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SINO-PAK ANTI TERRORISM COLLABORATION

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بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ
عَلَّمَ الْإِنْسَانَ مَا لَمْ يَعْلَم
TAUGHT MAN THAT WHICH HE KNEW NOT

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS / ACRONYMS

ANSF	Afghan National Security Forces
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CI	Counterinsurgency
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CICIR	Chinese Institute of Contemporary International Relations
COIN	Counterinsurgency
CSIS	Centre for Strategic and International Studies
CT	Counterterrorism
ETIM	East Turkestan Islamic Movement
ETLO	East Turkestan Liberation Organization
EU	European Union
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas
FCR	Frontier Crimes Regulation
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ISAF	International Security and Assistance Force
ISI	Inter Services Intelligence
ISSI	Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad
KKH	Karakoram Highway
KP	Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa
KSA	Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
LEA	Law Enforcement Agencies

Sino-Pak Anti Terrorism Collaboration

L-e-J	Lashkar-e-Jhangvi
MoUs	Memoranda of Understanding
NACTA	National Counterterrorism Authority
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDU	National Defence University
NGO	Non Government Organizations
OIC	Organization of Islamic Countries
PA	Political Agent
Pak	Pakistan
PCNA	Post Crisis Need Assessment
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organization
Sino-Pak	China-Pakistan
TTP	Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nation Security Council
VNSA	Violent Non State Actor

SINO-PAK ANTI TERRORISM COLLABORATION

Brigadier Najeeb Ahmad, Pakistan Army

Abstract

This study examined the potential of reducing terrorism in Pakistan by way of increased Sino-Pak anti terrorism collaboration. It identified the gap in such collaboration despite China being the key strategic partner and terrorism being the key strategic threat to Pakistan's security. Sino-Pak strategic anti terrorism collaboration is beset with numerous challenges. Pakistan's prudent approach towards fight against terrorism is focused on reducing extremism and terrorism by way of subtle socioeconomic incentivisation alongwith selective punitive deterrence. Financial capacity to support economic development in terrorism affected areas and enhancement of counterterrorism effectiveness of Pakistan's law enforcement agencies figured out as a fundamental challenge. Sino-Pak collaboration to fight terrorism remained suboptimal despite acknowledgement of terrorism as the primary threat by both strategic partners due to inability in devising a convincing common framework for collaboration. Absence of a coherent national antiterrorism strategy in Pakistan was signified as one of the primary hurdles in garnering Chinese help to fight terrorism holistically. Lack of synchronization in Pakistan of different facets of Sino-Pak collaboration for the purpose of attaining prioritized national objectives was also considered a key concern . As a conclusion, some fields and modes of Sino-Pak anti terrorism collaboration were highlighted, which, if implemented after overcoming the identified challenges, could result into reduction of terrorism in Pakistan.

Introduction

Strategic relationship between two countries is rooted in public sentiments. Pakistan and China are culturally divergent yet emotionally convergent countries with coinciding interests and shared perceptions, which is the bedrock of their bonding. Metaphorical description of this relationship, i.e, higher than Himalayas, deeper than oceans and sweeter than honey, is not merely symbolic but has stood the test of trying circumstances. ‘All weather friendship and all dimensional cooperation with Pakistan’ has been the ‘corner stone’ of China’s South Asian policy.¹ The “Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Good-neighbourly Relations between the People’s Republic of China and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan” that was signed in 2005, provided the legal foundation for the strategic partnership between the two countries. Both the countries realize the importance of retaining currency in the strategic content of their relationship vis-à-vis changing geopolitical dynamics, due to which exploration of new dimensions of meaningful collaboration remains a constant endeavor.

Pakistan is faced today with a multitude of national security challenges, terrorism being the most daunting. Accentuated after 9/11, Pakistan is grappling with choices of strategic cooperation with external actors to curb terrorism in the country and the region. Pakistan emerged as an ally of the US in “War on Terror” after her decision to support Operation Enduring Freedom in October

¹ Ye Hailin, “China-Pakistan Relationship: All-Weathers, But Maybe Not All-Dimensional,” in Kristina Zetturlund, ed., *Pakistan – Consequences of Deteriorating Security in Afghanistan*, (Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2009), 110.

2001. Despite overtures like strategic dialogues and promise of large assistance packages, the alliance seems to be grappling with relevance due to trust deficit. In the past twelve years, the Pak-US cooperation in counter terrorism (CT) has seen many ups and downs; latest dip being the 26 November 2011 attack by NATO forces on a Pakistan Army check post in Mohmand Agency, while resumption of Coalition Support Fund may be considered the latest rise.

China, being Pakistan's most trusted ally, has always remained a reliable balancer in Pakistan's strategic calculus. Pakistan's security collaboration with China does not reverberate anti-government public opinion, as does the transactional relationship with the US in War against terrorism. In this situation, where internal instability is the foremost strategic challenge and China is the most enduring strategic ally, there is a need for Pakistan to identify scope for collaboration with China holistically in order to address the causes and the symptoms both, in the fight against terrorism. Exploration of this scope, with its constraints and linkages within the domestic and regional context, will be the purpose of this monograph.

Sino-Pak relationship is very strong but despite cooperation in other fields it could not build a partnership or provide common grounds for fighting terrorism. The trend of this phenomenon spreading in the region is dangerous for stability and may even undermine Sino-Pak strategic relationship. There is requirement to find common ground and strategies to cooperate in this fight against terrorism, as consensus already exists on the issue between the two countries.

Andre Beaufre calls strategy "the art of the dialectic of two

opposing wills using force to resolve their dispute”². Strategy is also referred as interplay of ends, ways and means, or in other words, objectives, concepts and resources. To win this ‘clash of wills’ in the case of State versus Violent Non State Actor (VNSA), the former needs huge ‘resources’ to outmatch the latter, physically and ideologically. In order to formulate a winning antiterrorism strategy to attain desired ends (objectives), sound ways (concepts) and adequate means (resources) are obligatory. Pakistan cannot shore up these critical resources at its own due to the precarious economic situation. China is one of the few external sources from which Pakistan can expect more support.

General Liang Guanglie, China’s Minister for Defence, led a 17 member high powered delegation to Islamabad in May 2010, during which the two countries concluded three Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) aimed at enhancing Pakistan’s capabilities to fight terror.³ During this visit, Pakistan, while raising the issue of Indian intelligence agencies’ involvement in terrorist activities in Pakistan, asked for Chinese support to build Counter Terrorism (CT) capacity. China, though driven by her own national interests, is willing to support Pakistan in countering terrorism, as is evident from the address of Wen Jiabao, Chinese Prime Minister, to the joint session of the Parliament of Pakistan on 19 December 2010:⁴

We should address both symptoms and root causes of terrorism. Pakistan has paid a heavy price in the international counter-terrorism campaign and made

2 Andre Beaufre, *An Introduction to Strategy*, (London: Faber and Faber, 1965), 22.

3 Sultan M. Hali, “Pak-China Defence Cooperation Enhanced”, *Pakistan Observer*, 28 May 2010.

4 Asim Yasin, “Don’t Link War on Terror to any Religion: Wen”. *The News International*, 20 December 2010.

important contributions. China's position in this regard is clear and firm. It is ready to make tireless efforts and intensify coordination and cooperation with Pakistan and the entire international community.

This study therefore, has two objectives: (a) To understand challenges of Sino Pak collaboration to fight terrorism in Pakistan, and (b) to identify mutually beneficial areas of collaboration in fight against terrorism in order to build sustainable and long term partnership.

Pertinent Definitions

Terrorism. Attempting to define terrorism is a theoretical quagmire. Biases are imminent in various nuances that signify this concept. A brief account of the US/Western and the Islamic Countries views given below will illustrate this point. According to Bruce Hoffman, a well known RAND scholar from US, it is possible to identify some key characteristics of terrorism as:⁵

- Ineluctably political in aims and motives.
- Violent – or, equally important, threatens violence.
- Designed to have far-reaching psychological repercussions beyond the immediate victim or target.
- Conducted by an organization with an identifiable chain of command or conspiratorial cell structure (whose members wear no uniform or identifying insignia).
- Perpetrated by a sub-national group or non-state entity.

⁵ Bruce Hoffman, *Inside terrorism*, 2nd Edition, (Columbia University Press, 2006), 34.

“The UN has no internationally-agreed upon definition of terrorism”.⁶ This is preventing the UN from adopting the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism. The major factor blocking adoption of this Convention is Organization of the Islamic Conference’s (OIC) insistence to insert the proviso, that “the activities of the parties during an armed conflict, including in situations of foreign occupation....are not governed by this Convention”. The OIC also favours protecting the rights of peoples to self- determination in this Convention.

A panel appointed by UN Secretary General in 2004 on Threats, Challenges and Change defined terrorism as: “any action, in addition to actions already specified by the existing conventions on aspects of terrorism, the Geneva Conventions and Security Council Resolution 1566 (2004), that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act”.⁷

The UN International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 1999, which came into force on 10 April 2002, ratified by 173 parties as of 11 January 2011, is a widely accepted treaty, therefore, the definition of terrorism offered in this treaty should be regarded as most acceptable, according to which the following defines a terrorist:

- The actor is non-state in nature.
- The person is involved in violence that can cause serious bodily harm or death (indiscriminate or targeted).

6 Eye on the UN, Hudson Institute New York, Available from <http://www.eyeontheun.org/facts.asp?1=1&p=61>. Accessed on 14 February 2011.

7 M. Zaidi, “What defines a terrorist?” *Dawn*, 19 December 2011.

- The violence targets civilians and non-combatants (including military persons if not in combat).
- The purpose of the violence is to intimidate a population or to change the policies of a government or an international organization.

However, the adage ‘one man’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter’ bears testimony to the wide range of interpretations that complicate this variable.

Terrorism in Pakistan. For the purpose of this study, definition offered by James M Poland will be taken as the baseline; ‘premeditated, deliberate, systematic murder, mayhem and threatening of the innocent, to create fear and intimidation in order to gain a political or tactical advantage, usually to influence an audience’.⁸

While VNSAs mostly remain categorized as terrorists but at the same time State / Coalition Forces have the onus of very carefully regulated use of violence so as to avoid terrorizing the “non-combatant”, lest such actions itself get categorized as terrorism. In case of Pakistan, presence of legitimate state authority, exercised on behalf of the people of Pakistan, simplifies the problem of ‘right on the use of violence’ to some extent. In this case, terrorism can be defined as “the illegitimate use of force.”⁹

Counterterrorism. At this stage, it is important to identify the interwoven nature of CT and counterinsurgency (CI). CT is the practices, tactics, techniques and strategies that governments, militaries, police departments and corporations adopt to prevent or respond to terrorist threats or acts. If terrorism is part of a

⁸ Rafiuddin Ahmad et al., *IPRI Paper – Terrorism* (Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research Institute, 2002), 6.

⁹ *Ibid.*

broader insurgency, CT may also form part of a (broader) CI doctrine, where political, economic, and other measures may focus more on the insurgency than the specific acts of terror.¹⁰

Anti terrorism. There is a subtle difference between anti terrorism and CT. Anti terrorism constitutes “defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by military and civilian forces.¹¹ Anti terrorism is more wholesome; it sees all linkages of the problem, its root-causes, tackling the issue holistically in long-term. However, CT and anti terrorism are often used interchangeably.

