



2nd Pak - UK COIN International Seminar

Sharing Experiences in Stabilization and Peace Efforts

14-15 March, 2017



Sponsor

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PREFACE BY PRESIDENT NDU



Today 'peace' seems to be a rhetorically loaded phenomenon. It is not merely a tranquil stage, but for us it also indicates an aura of non-violence, non-aggression and respite from hostility. For the world at large, the changing nature of threats and subsequent threat perceptions asserts on the need of invigorating holistic understanding of how to achieve a stage where peace and co-existence may not be far entities. This is rather critical where states are fighting an enemy that transcends regions and impel entities within the borders to act against the well- being of states. Countering these threats in this era of globalization is indeed a tedious task. It requires states to streamline efforts that are indigenous in nature yet enjoy popular support at the regional and global level.

In this spirit, a Pak- UK COIN international Conference was held in UK last April, which allowed an exchange of views between Pakistan and UK on the theory and practice of the concept of counter-insurgency. This seminar at NDU marked the second in row collaboration between the two countries on picking up threads from the first conference and now facilitating the idea of sharing experiences in stabilization and peace efforts in a conflict-prone environment. I extend my profound gratitude to the members from UK side and especially Lt. Gen Patrick Sanders- Commander Field Army, UK for their participation in the endeavor. The candid and constructive views as expressed in the sessions are extremely valued. I also compliment Maj Gen Ghulam Qamar HI (M) Director General Institute of Strategic Studies Research and Analysis, and his dedicated team for an excellent execution of the activities related to the seminar. This learning opportunity indeed proved to be earnest and sincere effort towards integrating our regions for a cause of global stability.

FOREWORD BY DEPUTY HIGH COMMISSIONER, UK



The United Kingdom and Pakistan enjoy a deep, long-standing relationship. We are joined through common bonds of history, culture, education and friendship. There are more than a million Pakistani living in UK. The Year 2017 marks the celebration of seventy years of mutual ties. Since my arrival in January, I have been proud to be part of that celebration. It is an opportunity both to mark our shared history, and our common future in the twenty-first century. The relationship between our military forces is crucial. Our armed forces enjoy a rich heritage, stretching back through decades and in fact centuries. However, we also face common security challenges, which require us to work together now and in the future. In today's world, security requires co-operation across borders and continents.

In recent years, the British and Pakistani armed forces have both been engaged in the front line. On part of UK, we pay tribute to what Pakistan has achieved in the struggle against terrorism and violent extremism, and sacrifices, which were made. We know that peace is hard won. Military successes must be complemented by civilian efforts to build the foundations of a peaceful society. Justice, Trade and Administration of public services are all necessary if the seeds of a better future are to take root. There is no simple solution. Each situation is different. Success requires understanding, and a commitment for the long term.

The NDU on 14-15 March hosted the second Conference on COIN and Stabilization . The first took place in March 2016, at Wilton Park. I very much hope that the UK will host again next year. Each conference is an opportunity to learn from each other, and deepen the personal ties which enable us to work together. I am grateful for the support of the NDU, and the Military Operations Directorate, for making this year's event a success. On the Pakistani side, it was a particular privilege that both the Chief of the Army Staff, General Qamar Javed Bajwa and Interior Minister, Chaudary Nisar Ali Khan, were able to address the conference. On the UK side, I thank Lieutenant General, Patrick Sanders, and his colleagues for their participation. It was a memorable event.



Terrorism has increasingly become a trans-national and trans-regional phenomenon. The regional dimension of the menace embodies complex dynamics and complicated networking systems, requiring comprehensive and smart solutions. This indeed necessitates the coupling of national and regional forces. It is worth mentioning that, an unprecedented international effort to militarily subdue the menace, has acquired substantial results but much is desired to counter the menace of extremism and terrorism in other multidimensional domains.

Being one of the victims of terrorism Pakistan considers itself as part of the solution. It is actively involved in counter-terrorism initiatives and simultaneous efforts of peace building. It has always advocated an all-inclusive regional and international approach to address the issue. Hence, the choices before us are clear; either we can stay held up in a situation of hostility or make serious efforts to deal with the challenges by learning from our experiences.

In this regard, the seminar formed the second in the series of deliberative exercise between Pakistan and UK focusing on the key issues of peace building and stabilization efforts in a conflict-prone environment. UK and Pakistan enjoy immense commonality of interests and have a shared history in the region. This endeavor speaks volume of the commitment and zeal of both the countries in order to move forward in a collaborative mode. In this consideration, a galaxy of intellectuals and practitioners both from UK and Pakistan patronized ISSRA for an intellectually enriching event. I am confident that this will serve as a major stepping-stone for further strengthening our collective efforts for the betterment of the region and beyond.

Overview of the Seminar

The current era is marked with evolution in the phenomena of insurgency and terrorism. Impressions of their changing nature are manifest in the compulsions of regions to devise newer strategies that curb the related threats and to carve out a peaceful environment. On one hand, this evolving feature auger well to the need to understand philosophies of these phenomena', while on the other hand, it also stresses on the need of countering them accordingly. This 'tug of war' for striking a balance between these two necessitates a wholesome approach for deployment of modern military methods and alongside establishing approaches of long term peace and stability. In this regard, Pakistan and UK in a series of two conferences managed to engage in an open and candid academic discourse for understanding the complexities of these phenomena in their own setting and in the process learn from each other's experiences.

The first conference held at Wilton Park- UK (April' 2016), was attended by high-ranking military officers and civilians from both the countries. It mainly focused on exchange of views on Counter-Insurgency theory and practice. The event rendered an exceptional opportunity to the participants for sharing experiences and understanding diverse approaches to phenomenon of insurgency, terrorism and militancy in their own setting. In this regard, the UK side also desired to hold a conference in Pakistan for continuing the deliberative process.

Within this purview, the 2nd Pakistan-UK COIN International Seminar on 'Sharing Experiences in Stabilization and Peace Efforts' was held at ISSRA-NDU (14-15 March). It not only provided a platform for discussion on key peace building intricacies in a conflict prone environment but was also a unique opportunity for carrying forward the discussion openly and candidly, which befitted the strong relationship between the two countries. Furthermore, it also addressed some major issues underway peace building efforts by both the sides with causal notions of learning from experiences.

The profile of the seminar in qualitative terms was mirrored in the standing of the speakers and moderators: 21 including 6 from the UK and attendance of a 20 member delegation each from the British High Commission and UK Army headed by Lt Gen Patrick Sanders, Commander Field Army. From the Pakistan side, a set of outstanding practitioners and subject specialists as speakers including Lt. Gen Asim Salim Bajwa T.bt, HI(M), IG Arms, Maj Gen Shaheen Mazhar, IGFC, KPK and Maj Gen Sardar Hassan Azhar Hayat, GOC 7 Division added exceptionally to the intellectual endeavor. In addition, the attendance of Gen Qamar Javed Bajwa, NI (M), Chief of the Army Staff, Pakistan as Chief Guest Opening Session and Interior Minister Chaudhary Nisar Ali Khan Chief Guest Closing Session, speaks volume of the significance of the exercise. Amidst this, both the sides reflected upon numerous issues of mutual concern that were substantial in order to carry forward for future discourse. The well-planned and timely endeavor was exceptionally welcomed by the UK side and was considered as a sign of the mutually held respect. In this regard, consensus was also reached for the next conference to be held in UK (Feb/March 2018). This event is expected to build upon the key findings of the 2nd seminar and also to reflect upon the need of expanding the dialogue to include Afghan attendance (suggested by President NDU in his closing remarks). In addition, the conference may also include greater political attendance from both sides, which is critical as far as the focus is on stabilization themes. Nonetheless, this report provides the summary of the deliberations of the second conference and a detailed account of the two-day exercise along with mutually agreed major findings between both the sides along with recommendations. The event entailed six thematic-sessions; all geared towards distinct, yet corroborative issues of stabilization and peace efforts in the setting of both Pakistan and UK.

Increasingly constrained by domestic fault lines/fissures many countries continue to face challenges emanating from internal or externally driven conflicts. A set of geo-economic/geo political complexities exacerbated by internal socio-political compulsions compel nations and states to devise pragmatic strategies to deal with such scenarios, COIN being one of these. The more-often-than-not uncertain, unpredictable and inconclusive outcomes of Stabilization and peace-building efforts in conflict ridden zones necessitate sharing of experiences between countries engaged in sub conventional war with a view to identify valuable lessons for posterity and for aiding in development of effective strategies to avoid recurrence of the malaise.



Findings and Policy Recommendations

The two-day seminar entailed six thematic sessions with a wide range of speakers from both the countries. Every session was chaired by an eminent subject specialist who also provided an insight into the subject according to his own experience, besides moderating the session. The following is an account of mutually agreed findings (between Pakistan and UK), followed by policy relevant recommendations for the Pakistani setting.

Findings

Political stability is critical for the process of state building in a conflict-prone environment. Hence, without recognizing, reconstructing and developing the required dimensions of political institutes, realistic goals may not be achieved.

Stabilization response must be balanced and realistic goals must be set, while being conscious that there may be elements that seek to benefit from reconstruction and development opportunities, contrary to the needs of the population.

There is a need to show strategic patience while dealing with difficult situations. It is possible by focusing on the economic revival of the conflict-prone area, understanding the local culture and connecting with the locals in order to bridge the communication gap.

