Depoliticization of Bureaucracy in Pakistan

With its three fundamental pillars of politics, policy, and administration, the governance structure relies heavily on the bureaucracy to uphold the Weberian Principles of Impartiality and Neutrality. This is crucial for effective governance. However, political interference often disrupts this equilibrium in many developing countries, including Pakistan. Instead of prioritising efficient service delivery, the bureaucratic system frequently succumbs to self-interest, undermining its core purpose.
Over the past 20 years, governance in Pakistan has seen a significant decline in effectiveness, with its ranking dropping from 37.84 to 29.25 percentile. This decline can be attributed to factors like law and order, economic conditions, corruption, lack of meritocracy, and, above all, the deviation from political neutrality. Despite the government’s approximately 40 reform commissions and committees, the problem of ineffective governance persists.
On 18 September 2024, the Institute for Strategic Studies, Research and Analysis (ISSRA) at National Defence University (NDU) organised a focused group discussion with subject matter experts, including former and serving bureaucrats and experts from academia, media, and the legal fraternity to find root causes of bureaucratic inefficacy and propose a pathway towards responsive governance in Pakistan.
The bureaucratic system in Pakistan has a rich historical context. We inherited this system from the British Colonial Administration, which set up the Indian Civil Service (ICS) to ensure that the administrative leadership remained institutionally disconnected from the masses and continued to serve the interests of the Crown alone. Although Pakistan attempted to indigenize the bureaucratic system after its independence, the spirit of rigidity and class structure persisted. Understanding this historical context is crucial to comprehend the current state of the bureaucracy.
Analysis of governance reforms in Pakistan since independence shows that commitment was the hallmark of the bureaucracy during the initial years despite resource constraints. Experts cited the 1973 constitution's dropping of constitutional protection for bureaucracy enshrined in the 1956 and 1962 constitutions, with a special provision of ‘show cause notice,’ protecting removal and termination of service as a gateway to political interference in the bureaucracy. The 1973 reforms removed that provision, leaving the bureaucracy vulnerable to political pressures.

The reforms also introduced a notorious “lateral entry” system, opening doors for political recruitments, thereby declining the quality of recruits and general trust in the system. The literature presents lateral entry as a consolidating agent in politicising Pakistan's bureaucracy.
Although the 1993 Civil Service Ordinance restored legal protection through the Presidential Ordinance, it proved very short-lived and lapsed after its term completed.
Although there is general criticism of government officials being paid low salaries, a 2022 report presented that wage premiums for civil servants might be relatively low. Still, non-monetary benefits are 13% higher than private ones. For FY 2018- 2019, the Government’s salary expenditure cost was 242 billion rupees, while the non-salary expenditure cost was 226 billion rupees. This shows that the perception of non-salary perks being the primary motivation for the political patronisation of bureaucracy is incorrect.
Politicization is also seen in postings, transfers, and promotions. The experts extensively deliberated on this aspect and concluded that the drive to secure desirable postings, transfers, and tenure security lay the basis for the politicization of bureaucracy. Clause 21 of Rules of Business 1973 has set the term for regular posting at a station as 3 years. Still, it does not materialize in many cases due to politically motivated pre-term postings. The most infamous case of this politicization is ‘Anita Turab versus Federation of Pakistan,’ where the Supreme Court ruled that security of tenure must be ensured, except for compelling reasons, which should be recorded in writing and would be subject to judicial review.
While deliberating on solutions, the experts agreed that the bureaucracy must internally develop a system to ensure the security of tenure. A senior bureaucrat cited a relatively higher degree of political interference at the provincial level than at the federal level, where political leaders often overstep into allotments and intra-office matters of civil servants. Here, decentralization of power and delinking of the financial authority of politicians and bureaucracy would be fruitful. A senior bureaucrat asserted that the financial responsibility needs to be shifted to local bodies, ensuring direct accountability through closer proximity between the public and their decision-makers. In this regard, the experts presented two-pronged strategies:

• Strengthening the office of the Chief Secretary to contain intervention at the very first level.
• Consolidation of intra-bureaucracy buffer to assist their fraternity.

Furthermore, reports on civil service reforms reflect a disconnect between performance evaluation and promotion systems in Pakistan’s bureaucracy. In a survey conducted on bureaucrats, 84% of respondents confirmed no link between efficiency and better postings. The bureaucracy in Pakistan is said to operate in an ill-construed Annual Confidential Reports (ACR) system centered on the officer's personal qualities rather than measurable targets. This disproportionate evaluation and reward system has amplified the politicization of bureaucracy. Therefore, experts pressed for a KPI-based evaluation system that discourages cylindrical career growth and promotes a pyramid progression in service, eventually reducing political influence.
In addition to those above, the experts also argued that political interference and victimization under the garb of accountability have impaired bureaucratic efficacy. The discussion also took stock of the monopolization of administrative service and emphasized debunking the narrative of monopoly through the resettlement of the Apportionment Formula of 1993.
In conclusion, the solution to depoliticize bureaucracy is not new but straightforward. It is high time to tackle the issue using a well-structured, multitiered plan that balances the three pillars of governance. Although multiple reform efforts have been made, none have brought the intended success. Therefore, it is high time to create a comprehensive plan for depoliticizing bureaucracy, focusing on aligning principles, strategies, and tools across all levels of governance. A concise summary of key findings is presented below.

Action Matrix