Strategic. Relating to the identification of long term or overall aims and interests and the means of achieving them. Carefully designed or planned to serve a particular purpose or advantage.¹² It implies gaining long-term advantages or averting ramifications by skillfully employing available means and adopting a comprehensive approach by appreciating interdependencies.

Strategy. Strategy is the domain of the senior leader at the higher echelons of the state, the military, business corporations, or other institutions....Strategy is all about **how** (way or concept) leadership will use the **power** (means or resources) available to the state to exercise control over sets of circumstances and geographic locations to achieve **objectives** (ends) that support state interests. Strategy provides direction for the coercive or persuasive use of this power to achieve specified objectives. This direction is by nature proactive. It seeks to control the environment as opposed to reacting to it. Strategy is not crisis management.

¹⁰ Available from <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Counterterrorism>. Accessed on 26 February 2011.

¹¹ US Department of Defense, Dictionary of Military Terms.

¹² Apple Computers digital dictionary.

It is its antithesis. Crisis management occurs when there is no strategy or the strategy fails.¹³

Collaboration. Collaboration is the act of working with another person or group of people to create or produce something.¹⁴ It is a recurring process where two or more people or organizations work together to realize shared goals. This is more than the intersection of common goals seen in co-operative ventures, but a deep, collective, determination to reach an identical objective.

13 H. Richard Yarger, "Towards a Theory of Strategy: Art Lykke and the Army War College Strategy Model". The US Army War College Guide to National Security Issues. Vol 1, 45.

14 Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary Sixth Edition.

PROLIFERATION OF TERRORISM IN PAKISTAN

Origins of Terrorism in Pakistan

Terrorism in Pakistan as is witnessed today is direct fallout of her policy to fight a proxy war using international support to oust USSR from Afghanistan by arming, training and facilitating the armed struggle of Afghan fighters. 1 January 1980 marked the admission by the Kabul Government that it had invited Russian troops into the country ‘in view of the present aggressive actions of the enemies of Afghanistan’, without specifying who these might be. Thousands of refugees started pouring in Pakistan and Iran, which would swell to more than three million in Pakistan, besides hundreds of millions of dollars worth of aid from US, KSA, UAE and Japan. The CIA, “... supported the Mujahideen by spending the American taxpayers money, billions of dollars of it over the years, on buying arms, ammunition and equipment ... A high proportion of CIA aid was in the form of cash. For every dollar supplied by the US, another was added by the Saudi Arabian government...”¹ Augmented by General Zia’s overt policies of Islamization, this combustible mix of funds, international support and religious fervor proved to be the harbinger of religious bigotry, sectarianism and intolerance, whose fallout was to be manifested in blatant terrorism on the soil of Pakistan in the years to come. The decade of eighties ended with the humiliating withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan lending credence to the ‘might’ of Afghan jihad. Pakistan’s terrorism

¹ Brian Cloughley, *A History of the Pakistan Army* (Islamabad: OUP, 2008), 248.

history in the decade of the 90s is characterized by a steady rise in extremism, despite apparently liberal democratic dispensations in power. The decade saw the emergence of ‘Taliban’ who rose from being a ragtag militia emanating from religious seminaries in Pakistan to a reckonable force which was thoroughly bigoted in religious ideology. “Within hours of taking the city (Mazar-e-Sharif) Taliban Mullahs were proclaiming from the city’s mosques that the city’s Shias had three choices – convert to Sunni Islam, leave for Shia Iran or die.”²

After falling apart with the Rabbani Government in early 1995, Pakistan decided to tilt visibly in Taliban’s favour, convincing Saudi Arabia and even the US of the stability that Taliban can bring to the region, despite their despotic behavior. “Publically maintaining a policy of denial, of any support for the Taliban, Bhutto’s Government expanded its logistics and military assistance to the militia.”³ Taliban and Pakistan’s strategic cooperation of the 90s is often described as “marriage of convenience”. Taliban needed Pakistan’s help in logistics, recruitment bases, fund raising and a diplomatic link to the outside World, whereas Pakistan was looking forward to deny influence to its rivals in Afghanistan and to secure “strategic depth” against Indian military aggression.⁴ Rising momentum of both Kashmir freedom struggle and Taliban’s politico-military movement led an upsurge in sub-conventional warfare. Its obvious fallout was proliferation of VNSAs, violent agendas and ‘special operations’. The visible manifestation of such activity in terms of terrorism was not in alarming proportions in

2 Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban* (US: Yale University Press, 2000), 74.

3 Amin Saikal, “The Rabbani Government, 1992-1996,” in *Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban*, ed. William Maley (Islamabad: Vanguard Books, 1998), 39.

4 Rasul Baksh Rais, *Recovering the Frontier State* (Karachi, OUP, 2008), 70.

the 90s but it was brewing in the society, as was amply witnessed in the next decade.

Post 9/11

The first decade of the 21st Century is a milestone in Pakistan's terror landscape. It was characterized by two prominent strategic U turns; firstly in Kashmir by stopping alleged support to the freedom struggle and secondly in Afghanistan by denouncing Taliban and supporting international conventions against their rule. For Pakistan, negative repercussions of both were enormous in the fight against terrorism. Rise of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a sharp increase in sectarian militancy, blatancy of Mumbai attacks in 2008, etc, are some examples. Al Qaeda's becoming a network and its proliferation in Pakistan in concert with disparate militant organizations operating locally is perhaps the most serious blow to Pakistan's stability that occurred in the decade of 2000s. Pakistan's siding with the US provided the ideological poison on which Al Qaeda and her affiliates built a narrative to demonize the State of Pakistan and its LEAs, which was then used to expand recruitment and wage a terror campaign aimed at weakening the will, resolve and capacity of the Nation's fight against terrorism.⁵

Dynamics of Regional Stability

On 22 June 2011, President Obama announced withdrawal plan of US forces from Afghanistan entailing a reduction of 10,000 troops by the end of 2011 and a total reduction of 33,000 troops by summer of 2012, reversing the 'surge' of 30,000 troops ordered in 2009.⁶ As of now, there is a political debate about the withdrawal schedule of the remaining 68,000 US troops in

⁵ Syed Saleem Shahzad, *Inside Al Qaeda and the Taliban*, (US, Palgrave, 2011), xix.

⁶ Brad Knickerbocker, "Obama details plan to withdraw US troops from Afghanistan", *The Christian Science Monitor*, 22 June 2011.

Afghanistan. Their residual number beyond 2014 under the US-Afghan Strategic Partnership Agreement, including the strategy of their employment, is the key question that has been partly addressed by Obama in the February 2013 announcement of withdrawal of 34,000 troops by end of 2014. After US drawdown, Afghan National Security Forces' (ANSF) operational and logistical effectiveness and financial sustenance along with success of Afghan political process in 2014 is perhaps the most important uncertainty at the moment. As a result of her policies, US foresee some normality in Afghanistan emerging from the prevalent challenging situation. Pakistan's support in the peace process, which hinges on reconciliation with Taliban and retrieval of US forces, that depends on Pakistan's land routes, is projected to be most critical to the success or failure of US exit strategy. In the aftermath of 26 November 2011 Mohmand Attack by NATO on Pakistan Army's check posts, Pakistan's CT cooperation with US in Afghanistan and FATA at the operational level suffered serious setback. However, after restoration of NATO supply routes and with the recent release of Taliban prisoners and repeated gestures of unstinted cooperation with Afghan High Peace Council, a positive ambience is emerging in the political climate of the region.

US Think Tank Views about Pakistan vis-à-vis Afghan Imbrolio

A host of possibilities are speculated to foreclose Pakistan's options; economic/financial arm-twisting, controlled instability, fomenting rift with Afghanistan and even facilitating Indian intimidation,⁷ can be some of them. Bruce Riedel, author of the book "*Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America and the Future of Global Jihad*", opined at a Centre for Strategic and International

⁷ Bruce Riedel and Anthony Cordesman, "A Perilous Course? The Future of US Pakistan Partnership", *Global Security Forum 2011*, 8 June 2011.

Studies (CSIS) Seminar on 8 June 2011 that Kerry-Lugar-Berman legislation providing civilian assistance to Pakistan is a “very smart idea whose time has already passed”. He brazenly encouraged the US to use India to send a “message” to Pakistan. He also warned that attempting to play mediator between New Delhi and Islamabad would end in failure. At the same occasion, a renowned analyst, Anthony Cordesman, CSIS, while sharing his distaste for the idea of ‘regional solution’ of Afghan imbroglio said “as for the phrase regional solutions, after 50 years of hearing about them, my instinctive reaction is to leave the room the moment anybody mentions the phrase”. Cordesman argued that without US and NATO’s support the ANSF cannot be build to the desired capacity and the buildup is going to take at least 2016 to 2018, which gives rise to the problem of managing the drawdown beyond 2014. In his opinion, winning in Afghanistan without stability in Pakistan and without improved US-Pak relations will fail to achieve stability in the region besides undermining the transition. He considers that Pakistan’s goals in Afghanistan are to achieve and expand its own influence, especially in the Pashtun areas, to block India from “encircling” Pakistan through influence in Afghanistan. Therefore, he goes on to build his argument on the political geography; Pakistan is not going to willingly confront Al Qaeda or the Afghan Taliban, neither in FATA nor in Balochistan. This, in my view, is a classic example of building a “narrative”; using reputed think tanks to hold high profile seminars and presenting just one side of the story without bothering to bring objectivity in discourse by presenting alternate viewpoints. It can be argued very logically that after being in the cross hairs of Al Qaeda and its close affiliate TTP and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi for so long and having suffered more than 3,000 LEA casualties, besides the

30,000 civilian deaths and more than US \$ 60 billion economic losses, why would Pakistan not like to confront Al Qaeda? Afghan Taliban's hitherto fore deride by US had always been quite obvious as visible from the above discourse too, by scholars very closely associated to US policymaking. Now, the pinnacle of US policy makers like Vice President Joe Biden have deliberately distanced themselves from Taliban's enmity, while trying hard to negotiate and institute confidence building measures like exchange of Guantanamo prisoners.⁸

Terror Map Afflicting Pakistan

Having seen the regional dynamics vis-à-vis Afghan imbroglio, lets take a look at its fallout for Pakistan in terms of the strategy of terrorist organizations active against Pakistan. According to Rahimullah, a renowned Pakistani expert on terrorism, protracted US presence in Afghanistan helps TTP because drawdown and ultimately a complete withdrawal, if at all, will harm their narrative.⁹ At the same time if Taliban were allowed to portray the drawdown as their notion of success it would embolden the rank and file of terrorists of all shades operating in the region. Going by the cliché that insurgents win when they don't lose, Taliban are already winning. However, Taliban too are interested in negotiation because historically Afghan Mujahideen after the Soviet withdrawal were also not keen to show any hubris. More importantly, Pakistan cannot afford to make any distinction between Al Qaeda and TTP. Baitullah Mehsud formed the TTP in 2007, taken over by Hakimullah Mehsud after his death, supported by the Swat faction in exile led by Fazlullah. These are

8 "Obama will free Afghan Prisoners to Appease Taliban", *RT Question More*, 30 December 2011.

