The strategic temperature across West Asia and its extended neighbourhood remains high. Iranian officials have repeatedly stated in recent months that Tehran does not seek war but considers itself significantly better prepared than during the mid-2024 confrontation that followed the Gaza conflict and subsequent regional escalation. Whether such deterrent messaging stabilises or further hardens fault lines is uncertain. What is clear, however, is that several pivotal states are recalibrating their long-term security and economic partnerships in anticipation of a more contested regional order. Among the most consequential of these is the deepening convergence between Pakistan and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA).
The relationship itself is not new. For decades, Pakistan’s military institutions played a central role in training Saudi officers, advising on force development, and contributing to internal and external security planning. Pakistani troops were stationed in the Kingdom at different points, and defence cooperation remained a constant, even when political relations elsewhere in the region fluctuated.
What has changed since 2024–25 is not the existence of this bond, but its strategic closeness and the two entering a strategic mutual defence agreement. Also, the scale and frequency of high-level defence dialogue, joint exercises, intelligence coordination and political consultation increased markedly during 2025, pointing toward a more structured security partnership in the making.
The current effort at economic transformation by the two countries as a strategic glue is a major driver of this new phase. KSA’s Vision 2030 has placed digital infrastructure, fintech and non-oil growth at the centre of national strategy. Riyadh has invested heavily in cloud computing, digital identity systems, artificial intelligence and financial technology, while its central bank has participated in cross-border digital currency experiments such as Project Aber with the UAE. Pakistan, though operating at a different scale, is moving in a similar direction. The State Bank of Pakistan has announced regulatory preparations for digital asset frameworks and pilot projects for central bank digital currency, while Pakistan’s IT exports crossed roughly USD 2.6 billion in FY2023, reflecting the rapid expansion of its software and services sector.
By 2026, both governments are expected to explore practical mechanisms for digital trade facilitation, including faster settlement systems for bilateral commerce, technology collaboration between financial regulators, and partnerships linking Pakistani software firms with Saudi digital-services platforms.
Second and equally important convergence lies in mining and rare-earth development. Pakistan entered the global mining spotlight with the Pakistan Minerals Investment Forum in 2023, highlighting copper and gold reserves at Reko Diq and Saindak, along with emerging surveys of lithium and rare-earth deposits in parts of Balochistan and Gilgit-Baltistan.
KSA, meanwhile, has positioned itself as a global convenor of mining policy through its annual Future Minerals Forum in Riyadh, which now attracts delegations from more than 150 countries. Saudi estimates place its untapped mineral wealth at over USD 1.3 trillion, spanning phosphates, bauxite, copper, zinc and rare-earth elements essential for electric vehicles and advanced defence technologies.
Another commonality is that both states face the same strategic reality: China dominates rare-earth processing and refining, while the US and its partners are urgently seeking alternative supply chains. Islamabad and Riyadh have therefore adopted parallel approaches, working with Chinese firms where technology and speed matter, while simultaneously seeking Western investment for diversification and market access. This dual engagement has been publicly acknowledged by Saudi ministers and Pakistani officials alike. Mineral diplomacy is perhaps becoming for both countries what energy diplomacy was in the twentieth century: a foundation of long-term geopolitical leverage.
Moreover, stability has increasingly emerged as a point of convergence and a shared political doctrine. Beyond economics, Pakistan and KSA increasingly articulate similar regional principles. Both emphasise the preservation of existing states, oppose territorial fragmentation, and reject the instrumentalisation of armed non-state actors. KSA’s recalibrated Yemen policy illustrates this evolution. Riyadh has shifted toward supporting the internationally recognised Yemeni leadership and containing forces seeking to divide the country, including the Southern Transitional Council. Pakistan has quietly endorsed comparable positions in Somalia and Sudan, backing territorial integrity and recognised governments rather than competing factions.
This outlook was also articulated publicly when Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan said at the Future Minerals Forum that regional stability–not external engineering of political systems must be the priority when asked about Iran’s internal politics.
On Palestine, too, convergence is evident. Both Islamabad and Riyadh support eventual regional normalisation in principle, but only if prefaced by the creation of a functioning and viable Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital.
In addition, another commonality is that both states seek strategic autonomy despite maintaining deep ties with their allies. Perhaps the most distinctive feature of this convergence is its shared refusal to be absorbed into rigid country-partisan engagement politics. KSA maintains deep security ties with Washington while expanding energy, technology and infrastructure cooperation with China. Pakistan follows a similar logic, looking for enhanced economic ties with the US even as China remains its iron-brother with exemplary multi-faceted relationship architecture.
Interestingly when asked by international media whether Riyadh would “choose” between Beijing and Washington in rare-earth development, Saudi officials replied that cooperation with one does not come at the expense of the other; very similar to Pakistan's long standing position. Pakistan and KSA remain engaged on treading wise common grounds.
Most importantly, both are moving together towards a wider security network. Defence cooperation is also taking on a broader calculus. Pakistan, KSA and Turkey already coordinate on training, counter-terrorism intelligence, defence production components and emerging aerospace technologies. Although some commentators describe this as a prospective “Muslim NATO,” the three governments have not projected it as such. Instead, they see it as a stabilising security network stretching from North Africa to South Asia, designed to respond to externally inspired insurrections, terrorism, fragmentation and destabilisation.
By 2026, therefore, Pakistan-Saudi relations are evolving into a layered strategic partnership encompassing digital infrastructure, resource security, regional stabilisation, great-power balancing and institutionalised defence cooperation.