Nonetheless, for an all-inclusive counter-terrorism or counter-insurgency campaign, a complete across the board consensus within the country is critical.

One of the hurdles in counterinsurgency practices is the inability to maintain effective strategic communication. There has

been a collective failure to fully grasp and respond to the significance and the influence that militants and terrorists are able to exert through propaganda.

A thorough understanding of the concept of insurgency is critical for designing a comprehensive and sustainable counter insurgency strategy.

The insurgent movements have deep-rooted deprivations and grievances that develop through time. They then evolve with violent manifestations, which result in actions that challenge the writ of state. Hence, identifying the root cause of the insurgency is key to working out the solution.

Successful implementation of the National Action Plan in Pakistan promises for the overall stabilization and security of the state.

Leadership of the Armed Forces can help rejuvenate other institutions, like Police and Para-Military forces.

Restraint in use of force is also a key leadership trait, where a controlled military action can restrict notions of illegitimacy. Hence the Rules Of Engagement (ROE) need to be understood by everyone with a responsibility for handling weapons for exactly the same reason.

Forces cannot contravene law as they run the risk of being questioned on their legitimacy. However law can be adjusted to cover emergencies and special circumstances. In this scenario, Government should articulate to the media about the change in legal powers.

Even if the Military Courts are constituted for another two years in Pakistan, there is still an urgency to reform the Criminal Justice System.

Four key principles need to be followed while managing borders within a conflict prone environment: maintaining credible discrimination between terrorists and local population, denying complexities of 'blind spots' in surveillance through coordinated coverage, facilitating rapid networking during and after operations and also that the systems should be integrated for effective control.

The border issues between Pakistan and Afghanistan can remain pending because of the lack of cooperation on the subject by Afghan government. Pakistan has been successful in taking security measures on its side of the border but the reciprocity from the other side is still absent.

When the refugee crisis occurs, it becomes hard to differentiate friend or foe. The 21st century's most sophisticated systems have to be brought in use along with national data base in order to manage this problem.

The Non-State Actors on both sides of Pak-Afghan border have exempted themselves from the Constitution of both Pakistan and Afghanistan. They have started to disobey the Constitution by holding arms against state and building their own armies. International law necessitates cooperation amongst State's to deal with such elements, which have a trans-regional character.

In order to understand the target audience for perception management there is a need of conducting research, which is not a traditional area for the military. Hence, understanding local issues and addressing

them is some way towards defeating the propaganda of militancy, particularly if the story is told by 'local voices'.

For developing successful stories and narratives there is a requirement of learning to gauge emotional response, repetition of ideas and integration in to the society.

Terrorists frequently use 'fake news' to support their message. Hence, it is the joint effort of the State, local governments, and military to construct a National narrative using all the domains of information, re-enforce the truth and manage perceptions to counter militancy.

Main impediments to voluntary repatriation of Afghan refugees from Pakistan include lack of shelter, inaccessible land and livelihood ventures, insecurity and lack of socio economic infrastructure.

The Government of Pakistan has adopted a policy for providing education facilities to Afghan Refugees so that they can be useful citizens on return to their homeland. For this purpose, Government has adopted a very lenient policy for the admission of Afghan Refugees Students in various educational institutions.

Pakistan as a signatory to International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1967 (ICCPR) needs to follow the agenda it sets forth, including a broad catalogue of civil and political rights, rights to life, physical integrity, recognition before the law, political participation, freedom of movement and choice of residence, and protection of the family.

Recommendations

In light of the recent FATA reforms, a roundtable is to be conducted at ISSRA-NDU, with participation from Agencies of FATA to deliberate on their impressions about merger of FATA into Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa. The conclusions of the roundtable are to be shared with the policy relevant circle, including the Government of KPK.

The Interior Ministry is to conduct a countrywide review of the implementation of the National Action Plan in order to gauge its efficacy. Input is to be collected from other Federal Ministries and Provincial machinery as well. ISSRA-NDU may assist the Ministry in analyzing the input if so desired.

Police and other forces to work in agreement with the Armed Forces for at least a year in Pakistan. A brigade to temporarily oversee different Police units in their process of training for combat, intelligence gathering and interrogation.

In order to prepare the Armed Forces leadership in consonance with the compulsions of international laws, a separate course on International Humanitarian Law and Public International law to be added in the modules of the Command and Staff College Quetta and equivalent colleges and also in the National Security and War Course conducted at NDU.

For the Military Courts to work to supplement with the judicial setup of the country for another two years, it is to be supervised

by the Interior Ministry. In addition, the Criminal Justice System in Pakistan is to be improved by ensuring protection to the Judges and lawyers along with revitalizing the medico-legal sector of the system.

The trust deficit between Afghanistan and Pakistan to be bridged by invigorating Track-II dialogues particularly on the border management issues. A conference to be conducted at ISSRA-NDU with representation from Afghanistan, China and Iran to discuss regional issues.


The international community and UNHCR to be prompted for assistance in order to ensure smooth repatriation of Afghan refugees.

Private media in Pakistan to be regulated by PEMRA for projecting a positive image about the counterterrorism operations in the country. ISPR as a regular feature is to interact with different mediums of information to first analyze what the prevalent perceptions are in the society and work on target oriented audience.

The local Government machinery in Pakistan to be used as an effective tool of perception management.

The Ministry of Interior to publically announce the steps taken towards adherence of ICCPR.

Voluntary Repatriation of Afghan refugees to be facilitated by the international community by investing in developing infrastructure and providing avenues of earning livelihood.



The seminar provided a mix-bag of deliberations on key issues of stabilization and peace building in a conflict-prone environment for both Pakistan and UK. It took into consideration the ideas and opinions of the military and political realm, along with the issues at hand in their respective domains. As a second in series talks between the two countries, it is pertinent to emphasize on the need of depicting their lessons learnt to a larger audience. As one of the sessions on counter-narrative suggested, invigorating key methods of narrative building is in fact vital. Pakistan and UK have a shared history; they can not only learn from their experiences but also widen the horizon in order to generate policy- relevant debate and conclusions.

The way forward rests in continuing the dialogue and discussion on issues of mutual interest. Particularly the inclusion of Afghanistan in this endeavor is important. Similarly, insertion of China as a key stakeholder in the process of stabilization of the region may be appealing. This is amidst the Chinese interests to open up with the world and Pakistan's position as a 'zipper' of the region and the stability of Afghanistan as a key feature in the situation.

Nonetheless, the key lies in understanding the importance of moving forward. Peace is a key feature for every action taken by either the military or Government of a country. The methods deployed for achieving a state where it becomes a tangible reality may be similar between countries but need to be molded according to their own domestic setting. These differences need to be understood and worked upon for conclusive results.

Opening Session



Introduction

The international seminar started with an intriguing opening ceremony, which entailed a welcome address by Lt. Gen Rizwan Akhtar H.St, HI (M) - President National Defence University (NDU), Opening Remarks by Lt. Gen Patrick Sanders- Commander Field Army, UK and an address by the Chief Guest, Gen Qamar Javed Bajwa- Chief of the Army Staff, Pakistan.

Opening Remarks by

**Lt. Gen Rizwan Akhtar H.St, HI(M)-
President NDU**

At the outset, President NDU warmly welcomed the foreign and local dignitaries and guests who had travelled to participate in the academic discourse. He emphasized on the significance of such endeavors, which are geared in an aura of experience sharing that facilitate commonalities between regions. For

this specific event, he showed his gratification over the amount of work already done between Pakistan and UK for learning from each other's experiences of peace building and stabilization efforts in their own domains. This specific seminar in his opinion highlights the commitment of both the sides in facilitating each other's



efforts of further working together for the betterment of region and beyond.

Remarks by
Lt. Gen Patrick Sanders
Commander Field Army- UK

Lt. Gen Patrick Sanders- started by commending the efforts of the Pakistan Armed Forces in dealing with the menace of terrorism.



Particularly, he praised the successes achieved by Operation Zarb-e-Azb and the initiation of Operation Rad-ul-Fasaad, in the wake of efforts for uprooting the facets of terrorism from the country. He emphasized on the need of converting the military gains achieved by these operations in to tactical achievements. This he mentioned is possible because the Pakistan Armed Forces has already been successful in mobilizing popular support for these operations through a concerted effort by the Government of Pakistan.

Address by



Gen Qamar Javed Bajwa, NI (M)-
Chief of the Army Staff

'Let me begin by commending the efforts of the organizers of 2nd Pak-UK Counter-Insurgency Seminar. Events like these provide a great platform to exchange our perspectives and learn from each other's experiences. Importantly the interaction between Pakistan and the United Kingdom militaries, besides improving our understanding on various issues also helps us to strengthen our overall relationship and friendship.

I will attempt to outline before you what would essentially be a practitioner's perspective on Pakistan's campaign against the forces of disorder, as a nation and the army. My impressions will be covered in two parts: to start with, I will carry out a quick survey of the situation we have been facing and how we have responded to it militarily and perhaps more importantly, as a nation. And in the second part I will very briefly lay out before you broad contours of the way forward.