9 Rahimullah Yousafzai's interaction with the researcher at NDU on 17 December 2011.

hand in glove with sectarian terrorist organization like LeJ and Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan. Then, in Rahimullah's opinion, are the all important Hafiz Gul Bahadur and Late Maulvi Nazeer's groups. He was of the opinion that Haqqani Group does not have more than 2000 fighters who are directly under his command, though a much larger number may remain waiting in arms for a call. Total number of active Taliban fighters, in his opinion, would be around 25,000 and their hold in the southern and eastern Afghanistan is well known. Kunar and Nuristan are two examples where ISAF and ANSF have practically abdicated in Taliban's favour. However, the presence of Swat Taliban in these two provinces and their frequent attacks from these sanctuaries into Chitral and Dir speaks much about their collusion with Afghan Taliban and puts into question Afghan Taliban's motives vis-à-vis Pakistan. All factions of Taliban acknowledge their allegiance to Mullah Omar, the acclaimed Amir-ul-Momineen of the self-proclaimed Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. They would like to fight Taliban's enemies in Afghanistan, ie, Northern Alliance and would like to have some presence in FATA but attacking Pakistan would not be their policy. Moreover, their attitude would depend upon Pakistan's policy towards the US in war on terror. Nevertheless, Afghan and Pakistan's Taliban have complete harmony in their worldviews and they would do all in their power to discourage Pakistan's CT efforts.

Future Outlook of the Region

An interesting discussion between Maleeha Lodhi and Asad Durrani needs illustration to predict the future of regional stability.¹⁰ She was of the view that despite their sharp differences

¹⁰ Dr Maleeha Lodhi and Lt Gen (Retd) Asad Durrani's interaction with participants of

and lack of trust there are Pak – US convergences now about finding a political solution to the war in Afghanistan as Pakistan wants peace in the region. Pakistan would like to get “past the past” and both sides would need to understand that they cannot achieve their objectives at the other’s expense. Pakistan cannot be made to pay for the strategic errors of US. Both ISAF and Pakistan Army have capacity issues in dealing with the “safe havens” or the sanctuaries. Its not right to say that whatever right goes on in Afghanistan is due to ISAF and whatever wrong occurs is due to Pakistan. The sanctuaries in Pakistan are the consequences of the flawed US strategy in Afghanistan since 2001. They relied on the Northern Alliance and resulted in the marginalization of Pashtuns, which then manifested itself in the insurgency. That in turn led to sanctuaries. Durrani was of the opinion that there is neither trust nor converging interest between US and Pakistan. Trust has never been the hallmark of Pak-US relations. In his opinion, divergence of interests include: US’ ambivalence in keeping substantial combat forces beyond 2014 (Pakistan and other regional countries oppose it); Americans employing primarily military force vs. Pakistan’s preference for non-military means; and their avoiding or delaying serious negotiations with the “opposition” (Taliban).

Fence Sitters

Fear of the militants and their pervasive intimidation keeps the ‘fence-sitters’ apprehensive. As is widely known, it was Taliban’s atrocities, which turned the people against them. Syed Irfan Ashraf gives an account of the current dispositions of TTP in an article

National Security & War Course during a simulation exercise on internal security in NDU on 17 December 2011, as recorded by the researcher and reproduced with their permission.

pointedly titled “TTP losing its clout?”¹¹ The author argued about the waning influence of Mehsud tribesmen who formed the hub of TTP hardcore militancy and provided the bulk of its foot soldiers, logistics and popular support. They were in despair as displaced persons in Tank and Dera Ismail Khan Region after fleeing the military operation in 2009 against the Taliban controlled Mehsud area of South Waziristan. Government was deliberately ignoring their plight to send a message to other recalcitrant tribesmen about its seriousness in dealing with TTP and its associates in any manner deemed appropriate to undermine their influence. Interplay of tribal dynamics had denuded their independence to continue militancy as per their own priorities – targeting Pakistan’s State facilities and LEAs – due to their subservient status of seeking refuge in other influential tribal groups’ domains like the Late Maulvi Nazir Group in South Waziristan and Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group in North Waziristan. Their archrival’s (Ahmadzai Wazir tribe) increased influence further compounded their predicament. More importantly there were serious fissures in the TTP, aggravated by the *controversial* drone campaign of US. At the same time, diversification of ‘theatre of operations’ all over the country had helped to sustain TTP momentum. Ominous overall fallout is the waning ideological basis of militancy and rise of criminality in the shape of kidnapping, looting, extortion, drug trafficking and smuggling. Hence there is a need of careful holistic visualization of the “TTP Affiliates” strategy before deciding upon the next CT moves in order to contain the malaise effectively without giving them any chance to bolster public support, like the recent reconciliation overtures, to regain lost influence.

¹¹ Syed Irfan Ashraf, “TTP losing its clout?”, *Dawn*, 1 January 2012.

Political Expediencies of FATA

Upon departure of the British, “brown sahib” in the shape of Political Agent (PA) appointed by the Federal Government colluded with the Tribal Malik by greasing their palms to set about a system of political expediency in FATA. The aim was to set about a governance paradigm that could protect State interests by way of delegating unbridled powers to PA and convoluted responsibility to the Malik, both of which saw rampant abuse under cover of the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR). Ghulam S. Afridi from FATA, in an article appearing in daily Dawn of 19 December 2011, empathetically highlights the political, social, legal and economic woes of the roughly 4.7 million population of FATA¹². The existing political system is incapable of sustaining the realities of changing aspirations of the tribal people. They are afraid of the clutches of the so called ‘religious’ militants but equally disillusioned with the status quo political and legal dispensation that has whittled their voice as equal citizens of Pakistan and strangulated equal economic opportunity. It is about time that gradual repealing of FCR becomes a reality and FATA integrated with the mainland in a phased manner.

War of Narratives

The importance of ideology in terrorism studies cannot be overemphasized. Narratives drive these ideologies. Unless the constitution of a typical extremist narrative and its foundational logic is known, it cannot be countered effectively. A hypothetical example, though apparently a bit exaggerated, would illustrate:

We (i.e. our group, however defined) have a glorious past, but modernity has been disastrous....we are

¹² Ghulam S. Afridi, “Between a rock and a hard place”, *Dawn*, 19 December 2011.

tragically obstructed from reaching our rightful place, obstructed by an illegitimate civil government and/or by an enemy so evil ... This intolerable situation calls for vengeance. Extreme measures are required...It is a duty to kill the perpetrators of evil, and we cannot be blamed for carrying out this violence. Those who sacrifice themselves in our cause will attain glory.. In the end, we will bring our people to a new world that is a paradise.¹³

Unless the counter-narrative is equally comprehensive, convincing and abstract, it will not have the desired charm to wean the masses away from the extremist narrative.

13 Understanding Terrorist Psychology, Randy Borum, The Psychology of Counterterrorism, ed, Andrew Silke (London, Routledge, 2011) 27.

TERRORISM AND SINO PAK COOPERATION

A Pakistani expert, Fazal-ur-Rahman traced the history of anti-terrorism cooperation between China and Pakistan in order to establish it as a field of potential cooperation between the two countries.¹⁴ After discussing Chinese satisfaction with Pakistan's efforts to help stem the sporadic Uyghur terrorism roots in FATA and giving the present thinking about the scope of CT cooperation, he wrote: "China has taken a while to fully realize Pakistan's material needs with regard to its counter-terrorism efforts". On June 15, 2009, Pakistan's Interior Minister, Rehman Malik, announced after his visit to China that the Chinese government would provide security gadgets worth U.S. \$ 280 million to Pakistan for capacity building of law enforcement agencies (LEA). That includes vehicle scanners, mobile scanners and other equipment. Fazl-ur-Rahman quoted Hu Shisheng, a well known Chinese scholar on South Asian affairs in his article who said in this regard: "We will contribute to its (Pakistan) stabilization. A stable Pakistan is essential for building a stable Xinjiang. A disintegrated or dismantled Pakistan will be a disaster for us. We know that during the American campaigns in Afghanistan and operations in Pakistan, Uyghur were caught. There are huge tribal areas there, which have run themselves for centuries. Without close cooperation with Pakistan, how can China ensure stability there?"

¹⁴ Fazlur Rahman, "Traditional and emerging areas of strategic cooperation between Pakistan and China", *Strategic Studies*, XXIX, No 2 and 3, Summer and Autumn 2009, 41.

Chinese had been conveying their concerns to Pakistan as late as 2003 regarding two militant organizations fomenting separatism and militancy in Xinjiang, i.e., East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) and Eastern Turkestan Liberation Organization (ETLO)¹⁵. However, Chinese apprehensions were assuaged about their resource rich Western region as China and Pakistan pledged to fight the three evils, *extremism, ethnic separatism and terrorism* together. According to a Chinese online newspaper, China Daily, President Musharraf during a visit to China in November 2003 said “Pakistan stands resolutely against terrorism and will never allow anti-China forces - including ethnic Uyghur seeking independence for the North Western Xinjiang region – to use Pakistan as a base.”¹⁶

Ghulam Ali cited the April 2010 visit by Maulana Fazlur Rahman, head of Pakistan’s Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam, to China at the invitation of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and an earlier visit of similar nature by Qazi Hussain Ahmad (Late), the erstwhile head of Jamat-e-Islami, in February 2009, as Chinese efforts to seek political support against Chinese Muslim separatists.¹⁷ The CCP signed party level MoUs with both these political parties. The author asserted that Chinese help had been forthcoming for Pakistan at numerous occasions in UN, reflected in getting observer status for Pakistan in SCO and material support worth US \$ 470 million in CT activities between June 2009 and May 2010. Hence it is a mutually beneficial collaboration rooted in interdependence. Three joint China – Pakistan anti-terrorism

15 P.C. Joshi, *Main Intelligence Outfits of Pakistan* (New Delhi: Anmol Publications Pvt Ltd, 2008), 209-212.

16 “Sino-Pak Pledge to Fight the Three Evils”, *China Daily*, 4 November 2003.

17 Ghulam Ali, “China’s Deepening Engagement with Pakistan on Counter Terrorism”, *Central Asia - Caucasus Institute Analyst*, Issue of 26 May 2010.

military exercises have been conducted since July 2010,¹⁸ while China and India have also conducted two such exercises so far.

Sino-Pak alliance has always been a subject of interest in international relations. When terrorism emanating from Pakistan assumed world focus in the post 9/11 US led global security order, China – Pakistan collaboration came in as a natural corollary due to the Chinese influence over Pakistan and the former’s own terrorism issues. US newspaper, L A Times, disclosed on 25 May 2009 late Richard Holbrooke’s parleys in China about the need and significance of Chinese CT support to Pakistan.¹⁹ However, the article also carried the apprehensions that may impinge upon such endeavors, for example, Stephen Cohen opined on the issue; “China can be a positive influence,” he said, but added that there may be divisions within the Chinese government, and that the Chinese military, despite close ties to the Pakistani Army, may be reluctant to intervene. Lisa Curtis, a former congressional analyst at the Heritage Foundation, considered it a difficult proposition to persuade China to assume any military role in Pakistan’s terrorism threat, notwithstanding Chinese concerns about the spillover effects of the Pakistani insurgency.

Amina Yousaf Khokar’s detailed account of the December 2010 visit of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao to India and Pakistan is very peculiar from the antiterrorism cooperation point of view, as one does not find any mention about it as an area considered worth cooperating by both Governments.²⁰ However, terrorism

18 “China, Pakistan begin anti-terrorism exercises”, *Daily News & Analysis*, Beijing, 1 July 2010.

