's counter terrorism campaign should be viewed under international law as fulfillment of state's obligations under various treaties of international law. For example, the operation Zarb e Azb and earlier swat operations etc. including combing operations as ongoing need to be pitched as measures that fulfill Pakistan's obligation under Chapter 7 Resolutions of UNSC particularly 1373. In fact Pakistan should consider to sending reports of its achievements in military operations to UNSC Counter Terrorism Committee established pursuant to 1373.

Q no 3. What key factors will be significant in ensuring effective border management between Afghanistan and Pakistan? In terms of international law (special focus on fencing the border)

Ans. Every country has right to defend its borders and ensure such management of the same that keeps away any unauthorized person or entity. The whole regime of passports and visa is subset of border management. Likewise whenever a state believes that its border is open to misuse it can freely install measures such as guard posts, patrolling and even fencing. Under international law, there is no prohibition against fencing a border.

Q no 4. What is the legal connotation of having internment centers in Pakistan?

Ans. The internment centers in Pakistan have been set up in conflict zones for which notification under Article 245 has been issued which implies that law of conflict stands triggered from the date of Article 245 notification. In other words, the general law of fundamental rights applicable in peace time is paused when notification under Article 245 is issued. In such areas the law of conflict permits that those who are combatants / non-state actors using force against the state can be parked in temporary detention centers to minimize the duration of conflict and this is called as internment regime. The internment is in other words an administrative detention and an internee is a conflict detainee and not a constitutional detainee. The law of internment was competently issued by the President of Pakistan in exercise of his powers under Article 247 of the Constitution, for FATA and PATA only and has been viewed with approval by EU, UK, US and even UN. The internee needs to be de-radicalized and also at appropriate time or upon withdrawal of Article 245 notification handed over to police or other prosecution entity.

Appendix III

Questions for Respondents Stabilisation Unit, UK

Q no 1. How does the UK Approach to Stabilisation differ from traditional COIN operations given that both have political primacy at the core?

Q no 2. What do you see as the Centre of Gravity to Stability Operations? Should it be population or enemy centric?

Q no 3. Given the agreed need for civ-mil cooperation for successful stability operations, do you see this as being strategic, operational or tactical in nature?

Q no 4. There is evidence to suggest that collateral damage and civilian casualties during COIN operations can 'fuel' insurgency and radicalisation. Would you agree that the need for precision operations, and the balance of high risk versus high impact, has constrained mission command in UK doctrine?

Q no 5. Are the circumstances when a military understanding of the tactical situation is at odds with political vision?

**Sarah Spencer–UK Head of Conflict, Stabilisation
and Security Fund, BHC Islamabad**

Q no 1. There is a tendency to see COIN and Stabilisation as one of the same. Given that both have civilian primacy at their core, what do you believe are the key differences?

Q no 2. During your presentation, you spoke of a series of effect, some 'hard' and some 'soft' occurring simultaneously in conflict affected areas. Would you agree that provision of a secure environment is the domain of the military and that the need for security in stabilisation is non-discretionary?

Q no 3. The military is best placed to deliver rapid and decisive results and may have a tendency to hold a narrow, short-term view which is at odds to the long-term stability requiring patience and the ability to observe and shape over time. Do you agree?

Q no 4. The UK military has, in the past, been guilty, arguably, of failing to appreciate the wider contributions to stabilisation of civil agencies. During your time with DFID and SU, what changes have you noticed in military thinking towards stabilisation?

Transcript of Interviews (UK)

Sarah Spencer–UK Head of Conflict, Stabilisation and Security Fund, BHC Islamabad

Q no 1. There is a tendency to see COIN and Stabilisation as one of the same. Given that both have civilian primacy at their core, what do you believe are the key differences?

Ans The objective of COIN operations tends to be seen as having a military endstate. Stabilisation has a political endstate and broader political objectives. The military component is an important element of stabilisation but it is but one element. Stabilisation is about the use of a multitude of tools and levers to achieve those broader political objectives. Military activity is not an end in itself.

Q no 2. During your presentation, you spoke of a series of effect, some 'hard' and some 'soft' occurring simultaneously in conflict affected areas. Would you agree that provision of a secure environment is the domain of the military and that the need for security in stabilisation is non-discretionary?

Ans. The delivery of 'hard effect', using the military, is required to improve security. This is particularly true at the start of an intervention. The military can enable cease fires to be agreed but cease-fires are often short lived and prone to frequent violations. The military cannot be seen as a deliverer of security in isolation from all other levers – 'softer effects' have a role to play to and often the best form of security is a hybrid of hard and soft actions resulting in a more stable security less at risk from cease-fire violations. As with stabilisation, the provision of security should be seen as a result of a full spectrum of activity.

Q no 3. The military is best placed to deliver rapid and decisive results and may have a tendency to hold a narrow, short-term view which is at odds to the long-term stability requiring patience and the ability to observe and shape over time. Do you agree?