To begin with, I believe that our challenge has been more complex, than a set piece text book definition of insurgency. While an insur-

gency is underlined by a guiding light of a political philosophy, our enemy on the other hand followed the philosophy of hate and terror and an ideology of violence. An insurgent essentially plays to the people's gallery. But our enemy has instead been mercilessly preying on people daring to think differently. While external support to an insurgency is invariably covert, but based on some principle or a cause, the external support to our enemy has been both insidious as well as devoid of any moral standing and principle. Furthermore, while an insurgency is poised to provide an alternative order or a system, or enemy thrives on disorder, mayhem and fear and chaos, propagating a rouge ideology instead. There have also been some additional challenges particular to our struggle, for example, having to have dealt with a large number and scale of operations and a number of Temporary Displaced Persons. The perpetual need for relentless operations and vigilance against relapse is necessary as we cleared one area after the other with limited resources. Undertaking massive development works in our terrorism ridden environment as an essential part of our response based on a combination of deterrence and development. The stretch on our limited military and economic resources owing to a perpetual and varied kind of threat from India and the need to design a counter narrative for two audience of desperate orientation, that is to say one for the internal and second for the external mainly the western audience.

As we proceeded further to understand the peculiar nature of threat facing our people, as an army we found out what it takes to fight against terror as a professional army. All moral, legal and ethical bounds still apply to us, while the terrorists had to adhere to none. It is like fighting in a boxing ring with one hand tied behind the back. Add to this internal complexity is essen-

tially unstable and conflict prone regional environment which has been characterized by firstly, an entrenched culture of conflict that has kept the region in a state that resembles Thomas Hobbes conception of 'All Against All'. It's a region characterized by limited resources, growing population, perennial hostility, simmering conflict, like Kashmir and a volatile interior. This state of affairs has all along provided a vicious narrative to the violent ideologically driven non-state actors and their supporters. This regional context has been vitiated further by great power struggles, enduring legacy of militancy along with physical and ideological displacement of large population.

Now coming over to what has been our response so far. As most of you are aware that through a series of counter-terrorism operations, we have largely dismantled the organized structure and command control architect of terrorism from our soil. However, as we fought, the enemy constantly mutated and evolved and presented itself in a bewildering range of forms and manifestations. Our response to a complex array of challenges has transcended the typical parameters of COIN and Counter Insurgency. It required hard work and immense sacrifice over 50,000 dead, including 5000 military persons, over \$150 billion lost in economic terms and massive stain on our social fabric.

It would be right to call our response as 'Counter Insurgency Plus'. We had to cleanse terrorism from our country internally without much control over external dimensions of the threat. We lack the cooperation required from our neighbors. Secondly, we did not have the luxury of need demarcation between clear, hold, build and transfer stages of a typically linear counter-insurgency construct. In our case, we cleared and governed simultaneously, we fought just as we build resolutely. Our hold stage



has also been nearly ending because of rampant instability in Afghanistan, which can still undermine the stability in the cleared areas. We therefore, we compel to maintain strong presence of military in border regions. And most importantly, given the outdated and misdated systems of the affected areas we did not have the comfort of neatly transferring the cleared areas to a functional political authority. Especially, in FATA, and therefore the transfer part has been awaiting implementation of reforms necessary to update policing, administrative and judicial processes.

So, where do we stand today? Through a series of operations over the last one decade. We have managed to stop the bleeding and have reversed the tide. Nearly 80% of the displaced people have returned to their homes and are back to their normal life. From a daily reign of terror we have brought things back to relative stability. The level of violence has reduced, but the threat remains. While our Western zone along Afghanistan- Pakistan border is still in the recovery or in patient care stage, most of the hinterland of the country is in an early stage of self-sustainability. In a nutshell, I would say that the terror surge which resembles an insurgency has been largely subdued. As I speak today, there is no organized or ominous challenge to the writ of the State of Pakistan and there are no,

no-go areas anymore. However, across the nation hinterland, random networks of facilitators, ideological mentor, abettors, financiers and sympathizers are still there. I must confess here that the last fifteen years of our war against terror, we have achieved great success in the kinetic domain, but in the social domain, that is to say implementation of 'National Action Plan', we still have to do a lot. There is need to give impetus to this prong so as to help and improve social order and to defeat the scourge of terrorism in totality. Moreover, due to the porous border of Afghanistan, we have a serious problem due to the flow of arms and explosive across the length and breadth of the country. We also know that due to successful counter- terrorism operations and a COIN like reconstruct, rehabilitation and reintegrate information efforts, a large number of terrorists and criminals are pushed across the border. They have since been exploiting ungoverned spaces in Afghanistan and with the sponsorship of hostile agencies have regrouped and started to sneak back through the porous border as individuals, in order to launch terrorist attacks against our innocent civilians. Although there are no sanctuaries at all, but we do have elements or signatures of Tehrik-e-Taliban Afghanistan and Haqqanis towards our side of the border. However, our

ability to act against them is severely curtailed as they morph into Afghan refugees. Furthermore, there is still a large number of reservoirs of militancy in the form of elements that were radicalized but did not turn against the state. These elements require controlling and mainstreaming.

This was the environment and on ground situation, which brings me to the final part of the way forward. The challenge before us as a nation now is to effect a transition from current state of relative but reversible peace to an enduring peace and stability. Hence the need of operation Rad-ul-Fasaad or eradication of residual discord and disorder. Under the overarching and long term concept we envisage a sustained effort against terrorism and extremism and all its facilitators in ideological, financial and physical domains. In a whole of a country approach the effort will be essentially three-pronged: first, stabilizing western zones through improved border management and clearance of residual pockets of terrorism without any discrimination. Elimination, neutralization of organized terrorist supporters base that is to say, facilitators, financiers, sympathizers, abettors and handlers in the hinterland.

To synergize law enforcement efforts including legislation pertaining to weapons flow and explosives. Support and assist the Government of Pakistan in implementation of key policy reforms including National Action Plan elements, especially police, judicial, education and administrative. We are also determined to renew and redouble our efforts to produce and project a sustained narrative against the forces of disorder. A special focus will be given to this effort through an organized awareness campaign, under the banner of operation Rad-ul-Fasaad. Our desire end is a stable, peaceful

and normalized Pakistan with terrorist freedom of action significantly curtailed and public confidence restored. As mentioned earlier in my impressions, our peculiar challenges and environment will deny us a neat and linear construct of clear, hold, build and transfer. Therefore we as a nation, including military and Government will continue to attack all ends of the problem, that is to say terrorism in all of its manifestations simultaneously and relentlessly in order to prevent it the breathing space or freedom of action to regroup and resurge. We also know that our internal problems would not be entirely addressed, until the external context is addressed and a more effective management of our borders. In the external domain we expect more understanding and empathy from our partners and also acknowledgement of our efforts and unparalleled sacrifice that we have rendered in the war against terror.

We also expect more positivity in terms of strategic messaging and public pronouncements about each other. We sincerely believe that the regional cooperation in terms of institutionalized intelligence sharing, collaborative border management, including physical infrastructure like fencing and of course gainful socio-economic reintegration of the displaced population is the way-forward. We also believe that instead of blame game our neighbors must sit down with us to formulate a cohesive response to the menace of terrorism based on attainable and tangible measures. To sum up, we are constantly trying to grasp the kind of war and adjust our response accordingly. We also understand that ours is a generational challenge and we are willing and determined to fight it to the very end. Finally, as a resolute nation I have no doubt in our ability to prevail.'

Stabilization Efforts: Sharing Experiences on Issues and Challenges



Introduction

The first session of the seminar was chaired by Lt Gen Asif Yasin Malik, HI (M) (Retd) with two speakers: Ms. Sarah Spencer and Maj Gen Sardar Hassan Azhar Hayat- GOC 7 Division. Synopsis of presentations is as following:

Stabilization Lessons learnt from Afghanistan and Middle East- UK's Perspective by Ms. Sarah Spencer

An unprecedented intra-State post-conflict situation emerged after the Cold war. This paved way for a closer coordination between civil administration and NGOs in States, harnessing a more institutional approach at strategic and operational levels. However, with the 9/11 episode, certain political conflicts exacerbated the environs with rise in potential threats that hinder stabilization. This revitalized the role of military for inducing stabilization in ungoverned areas rather than by the political machin-



ery. Tasks of the military albeit this changing role became more of a political nature particularly for preventing the reemergence of insurgency.

Generically, stabilization efforts are all political in nature. In this regard, intra-state conflict resolution and stabilization efforts are likely to be conducted simultaneously with intra-state conflicts. There is in fact an overlap, and not necessarily a single point that switches from conflict to stability. The conflict may be

quite specific in location but there needs to be a balanced response between local leadership, and coordination between State, Region and International response. Hence, the Stabilization response must be balanced and the goals set realistic, whilst being conscious that there may be elements that seek to benefit from reconstruction and development opportunities, contrary to the needs of the population. In this regard the UK focuses on protecting, promoting and legitimizing authority. This approach hinges on political bodies as it establishes and strengthens political settlement thus, adding to and not diminishing stability. For this, one needs to recognize, reconstruct and develop the required dimensions of political institutes. Steps in this direction require setting realistic goals and interventions not dominated by technocratic engagements as they tend to fail.

Endeavors under 'Zarb-e-Azb' and Future Outlook by Maj Gen Sardar Hassan Azhar Hayat

Some years ago, amidst the rise in militancy and terrorism in Pakistan, consensus for either negotiating with them or conducting a kinetic operation against them was a tricky affair. Hence, the decision for formulating the military operations strategy against the surge of militants was reached in light of Pakistan's image of a fragile state in the international community. 'Counter Terrorism' operations started from the periphery in the tribal areas for encircling their hideouts. In this regard North Waziristan was the last bastion of terrorists. Meanwhile, up till now, damages account for economic losses up to \$118.32 billion, martyrs numbering to 3588 and injured touching a figure of 12476. It is worth

mentioning that Operation Zarb-e-Azab includes elements of National power encompassing political, socio economic and military development.