19 Paul Ritzer, “US appeals to China to help stabilize Pakistan”, *Los Angeles Times*, 25 May 2009.

20 Amna Yousaf Khokar, “Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s visits to Pakistan and India”, *Reflections*, Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad, 2011.

and Pakistan figured prominently in the Chinese Premier's speech to the parliament. This anomaly vindicates Lisa Curtis's analysis above. Moreover, in order to create space for Pak-China CT cooperation, unless certain core CT concepts are identified with concrete objectives in mind, sporadic assistance/cooperation like 'security gadgets' for LEAs and joint military exercises will not initiate a strategic equation. The internal CT strategies will have to be adroitly dovetailed with the external ones to mobilize resources (means) for achieving identified objectives (ends) through pragmatic concepts (ways). It is in such conception and its analysis that the literature on Pak-China CT collaboration suffers a void.

Chinese Ambassador to Pakistan Liu Jian at the Seminar "Pakistan-China Relations 2011: Year of Friendship" hosted by the Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad, stated inter alia:

Both countries agree that terrorism, separatism and extremism pose a great threat to regional peace, stability and security and will continue to fight against these 'three evil forces' within bilateral and multilateral framework. I would like to emphasize that Pakistan has made tremendous contribution to and huge sacrifice in the anti-terror drive. The international community should fully recognize this and actively support Pakistan's efforts in safeguarding national as well as regional security and stability.²¹

Dr Wang Zaibang dilated upon Chinese Vision for the Emerging World Order in the above mentioned Seminar. While emphasizing

²¹ Liu Juan, excerpt from the speech at Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad (ISSI) on 11 January 2011: authentic draft acquired by the researcher from ISSI.

the need to establish a new world order, he explained that Chinese President Hu Jintao's concept of "harmonious world" revolves around four viewpoints; 1) Democratization of international relations. 2) Respect and upholding of diverse civilizations. 3) New concept of security with mutual trust, equality, mutual benefit and collaboration. 4) Strengthening the role of UN, balanced development of world economy.²²

In continuation, Ye Hailin delivered a very interesting talk on 'China and South Asian Relations in a New Perspective,'²³ deliberating at length on the balanced approach that China is likely to take in future vis-à-vis South Asia. He discussed non-traditional threat to Chinese overseas interests: terrorism and local violence. Therein, after signifying Pakistan's help to nab some leaders of East Turkestan terrorism groups and lamenting the loss of Chinese lives to terrorism in Pakistan, he appreciated Pakistan's deep concern on the loss of innocent Chinese lives and mutual assurances by China and Pakistan of disallowing misgivings to affect Sino-Pak ties. He opined:

After several years of military strikes launched by Pakistani Security Forces, there are still some elements concealing in some mountain areas controlled by local tribes which are sporadic in obedience to Islamabad. CT cooperation provided a new field for China to close its ties with (this) South Asian country, but the bloody price also tested the solidarity of their relationship.

While concluding his talk, the speaker deliberately explained the nuances of China's policy towards India and Pakistan, but

22 Wang Zaibang, Vice President of Chinese Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), excerpt from the speech at ISSI on 11 January 2011: authentic draft acquired by the researcher from ISSI.

23 Ye Hailin, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, excerpt from the speech ISSI on 11 January 2011: authentic draft acquired by the researcher from ISSI.

suggested keeping China-Pakistan relationship as the cornerstone of China's South Asian policy in these words:

The improvements in China-India relations and China-Pakistan relations need not be a zero-sum game. China should not be a mediator for the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan but should be a positive partner of these two at the same time, seeking a framework to enhance their bilateral trust and shared interests. Meanwhile, China should also be a responsible friend of Pakistan, continuing its support for the efforts made by Pakistan at promoting peace and stability in South Asia and safeguarding its sovereignty and independence.

Chinese strategic outlook towards South Asia has generally remained consistent for the past half century despite major strides in Sino-Indian trade relationship. It is evident that this relationship has not transformed Chinese worldview towards India or Pakistan. China continues to maintain strong ties with Pakistan and Myanmar and warns against Indian hegemony.

Despite its own faster growth in military expenditures, China kept warning that India's heavy military expenses hurt its peaceful reputation and arouse suspicion in its neighbours. More than any other region of Asia, China depicted South Asia in zero-sum terms, blaming one state within the region.²⁴

Chinese blame Indian establishment and politicians for sensitizing public opinion against China by playing the 'victimization card', which depicts China as an invading power

²⁴ Gilbert Rozman, *Chinese Strategic Thought toward Asia* (US, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 211-214.

that has previously invaded and occupied Indian territory in 1962 and might repeat the same again in future. Indian perception of threat emanates from fears of Chinese naval dominance; her close security and economic ties not only with Pakistan but also with Sri Lanka and Nepal. On the other hand China sees a threat to her energy shipments emanating from emerging Indo-US nexus. However, according to Rozman's opinion, the proclivity to paint a positive image of bilateral relations (between China and India) obscures the warnings that are buried in the texts.

Sino-Pak CT collaboration came into focus once again as a result of violent attacks in Kashi (Kashgar) in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomy Region on 30-31 July 2011 in which several lives were lost. Global Times, Beijing, as reported in the daily Dawn of 4 August 2011, squarely blamed 'overseas extremists' for fomenting animosity between the Chinese Han and Uyghur communities. It claimed that extremists tend to portray a picture of oppression of Uyghur Muslims by the Government, which, according to the newspaper, was totally wrong. It suggested that unity and harmony in the Xinjiang Province must be promoted as a first step towards mitigation of this problem. Secondly, terrorism must be dealt with an iron hand and indiscriminately, irrespective of the ethnic affiliation of the perpetrators. The Kashgar Government blamed ETIM for these attacks alleging their arms and explosives training in Pakistan. However, the China's Foreign Ministry was quick to rebut these claims by appreciating Pakistan's role as a long-standing partner in fighting terrorism and religious extremism. Acknowledging Pakistan's sacrifices and contribution in the fight against terrorism, the Ministry's spokesman added that China and Pakistan "have developed healthy cooperation in the anti-terror area and China will continue strengthening cooperation

with Pakistan.”²⁵ Earlier Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry had issued a statement offering full support to China after the attack. On 10 August 2011, Dawn reported the extradition of suspected ETIM members believed to have links with the recent terror attacks in Kashgar area. The news article recalled that similar extraditions have occurred in the past as well; fourteen in 1997, seven in 2002 and nine in 2009. Such statements indicate a contemporary willingness in both the countries to enhance CT collaboration, which requires a diplomatic mechanism to translate this desire into more substantial, result-oriented action. In order to actualize such action it is of foremost importance that structured research is undertaken in both countries to identify a meaningful collaborative mechanism that is cognizant of the strategic opportunities and constraints associated with Sino Pak CT cooperation.

US and China are not very congenially aligned with each other as far as the concept of CT is concerned. The US has apprehensions about Chinese arms imprint being found in terrorist infested regions and Iran-China cooperation.²⁶ However it acknowledges the need to seek Chinese alliance in her global CT campaigns. A news item in the daily Dawn of 10 September 2011 titled “China blasts West’s anti-terrorism double standards” quoted China’s state media, Xinhua, accusing Western countries, especially US of turning a ‘blind eye’ towards damage caused by extremists in Russia’s Chechnya and in China’s Xinjiang. US refusal in 2009 to extradite Uyghur detainees at Guantanamo Bay Prison to China has been the cause of Chinese consternation. Xinhua also accused Western Countries of using CT as an excuse to intervene in other

²⁵ Reuters, “China Praises Pakistan, downplaying risk of rift”, *Dawn*, 3 August 2011.

²⁶ Shirely A. Kan, “US-China Counterterrorism Cooperation: Issues for U.S. Policy”, *Congressional Research Service*, May 2009.

countries internal affairs. US is cognizant of China's reluctance and apprehensions in getting fully integrated in global CT efforts in accordance with US norms.

Pakistan at the moment is suffering more from the aftermath of war against terrorism than the war itself. There is an urgent need for reconstruction and rehabilitation in the war ravaged areas that are being gradually reclaimed to avoid their falling back into the trap of deprivation that cultivates alternative political ideologies, i.e., obscurantism and militancy. Richard Jones in the essay, "The Economics of War and Post-Conflict Poverty Reduction",²⁷ deliberated upon these ideas. In view of his theory, the macro and micro economic perspectives highlighting winners and losers and the impact of war on national economy need to be studied in relation to Pakistan's conflict ridden zones. Such studies in the World mostly focus on Afghanistan, Iraq, Rwanda, Somalia, etc, forgetting countries like Pakistan, which have suffered conflicts of a relatively less devastating manner but are fraught with travesties of neglect. For example, the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Government recently reviewed a new strategy for eliminating militancy in the Province. It was called Post Crisis Need Assessment (PCNA), compiled by a group of multilateral financial institutions.²⁸ This is the kind of document much needed to convince a strategic partner like China into helping Pakistan fight terrorism while employing indirect strategy of fulfilling the genuine sociopolitical needs of the affected population in order to thwart terrorist forces. This monograph is expected to help bridge this gap.

27 Sultan Baraket, ed, *After the Conflict – Reconstruction and Development in the Aftermath of War* (New York, Macmillan, 2005)

28 Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA Secretariat, "Post Crisis Need Assessment Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA". September 2010.

Shahid Javed Burki, an eminent scholar of Pakistan's political economy suggested; "an important way of reorienting Pakistan's economy is to align it more meaningfully with China's interests. Looking West should not be the automatic response during crises."²⁹ This idea cannot bear fruit unless Pakistan presents China with long term, coordinated and well thought out areas of mutually beneficial collaboration. The benefits can range from diplomatic to political and economic to security. However, caution is warranted in these turbulent times as Pakistan chooses to balance its strategic calculus. The same author writes in another article, "What we are seeing is the likelihood of Pakistan becoming the focus of great power rivalry. This could have consequences that may not be all that good for the country."³⁰

Fareed Zakaria, while analyzing the significant reduction in global terrorist threat, said:

The real threat of Al Qaeda was that it would inspire some percentage of the world's 1.57 billion Muslims, sending out unstoppable waves of jihadis. In fact, across the Muslim world, militant Islam's appeal has plunged. In the half of the Muslim world that holds elections, parties that are in any way associated with Islamic jihad tend to fare miserably, even in Pakistan, which has the most serious terrorism problem of any country in the world today. Over the last few years, imams and Muslim leaders across the world have been denouncing suicide bombings, terrorism, and Al Qaeda with regularity.³¹

²⁹ Shahid Javed Burki, *Looking East*, Dawn, 28 September 2010.

³⁰ Shahid Javed Burki, *A New Twist to Old Ties*, Dawn, 5 October 2010.

³¹ Fareed Zakaria, *We're Safer Than We Think, But No One Wants to Admit it*, Newsweek, September 11, 2010.

It signifies the window of opportunity created by retrenching terrorists, which should be capitalized by Pakistan and China through meaningful and well-considered collaboration.