Ans. Yes...but because the military is trained and has the forces available to deliver rapid results to support political

decisions. It is important to ensure political agreement that rapid military intervention is in support of a wider Full Spectrum Approach that sees early planning from all relevant Govt depts.

There is no evidence of short-termism from the military or any suggestion of pushing to extract once initial military objectives have been achieved. The military must ensure that it is clear on the long term stability objectives; the Chilcott Report raised some interesting points and the military will want to ensure that its role is understood. Ultimately, long term political patience may be reliant on initial, rapid results.

Q no 4. The UK military has, in the past, been guilty, arguably, of failing to appreciate the wider contributions to stabilisation of civil agencies. During your time with DFID and SU, what changes have you noticed in military thinking towards stabilisation?

Ans. The military has taken a number of steps to improve understanding across Govt of the way it operates. The recent example is the 'Working with Military' course held at PJHQ with a pan-Govt focus. Similarly, DFID have run courses looking at working with OGDs to which the military, amongst others, are invited. Similarly ensuring that those military appointments within non-military organisations are filled with individuals of

the correct personality and talent is important. There is enough intent to make this work, but there is some way to go.

**Lt Col James Gladwin–Military Advisor to
Stabilisation Unit, UK.**

Q no 1. How does the UK Approach to Stabilisation differ from traditional COIN operations given that both have political primacy at the core?

Ans. COIN is seen as having a military lead so whilst there might be political objectives at its core, it is inherently military in delivery. The focus of COIN is ‘countering’ the insurgency, which is but one aspect of a sterilisation operation. Stability operations are inherently political in nature and critically have a civilian, rather than military, lead. The civilian dimension is key; COIN operations stop once the insurgency is defeated whilst stability operations continue through the COIN phase to deliver a lasting settlement that addresses the root causes of insurgency. It is important to distinguish between COIN and stabilisation; the two are not interchangeable and understanding the wider aspects of stabilisation beyond military effect that characterises COIN is crucial.

Q no 2. What do you see as the Centre of Gravity to Stability Operations? Should it population or enemy centric?

Ans. For an insurgency to thrive, it needs to the support of the population. This was demonstrated in both the Malay and Cyprus Campaigns and more recently for the British Army in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The Centre of Gravity therefore needs to be the population; countering the insurgency both focussing on 'enemy body count' is both false and of no value when trying to assess the success of a COIN operation. It can be likened to 'mowing the grass'—once cut, it grows back. The British Army learnt this lesson following the early stages of operations in Helmand Province.

Mr Ed Hadley—Stabilisation Unit, UK.

Q no 1. Given the agreed need for civ-mil cooperation for successful stability operations, do you see this as being strategic, operational or tactical in nature?

Ans. Civ-mil cooperation needs to happen at all levels. Strategically, there is a need for all Government Departments, particularly FCO / DFID / MOD, to work closely together to agree achievable objectives. Political direction needs to be understood and implement by each Dept represented in Theatre. The evolution of the PRTs in Afghanistan

demonstrated the importance of the Comprehensive Approach at the tactical level.

The Stabilisation Unit itself is a good example of how the Comprehensive Approach could be applied at each of the strategic, operational and tactical level but, importantly, the finances required to support this approach need to be joint as well. The UK approach has been to develop the Conflict, Security and Stabilisation Fund, CSSF, as a cross-Government fund that delivers stabilisation objectives. It has been widely used in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Q no 2. There is evidence to suggest that collateral damage and civilian casualties during COIN operations can ‘fuel’ insurgency and radicalisation. Would you agree that the need for precision operations, and the balance of high risk versus high impact, has constrained mission command in UK doctrine?

Ans. Gen McCrystal encouraged ‘courageous restraint’ when Commander of the NATO Mission in Afghanistan with the reasoning that a more restrained approach, which minimized civilian casualties, was clearly in the line with a CoG that was population rather than enemy centric.

An Army cannot fight an insurgency that same way that it does a standing army without risking unnecessary civilian casualties and collateral damage. It must deliver those basic

services that are required by a population (healthcare, housing, water, sewerage etc) as soon as is practicable after the physical act of 'fighting' has ceased. This is necessary to support address the root causes of insurgency and promote political objectives. The risk of not doing this are that the population retains as a sense of grievance allowing the insurgents to return.

**Lt Col James Gladwin – Military Advisor to
Stabilisation Unit, UK.**

Q no 1. Are the circumstances when a military understanding of the tactical situation is at odds with political vision?

Ans. It is important that strategic effect requires time to deliver, which may not always be apparent to the military at the tactical level who see rapid effect at the tactical level. Defeating the insurgent at the tactical level does not guarantee the resolution of root causes of the insurgency and hence does not, in itself, guarantee against a return to insurgency at a future point. This can only be delivered by a long term political vision enabled by an agreed, cross-government strategy.

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