Pakistan's Western border consists of a difficult terrain and mountainous region. The impediments were countered by accessing those areas and employing Air Force to fill in the gaps. With the combined efforts of Armed Forces, at present, there are no "No Go" areas in the region and the security situation is much stabilized. However, the border management in the area is still weak and requires much attention by policymakers for sustainable outcomes and far reaching success of the military operations. Present undertakings in the area are focused on FATA reforms, rehabilitation efforts, devising a strategy of reorientation, building of a Frontier Care Capacity Building, using various non-kinetic



approaches and efficient border management. Efforts are being made to employ technical border management system and ground surveillance radars by Pakistan. Socio-Economic development of the area is focused on shifting livelihood practices which were

previously based on smuggling. The soft prong approach aims at facilitating presence of NGO's in the area and empowering the youth. Army has been building schools and hospitals, women empowering programs have been started along with vocational training centers. The programs initiated also include de-radicalization programs with vocational and psychological modules. Furthermore, recruitment of people in the Army, reconstruction of infrastructure, sending children to study abroad and reforming the socio-political spectrum of the area were some of the steps taken by the Army. The lessons learnt from these operations envisage the compulsions of forming a comprehensive approach with a clear vision and logical end, showing strategic patience while dealing with difficult situations, focusing on the economic revival of the region and understanding the local culture in order to connect with the locals for bridging the communication gap.

Interactive Session.

In the interactive session, the parameters that are used to gauge the success of operations in North Waziristan and the lessons that have been learned in FATA and the UK by practicing different policies over the period were discussed. It was brought up how corruption has been the major driving force behind terrorist activities and instability. For gauging the success of an operation, satisfaction of people was the litmus test especially in the post-operation phase when they return to damaged infrastructure. The growing awareness amongst the TDPs has been because of efforts made by the army to understand the local culture and traditions. It is important that technical responses be applied to governed areas only, and the hearts and minds of locals be won over for better results.



Session 2

Sharing Experiences on Military's Support of Governing Authorities During, Hold, Build and Transfer Stages of a Campaign



Introduction

The second session of the seminar was chaired by Lt Gen Ishfaq Nadeem, HI (M) (Retd). It comprised of three speakers namely: Lt. Gen Sir David Andrew Capewell (Retd), Amb Rustum Shah and Maj Gen Noel I. Khokhar, HI (M) (Retd). The session was primarily dedicated to the role of a military in a stabilization phase. Synopsis of presentations by speakers of the session is as following:

UK Perspective by Lt Gen Sir Andrew Capewell (Retd)

An adequate doctrine of counter insurgency is not available in the British history. Hence, case studies of insurgent movements which were successfully controlled and handled including that of Northern Ireland, Sri

Lanka, South Africa and Columbia, can be a guide to combat insurgent movements and the interrelated violence outbreaks in a State.

Within this purview, it can be argued that the main hurdle in the process of COIN practices is maintaining strategic communication, which is the problem of this information age. The failure to understand cultural belief systems and ethnic orientations that interweave the war struck societies has led us to failure in Afghanistan and Iraq. A deep understanding is needed for designing a comprehensive and sustainable strategy for implementation as insurgency breeds itself through trail of generations. The failure of the political class to understand difference and extent of military operations along with the unstable military relationships among states can also be a possible point of friction in the way of an

effective collaborated COIN strategy for future engagement. There are certain fault lines like the alignment challenge, incomplete ideas about democracy that may be applicable to one state but it may be completely alien and unimplementable for the other. In addition, inability to calculate events on daily basis is also a hurdle for effective COIN in a certain area.

Civilian Perspective (Pakistan) by Amb Rustam Shah Mohmand



The concept of stabilization is now challenging the predominant narrative. It does not only mean the end to violence escalation and war, but it is a process which aims at creating conducive environment for human development and utilization of economic resources in a manner that is compatible with the aspirations of the people in a state. There is always a root cause for insurgency and the perception that it rose solely because of the insurgents themselves is wrong. The insurgent move-

ments have deep rooted deprivations and grievances that develop through time and then present themselves as the violent manifestations causing insecurity and challenging the writ of state. Likewise it is wrong to think that the people of FATA who rose were only subverted by Afghanistan but it was also a manifestation of the fact that the government started projecting itself as front line state in war on terror and induced troops in tribal regions which aggravated the situation. The disturbances in the tribal areas can have two reasons, either they seek legitimacy in any possible way or it was the response of the deprivation and un addressed concerns that they had with the central government.

Insurgency should be handled with a multi-dimensional approach because it has the aspirations of spreading a long way in the population. It breeds because of the ethnic, sectarian inequalities and discrimination in the institutions and governance structures. The brutal policies that show that one section of the society is more privileged than the other creates a sense of deprivation and frustration that leads to further subversive attitudes and ultimately facilitates the insurgent ideas in society. Military operations of large scale leave deep scars on the face of the society because they are targeted on the superficially ending the violent conflict by force that also causes collateral damage in terms of human loss and infrastructure damage. The impact of drone policy is in front of us. It does not create a sense of sustainable trust and mutual confidence among the tribal people for the long run hence, any operation that has a military side to it must incorporate the strategies to build the institutions. Investing in the rebuilding of institutions and reintegration is the most crucial step after the military operation has been run in full swing and ignoring this step can cause a

relapse of the violent insurgency with an aggravated extend.

Armed Forces Perspective (Pakistan) by Dr. Maj Gen Noel I. Khokhar, HI (M) (Retd)

The war against terrorism continues in full swing as military operations are being run all over the country. It is an unconventional war in which there are no rules for terrorists but for military there are certain protocols to follow as in it has to intelligently conduct the operation against the armed insurgents / terrorists and also protect the non-combatant/ civilian population along the way. The general perception in the population today is that the military operations are essential part of the state affairs now. The widespread terrorist attacks and violent episodes has made up the mind of the society in such a manner that they think that only military and coercive solutions can be effective for even the matters relating to public safety and governance. However, it is supposed that the narrative is changing, as the operations are more time and target specific and tend to end followed by a post op rehabilitation and reintegration plan that involves political stabilization and security for the population. The successful implementation of the National Action Plan promises for the overall stabilization and security of the state by addressing all the loopholes in the National counter insurgency and counter terrorism policy.

Interactive Session

During the Interactive Session the key issues of strategic messaging, stabilization issues in FATA the recent reforms and Daesh as a regional threat were raised by the partici-



pants. It was opined firstly, that the lack of strategic messaging create a trust deficit between military and political elite only to some extent. However, the problems associated with it will persist in the long run. Particularly, in the third world, communication with the marginalized community is not a simple job to do. However, if information was a weapon, the militaries must be investing more in it instead of weapons themselves.

Secondly, in FATA efforts of rebuilding infrastructure, homes and villages should be supplemented by liberating the locals. It is an egalitarian society where historically Hindus and Sikhs lived together with the tribes of Bajour, Mohmand, Orakzai and in Waziristan. Hence, the key lies in promoting retribution and accountability in the area. The solution lies in recognizing and respecting cultural realities, opening up economic opportunities, and facilitating educational opportunities. Nonetheless, Afghanistan and Pakistan are indispensable economic partners. This needs to be understood with a long term vision. Emphasis today is on fighting instead of pro-



moting positivity and a strategic vision.

Thirdly, Daesh is a short term phenomenon which will fade out. Despite the fact that its ideology is alien to Afghan character, it is still trying to create a space by fighting against

Taliban and the Government. Today it is not getting any more recruits and is no longer dispersing money as its resources are limited. It is to be emphasized that Afghans do not accept a group that is controlled from far away.

Session 3

Laws and Stabilization Efforts: Constraints and Practical Solutions

Introduction

The third session of the seminar was chaired by Maj Gen Asghar Nawaz, HI (M). It comprised of two speakers: Brig Benjamin William Barry (Retd) and Mr. Ali Sultan. Synopsis of presentations by the speakers is as following:

The leadership and legal requirements of stabilization by Brig Benjamin William Barry (Retd)

Stabilization is an inter-agency activity which is geared to achieve the political objectives of reducing instability. It is demanding for commanders at every level; the higher the level the more demanding it is intellectually. It requires not just the military leadership but alongside a wide variety of agencies and legal factors in determining the things to do get done. It is followed by a need of legitimacy ranging from what should and should not be done. In this regard, it is pertinent to look at the US and UK campaign in Iraq and Afghanistan and also goes back in time of the British campaign in Northern Ireland. Whereas a campaign in one's own country may lead to some lessons for Pakistan in the contemporary era.

Quite clearly the stabilization efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan are still problematic as the insurgents, militants and terrorists use diverse tools in order to achieve political objectives. Hence, in a counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency campaign in these areas economic, political and information measures are equally important. The campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan illustrated the traditional

concept of insurgency and counter-insurgency, within which political legitimacy and governance needs to be upheld down to the tactical level and starting off from the top leadership.



Commanders in a counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency campaign need to look through the lens of local political dynamics rather than their own binoculars. Nonetheless, the battle of narratives became more integrated into the tools and methods of deploying actions in a conflict for both insurgents and commanders. Hence, strategic patience exercised at the operational, tactical and strategic level becomes a necessity for commanders. A political operation is mandatory for devising any kind of military strategy by the commanders. Militaries usually lack in dealing with the civilian component resulting in a gap. In Iraq and Afghanistan there was no inter-agency coordination in the UK and US armies. Therefore, success often rested on certain acts of individuals who acted as bridge between organizations for working together.