'Effectively Countering Terrorism; the Challenges of Prevention, Preparedness and Response'³², a collection of scholarly articles by experts in the field of terrorism, warrants review as a pertinent intellectual foundation for this monograph. The fundamental assumption of the book was that "military approaches and retaliatory measures" against the contemporary spate of terrorism have proved futile, rather inflaming the conditions surrounding terrorism even further. Such an approach has augmented adaptability of transnational / trans-cultural terrorism making it more survivable with an expanded motivation base. The contributors in this book argued that CT comprises "a more complex and elaborate set of measures before, during and after the attacks". The editors identified three categories of measures; "primary prevention" entailed addressing the root causes of terrorism in the political and societal domains in order to deny sociopolitical space to the terrorists and to debase their ideology by exposing its inconsistencies; "countering the threat" entailed more focus on intelligence based and police led operations in the short term as prevention's gestation matures; "responding to attacks" entailed responses to deny vulnerability of targets and to be able to manage the crisis resulting from terrorist attacks, which, despite efforts of preventing and countering, are likely to keep occurring. The approach of US administration in conceiving terrorist safe havens as a corollary of state protection and abetment, entailed such states becoming

³² Effectively Countering Terrorism, ed, Cornelia Beyer and Michael Bauer (Brighton - Portland, Sussex Academic Press, 2009)

the prime objectives in the so called Global War on Terror, was criticized as being farther from the reality on ground. It is rooted in the realist school of thought, which propounds the states to be in a constant state of competition in a zero sum game matrix. Peaceful interaction and cooperation among nation states is alien to realism that espouses the idea of national security being grounded in military might. The authors argued that terrorism should not be related to “sponsoring states” and only by doing so could a broad international consensus be reached to fight terrorism as a “transnational network, by multi-national political cooperation, intelligence sharing and police coordination”³³

The first chapter of the aforementioned book, *Ideology in Terrorism and CT*, by Rohan Gunaratna dilated upon the lessons learned in combating Al Qaeda and Al Jemaah al Islamiyah in South East Asia. It explained their ideologies, operating strategies and motivation techniques in detail before suggesting a response. The response revolved around “greater international and domestic cooperation within and between governments and agencies engaged in fighting terrorism and extremism.”³⁴ It emphasized the need to understand the linkage between extremism and terrorism as the former breeds the latter. However, the author’s recipe of ‘strategic CT’ that includes “ideological, educational, media, legislative and financial responses” missed on the important response parameter of economic opportunity for the deprived sections of society that are most vulnerable to fall prey to religious extremism in under developed / developing Muslim states. It also missed in identifying the significance of regional approach to CT strategies. The complexity of geopolitics often

³³ Ibid. 2-5.

³⁴ Ibid. 47.

prevents international consensus in reaching decisions about ways to stabilize unstable regions like Afghanistan and the weakly governed spaces of FATA in Pakistan due to divergent political interests and compulsions of stakeholders. In this backdrop, this monograph will attempt to identify the importance of economic opportunity in eradicating extremism and terrorism in Pakistan by way of cooperation between two regional countries, ie, China and Pakistan.

The second chapter of the aforementioned book by Jason Franks titled “The Root Causes of Terrorism, How to Address Them” is very relevant to this study. He identified three broad theories to categorize terrorism. Firstly, ‘Orthodox Terrorism Theory’; the most widely accepted one, this theory sidesteps the root causes of terrorism and favours the ‘illegal and illegitimate approach’ (Westphalian state retains sole propriety over violence) to explain the realists worldview about terrorism that is often considered state-centric. It is usually the basis of government’s anti-terrorism and CT policies. Secondly, ‘Radical Terrorism Theory’; the view taken by the terrorists forms the basis of this theory that justifies violence due to the root causes that exist in structural imbalances of the political system. Thirdly, ‘Moderate Terrorism Theory’; a not-so-developed field of study as yet that identifies the roots of terrorism in terms of socioeconomic, structural and political causes. The author argued that the ‘Orthodox’ school has gained undisputed dominance over the others and states are busy in explaining what constitutes terrorism, how does it function and how to overcome it; *why* it occurs especially in challenge to state authority is a much less debated perspective. He very pointedly accused states of misusing the legitimacy on violence by seeking unbridled powers to further their vested political

agendas against their political opponents made to identify with lead terror networks like Al Qaeda.³⁵ He identified four different types of terrorisms on the basis of structural chasms like cultural terrorism (historical / cultural influence for use of violence), systemic terrorism (perpetually conflicting relationships amongst actors of the system), situational terrorism (actors' goals incompatible with the perceived structure of the system) and socioeconomic terrorism (socioeconomic depravity and underdevelopment resulting in conflict). While giving the example of Northern Ireland, Nepal and Peru, the author argued in favour of an '*alternate approach*' to understanding terrorism, adopted to address the root causes of terrorism, particularly at structural level with emphasis on sociopolitical dimensions. Unless terrorists are redefined in 'value-neutral' conflict term like 'militants' or 'fighters' and their 'terrorist crimes' pardoned in order to engage in a political dialogue, conflict resolution would remain elusive. This argument alludes to a gradual shift in the CT approach by the state from 'Orthodox' to 'Moderate' after expending some energy on the former, either realizing its futility or creating a position of strength vis-à-vis the terrorists and subsequently making way for the latter. US political engagement with Taliban and Pakistan Government's inclusion of "dialogue" in their proclaimed three D strategy (development, deterrence and dialogue) tend to follow the same pattern, howsoever ineffectual that might be at this point in time.

In September 2011, a US think tank, Council on Foreign Relations, released a report titled 'Managing Instability on China's Periphery', that discussed contingencies about potential destabilization in North Korea, Myanmar, Pakistan and Central

³⁵ Ibid, 64.

Asia in separate chapters by different authors. In the chapter 'Pakistan Contingencies', Daniel Markey opined that any devastating instability in Pakistan could threaten China and US alike, yet Beijing and Washington held differing perceptions about the reasons of such an evolving catastrophe and the ways of dealing with it. The difference in Pakistan's view about China and US, highlighting the growing skepticism against US and more closeness with China, was mentioned alongside China's perceived keenness to prevent a breakdown in US – Pakistan relations and aversion to regional instability. In this backdrop, prospects of 'Sino – US consultation, and where possible, cooperation' were explored in order to bring stability in Pakistan, which was threatened by 'numerous sources of instability'. The author listed terrorism and extremism, poor governance, weak economy, regional tensions and socioeconomic disparities as the core enablers and based on them went on to develop four 'plausible' crisis scenarios. A terrorist attack in US traced to Pakistan based militants; a war with India; a major terrorist attack that eliminates top Pakistani leadership; a massive popular uprising that Army is unable or unwilling to clamp down. While both US and China would like to counter 'Islamic terrorism', avoid Indo-Pak war and improve regional and economic stability, they differ on relative power that US, China and India should wield in South and Central Asia. Influence of Pakistan's civilian political dispensation and her nuclear program are also points of departure in US and China's perspectives about Pakistan. Yet, three perceived areas of possible Sino-US cooperation could host a number of CT and assistance strategies; to reduce threat of extremist's violence, to improve *discipline* and capacity of Pakistan's security institutions (especially its intelligence agencies), to reduce chances of nuclear

risk-taking or potential use, and to enhance opportunities of broad based economic growth.

In case of a crisis, Sino-US collaboration could consider unilateral or multilateral means of coercion and inducement to limit escalation by Pakistan (and / or India). US and China may also consider coordination with other states having influence in Islamabad, like Saudi Arabia, Turkey, UAE and UK for 'preplanned multilateral crisis coordination'. Limited existing level of Sino-US cooperation on Pakistan should expand to include information sharing, joint planning and coordinating assistance programs. This should be done with a view to 'better train, equip and *motivate* Pakistani security forces for CT and CI, implement a large scale development plan, and encourage Pakistan to adopt a nuclear doctrine of minimal deterrence'.³⁶ The US viewpoint seeking Sino-US collaboration to engage Pakistan on the whole range of security issues affecting her CT orientation seems quite farfetched, almost untenable.

It can therefore be deduced from the discussion so far that convergence exists in Sino Pak viewpoints about the cardinality of reducing terrorism in Pakistan but the moot point lies in transforming this convergence into a 'strategic collaboration'. Three broad approaches of fighting terrorism are; the kinetic approach entails emphasis on the use of force to isolate terrorists from the public, eliminate its perpetrators and consolidate security situation in areas reclaimed from terrorists; the non-kinetic approach entails socioeconomic uplift, psychological efforts, diplomatic endeavours and political reconciliation to win over

³⁶ Daniel Markey, "Pakistan Contingencies," in *Managing Instability on China's Periphery*, Paul B. Stares et al (Council on Foreign Relations: 2011), 41-42.

terrorists with minimum resort to violence; a hybrid approach entails a predominantly political maneuver with suitable military backing, a mix of kinetic and non-kinetic approaches, with a view to reduce violence primarily through diminishing political space for the terrorists.

Three conclusions summarize the above discussion. Firstly, a purely kinetic approach of countering terrorism in Pakistan with Chinese collaboration may not be the most suitable way as methodology of CT efforts are very different in character. Secondly, a non-obtrusive and subtle yet effective method of countering terrorism is through the non-kinetic approach, which uses dialogue and development as its main proponents with deterrence in the background. As seen in various post crisis need assessment studies, Pakistan's terrorism affected areas are in dire need of development, which is most likely going to wean away the neutral population from terrorist's radical propaganda. Thirdly and most importantly, China has repeatedly reiterated her resolve to help Pakistan, her very close friend and partner, in fight against terrorism in order to achieve stability in her neighbourhood but the modus operandi of this collaboration has somehow eluded strategic focus.

SINO-PAK ANTI TERRORISM COLLABORATION AND REGIONAL STABILITY

Views on Sino Pak Strategic Relationship

Pak-China relationship, especially in the wake of recent souring of Pak-US relationship, evokes much interest in the US policymaking. A report of The Heritage Foundation, US, pointedly highlights China's disinterest in propping up the weak economy of Pakistan evident in aversion to provide economic aid in Pakistan's time of need. The think tank believes that China's response to Pakistan's recent overtures has been "lukewarm" highlighting the limits to what Pakistan could expect from its "all-weather friend". The report underplays the Pak-China strategic relationship as Chinese bid to contain India while encourages US to engage China in seeking her cooperation against a common threat emanating from Pakistan by way of "Islamabad's support for some terrorist groups (that) strengthens the ideological base, logistical capabilities, and financial support for all Islamist terrorist groups". However, the limits of Chinese investment in Pakistan vis-à-vis other countries where China invests make an interesting comparison:

Chinese Outward Investment, 2005-2011³⁷

Country	Investment in US \$ billion
Peru	7.18
Nigeria	5.44
Afghanistan	3.27
India	3.22
Hungary	2.11
Philippines	1.02
Pakistan	0.76
Turkey	0.75
Total all countries	310.10

China's Worldview

China made a seminal and momentous decision in late 70s under Deng Xiaoping to retreat from global power politics and concentrate on building her economy by controlled deregulation and improved governance. She pursued a policy of non-confrontation and has managed to reduce conflict with all neighbours in her pursuit to maintain a stable neighbourhood. Internally, an aging population and underdeveloped western region confront China; for the latter, a grand strategy is already at work to help develop a bridge with CARs and the West. China wishes to keep Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh differences with India at a low pitch and Indian official stance is also similar but it's the Indian media that remains quite aggressive towards China. Meanwhile, Indo-US strategic collaboration is being watched carefully by China, while remaining skeptical of Indian Security Council bid. China wants peaceful and stable Afghanistan and is very wary of permeation

³⁷ Lisa Curtis and Derek Scissors, "The Limits of Pakistan-China Alliance", Heritage Foundation, 19 January 2012.

of three tendencies considered vicious in their opinion; terrorism, ethnic separatism and religious extremism³⁸.