We need an inter-agency level plans from which tactical plans can be developed. The key to success is coordination at strategic and tactical levels. Military leaders have a key role to play. There is a need of mutual imbedding of staff. In Afghanistan, an initiative of creating provincial inter-agency teams was initiated. Diplomats and developmental experts they extended reach of Government by supporting and funding reconstruction levels.

In Northern Ireland, the Army operated in its own country under scrutiny of media. In the year 1969, police failed as they were ineffective and weak in discipline. Whereas, Army was the only security force in Catholic areas deployed as peace keepers, but insurgency broke out for which the Army conducted counterinsurgency operations. In the year 1977 a strategy was agreed upon with a transition to a police lead and normalization was, and took 30 years to execute. The Army helped the police to fill the manpower shortage. As a result in 1980 the police had become more effective, through coordination with the army. As a result, in the year 1991, the police did counter insurgency operations on their own. In the year 2002 the Police was completely in charge and Army went back to the barracks. Hence, it is worth emphasizing that the leadership of Army can help develop leaderships of other institutions.

As far as the legal issues in counterinsurgency operations are concerned, it is to be emphasized that terrorists use force and shed innocent blood, with the intention of enticing an overreaction by Armed forces. Leadership skills should be used in this situation to restrict an overreaction in this scenario. Hence, restraint in use of force is a key leadership campaign.

Moreover, collateral damage and detention also reduces legitimacy of the forces in a

conflict prone area. As law be flouted by the forces; they run the risk of their legitimacy. However, law can be adjusted to reflect emergencies. Officials should articulate both to the Government and media while change in legal powers are needed as Insurgents would like to exploit the legal loopholes.

On the other hand, for the forces unforeseen legal issues may arise when communication is not effective. Sometimes there is a security classification limiting people where the commander can ask for advice. Differences in interpretation of laws between institutes are a course of action. Hence, four necessary questions need to be addressed: What is legal to do? Can it make the situation better or worse? Is it morally right? And what course of actions help our opponents most?

Stabilization Efforts amidst International and local laws by Mr. Ali Sultan.

Within the purview of the prevalent situation in Pakistan, it is first necessary to establish if it can be termed as a conflict. A 'conflict' state under international law is recognized either on the subjective factor or



intent of the parties to the conflict or upon objective factors of the scope and extent of the hostilities. Militant non-state actors including the TTP and their affiliates have unequivocally expressed their intent to assert and establish unlawful control over the territories of Pakistan through private armies and private military organizations forbidden under the Constitution's Article 256. Driven by a militant ideology, they take direct instructions from elements hostile to Pakistan and obey them, and have established channels to launder funds to procure arms. Through their express intent and overt acts, these militants have withdrawn their loyalty to the state in contravention of Article 5 of the Constitution and are waging war against the state in contravention of the Pakistan Penal Code's Sections 121-140.

Along with the subjective intent of the parties, the sustained and organized violence by militants against the state and its functionaries and citizens that has claimed the lives of over 50,000 civilians and 5,000 military and other state personnel conclusively raises an irrefutable legal presumption under international law that a 'conflict' state exists between the state and militant non-state actors including the TTP and their affiliates. Therefore, the appropriate body of international law that applies to COIN operations in Pakistan is International Humanitarian Law, which has displaced the International Human Rights Law applicable in normal or peace times with respect to the conduct of these operations and the legal treatment of militant non-state actors.

While acknowledging the distinction between 'law of war' and 'law of peace,' the Court, in paragraphs 121-145 of its detailed judgment, justifies the creation of military courts as a necessary and appropriate

response to defend Pakistan against internal threats of war from militant non-state actors in a time-bound manner. The Court characterizes the existing situation as 'warlike' where the law and order situation has degenerated beyond mere civil disorder and rioting to insurrection, mutiny or open armed rebellion against the state.

Significantly, this entails the duty of the Federation under Article 148 (3) of the Constitution to defend the Provinces against external aggression and internal disorder through the Armed Forces using all necessary means, including the military courts, to effectively carry out this constitutional duty.

Hence, the way forward rests in first, extension of the military courts in Pakistan. The military courts should be extended for two more years to speedily bring 'jet-black terrorists' to justice and hence comply with our obligations under UNSC Resolution 1373. These courts should be strictly viewed as a stop-gap and necessary measure, a least bad option in the prevalent circumstances, and should in the next two years spur rather than detract from much-needed holistic reform of the civilian criminal justice system. As until now, very few and genuine cases of 'jet- Black terrorists' are continue to be referred to the military courts.

Second, Tailored and well thought-out reforms of the substantive and procedural aspects of criminal/anti-terrorism laws must be undertaken immediately. Police laws should be upgraded and harmonized to enable the Police to effectively act as the front-line force against terrorism. Protection of Judges and witnesses should be prioritized. A case-management system should be introduced across the board to streamline handling of criminal and terrorism cases. Shift focus from

ocular evidence to electronic and forensic based evidence. Thirdly, mainstreaming the tribal areas, politically, legally economically and administratively. Lastly, it is to be understood that an effective counter-insurgency is a shared responsibility of the military and civilian authorities. Hence, all of the 20 points of the National Action Plan should, therefore, be fully adhered to and strictly implemented by all the stakeholders through enhanced will and improved co-ordination.

Interactive Session

During the Interactive Session it was opined that firstly, the better trained the highest commanders of a military, the more they would be able to apply restraint or aggression. The commanders must understand the legal issues, which includes, the Law of Armed Conflict. There has been neglect in understanding these basic legal issues in the preparation of forces and their management and the prisoner abuses committed by UK and US forces in 2004 in Iraq is an illustration of an organization that lost sight of that. There could be an ethics committee like the ones there are in hospitals.

Secondly, extra-judicial killings have seen as a problem. The incentive for law enforcement agencies, police included, for killing in a conflict situation is only because they are

frustrated. The case as viewed in FATA is that if you engage in a very creative law making, which at blush might be quite oppressive from a human rights angle, like the internment regulations of Action in Civil Aid power regulations. A Constitutionally constituted interrogation organization can produce intense intelligence. You need to get in to the minds of the people, so many campaigns in the last century, was where live prisoners should be treated properly.

Thirdly, if the military courts are constituted for another 2 years in Pakistan, will it be able to reform the civil and military justice system in the country? We don't have a choice of not reforming the judicial system. Today there is a lot of urgency in order to reform the system from both the judiciary as well as the executive. Hence, we can be guardedly optimistic that from two years from now we would not need the military courts

Fourthly, Northern Ireland is an ideological conflict or territorial. Unfortunately, there is no good history in this regard that brings in the military security in conflict side. The drivers were massively institutional discrimination against the Catholics in Northern Ireland. There was never a proper information campaign. IRA was a terrorist organization; they minimized collateral damage and civilian casualty.

Session 4

Border Management: Issues/Challenges



Introduction

The Fourth session was chaired by Amb Muhammad Sadiq and included three speakers; Maj Gen Shaheen Mazhar Mehmood HI (M), Brigadier Bowder and Mr. Ahmer Bilal Soofi. The synopsis of presentations by the speakers is as following:

Pakistan-Afghanistan Border Management experiences by Maj Gen Shaheen Mazhar, HI (M)

In the present scenario, there is a dire need to jointly manage the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Unfortunately Afghanistan is not playing its due role and albeit the critical situation across the border, also denies its international status. Amidst this scenario, long standing wars and consequent instability provided terrorists feasible ground and safe

havens in FATA. Hence, from the year 2007 till today, Pakistan is engaged in an internal war against terrorism. Whereas, poor infrastructure and porous nature of the border accentuated the instability.

Meanwhile, the topsy-turvy Pak-Afghan relations and lack of effective cooperation



hinder the efforts of bilaterally managing the border. Pakistan is engaged in taking serious security measures on its side of the border, which is not reciprocated from the other side. In addition, refugee management and their repatriation has been another tribulation.

Solution to these problems lies in accepting the Durand Line as an international border by the Afghans. A well-managed border is in the interest of both the countries. Furthermore, eradication of terrorists is significant not only for both the countries but also for promoting regional economic connectivity and export of energy from the Central Asian States. In this regard, it is pertinent to invest in bilaterally managing the security across the border and scrutinizing visa through joint border control mechanisms. As a window of opportunity in this regard, the vacant bases of ISAF forces may be reestablished by the Afghan Forces.



Border Management and exploiting Technical Solutions by Brig Bowder

Border management has multiple dimensions, one of which is technical. For an effective border management regime efficient 'discrim-

ination' of people travelling across the border along with goods being transported is critical. This is true because as soon as a refugee crisis befalls, differentiating between a friend and foe becomes challenging. Hence, the most sophisticated tools and systems of the 21st century including the national data base should be used to start managing the problem. In this regard, a major element of border management is persistence and preservice. This becomes a tedious task once a long and porous border like the Duran Line needs to be managed. A lot of economic, military and political initiatives are required to acquire swift and durable border management regime. Meanwhile, it is pertinent to promote a cohesive action of the political, military and intelligence domains in order to manage a border and alongside curb trans-national threats i.e. terrorism.