Sino - Pak - US Dynamics and Terrorism

China expects US to stabilize the security situation in Afghanistan before leaving, whereas she is not inclined to get involved in the Afghan reconciliation process due to her unwillingness to be seen as partisan towards any faction but she is willing for reconstruction, as is evident from her US \$ 4 billion investment. China looks askance to any permanent US bases in Afghanistan. In Masood's opinion "string of pearls" analogy ascribed to China for containing India "is a fiction" because, he argues, it is counter-intuitive to imagine commercial ports being developed for strategic ambitions (US and Indian thinkers obviously think otherwise). On the other hand, Pakistan seems keen to have strategic naval cooperation with China. Sino-Pak strategic relationship having been built on trust, mutual respect, non-interference and unconditional assistance, supported by popular ethos and anchored in the psyche of the two peoples, is moving from strength to strength following a unique trajectory. However, in the same context, considering Pak-China and Pak-US relations as zero-sum would be inappropriate, because none can fill the gap left by the other³⁹. ETIM threat to China is a very serious challenge and Pakistan is collaborating fully at every level to counter it, having foiled many terrorism bids in the offing through intelligence cooperation and joint mechanisms. Uyghur Diasporas, who trace their Turkic roots to Central Asia, are spread in Turkey, Germany, USA, etc and have formed ETIM as their militant wing.

38 Masood Khan, Pakistan's envoy to China, lecture to National Security & War Course, NDU on 26 September 2011, as recorded by the researcher.

39 Masood Khan.

China sees this as a serious vulnerability and wishes to secure her Western flank that might cause internal turmoil.

Terrorism - China's Primary Security Concern

China's current defence policy published in March 2011, and available publically by the name of China's National Defence in 2010,⁴⁰ clearly mentions her perceived threat from terrorism as a primary source of concern. "Security threats posed by such global challenges as terrorism, economic insecurity, climate change, nuclear proliferation, insecurity of information, natural disasters, public health concerns and trans-national crimes are on the rise."⁴¹ According to Chinese strategic thinking, along with traditional sources of threats such as hegemonies, global power politics and military interventionism, a host of non-traditional sources of threats have arisen, such as 'terrorism' both to international security and to China's national interests.

Chinese Views on Origins of Terrorism

According to Chinese perception, contemporary terrorism rose as a result of unbridled capitalism from the end of 18th Century onwards, which led to intensification of class conflicts. The fundamental reason lay in failure of people's expectations of peace and development, widening gap between the North and South and the national and religious contradictions becoming more pronounced.⁴² China's security concept is based on four elements: 'mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination. Mutual trust is the foundation, mutual benefit the

40 State Council of the People's Republic of China, "China's National Defense in 2010", 31 March 2011.

41 Ibid, 4.

42 Institute of Regional Studies Islamabad, "China's National Security Concerns: South Asian Dimension", Spotlight on Regional Affairs, March 2005.

objective, equality the guarantee and coordination the means of the new security concept⁴³. Mutual benefit seeks contribution to the security of other countries as well, rather than seeking solely one's own security and collective security mechanisms tend to aggravate sense of insecurity amongst the countries outside of its folds. Chinese believe, and quite rightly so, that no country alone can remain immune to terrorism. Terrorism has brought about unprecedented interaction and mutual accommodation among major powers. China's armed forces are considered to have a pivotal role in cracking down on terrorism effectively. Political fallout of instability in Central Asian States, especially in the form of 'secessionism, religious extremism and international terrorism' is very worrisome for China.

Chinese Approach towards Extremism

ETIM threat is central to China's fight against terrorism, which it firmly believes is jeopardizing economic development, unity among nationalities and social stability in the border areas. However, this does not mean that China has set about cracking down on all forms of religious expression and freedom, rather, it has realized in the wake of 9/11 attacks that if religious forces are driven to desperation and extremism, the results are catastrophic. Therefore, Jiang Zemin acknowledged in December 2001 Politburo and State Council's joint National Religious Work Meeting that religion could act as a stabilizing force in society with stability being the cardinal precept of China's strategy.⁴⁴ The Party acknowledges that its prime responsibility of nurturing the revolution has now moved on to "stabilization" and "management"

⁴³ Ibid. 17.

⁴⁴ Beatrice Leung, *China's Religious Freedom Policy: The Art of Managing Religious Activity*, *The China Quarterly*, No 184, December 2005, 910.

through regulation and other norms of statecraft. It realizes that boxing up of every expression of religious freedom in the information age and globalization will be counter-productive; hence the need to revive Chinese culture and socialism as a counter weight to religious ideals being sought in the current environment of choice and individuality. Even when religious adherents are numbered at only 100 million in China, control of their activities in accordance to Party policies by means of legal regulations alone is not completely achievable and the need of the hour is a mix of creating attractiveness for the traditional social ideologies and military power for deterring any unacceptable excesses.

ETIM Proliferation

Al Qaeda provided the much needed financial support to Central Asian Islamic militants including Uzbek, Chechen, Chinese (Eastern Turkestan's) and Tajik fighters⁴⁵. During the rule of Taliban, an assurance was given to the Chinese that ETIM would be allowed to live peacefully in Afghanistan, but it would not be allowed to instigate insurgency in Xinjiang as the Chinese feared.⁴⁶ In the aftermath of Taliban's ouster, this Central Asian Diaspora moved to Pakistan's tribal areas, mostly to North and South Waziristan in FATA and some even settled in Turkey. Regarding FATA, Pakistan's firm resolve to crackdown on all foreign militants, especially the ETIM, is amply reflected in Chinese official response that categorically rejected the claims of ETIM base in FATA while lauding Pakistan's CT efforts in the wake of 30-31 July 2011 attacks by terrorists in Xinjiang. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that ETIM has any organized presence in FATA

⁴⁵ Syed Saleem Shahzad, 206-208.

⁴⁶ Ibid, xviii.

at the moment, although individual hidings cannot be ruled out. Thus it provides an opportunity to stem future regrouping of this terrorist organization in FATA by way of strategic CT collaboration between China and Pakistan, without chances of an acrimony arising out of the fear of ETIM's established footprint in Pakistan.

Chinese Development of Underdeveloped Western Regions

As a means of providing better socioeconomic opportunities in neglected regions, in order to deny fertile grounds for extremist narratives in Provinces like Xinjiang, China is undertaking massive development in her Western hinterlands. It provides an opportunity for Pakistan to link her own underdeveloped Gilgit Baltistan Province more intimately with Chinese development efforts by way of increasing trade and economic interdependencies through an improved communication and business infrastructure.⁴⁷ Opportunity also rests with Pakistan in emulating Chinese model of addressing extremism by giving improved economic incentives to deprived areas of Southern Punjab, Interior Sindh, FATA, KPK and Balochistan through mutually beneficial business collaboration in sectors like oil & gas, mineral development, trade & energy corridors, hydroelectricity, ports & shipping, agriculture, etc.

International and Regional Perception on Sino-Pak CT Collaboration

Sino Pak collaboration in fight against terrorism is an international obligation as well. The US has already been encouraging China for broadening its role in global anti

⁴⁷ Pakistani Government official in Beijing, interviewed by the researcher at Chaklala, Rawalpindi, February 12, 2012.

terrorism efforts.⁴⁸ Global powers would welcome sharing of this international responsibility of fighting the menace of terrorism in the badland border regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan by China, which in their opinion has so far has shied away from this obligation despite its growing geopolitical influence. The regional stake holders, ie, India, Afghanistan, Iran, Turkey, GCC, etc would also like China to play a more assertive role in the Global Campaign against Terrorism. Economic issues of Pakistan are too well known vis-à-vis the enormity of her challenges and this is widely accepted in the region as well, at times with peculiar reservations like that of India. The leverage that China enjoys with Pakistan and the importance of Pakistan's anti terrorism campaign to the stability of the region are the two most significant factors that will move the regional countries' discourse towards nudging these strategic partners closer on the counter terrorism plane.

Challenges of Sino - Pak Collaboration in Fight against Terrorism

Need for Synergy in Pak-China Relationship. According to a senior Pakistani government official in Beijing, China's time-tested, friendly neighbourliness is great advantage for Pakistan today. China's surplus capital, evolving technology, political wisdom and sincere inclination to help are some of the important factors that go in favour of augmenting Sino-Pak strategic relationship.⁴⁹ China remains obliged to Pakistan not only for the popular Sino-US rapprochement but also for many less known cooperation activities during their rise to power like

48 Richard Boucher, *US Relations with China and Discussions about Pakistan, India and Afghanistan*, Remarks to the Press, Beijing, China, 12 December 2008. Available on <http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rm/2008/113318.htm> Accessed on 27 August 2011.

49 Pakistani Government official in Beijing.

modernizing banking system and developing megacity plans like that of Shanghai on pattern of Karachi. In his opinion success story of China is actually the success story of Chinese Communist Party (CCP). It has about 70 million members who are very well trained through a mechanism that caters for elaborate training for every tier of leadership. It is a widely known fact that CCP is disinclined towards any form of dissent. At the same time it is also grappling with understanding peculiar religious tendencies in order to apply indirect approaches for dealing with any radical inclinations as CCP is disinclined to interfere in religion. However forces inimical to China, in concert with extremist elements from the Uyghur Diasporas, are constantly on the lookout to exploit and exacerbate this subdued sourness with a view to reignite Chinese fears of extremism and terrorism export from Pakistan.

Lack of synergy on Pakistan's part in orchestrating strategic involvement with China is how the official described the attempt at forging a comprehensive Sino-Pak strategic collaboration. Various Government departments remain wanting in coordination while seeking Chinese cooperation through enhanced, long-term and advantageous business relationships in their own domains. On the other hand, Chinese system of working entails long term planning and coordination. It means, for example, a coordinated allocation / pledge at highest level for a friendly country's developmental assistance in a particular timeframe, which will then be spent in a mutually consented fashion for advancement of recipient and donor's respective national objectives. Harmonizing these objectives essentially remains an internal function. In the absence of a coherent, overarching cooperation strategy, effects of Chinese support are diluted vis-à-vis the priority of Pakistan's national priorities.

Dysfunctional National Counterterrorism Authority.

Terrorism being the number one strategic challenge for Pakistan and China being Pakistan's sole strategic ally, obstructions in their collaboration is quite ironic. A non-functional apex body like National Counterterrorism Authority (NACTA), which is finally close to gaining statutory status, is a main cause of not having a comprehensive anti terrorism strategy in Pakistan.

Defining National Objectives. There is a growing realization in Pakistan about the need for clearly defining national objectives. Maleeha Lodhi identified 'economic revival' and 'preserving the country's strategic deterrence capability' as the two overriding objectives on which coherent national policies should be predicated. Pakistan's weak economy prevents her from asserting independence in foreign and domestic policies, which can only be redeemed if the financial and economic indicators stabilize, and inclusive growth kicks off with visible improvement in poverty alleviation, job opportunities and integration in international business and trade. Strategic deterrence capability is the ultimate guarantor of Pakistan's sovereignty and territorial integrity, which is mostly under international scrutiny over 'proliferation, irresponsibility, safety & security' concerns. Pakistan needs a constant vigil to thwart informational and diplomatic diatribes against her nuclear program.