Understanding Legal Dimensions of Border Management by Mr. Ahmer Bilal Soofi

The complexities of the Pak- Afghan border are immense. It is not as simple as people crossing border every day. When a person carries a step against a writ of the state it is an act of waging war against a state under



Pakistan Penal Code Section 121. Legally, border management comes into play during ventures of trade and tourism, but what we face across the Durand line is wagging of war paradigm. The Non State actors on both sides of the border have exempted themselves from the Constitution of both Pakistan and Afghanistan. They have started to disobey the Constitution by holding arms against state and building their own armies. International law tells about the state's obligation to cooperate with the other state when hostile elements at one side of border take illegal actions on the other side under the extradition laws.

There are two approaches towards this cooperation one is war approach i.e. using force straight away against non-state actors and finding collaborative strategy. Second is law enforcement approach which envisages a move of conveying justice. Unfortunately there has been no extradition requests on both sides of the Durand Line and border management has unluckily become a one sided paradigm, where Afghanistan denies the legal status of the border. It is worth mentioning that the Durand line has been accepted as an international border by Security Council documentation and by bilateral agreements between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Meanwhile, the issues of refugees remain on the forefront and their repatriation is questioned. As per international law, when the danger or instability from the country of origin minimizes, refugees are to be repatriated from the host country as its obligation ends. However, in the situation where the refugees prolong their stay and engage in economic venture sat the host state, then visa and immigration laws are applied as they acquire the status of an economic migrant. These laws are in fact quite relevant for the status of Afghan refugees in Pakistan.

The way forward rests in provision of providing economic incentives on both sides of the border. Economic zones need to be managed with political consent of both the Governments. Pakistan as a neighboring nation wants to rebuild Afghanistan and it is the duty of the coalition forces and Afghan government to provide collaborative security in carrying out the mission of re-constructing Afghanistan for the better future of both the states.

Interactive Session

During the Interactive Session it was opined that, with the merger of FATA in to KPK, the easement rights of people who are living in divided tribes due to the Durand line needs to be reassessed.

Secondly, forming an economic buffer zone in the Durand Line area is a political choice which will also be effective in hot pursuit operations. However, optimum level of scrutiny and security would be required in order to restrict any violations of the agreement.

Thirdly, for maintaining an effective border force by Afghanistan, corruption in the upper tier needs to be addressed. This will also be beneficial in order to take joint action against smuggling. Pakistan has tried to play its part by maintaining five major crossing across the border and closing the rest. It is expected to turn these crossings into state of the art terminals where on spot visa service will help keep a check on militant movement across the border. In addition, human navigation is shortly expected to be replaced by sophisticated weaponry. Where cross border bilateral collaboration will be significant in dealing with issues of mutual concern.

Sharing Experiences in Managing Narrative



Introduction

The fifth session of seminar was chaired by Lt Gen Khalid Rabbani HI (M) (Retd). It comprised of two speakers Brig Alistair Aitken and Lt. Gen Asim Saleem Bajwa T.Bt, HI (M). The synopsis of presentations by the speakers is as following:

Western Approach in Shaping Environment through Narrative by Brig Alistair Aitken

Stories are narratives told and captured. These stories have an emotional response. The previous Iraq and Afghanistan experience determines that strategy differs from stardom. In an alliance or a coalition, there is a lack of clarity in the strategy because the interest and the motivation of each actor differ. These are

referred to as interior and exterior lines in the information. Exterior lines created by a coalition becomes easy to fight with someone in the interior lines because the interior lines consists of just one commander which rules one aspect and has one objective. Fighting in the exterior lines becomes difficult, as it is difficult to wage a war in coalition. The horizontal and vertical integration becomes important in this



case, horizontal integration is much easier than vertical integration, which accounts for the top to bottom consolidation on an aligned strategic intent. The historical thread of stories is an essential component which needs to be understood to derive narrative, they determine at which point they are joining the story and how will it shape the narrative from the common history that they share.

Governments and militaries throughout the world want to centralize the system, and the most effective way to say it through a local voice. The local voices play an important role in the development of the narrative as it has a greater and flow in society. These Stories easily make their place in the existing narrative and help to shape up a new story. The lessons learned from the war on Iran and Afghanistan is that the information environment was not as contested as in the case of Syria and Iraq war with a very strong adversary.

In the western military thought, the military philosopher is taken as Dogma. The Chinese book on restricted and unrestricted warfare written by two military army Colonels in 1999, determine that the current period of warfare is not only facing a clash of will but also a clash of interests. This makes it difficult for the construction of a narrative, because it isn't as clear as black and white it has end state to work with. The Russian military thought determines the persistent nature of the strategic military deterrence and the means of delivering and the information psychological, the effect that is intended allows you to tell the story.

The most effective way of building narratives is seen in Danish military. They acquired the expertise by understanding the target audience not only in the regional proximity but also globally. They narrative of hope

and optimism is framed and clearly targeted to the desired audience. Stories are based on historical, political, religious narrative.

Lessons can also be drawn from the French philosopher work on propaganda which is a clear technique that talks about the vertical and horizontal propaganda. The historical propaganda is practiced by the Military and the Western Governments directly communicate with people and is a top-down approach. The horizontal propaganda comes from revolutionary warfare theory. In this population groups are mobilized by spreading ideas into these groups. This is the same strategy used in digital marketing and commercial sector. Another theory is to create an in group and out groups to mobilize sections of a population that divides into the population into them and us. The Danish methodology is to mobilize 1% of the population and the rest of 90% are the followers and will be mobilized. This technique is seen in the presidential campaigns determine how the narratives and story lines are created.

The technological changes in the modern times have an effect on the social interactions. These changes are machine learning, data and accessibility. The ability to collect and receive information, the information environment is changing. The information environment in Iraq and Syria is made by the above three factors, has contributed to accessibility of information which aids the development of a narrative by all the actors.

In order to understand the target audience we need to conduct research. This is not a traditional area for military agencies. Narratives are enduring. The actions of the US president are led by 50% of the population's opinion.

Developing successful stories require emotional response. It has been proved though a report that the facts without the emotional response have no impact. Successful stories are only made by the use of an emotional response, repetition and integration. The most effective emotional response is fear. Fears instigate and are a very good motivation. Military is not the best in creating narratives but this is made possible by integrating different skill set into the military to create effective story lines.

Perception Management in Counter Militancy Operation by Lt Gen Asim Salim Bajwa T.Bt, HI (M)

Militaries are not good at handling information because of the dynamic nature of their job. Strategic communication is subservient to strategy. Perception management is not done in isolation instead it is aligned with the political strategy for counter insurgency. Perception management is sharing of information, contesting existing narratives and building new narratives. There is no such thing as counter narrative, narrative need to be established. The aim for Pakistan at hand was to delegitimize the insurgents creates political will, and establishes civil military coordination, where international support was essential.

The main complexity in the formation of the narrative in this region was that a geopolitical narrative was in place and funded. This change in the narrative was seen after the incident of 9/11. The perception was that Pakistan was forced to act upon external factors. Post 9/11 was a time of strategic indifference to this region. Taliban came in

Pakistan and created space for Al-Qaeda. When the problem became transnational, Pakistan faced severe circumstances. All these aided in building perception.

The Era of post 9/11 was developed the Anti-Pakistani narrative. The military was fighting with the militants and the US pressurized the government of Pakistan to do more. There was a shift of narrative seen. Pakistan military list its credibility and the people of Pakistan lost their confidence in the military. The international and the local media aided in building perception. These were a contestation between the national and international media.



The narrative was confused up till 2007 and 2008. The Lal masjid attack created a new narrative. The radical insurgent groups were challenging the military and the state institutions. The operation led to the spread of terror throughout Pakistan. Suicide attacks paved way into the society. The people of Pakistan couldn't make a distinction in the type of war the military was fighting, a war against the West or Islam.

The people became in favor of the military after the flogging video which helped to shape the perception. The Swat operation proved to be success and the military gained victory over

the terrorist and the writ of the state was restored. This spread a positive perception among the people. This was attained through the mobilization of media.

The problem grew severe in 2014. A new strategy of perception management was adopted. These were a ceasefire between the government and the Taliban. Complete use of information was made in domains of music, theatre, movies and TV shows was made to build a positive perception and identify the right enemy.

Crisis communication was also learnt in the Karachi Airport incident. The military made use of Print media, Electronic media and social media to tackle the situation. The APS attack was dark time when the narrative became clear and the nation became resilient. The enemy of the state was identified. A 20-point national action plan was formulated to address the threats of the problem. Raad-ul-Fasaad is the current initiative of the military which is being used and is a road to lasting peace.

A joint effort is required by the State, local Governments and military to construct a

narrative using all the domains of information. The information technology tools will enable us to build a positive perception and the image of Pakistan that has been destroyed.

Interactive Session

During the Interactive Session, it was opined that, firstly, narratives based on lies are not credible. Media expansion has reduced the room for lies; instead it has helped to show the versions of truth and promoted diversity of opinion. These are a need of managing the collective perception.

Secondly, the Gulf war was a complete lie which was revealed later, but the perception on that lie was carefully managed. In the emerging global order, nations have competing narratives, which undermines the truth. Truth always finds its way, whether the stories you are telling are based on the truth or lies. Building narratives, managing perceptions and shaping the environment is an important task but these will evolve with the technological advancement. Narratives are a major part of psychological warfare.