Pakistan and US in "War on Terror". The debate about Pakistan's role in US led war on terror against Al Qaeda and Taliban in Afghanistan is quite paradoxical. On one hand is Pakistan's internationally acknowledged relevance while on the other is the local perception of Pakistan being caught in a proxy war. Pakistan's fight against terrorism has complex foreign policy linkages. What

should be the extent of Pakistan's support to US in war on terror appears to be the moot point. It was a war of revenge that the US waged against Al Qaeda that morphed into a war against Taliban, which the US is also trying to redefine by admitting that Taliban are not their enemy and never were! This is evident from the recent controversial interview of US Vice President Joe Biden. A *Washington Post* editorial of 20 December 2011, pointedly titled - Biden's Taliban Buddies – Why are we killing them if they are not our enemies? – sums up the controversy best; “*In Obama administration terms, the United States is engaged in a war that is not to be called a war, against an enemy that is not an enemy per se, in pursuit of something it refuses to call victory. It's no wonder record numbers of Americans have turned against the war effort on President Obama's watch.*”⁵⁰

Harmonizing China's and Pakistan's Antiterrorism Perspectives. Ye Hailin of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences during his aforementioned talk on 'China and South Asian Relations in a New Perspective' at ISSI on 11 January 2011, answered a question related to comprehensive approach of dealing with terrorism, ie, Chinese willingness to invest in the recently secured terrorism prone areas of Pakistan like Swat, as a means of de-radicalization by providing economic opportunities. Hailin was very candid in his reply stating that China admittedly has a huge surplus for investment around the World but its priorities are driven purely on business merit; if Chinese businessmen are convinced about the profitability of their investment in a safe and secure business environment, they would feel encouraged to invest but otherwise

50 Available on <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/dec/20/bidens-taliban-buddies/>
Accessed on 30 December 2011.

investment cannot be forced into unfavourable circumstances.⁵¹ The decision in October 2011 by Chinese business group Kingho to withdraw⁵² from its ambitious \$ 19 billion 20 year plan of developing Thar coal project is the recent example of Hailin's fears. It reflects the challenge in engaging Chinese support by means of seeking their direct investment in Pakistan and creating employment opportunities for Pakistan's burgeoning population that is likely to fall prey to extremism and terrorism unless provided with suitable economic opportunities.

51 Ye Hailin speech at ISSI.

52 Available on <http://www.dawn.com/2011/10/17/comment-and-analysis-thar-coal-mining-chinese-group-loses-interest.html>. Accessed on 30 December 2011.

FIELDS AND MODES OF SINO PAK ANTI TERRORISM COLLABORATION

Whole-of-the-Government Approach

Geopolitical compulsions and the opportunities and challenges that beset the anti-terrorism dimensions of Sino-Pak relationship lead towards holistic assessment of possible areas of collaboration, which could help Pakistan in its fight against terrorism. The State of Pakistan, which is the final arbiter in devising a sound anti-terrorism policy in the country, has to formulate a comprehensive strategy in this regard, utilizing its existing resources. It has to be understood that any foreign assistance and collaboration is bound to look for a blueprint; indeed, a well-defined roadmap for the strategic purpose, to achieve which, the strategic partner would enter into a long term, mutually beneficial relationship with clear objectives in sight. Pakistan has shown enough determination and grit by sacrificing more than 36,000 of its citizens and suffering US \$ 70 billion in direct and indirect losses while fighting terrorism in the country⁵³, yet it has not formulated a cogent strategy to fight terrorism in the wake of lessons learned so far. Unless the energies of the nation are orchestrated by the State to fight terrorism under a well considered and well-articulated anti-terrorism strategy, from which should emanate relevant operating strategies in complementing spheres, neither transnational strategic collaboration nor intrinsic solutions can be imagined to work. “Whole-of-the-Government” approach

53 “\$70 bn loss suffered in terror war: Zardari”, *Dawn*, 1 November 2011.

is one of the most viable options for Pakistan to fight terrorism effectively and be able to capitalize on Chinese collaboration, as and when it materializes in different domains.

Creation of economic opportunities in marginalized zones like FATA and Balochistan, madrassah and education reforms throughout the country, social sector reforms in the poverty-hit population segments, LEA reforms aimed at capacity building / effectiveness and lastly an overall economic rejuvenation to generate jobs; all fall within the ambit of a comprehensive anti-terrorism strategy. Each of these dimensions merits a separate operating strategy within the fold of this umbrella strategy, in order to create synergy in effects. Such an effort by the Government will produce the desired mobilization of public support and restoration of their confidence that is so direly required at the moment to stem the spread of extremism and radicalization in the country. As the first and foremost step, the Government should vitalize NACTA and task it to formulate and coordinate implementation of the aforementioned comprehensive anti-terrorism strategy. In the ultimate analysis, a gradual political and economic reform to improve institutional effectiveness is the most important strategic imperative for Pakistan⁵⁴.

Socioeconomic Cooperation Aimed to Reduce Poverty

Adopting an indirect strategy, two areas of CT collaboration can be useful: firstly, increasing trade and economic cooperation with China with a an aim to reduce poverty in Pakistan; secondly, increasing people to people contacts, cultural exchange and students exchange programmes with an aim to broaden attitudinal

⁵⁴ Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson. *Why Nations Fail*. (New York: Crown Publishers, 2012), 56.

construct of Pakistani people.⁵⁵ Diplomatic instruments work to enhance preventive measures (preventive diplomacy) in conflict situations. There could be extradition agreements, visa / immigration regimes and other friendship / cooperation treaties in various political, economic and social fields to mitigate terrorism as their long-term effect. Regarding the potential of Sino-Pak socioeconomic development collaboration leading to reduction in terrorism in Pakistan, three steps were recommended: 1) Learning Chinese language and enhancing tourism between the two countries (religious, medical and sightseeing tourism, etc). 2) China could open / sponsor education and health facilities in underdeveloped areas of Pakistan in a big way. 3) China – Pakistan private sector industrial complexes could provide employment and contribute to Pakistan's (economic) growth. However, it must be kept in mind that terrorism in no society can be overcome by use of force. This cooperation with a friend like China has to be done with delicate handling; lest China might be perceived by terrorists as party to conflict (just like USA).

Economic Development of Xinjiang and Gilgit Baltistan

Three mutually beneficial areas of CT collaboration are perceived to be pragmatic: 1) Chinese investment in improving education curriculum in schools / madrassahs. 2) Communication (rail, road) and (increased) investment opportunities. 3) Complementary economic development of Xinjiang and Northern Areas. Regarding diplomatic collaboration, visa relaxation, extradition MOUs, more education scholarships and student / cultural exchanges can be considered but the limitations of

⁵⁵ Ghulam Mujaddid, Assistant Professor, Department of Strategic and Nuclear Studies, NDU Islamabad, comment on questionnaire.

language barrier and social differences would need to be handled with ingenuity and care⁵⁶.

Socioeconomic Development Projects

It will not be an easy road to take, as many Pakistan based or affiliate religious organizations have been allegedly involved in China's Muslim provinces, which does not go well with China's internal security dynamics.⁵⁷ Regarding diplomatic collaboration, Salma observed that in terms of diplomacy, not only does Pakistan benefit immensely from China's strong and unflinching diplomatic support, but can rely on China's help at regional and international fora in voicing its concerns as well as harness support for its stance and commitment to eradicate terrorism. However given that international discourse is heavily Western dominated; it would be problematic for Pakistan to seek an independent stance. Pakistan needs to gather as much support in this avenue as possible and China's political wisdom is of utmost importance.

The Pakistani public has always considered China in the positive light, yet it had to pay the price in shape of abductions and killings of her citizens working as engineers and technical staff attached to various development projects in Pakistan. Yet socio-economic development projects will and do certainly create more employment opportunities and this positive clout can be used very effectively. Limits of course are in the form of ultra religious, ultra nationalist and anti China sentiment fueled from outside propagating the feelings that China is after Pakistan's precious resources. China is one of the biggest foreign investors in Pakistan

56 Commodore Naveed Ahmad Rizvi, Pakistan Navy, ex Naval Attaché to China, comment on questionnaire.

57 Salma Malik, Assistant Professor, Department of Defence and Strategic Studies, Quaid-e-Azam University Islamabad, comments on questionnaire.

and is involved in virtually every infrastructural project, whether the expansion and extension of the KKH, Gawadar Port, Super Highway or resource harvesting. China is the only country, which has stood by Pakistan through thick and thin and what Pakistanis term as an all weather Friend, a very effective bulwark against US as well as India. Challenges to Sino-Pak collaboration emanate from both, within (religious and sub nationalist outfits) and outside (such as US/ India) and others who feel that China is trying to establish and manifest her power. However, if the terrorism situation in Pakistan gets worse, and seems to be spilling over into China, it will have serious repercussions for Sino-Pak relationship.

Technology, Finances, International Support, and CT Training

Mutually beneficial areas of counter terrorism collaboration between China and Pakistan are numerous. Terrorism affects both; Pakistan wants to get rid of this menace and needs international support including from China. China has serious concerns about Uyghur militants and its joint CT efforts with Pakistan can help address this problem. Both countries can develop better economic and trade relations once terrorism is curbed or reduced.⁵⁸ The options of gas pipelines from Central Asia to Pakistan and from Iran to China, and engagement of China in development projects in Pakistan greatly depends upon better security and absence of violence and terrorism. The Chinese company's withdrawing from Thar Coal project is a case in example.

Pakistan needs better technology, financial assistance, international political support, and CT training for its security

⁵⁸ Safdar Hussain, Research Analyst at Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, Islamabad, comments on questionnaire.

forces to curb terrorism. China can help in that regard. The potential advantage that both countries enjoy in evolving some joint mechanism is existence of trust between the two not only at state level but also at public level. China's interest in a peaceful and secure Pakistan is much more real and valid than US and other Western countries because China has geographical proximity with Pakistan, faces direct threat of terrorism in regional perspective, has huge economic and trade interests particularly those related to energy, and sees Pakistan as a friend in the region. Nevertheless, China has been very careful in directly engaging with Pakistan or US and its other allies to counter terrorism. China's careful engagement with regional and global actors in fighting terrorism can offer a considerable limitation. These views corroborated this study's analysis about China's careful approach in her CT overtures and less possibility of Sino-US collaboration to counter terrorism in Pakistan, contrary to Markey's propositions for the US Administration in the report discussed earlier.

Rehabilitation leading to reduction in terrorism in Pakistan is pragmatic option to reinstate militancy prone areas' economy through providing business activities by indirect Chinese engagement. For that Pakistan first needs to evolve a comprehensive de-radicalization and rehabilitation plan and then see where China can intervene; project proposals can be made and shared with China to seek its support for the said through-business rehabilitation. But it's one segment and should be connected with a wider policy and programme. Here again, Safdar reaffirmed the notion of establishing a comprehensive anti-terrorism framework before any external support could be expected to find its niche in that effort. It must be remembered that the lead role for countering terrorism in Pakistan lies with the State itself. Pakistani security

forces have more experience to counter terrorism than Chinese, though equipment and technology can be sought. The important thing in Pak-China security collaboration is that China understands and acknowledges the real security concerns of Pakistan unlike the US and Western world. So Pakistan's collaboration with China regarding CT can be more trusted and mutually beneficial.

CT Collaboration - Diplomatic, Intelligence and Socioeconomic

By joining forces, both China and Pakistan can share intelligence information and endeavour to catch the miscreants before they can wreak havoc⁵⁹. Pakistan and China already enjoy excellent diplomatic relations. In 2011, they celebrated 60 years of diplomatic ties. These ties need to be translated into further cooperation for the reduction of terrorism. There should be frequent exchange of delegations comprising experts on counter terrorism. The diplomatic staff on both sides can also comprise specialists on dealing with terrorism. This will enable full time availability of experts who can devote more energy and follow trails of the miscreants.