Refugee Management and Repatriation



Introduction

The sixth session of the seminar was chaired by Mr. Arbab Shehzad. It comprised of two speakers: Dr. Imran Zeb and Ms. Ariana Pelham. The synopsis of presentations by the speakers is as following:

Wholesome view of Refugee crisis, management and repatriation issues by Dr. Imran Zeb

Under the auspices of the Tripartite Agreement of March 2003 between the Governments of Pakistan & Afghanistan and the UNHCR, the Afghan refugees are to be repatriated to their home country on

voluntary basis. The statistics shows that from 1990 to date 6.3 million refugees returned to Afghanistan, the main impediments to those voluntary returns were lack of shelter, access to land and livelihood, security and lack of socio economic infrastructure. In this regard.



Pakistan Government has established infrastructure, there is sufficient International and UN support. Resolution strategy for the refugee management is to adopt an overarching policy. We along with our neighbor would have to adhere to regional approach in this matter.

There were also some factors highlighted which is influencing repatriation. It was a misperception that the refugees are pushed back to Afghanistan. The problem lied in the fact that when Turkham border was regulated it disturbed the normal way of life many refugees as they had developed a habit of two homes i.e. moving back and forth in Afghanistan and Pakistan whenever they wanted. Also, Government of Afghanistan took an initiative to call its people to come back to own ground. Thirdly Enhanced repatriation grant from 200 to 400 US\$ and Security operations were a important factors which called major afghan population back.

The Afghan government's sustainable reintegration is crucial for refugee settlement back in their homes. The pillar two of SSAR is Sustainable Reintegration in Afghanistan is security related issues. The political dynamics of Afghanistan could not be ignored. 15 billion US\$ pledged at Brussels Conference were provided as humanitarian assistance. Not only the refugees but the host community also benefited from these initiatives. It is an important aspect of security that the refugee camps do not foster terrorism nr the registered afghans ever have been part of any terror incident. Some challenges in hand are security related issues when it comes to dispersed urban refugee settlements. On the other hand, the dwindling International support is making it hard to manage the refuge population anymore.

The way forward lies in peaceful repatriation of refugees back to their homeland. Afghanistan needs to have long term strategic planning in this regard. For this, long term afghan political stability is essential. Sustained reintegration and reform agenda regarding refugee return is the dire need of the time. Meanwhile, on our side, proper documentation of the refugees living in host communities is necessity of time.

Approach to Refugee Crisis and Humanitarian Relief Globally by Ms. Ariana Pelham



Humanitarian law has developed in line, started from brutal battle in Italy 1864 followed by Geneva Convention. After the successful termination of the Geneva Conference of 1863, the Swiss Federal Council, on the initiative of the Geneva Committee, invited the governments of all European and several American states to a diplomatic conference for the purpose of adopting a convention for the amelioration of the condition of the wounded in war. The conference, at which 16 states were represented lasted from 8-22 August 1864. The draft convention submitted to the conference, which was prepared by the Geneva

Committee, was adopted by the Conference without major alterations. The main principles laid down in the Convention and maintained by the later Geneva Conventions are: - Relief to the wounded without any distinction as to nationality, neutrality (inviolability) of medical personnel and medical establishments and units; and the distinctive sign of the red cross on a white ground. During the decolonisation period international organizations expanded, however, institutionalizing the distribution of aid is a problem. The governments, NGOs do not use aid for humanitarian purpose.

Humanitarian Aid is not perfect nor it is the solution to all problems, it does require civilian and military efforts, humanitarian assistance should be linked properly to succession of peacekeeping, civilian law, military law and international humanitarian law. From decolonization period by 90's break down of two large countries, which created huge number of refugees and massive crisis across Gus Lavonia and Soviet Union humanitarian assistance continuously, grows as the disasters have grown. International Criminal courts ICC has been established, special courts in Sierra Leone, Rwanda, ex-Yugoslavia special courts for the Protection of Civilians in domains 'Combatants to prisoners of war to civilians and for Expanding human rights movement for all people. To internalise the aid it needs growth of non-governmental organizations and also global appeals & exposure such as Famine in Ethiopia and Ex-Yugoslavia.

To develop code of conduct and Emergence of 'humanitarian intervention' The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) United Nations (UN) body was formed in December 1991 by General Assembly Resolution. The core

humanitarian principles is Humanity (Moral imperative to respond: saving lives, alleviating suffering), Neutrality, Independence and Impartiality. To talk about Refugee Policy one of crucial aspect is '1951 Refugee Convention' which was focused on "owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country"

The Humanitarian Strategic Plan addresses the needs of 2.23 million people in Pakistan. In 2017, the humanitarian partners will support 0.14 million people that have been displaced from FATA, 48 million IDPs that have returned to FATA, 1.34 million registered Afghan refugees, and 0.27 million malnourished children and women. In addition, humanitarian partners will support the Government with disaster preparedness and coordination Strategic objectives of the humanitarian community in Pakistan in 2017 are Support the humanitarian and protection needs of IDPs that remain displaced and those that have returned, ensuring a smooth transition to longer-term recovery and development, Ensure protection, provide assistance and seek lasting solutions for Afghan refugees in Pakistan, and Reduce rates of acute malnutrition among children under five years, and pregnant and lactating women in disaster affected areas by Strengthening humanitarian preparedness for a coordinated and effective response at local, provincial and national levels.

Interactive Session

During the interactive session, the participants raised questions regarding refugee camps, hosting and problems of refugees,

lessons from military hot stabilisation, populism of international aid in US and UK and risks to international consensus, about international law success but when it comes to targeting civilians is failure, lessons learnt from integrated approach; between military and other responsible agencies for refugee management, registration of refugees and any law about it. As far as the conducive situation of Afghanistan is concerned, recently, 600 thousand from Pakistan and 400 thousand from refugees from Iran have returned to Afghanistan. 70% amongst them is youth. They find no feasible environment in Afghanistan to live, they usually left with three options; first, to come back, second, to move to Europe, and third, to join terrorist organizations.

In response, it was observed that for hosting refugee, good administration is working and also are facilitated by the responsible

agencies and Government, for problems in hosting refugees 1951 convention is enough its only about the intervention and implementation. Humanitarian aid is not solution to everything it's just one part of sorting out problems, to deal with refugees the humanitarian approach is adopted for voluntary repatriations, millions of people are going back to Afghanistan for this conducive environment should be provided to reintegrate the youth, missing links in Afghanistan should be managed properly, to move forward the situation must be completely organized to avoid undesirable results. Problems of why not coming back to Afghanistan is the environment is not conducive in relative terms the facilities are not available there as like Pakistan.

Introduction

The two-day long activity provided an enthralling opportunity to the participants from UK and Pakistan for deliberating on critical issues of stabilization and peace building efforts. It gyrated around notions of further enhancing coordination between the two countries, by invigorating mechanisms of experience sharing and learning from each other's challenges. The seminar was concluded by a closing session which entailed speeches from the Chief Guest - Honorable Interior Minister Chaudhary Nisar Ali Khan, Lt. Gen Patrick Sanders- Commander Field Army, UK and Vote of Thanks by President NDU, Lt. Gen Rizwan Akhtar, H.St, HI (M). Excerpts of the speeches are given below:

Remarks

by Lt. Gen Patrick Sanders

This seminar had a powerful impact on me. First of all the Pakistan Army's courage and sacrifice in the discourse of fighting the menace of terrorism is deeply humbling. We should also be cognizant of the challenges, which are underway to the local population of Pakistan in this war. In this regard, it is worth mentioning that the challenges, which are underway, the stabilization phase and peace building efforts ought to be viewed through the remarkable success achieved in the tribal areas of Pakistan. So we have learnt that every counter-insurgency campaign is different. However, a major convergence arises on the idea of maintaining strategic patience and mobilizing popular support during a counter insurgency campaign. The issue arises during a campaign where we need to translate the conventional military skills into war fighting against insurgency, which the British Army is also facing.



Politics is about legitimacy and the transition paradox arises where the military is required to play a part in the stabilization phase and acquires more legitimacy. The army should create space for the political institutions and not take their space. It should be in fact used for capacity building. A population centric COIN is difficult in this information technology age, it causes to lose control of public information. In this regard, the border management is a major issue and the frustration on the Pakistan side for managing the Durand line is justified.

Hence, it is important to create partnerships between Pakistan and UK, which have a common military culture but different perspectives. However we have learnt a lot deal from you. The combination of our backgrounds with joint efforts can be extremely useful. This seminar helped us in building trust and look forward to the UK hosting the next conference with a wider scope of having Afghanistan's participation.

Address by the Honorable Interior Minister, Chaudhary Nisar Ali Khan

Pakistan has never faced insurgency but has been facing a scourge of terrorism. In forums such as these, the fine lines between insurgency and terrorism should be clearly defined. Pakistan has unfortunately been 'in the eye of the storm' since the last four decades in no fault of its own. The country's geopolitical and geostrategic location has put it in a very important position in which Ordinarily should have helped Pakistan to develop economically, strategically and in many other ways. However, unfortunately all the security discrepancies in the region had fallout on Pakistan. It had to pick up the pieces of the acts of commission or omission and folly policy initiatives of other countries in the region. Whether it was the Soviet Invasion in 1979 or the American war in 2001, Pakistan had absolutely no starring role in either. However, the huge backlash and gaps which were left, Pakistan had to fill and vent for itself on its own. In fact, Pakistan has handled the situation singlehandedly.