Socioeconomic development collaborations should be translated into projects in the disturbed are of FATA. Terrorists recruit local personnel who are impoverished and deprived. By infrastructure development, establishing trades, businesses and production facilities and laying down a network of communications, local population can be weaned out of the clutches of terrorists, when they will have alternate means of sustenance. Establishing such an infrastructure is fraught with security risks and will have to be protected from terror attacks. Once the local population comes on board, they would voluntarily guard their assets.

59 Sultan M. Hali, a renowned defence analyst, comments on questionnaire.

Both sides have a stake in eradicating terrorism and have vast experience in handling terror and are already in security collaboration, which can help them learn from each other's experiences. China is more advanced in security equipment and can help Pakistan develop the same while Pakistan's strong point is human intelligence. It has a much greater understanding of the origins of the terrorist and shares a cultural background, which is a plus point.

Curtailed Collaboration Prospects due to Chinese Inward Looking Policies

There are two mutually beneficial areas of CT collaboration between China and Pakistan; 1) Greater involvement of China for conflict resolution between India and Pakistan, either bilaterally or multilaterally. 2) Capacity building of intelligence agencies of Pakistan for CT and in information gathering.⁶⁰ Regarding the potential of diplomatic collaboration, Noel's views were candid: "Substantial, only if China is willing to play a greater role and not remain an inward looking and self centered / self focused power." China might have 'missed the boat' due to renewed assertive posture adopted by the US in Asia Pacific. Even countries like Vietnam in China's geographic backyard and culturally akin have joined the US camp. Although China has considerable influence in ASEAN, yet the US increasing influence there is also significant. Therefore, unless China decides to play an international role commensurate to her power potential, her sphere of influence in the global security matrix would remain marginal. Moreover, China has vast swaths of underdeveloped regions and poor segments

⁶⁰ Major General Noel Israel Khokar, Commandant National Security College NDU, Islamabad, comments on questionnaire.

of population. This is accentuated by their single party political dispensation and internal dissension, a handicap in his opinion, which will hamper broad based development and a comfortable position in the international security dynamics. However, in the context of 'socioeconomic development cooperation' it could lead to reduction in terrorism in Pakistan if joint ventures are undertaken in southern Punjab and FATA / KP to provide jobs.

Unlimited Collaboration Scope, Hamstrung by Pakistan's Policies

There are two main manifestation of terrorism, which affected China-Pakistan relations:⁶¹ 1) Links between Pakistan-based militant groups whose roots go back to 1980s when both China and Pakistan were jointly fighting against Soviets under the US umbrella. Although, China's role was quite limited as compared to Pakistan. 2) Targeted attacks on Chinese technicians in Pakistan. Pakistan needs to break/curtail links between Pakistan-based militant groups and Chinese separatists in Xinjiang. Although, Pakistan has taken a number of measures, Beijing still is not fully satisfied. Sharing information between the relevant departments of the two countries is need of the hour. Both can have joint military exercises (like the four done so far) to exchange experiences through training in counterterrorism and promoting cooperation. China can supply weapons specifically used on counterterrorism. Pakistan *must* take into consideration China's concerns vis-a-vis links between Pakistani based militant groups and Chinese separatists. 'Internal stability' is one of the prime concerns of Chinese authorities. There were four incidents of targeted attacks on Chinese in the past (2003-2007) besides incidents of abduction (including of Red Mosque incident) in

⁶¹ Ghulam Ali, PhD Candidate at Monash University, Australia and an expert on China, comments on questionnaire.

which about 10 Chinese lost their lives on Pakistani soil. A detailed inquiry into those incidents is required. These targeted attacks severely affected pouring in of Chinese investment in Pakistan. Latest being the attack on a convoy carrying Chinese Engineers in Balochistan on 21 November 2011 in which the Chinese luckily remained unhurt, however five others were killed.⁶² Pakistan needs to make a strategy to ensure that no such incident take place in future and more importantly, if it takes place then how to control its fallout.

Ghulam Ali asserted that extensive potential exists for Sino-Pak diplomatic collaboration but Pakistan lacks understanding of China. There is hardly any serious national effort to understand the dynamics of the various aspects of China. A comprehensive national strategy involving all stakeholders that include, government, military, business community, academics, etc need to work on China. Certainly, a comprehensive China study programme, at national level, would also help to point out methods of counterterrorism. Both the countries can, as they have already been doing, expand their collaboration on bilateral and multilateral forums.

There is enormous potential of economic and trade cooperation between the two sides. It all depends upon how Pakistan resolves its domestic issues (political instability, law and order situation, terrorism). Once these issues have been managed, there are enormous opportunities for Chinese investments. China is moving from low-quality production to high-tech. Like in East Asia (Japan, Korea etc), China would move its industries outwards (as did Japan to China, Vietnam etc).

⁶² "Quetta: 5 Killed, 11 wounded in attack on Chinese Engineers", *Pak Tribune*, 23 November 2011.

In very pragmatic terms, Ghulam Ali outlined Sino-Pak CT collaboration: It is always good to learn from each other. China has successfully controlled law and order situation. Pakistan can learn from the Chinese experience. Pakistan can gain modern technology, surveillance systems, equipment etc, and learn Chinese methods and technique. For sure, Pakistan needs to modify them according to its own conditions.

Orchestrating Sino-Pak Strategic Relationship in Fighting Terrorism

There is a growing need to enhance the CT collaboration presently restricted to the intelligence agencies of the two countries. Pakistan should seek enhanced access to Chinese intelligence mechanisms by way of presence in their troubled regions to help identify and track any miscreants that might be operating with help from the other side of the border.⁶³ More importantly, CT is only a small fraction of the strategic relationship between the two countries and it is on the larger plane where the focus should be, i.e., developing an indirect approach of fighting terrorism by raising economic stakes and incentives with Chinese support in regions prone to radicalization. There is a need to capitalize on Chinese extraordinary goodwill towards Pakistan by harmonizing our internal policies towards China's business concerns. It needs implementation in a manner that neither mismanages Chinese interests like the Gawadar Port's management or Thar Coal law and order disincentive or Chinese KKH realignment assistance issue nor undermines Pakistan's interests like exploitative profiteering in unprocessed exports from Rekodiq or unregulated flooding of Pakistan's markets with Chinese goods.

⁶³ Pakistani Government official in Beijing.

Peaceful Development in a Harmonious World

China's international politics is being pursued in a gradual and incremental manner with aversion to open conflict and in harmony with world trends.⁶⁴ In a world where a host of developing countries are vying for power in the international arena, China is looking for ways and means to improve her comprehensive national power by maximizing her strategic opportunities. Reminisce of Monroe Doctrine, regional stability is the linchpin in Chinese strategic thinking, where China actively seeks commonality of interests. To emphasize the dynamics of interests and power in political realism, Hans Morgenthau quotes Thucydides, "identity of interests is the surest of bonds whether between states or individuals"; as alluded to by Max Weber:

Interests (material and ideal), not ideas, dominate directly the actions of men. Yet the "images of the world" created by these ideas have very often served as switches determining the tracks on which the dynamics of interests kept actions moving.⁶⁵

CT appears as a contemporary 'image of the world', which is serving as one of the 'switches' to translate the Sino-Pak interests into actions. The all weather and all dimensional Sino-Pak friendship, it appears, has to keep up with international norms in order to remain harmonious in world politics.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Pakistan and China enjoy sixty years of unstinted partnership that has gradually matured into a strategic relationship. Its unique trajectory is inspiring in international politics. Despite complex

⁶⁴ Henry Kissinger, *On China* (New York: Penguin Books, 2011), 497-503.

⁶⁵ Hans Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Fourth Edition (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967), 8.

geopolitical compulsions, both countries have successfully nurtured their alignment, especially in post 9/11 period of volatility and uncertainty. Widespread dangers of terrorism and its proliferation have been instrumental in shaping the security policies of both countries, both internally and externally. Implications of the internal dynamics of China and Pakistan, the regional security situation and the global players' strategic interests warrant a reappraisal of the security and welfare dimensions of Sino-Pak alliance in order to synchronize it with domestic, regional and global developments. CT collaboration emerges as a very important facet of this synchronization effort, which has sizable potential, quite akin to the ever increasing collaboration in the field of defence production and, to some extent, in infrastructure development.

CT collaboration need not be in the kinetic domain only. It also has the ways and means of indirect approach by addressing the root-causes of terrorism that lie in socioeconomic deprivation, radicalization and political disempowerment. Kinetic applications for CT, simultaneously, are also essential to create the required conditions for the non-kinetic means to work. The 'clear, hold and build' strategy of CT in Pakistan is mostly hindered in the 'hold' and 'build' phases, which entails capacity building of LEAs for 'holding' the cleared areas and FDI infusion for 'building' the held areas in order to reinvigorate politico-economic activity that could, in turn, bring normalcy in societal dynamics. In tandem with diplomatic initiatives to stabilize Afghanistan, Chinese non-intrusive support to Pakistan in LEAs capacity building and in providing socioeconomic opportunities holds significant promise in reducing terrorism. Regional stability would be facilitated resultantly and China would be seen fulfilling her much-demanded international obligations. Stability and development in Pakistan and Afghanistan would

be in line with her policy of non-threatening, mutually beneficial and cooperative development, besides checking influence of extra regional powers in the region. However, Pakistan could only benefit from such dispensations if it can organize its internal policies on surefooted grounds, convincing enough for its strategic partner, China, to lend unflinching CT support.

After analysis of the subjective and objective data reviewed in this monograph, following can be deduced:

- All Federal and Provincial Government departments including economic, defence, intelligence, commerce, industry, communication, agriculture & livestock, ports & shipping, water & power, petroleum & natural resources, tourism, culture, education, youth affairs etc, should coordinate respective pursuits seeking Chinese assistance and business collaboration through Foreign Ministry, where a body of co-opted experts, Pak-China Collaboration Council, should be formed to orchestrate the varying cooperation initiatives in order to synergize their benefits for meaningful strategic gains. Fighting terrorism more effectively, through ways and means discussed above, could be the first strategic objective of this Council, duly reflective of the most urgent national priority at hand.
- Pakistan does not possess a comprehensive anti terrorism policy, which affects its ability to convince China, its strategic partner, for more effective support in the fields and modes identified in this study. Hence the need for reinvigorating NACTA to become the focal point of the country in a whole-of-the-government approach to fight terrorism.
- Bias of the fight against terrorism should be towards addressing the root-causes by removing genuine

socioeconomic and political grievances, especially in the terrorism prone areas of KP, FATA, Balochistan and, to some extent, Punjab.

- Chinese assistance in socioeconomic uplift as a mode of fighting terrorism is not forthcoming unless business conditions improve. In order to effect this improvement, concerted efforts are needed to provide secure environment and business friendly governance, inclined towards Chinese interests as a well-considered strategic choice, providing further incentive.
- FDI in infrastructure, mineral development and communication projects in Balochistan and in setting up of competitively advantageous industries in Southern Punjab, Interior Sindh, KP and FATA with full involvement of local population should be pursued.
- Joint CT exercises are a very useful way of military diplomacy and should continue to expand in scope.
- Seeking visible Chinese military support in fight against terrorism would be counterproductive; capacity building of LEAs, sophisticated CT / intelligence hardware (even if a shade less sophisticated than western origin equipment), and joint intelligence functioning in both countries is recommended to be sought, after due coordination at national level.
- With China's diplomatic and economic support regional co-opting approach, rather than a competing approach, should be pursued more vigorously to ease Afghan imbroglio, with neighbouring countries having direct stakes in Afghan stability supporting an Afghan-led and Afghan-owned political reconciliation.