There has been occasional support but the fact remains that as a whole Pakistan had to vent out its own way. The situation would not have been that bad if we had received diplomatic and international support on what we had done. Unfortunately, rather than receiving support we have been constantly are cajoled to do more and criticized for the things we might or might not have done and constantly 'humiliated' for fighting someone else's war. We were left to pick up the pieces as soon as the Soviet Union left, and exactly the same thing is happening now after the American led war in Afghanistan.



So whether it is conflict or post-conflict scenario, there are certain variables that are constant. First and foremost, there is a requirement of unity within the country. No fight, conflict or post-conflict scenario can be handled if there is no unity within all the tiers of the society within the country. Prior to 2013, the unity was absent. Hence, despite of two very successful military operations the mopping up was not done, questions were raised about the credibility of the military operations within the country. Swat and North Waziristan operation was clockwork of the military strategy and implementation of that strategy. I think one of the most successful stories of military operations in recent times, but what happened after those operations? Terrorism in

Pakistan hit the roof. We were having almost 6-7 terrorist attacks daily. The year 2010 saw the highest of over 2000 terrorist attacks in a year, 2011 a little less, but it needs to be understood that military operations cannot resolve these issues. It is a very

unconventional and unfamiliar war. Our security forces and even Armed Forces were not even trained to fight this type of a war prior to 2001, what about the police or people at large. It was like being thrown in a quagmire. However, with the valiant sacrifices of our Armed Forces, Civil Forces and public at large, in the past decade, we have been able to fight the war all around.

Unfortunately, what should have been appreciated by the international arena, has been seen with a lot of doubt and mistrust. More questions have been asked than answers and certain countries have attributed terrorism to our country which has been the longest serving victim of terrorism. Countries across the border put the onus of their weaknesses on Pakistan. Countries which have not been able to resolve certain issues, which the international arena also has refused to resolve, those countries have dovetailed independence movements within their countries with terrorism.

Hence, the synopsis of dealing with the situation, given our experiences over the last few decades has been that firstly, there cannot be any success achieved in fighting any form of terrorism or militancy without unity within the country. That happened in 2013, and to this day we are reaping the benefits of that unity. Let me also emphasize on the fact that before coming to this particular juncture, we engaged in an eight months long dialogue with the militants. This had never happened in the history of Pakistan where with the full support of the military, a democratic civilian Government had engaged itself in a full-fledged dialogue with the militants. Earlier we had instances of dialogue that too through local military commanders. As part of the process we engaged with the militants in a

dialogue whole-heartedly in order to find a peaceful way out of the crisis. Eight months of deliberations and dialogue, brought a consensus to the length and breadth of Pakistan, that these militants were not mujahids. They were not looking for peace, but they were out there looking for opportunities to destabilize Pakistan and God forbid even destroy Pakistan. Hence, those eight months brought a sea change in the understanding that they are not soldiers of Islam, that the Government of Pakistan is dancing to foreign tunes or the military is implementing foreign agendas. All this notions were set aside. Hence, the people of Pakistan began to think differently which was later translated into Zarb-e-Azb. This operation had the support of every Pakistani, and as said earlier, that once there is an across the board consensus on a military initiative there can only be one thing upheld which is 'success'. Having said that, in the last eight to ten months we have tried to mop up the success achieved by the military side. Military operations cannot themselves bring any administrative or political solutions. Hence for the first time in Pakistan's history we had a political programme. The National Action Plan. It is the result of this plan that there has been a reversal in the terrorism graph of Pakistan. From over 2000 plus terrorist incidents per year prior to year 2013, finally in the year 2016 they have come down to 764, out of which over 400 were the ones where there was no loss of life. This indeed is a sharp decline.

Hence, now we need to build on this success for which the support of the international community is critical. If nothing else there should be an understanding of Pakistan's position on this issue. There cannot be no regional peace unless and until there is national consensus on the issue. But

everything flows from the local quagmire, if there is no peace locally the region will be in turmoil. If a region is faced with instability it will have an impact on the global peace and development. That is something we all need to understand. But we also need to understand that no foreign solution can be imposed. Terrorism, insurgency or violence has to be handled by the country itself, it just needs support. But it is also very important to create an environment which facilitates this fight against terrorism and insurgency. I mentioned in front of President Obama as well that for internal consensus to develop against terrorism it is important to get out of concept of Islamic phobia. It is not a rocket science; just go in the figure of terrorist incidents. The biggest victims are Muslims and Muslim countries. Who would have a higher stake than Muslims themselves. We feel that the militants are using the name of Islam, over billion Muslims as a community of the world. I feel humiliated where the most peaceful religion of the world is related to terrorism. Our religion views disfavor to even speaking loudly. God repeatedly mentions in the Quran that somebody who inflicts harm you have the right to inflict the same harm, but also mentions that if you forgive you are better off. The Prophet (S.A.W.), at the time of battle of Makkah announced peace and security for all non-Muslims. What better place than Madina where the Prophet (S) would dispense justice even against Muslims in favor of a non-Muslim.

Islam is not about militancy. It is ordained in Islam to change a non-Muslim's religion. This message needs to go across. As a lot of our foreign friends refuse to listen they listen to few distorted individuals. UK understands us better we have a common history, it has the capacity to listen which is better than our other foreign friends. That will not stop us from

saying what is right, it is up to you to absorb. The UK has a role to play, it can act as a bridge between East and West.

The world powers will have to get over the policy of ignoring longstanding regional issues and only stopping when it serves strategic and political interests. Unless it is resolved, you will provide these criminals breathing grounds for distorted agendas. We must work together and learn from each other experience. Pakistan has learnt that conflict and post- conflict cannot be handled just through operations so we evolved a national consensus. Civil military relations have been evolved. If you allow to say that the success of the 3 half years were a great deal of civil military relations. We have also learnt that we should ignore weaknesses and work on success.

I would like to thank the NDU for inviting me at such a well-organized forum. Now we need to carry forward the deliberations and discussions and analysis over the last two days. I was going through the papers and agenda items which are very comprehensive. I think this should be reduced to writing, may be in a book form and we should carry these deliberations forward, we should not move from one seminar to another. We need to share at the administrative, military and political level, what important discussions have been taken place. Our administrative and governmental organs must gain from this input and carry this process forward in to the next seminar. The next seminar should look at what was analyzed in this seminar and for the next one year what has been transpired. How much has it been used by Governmental and Non-Governmental organizations and for the betterment of the future. But over and above that we need to understand that there is no quick solution to these issues. It has to be

handled brick by brick. There is no military solution by itself and there is no civilian solution by itself. That effort has to be monitored and supported by the international community. Here UK has a very important role to play.

There is a need to differentiate between independent political movements with this war. When we talk about stability and security and about counter-terrorism and counter insurgency that must not include personal and political agendas of Governments or Countries. Let's move forward and continue to work and

criticize .it is not short term. We must have patience through collaboration internally and internationally. What we want is peace, stability and security for mankind. What the other side wants, which is not Islam, is killing, burning and instability and bring horrendous cruelty in the region and beyond. I think our cause is just and our objective is right. God willing we will be successful. May God be with us, particularly with the Armed Forces and Security Forces who have been in this sacred war for making Pakistan safe again.



Vote of Thanks by President NDU

We have just finished with a thorough and intense exercise that enabled us to deliberate on some of the most crucial issues of peace building in conflict ridden areas by devising strategies in a collaborative environment. It is always difficult to conduct an event such as this in continuation. As the first sets a pattern and scales which need to be matched with accordingly. However, the fact that Pakistan and UK sides have successfully managed to share their experiences as a continuation of the series of Pak- UK COIN conference by achieving higher standards is indeed commendable. This seminar covered some of the most important aspects of experience sharing, not only in the military domain but also in the political and social domains. It was heartening to note that the speakers with their wide ranged experiences delivered talks that enabled the participants to brainstorm on the key issues that come underway of the goal of peace building in an environment that is prone to hostility. This era may be marked by some of the most intricate hostilities. States continuously face the repercussions of conflicts that are both internal and external-driven. While the notions of geo-strategy and geo-politics aggravate the complexities of internal socio-political compulsions. In this regard, States that are involved in sub-conventional warfare find it more crucial than ever to minimize the worsening of conflict and also to launch stabilization efforts in the process. In this light, this seminar was designed to rather focus on the peace building efforts in the conflict zone by sharing experiences between Pakistan and UK that have been involved in stabilization efforts in close proximity to each other.



I strongly believe that this platform has provided us an opportunity to share our thoughts and experiences that may serve as a vital input for any policy-relevant decision making in the contemporary environment. Not only this, it was very encouraging to see that whether or not we adopt some approaches to achieve our cherished dreams, we all do share commonalties of interest in many ways and dimensions. We all envisage same ideals for our people and want, with all the sincerity of our hearts, to do the best for our people and for the world in general. Similarly, throughout the course of discussions, we have also learnt that a lot of good work is already being done at the government level between Pakistan and UK and there is no dearth of indigenous, innovative and inclusive solutions to the challenges as far as the region is concerned.

The culmination of this seminar, in fact promises the beginning of a journey between UK and Pakistan of experience sharing in peace building efforts within their own setting. The impressions of successes achieved in the endeavor will be reflected in a joint publication and also set the stage for a subsequent conference in the UK next year.

A job well done indeed!



PICTURES











International Seminar



Pak - UK COIN International Seminar











2nd Pak - UK COIN International Seminar

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